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SUMMARY
Very little is known about the development of the 
non-Labour parties in Australia. Furthermore, the emergence 
of parties has seldom been the subject of theoretical 
examination. In this thesis I suggest that the early stages 
of development of any party can be studied by examining its 
use of political resources, such as organization and ideology, 
and its development of a collective identity.
Between 1894 and 1912 the non-Labor parties in New 
South Wales and Tasmania gradually increased their activities 
and became recognizable as distinct collective bodies. In 
Parliament they devised methods of maintaining unity which 
were informal but which were as effective as the procedures 
of the Labor party. In the electorate the non-Labor parties 
began to co-ordinate campaigns and to develop a coherent 
policy and a well articulated organization. They deliberately 
used procedures which turned existing political influences 
to their own advantage. In both spheres of activity, the 
non-Labor parties had to act within constraints created by 
the existing political attitudes of the non-Labor members.
In both states the non-Labor parties developed along similar 
lines because, despite the economic and geographical 
differences, the political resources available to them were 
generally the same.
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Chapter 1
Political Theory and the Emergence of 
Political Parties
Introduction
Although mass political parties in western democracies 
have generally emerged within the last century, most of them 
were in fact formed by 1920. After this date the parties and 
party systems 'froze'.'*' Many party systems and in many cases 
even the party organizations have not changed since then des­
pite advances in communications and technology, changes in 
class structure and new political problems. Changes of align­
ment within the party structure may have occurred, the role 
of ideology may have decreased and political methods may have 
become more sophisticated, but basically, if changes of names 
are allowed for, most of the parties of to-day are the same 
parties which developed their original structure around the 
turn of the century. The Australian parties are no exception; 
the two main parties date back to the nineteenth century and 
have had continuous parliamentary representation, while only 
two other new parties, both narrowly-based, have been formed 
since then. Yet we know little about the history of the inter­
nal procedures and organization of the parties and what we do 
know is concerned mainly with the extra parliamentary organi­
zation and not with the behaviour and organization of the party 
in parliament.* 2
Political scientists have studied the circumstances in 
which parties developed rather than the actual process of de­
velopment. They have drawn conclusions about the effect of 
political situations, legislative duties, electoral systems 
and other factors on the shape of parties and they have ex­
plained their emergence as a response to these external var­
iables. Systems theorists at a more general level have de­
scribed parties as organizations which perform a variety of 
functions for society as a whole. These functions include the
1. The idea of 'freezing of political systems' is introduced
by S.M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, "Party Systems and Voter 
Alignments; Cross National Perspectives. New York, 1967
p . 5 0 .
2. For a review of the literature on Australian parties, see
below chapter 2.
2aggregation, articulation and communication of social demands.
In almost every case the analysts assume that a party fulfils 
roles to benefit some other group in society and examine a par­
ty in relation to the state, society or some other external 
body . ^
A few examples of the views of political scientists will 
illustrate how the development of parties has been interpreted 
purely in terms of response to outside pressures. La Palombara 
and Weiner concluded that three types of theory have been deve­
loped to explain the emergence of political parties - institu­
tional theories, historical-situation theories and developmental
2 3 4modernization theories. McKenzie and Duverger both argued 
that modern parties were a direct result of the extension of 
the suffrage; Lipset and Rokkan devised a model to explain par­
ties and party systems in terms of political cleavages within
5 6a state. A few writers, notably McKenzie and Ostrogorski,
considered the distribution of power within parties and inci­
dentally traced the growth of party organization, but the de­
velopment of party still remains largely unconsidered. We 
know the effects of a party's interaction with society, but 
not how a party developed its organization so that it could 
have those effects.
Lipset and Rokkan were aware of this and pointed out that
'we know much less about the internal management and
organizational functioning of political parties than
1. See, for instance, G.A. Almond and J.S. Coleman (ed s . )The
Politics of Developing Areas, Princeton, 1960, p.38-52.
For a summary of the functions which a party is assumed 
to play in relation to other sections of society, see 
R.C. Macridis (ed.) , Political Parties: Contemporary Trends
and Ideas, New York, ±967, p. 14, 17.
2. J. La Palombara and M. Weiner (eds.) , Political Parties and
Political Development, Princeton. 1966, p.7.
3. R.T. McKenzie, British Political Parties; The Distribution
of Power within the Conservative and Labour Parties. 2nd 
Ed. London, 1963. p.7.
4. M.Duverger, Political Parties, London 1965, p.XXIII.
5. Lipset and Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments,
p. 39-50
6. M. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political
Parties , 2 vols. , London, 1902 .
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we do about their sociocultural base and their 
external history of participation in public de­
cision-making' . 1
While this comment is probably generally applicable to parties 
at all periods of time, it is particularly true of the period 
in which parties emerged. A brief examination of some general 
comparative theories of political parties is necessary to show 
how little attention has been given to this phase of party de­
velopment and to the special theoretical questions which are 
raised by the study of their early growth.
2Duverger , the most eminent of stasiologists, argued that 
in western democracies there were two types of party, the cadre 
and the mass, and briefly sketched the early development of 
both in a theoretical and abstract, rather than in a historical 
sense. He claimed, for instance, that the cadre parties were 
generally founded by parliamentary representatives who wanted 
to secure their own re-election and formed electoral committees 
for this purpose. These committees were gradually extended 
to influence those electorates which had not yet been won by 
members of the parliamentary group. At first the connections 
between the electoral committees were indirect and existed 
only because their representatives co-operated in parliament. 
When these links between electoral committees became direct 
and formal, and when they no longer relied on particular indi­
viduals, then a party could be said to have been born. Duver­
ger also suggested that cadre parties only widened their mem­
bership as a reaction to the formation of mass-based parties 
and that therefore their development was caused by 'contagion
3from the left' . Duverger included no details about the early 
development of parties but merely suggested the methods by 
which parties were formed. His work was more concerned with 
modern party systems. Lipset and Rokkan suggested, but did 
not pursue, a strategy for understanding the early development 
of parties. They claimed that information was needed about 
the 'timing of the formation of local party organization' and 
that this area of research would be the key to an analysis of
1. Lipset and Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments, p.51.
2. He suggested the word 'stasiology' as an apt title for the
science of political parties, Political Parties, p. 422.
3. Duverger, Political Parties, p. XXIV-XXX.
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the growth of parties because local activists were the back­
bone of party organization and local representation would 'open 
up much more direct access to power resources than representa­
tion at the national level'. ^  Neumann admitted the growing 
complexity of parties and argued that some of them developed 
from parties of personages to parties of individual representa­
tion, but he was not concerned with how the parties were orig- 
2inally formed. Epstein explained the growth of cohesion in
the parliamentary parties and described the circumstances
which caused parties to emerge, but he did not consider how
3their internal organization developed. Engelmann and Schwartz 
admitted in their classificatory scheme that many of the main 
determinants of a party's structure depended on how it was 
originally formed and suggested that all parties of parliamen­
tary origin have a wide base of support, a cadre organization, 
governmental experience and an orientation towards electoral
success. They did not explain how a party with a parliament-
4ary origin developed these characteristics.
Generally there is no theoretical approach to guide anal­
ysis of the development of the internal structure of the early 
parties and this is an important gap in the theory of party.
In other fields the importance of the theory of collective
action and organization has been recognized, even if little or
5no agreement among the theories exists. For political part­
ies there are no explanations of the development of collective 
action, with the exception of general Marxist theories of 
class representation. Even these do not consider the compara­
tive and analytic details which should be taken into account 
in any theory.
1. Lipset and Rokkan. Party Systems and Voter Alignments, p,53.
2. S. Neumann, "Towards a Comparative Study of Political
Parties' in H. Eckstein and D.E. Apter, (eds.) , Compara­
tive Politics; A Reader, New York, 1965, p.362.
3. L . D . Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies,
London, 1967, p.19-45, 318-22.
4. F.C. Engelmann and M.A. Schwartz. Political Parties and the
Canadian Social Structure. Toronto, 1967, p.2-3
5. See, for instance, M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Econ­
omic Organization, London, 1947, for one view and M.Olson, 
Jnr . ,The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, Mass.,
1965, for an example of theoretical work on the same 
subject.
5Why does this large lacuna in political theory and empir­
ical study exist? There are basically three reasons. In the 
first place, modern political scientists are concerned with 
parties in the modern community and their effects on present- 
day politics. Comments on the original development of politi­
cal parties are usually introductory and are placed in the 
general context of national development. The emerging parties 
themselves have never been examined in a theoretical manner, 
except in connection with the politics of underdeveloped coun­
tries. Secondly, most studies of early party organization 
have been written by historians and dealt with single parties 
or particular countries; these works were neither comparative 
nor theoretical.'*' Thirdly, and perhaps most important, writers 
have usually concentrated on the aims, official structures and 
external relations of the party and have been less concerned 
with their internal activities. They have studied the inter­
action between the party and society but not the actions or 
the methods of the party itself. The necessity to concentrate 
on the activities of a party, rather than on its aims, has been 
suggested by J.A. Schlesinger. He assumed that politicians 
were motivated by ambition for office and claimed that with this 
assumption a political scientist could avoid asking why a poli­
tician wanted office and could concentrate on what he had to do
2in order to gain it. His emphasis is on the 'how' rather than 
on the 'why' of politics. While his acceptance of ambition for 
office as a sole motive is an over-simplification when applied 
to parties rather than to individuals, the strategy of concen­
trating on activities rather than aims, on the internal beha­
viour rather than the external relations of a party is sound, 
provided that the various aspects of a party's activities are 
still considered in conjunction with one another.
Existing theories of political parties are inadequate to 
provide a frame-work for this thesis for three reasons. In the
1. Such as E.J. Feuchtwanger, Disraeli, Democracy and the
Tory Party , Oxford, 1963. J.A. Vincent, The Formation 
of the Liberal Party, 1857-1860, London, 1966.
2. J.A. Schlesinger, 'Political Careers and Party Leadership'
in L . J . Edinger (ed.), Political Leadership in Industria­
lised Societies, New York, 1967, p. 266.
6first place functionalist approaches draw attention away from 
the internal affairs and activities of a party, concentrate on 
its relations with external groups or structures and presume 
that the party system is settled and that there is a well- 
established system of relations between a party and the state 
or social institutions. In the early stage of development 
of parties, the relations between the party and society were 
not settled and therefore a party should be examined first in 
terms of its own affairs and not in terms of the functions it 
performs in relation to other parts of the political system. 
Secondly, it is not easy to examine a political party at an 
early stage of development in terms of prescribed activities 
because, when its organization was not formally settled and 
was in a state of rapid change, assumptions which depend on 
the formal, official or regular activities of a party are often 
inappropriate or inaccurate. Thirdly, many modern theories of 
parties which suggest methods of enquiry into their internal 
procedures, such as that adopted by Eldersveld /  cannot be em­
ployed once party origins have slipped into history and are 
beyond the reach of surveys, questionaires and other modern 
methods of investigation. I propose instead to adopt a theo­
retical framework which avoids these shortcomings and which 
is appropriate to historical investigation.
A Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Emerging Parties
If a party of any kind, whether parliamentary of extra- 
parliamentary, radical or conservative, cadre or mass, class 
or interest based, is operating in a democratic framework and 
aiming to win power through parliamentary and electoral insti­
tutions, it must attract, influence and, if possible, control 
the votes of individuals. In parliament these votes are cast 
by members, in the electorate by enfranchised citizens.
In a western democracy the processes of government and of 
elections are carried out within a framework which is deter­
mined by law and precedents. In an election the method of vot­
ing, the date of the poll, the siting of polling booths and
1. S.J. Eldersveld, Political Parties; A Behavioural
Analysis , Chicago, 1964 , is an example of a study of 
the internal procedures of a party organization based 
on survey data.
7
the franchise - indeed all the mechanics of the electoral 
process - are, at least theoretically, beyond the control of 
any organization which is competing in the election. The rules 
of procedure allow individual citizens to place themselves be­
fore the electors as candidates, to express their views and 
to await the final decision of the voters. In theory any 
electoral organization is unnecessary because the framework 
within which the election is held is predetermined by a dis­
interested body. In parliament the rules of procedures and of 
debate follow established precedents and any man who receives 
the support of a majority of M.P.s can form a ministry. In 
both the electorate and in parliament the political system 
could, and indeed at times did, operate without any other 
formal organization.
But in practice there are advantages for an individual 
member or political leader and for groups of members in being 
able to attract and control the votes of individuals. If 
a party wants to gain power and effect political decisions, 
it must be able to influence or control votes both in parlia­
ment and in the electorate. The lacuna in the theory of 
party already mentioned is the failure of any writer to pro­
duce a theory to explain how the internal activities or struc­
ture of a party of any type were designed to meet this need 
and how the shape of the party was moulded by its interaction 
with, rather than purely its response to, the environment.
Some histories of early party development at least implicitly 
adopt theories which may be applicable to the case under study, 
but no theory has been produced which is sufficiently general 
to be used for a variety of parties of different types and in 
different contexts.
The relationship between a developing party and its en­
vironment must be seen to be dynamic and two-way. If a party 
is to succeed in influencing votes, it must react to the 
existing pressures and demands of the environment; in its at- 
temps to manipulate, mould and use these pressures to its own 
advantage, a party is restricted by the limitations placed upon 
it by the institutions of the state. Within these constraints, 
a party must develop sources of power, political resources 
which are applicable to and effective in its environment. The 
study of the emergence of parties is then a study of the way
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in which they develop or obtain these resources and discover 
their uses and limitations. It is the study of how an 
individual politician or a party as a unit attracts and 
controls votes and of how the use of political resources 
gradually changes over a period of time.
Most theories of party concentrate on one aspect of party 
development to the comparative exclusion of other factors. A 
class interpretation of party requires that a certain stage of 
economic development has been reached before parties can 
develop on the basis of horizontal social divisions. An 
'interest group' interpretation, which sees a party fulfilling 
an aggregative or brokerage role, is primarily concerned with 
the relations of a party with external pressure groups and sees 
its internal organization as a reaction to these external 
pressures. These methods of typing or classifying parties 
all tend to focus attention on only one part of a party's 
activities, supposedly the essential part, to the comparative 
neglect of the remainder which are considered merely mechanical. 
A theoretical framework ought to analyse all parts of a party's 
behaviour in a balanced way. A consideration of parties in 
the light of their use of political resources should permit 
such an analysis.
The procedure of assessing the power or influence of 
political bodies by reference to their use of resources has 
been summarised by R.C. Fried. He defined a political 
resource as -
A source of power [which] consists of any means of
inducing compliance, support, neutrality or non­
participation by other political actors. 1
Fried only considered modern political parties with this
conceptual approach but his method, even if not his details,
can be adapted to the examination of parties in their formative
stage. In particular, the use of organization, office,
ideology, manpower, finance, leadership, information and
legitimacy as political resources are relevant to a study of
developing parties. In this thesis, I will use 'ideology'
in the loose sense of general political slogans such as
1. R.C. Fried Comparative Political Institutions, New,York,
1966, p.2. The resources which Fried uses are infor­
mation, expertise, social power, popularity, legitimacy, 
leadership skills, organization, violence, rules, 
economic power, manpower and office.
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freetrade or social amelioration and not as a reference 
to a coherent fundamental political creed,
A party can use any of these political resources as a 
means of attracting and controlling support and of expanding 
its influence, but no one resource is likely to be of such 
importance in different institutions or environments that a 
party can rely on it and ignore the others. To examine party 
development purely in terms of, say, ideology would be both 
inaccurate and a distortion. A consideration of a party's 
use of several resources and of its changing methods can show 
how it improved its effectiveness simultaneously in different 
areas and learnt to manage the political environment to its 
own advantage.
Of course, any party's use of resources is constrained 
not only by the institutional limits of what the constitution 
and law permits but also by the receptiveness of the environ­
ment. A political resource is useful as long as it is 
effective. Furthermore, each resource which a party uses must 
also impose restraints on its actions. If a party is to 
remain consistent, other options are closed off. For example, 
once an anti-socialist party has used anti-socia1ist ideology 
to attract votes, it can not desert its anti-socialist stance, 
advocate the nationalisation of industry and expect to keep 
its votes. If a party gains support because its constitution 
permits branch participation in the selection of candidates, 
the party leaders cannot ignore locally selected candidates 
without provoking internal conflict and losing those supporters. 
In other words, resources are not only a means of gaining 
influence; they also impose restraints on a party's actions.
A party must learn which resources gain the most effective 
response from the environment and then accept the constraints 
imposed by those resources in exchange for their advantages.
For instance, some parties wanted to attract the support of 
M.P.s who did not accept the idea of rigid discipline. They 
had to devise methods which could achieve the required 
discipline without appearing to restrict the freedom of action 
of those M.P.s. The shape and activities of a party were 
therefore moulded by its use of resources.
One distinct sign of the development of a party is the 
growth of a collective identity. A party gradually ceases to
10
be a collection of co-operating individuals and gains a corpor­
ate existence» In the early stages of party development it is 
usually a mistake to say that a 'party' carried out some action 
since the 'party' did not have any process of consultation with 
which to discover its collective will. In these cases the word 
'party* is often used as a short-hand term to denote the party 
leaders, the party supporters or some other such group and there­
fore is in fact inaccurate, although stylistically useful. 
Gradually a party develops a collective identity which replaces 
the earlier alliance of individuals or groups and this iden­
tity gives reality to the metaphor because then a decision or 
action can be said to be that of the party as a whole.
This collective identity and corporate existence grows 
as a party's use of resources becomes more sophisticated and 
co-ordinated„ It can be best seen in the development of 
party offices and rules. For instance, although in the early 
stages the influence of a leader is due to his own abilities 
and only partly to his party position, gradually the position 
itself g a m s  acceptance and recognition and gives additiona 1 
power to the leader in his capacity as a party official. The 
introduction of rules to regulate pre-selection ballots simil­
arly indicates that a party now has a prescribed way of carry­
ing out its business and using political resources.
Two themes therefore underlie this theoretical approach 
to emerging parties and must be considered simultaneously. 
Firstly, a party used resources to advance and increase its 
influence and this manipulation of the environment gradually 
became more sophisticated. The use of resources and the 
resulting constraints were largely responsible for the shape 
and methods of the party. Secondly, a party developed a cor­
porate and collective identity. These themes facilitate a 
comparative study of developing parties because they are con­
cerned with how the internal procedures and structure of a 
party developed in relation to its environment as a whole and 
not as a response to certain parts of it and because all par­
ties develop some internal procedures and methods to increase 
their influence.
At this point a political party must be defined in order 
to anticipate semantic quibbles about what a party might be and
11
therefore whether the organizations discussed later in the 
thesis are parties. For the purpose of this thesis, I have 
defined a political party as any group, however loosely or­
ganized, which seeks to elect representatives to parliament 
under a given label, with the purpose of obtaining political 
power.  ^ By 'label', I mean any distinct name which does not 
merely signify allegiance to an individual; therefore the 
followers of a faction leader do not constitute a party. By 
'controlling political power' I mean that a party under its 
own name seeks to influence ministerial decisions; I do not 
include the supporters of particular movements who belong to 
different parties and who unite only on that issue. I have 
deliberately avoided any reference to ideology or structure 
and have concentrated on what a party must do, that is, elect 
representatives under a given label and affect political 
decisions. I will therefore use the term 'party' to refer 
to both well-established organizations with a strong and 
elaborate formal structure and the fluid informal groups of 
men who gradually developed the institutional characteristics 
we now expect a party to have.
In this thesis, I will use the theoretical framework 
suggested in this chapter to explain the development of the 
non-Labor parties in Australia. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, very little is known about the emergence of these 
parties and an examination of them in the light of the 
theoretical framework can both test the value of the theory 
and add to our knowledge of Australian history.
1. This definition is derived from Epstein, Political Par­
ties in Western Democracies, p. 9 and S. Henig and J. 
Pinder, (eds.) European Political Parties , London, 
1969 , p . 12 .
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Chapter 2
A Review of the Literature on the Emergence of the 
Australian Non-Labor Parties
In troduc tion
Very little has been written on the development of 
parties in Australia and most of what does exist is on the 
Labor party/ It is assumed that the non-Labor parties 
were formed as a response to the competition of Labor and 
that they were forced to adopt similar organizational methods. 
The political historians who have discussed the years between 
1891, when the first Labor party appeared in parliament, and 
1910, when Labor ministries were formed with supporting major­
ities in the Commonwealth and New South Wales parliaments, 
have been concerned primarily with tracing the growth of that 
party. Yet during these years not only did the non-Labor par­
ties maintain themselves in office but they also laid the 
foundations of the type of organization which they now have.
Before 1910 the Labor party had only formed three short-
3lived minority governments. In New South Wales it remained 
the third and smallest party until 1904; in Queensland it 
became the recognised opposition party in 1898, but in the 
Commonwealth and Tasmania it did not gain this position until
1. The official spelling of the party was not generally
adopted till after 1912. Nevertheless in this thesis 
I will use the modern spelling of the party name and 
will also spell the name of the opponents in a similar 
fashion, i.e. as non-Labor, not as non-Labour.
2. For a discussion of the initiative-resistance theme, see
H. Mayer, 'Some conceptions of the Australian Party 
System’ , in M. Beever and F.B. Smith (eds.) His tori cal 
Studies; Selected Articles, Melbourne, 1967, pp.217-40; 
D.W. Rawson, 'Another Look at "Initiative and Resistance"', 
Politics , Vol.3,No.l, May 1968 , p p . 41-54; M. Goot,
'Parties of Initiative and Resistance: A Reply' , Politics , 
Vol.4, No. 1, May 1969, p p .84-99; H. Mayer and D.W. Rawson, 
'Initiative and Resistance' , Politics , Vol.4, No. 2,
Nov. 1969, pp.212-216.
3. Queensland in 1899, the Commonwealth in 1904 and Tasmania
in 1909. These ministries lasted respectively one week, 
four months and one week. These and the following out­
line details were taken from C.A. Hughes and B.D. Graham,
A Handbook of Australian Government and Politics, Can­
berra , 1968.
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1909 or in Victoria until 1911. Twice the party entered 
coalition ministries with Liberal members and one of these 
resulted in a party split.'*' Its success as an office-seeking 
body was decidedly limited.
During this period the non-Labor parties provided stable
government in parliament and won elections without adopting
Labor's methods. In New South Wales there were only three
2ministries between 1894 and 1910; in Queensland the 'Con­
tinuous' ministry lasted from 1891 to 1903 under six differ­
ent leaders, with the exception of a one-week break in 1899; 
in Victoria the Reform ministry of 1903 lasted under various 
leaders until 1913. In elections the non-Labor parties 
regularly won sufficient seats to return a safe majority; 
their methods were based at first on personal contacts rather 
than on formal organization. The Labor party had to compete 
with established methods when it entered politics and the 
Labor and non-Labor parties gradually each developed differ­
ent political techniques which suited their attitudes, ideol­
ogies and approaches to politics. Nevertheless, there is a 
scarcity of information about the development of the non- 
Labor parties which prevents a clear understanding of the 
politics of the period because we do not know how the govern­
ment parties maintained their existence, on what assumptions 
their organization was based and whether they reacted to the
methods of the Labor Party. To illustrate this lack of de-
3tailed knowledge of the non-Labor parties, the existing 
literature must be examined to discover what little we do 
know about their development and methods.
*■ • Queensland, 1903-7 and South Australia 1905-9. The 
Queensland party split.
2. I count the ministries headed by Lyne, See and Waddell
or by Carruthers and Wade as single ministries because 
the changes were of personnel, not party. A similar 
approach is taken to the other states.
3. In this thesis, I am not including the Country Party
in any discussion of non-Labor parties. The Country 
party had not been formed at the time when this analy­
sis ends and its early years are, by comparison with 
the other non-Labor parties, well documented.
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Five general areas of research have produced some evi­
dence about the development of the non-Labor parties, but it 
must be emphasised that most of these writers regarded party 
organization as a topic which was incidental to their main 
subject or purposes. These areas are:
(1) Descriptions of the pre-party period which mention 
the early development of parties or describe events 
in which the first signs of party were appearing.1
(2) Histories of the Labor party in which comment^ on
some aspects of the organization or methods of the
non-Labor parties can be derived from descriptions
of the Labor party, even though the non-Labor par-
2ties are never directly analysed.
1. P. Loveday and A W . Martin, Parliament, Factions and Par­
ties; The First Thirty Years of Responsible Government in 
New South Wales, 1856-1889. Melbourne, 1966; J. Rydon and 
R.N „ Spann, New South Wales Politics, 1901-10, Sydney stud­
ies in Politics 2 , Melbourne 1962; B. Mansfield 'Party 
Organization in the New South Wales Elections of February 
1889', J o R A  o H „ S . Vo 1 . 41, Part 2 , 1955; B. Atkins, 'Ante­
cedents of the N.S.W. Protection Party, 1881-1889; the
Protection and Political Reform League' , J .R .A .H .S . Vol.
44 Part 2, 1958; A.W. Martin, "Free Trade and Protection­
ist Parties in New South Wales; , Historical Studies, Vol.
6, N o 0 23, November 1954; A.W. Martin, 'Political Develop­
ments in New South Wales, 1894-6' , M.A. Thesis, University 
of Sydney, 1953j S.M. Ingham, PoliticalParties in the Vic­
torian Legislative Assembly, 1880-1900' in Historical Stud­
ies, Selected Articles; N.B. Nairn, The Political Mastery 
of Sir Henry Parkes; New South Wales Politics, 1871-1891' , 
J.R.A.H.S. Vol. 53 Part 1, 1967; J.A. Ryan 'Faction Poli­
tics: A Problem of Historical Interpretation', Australlan
Economic History Review, Vol.8 No. 1, 1968; P. Loveday and
A.W. Martin, 'The Politics of New South Wales, 1856-1889:
A Reply' , Historical Studies, Vol.13, No. 50 , 1968; N.B.
Nairn, 'The Politics of New South Wales; A Note on a Reply', 
Historical Studies , Vol. 13 No. 52, 1969 ; J. Kiernan, "Par­
ty and Politics in Victoria, 1901-1909' , Historical Journal, 
University of New South Wales, No. 1, August 1968; B.
Dickey (ed.) , Politics in New South Wales, 1856-1900 , Mel­
bourne , 1969.
2. W.G. Spence, Australia's Awakening, Sydney 1909; G. Black,
The Labor Party in New South Wales; A History from its 
Formation in 1891 to 1904, Sydney n.d.; R. Gollan, Radical 
and Working Class Politics; A Study of Eastern Australia, 
1850-1910 , Melbourne 1960; B. Fitzpatrick, A Short. History 
of the Australian Labor Party , Melbourne 1944; V. Childe,
How Labor Governs, London 1923; D.J. Murphy, R.B. Joyce,
C o A „ Hughes (eds.) , Prelude to Power, The Rise of the Labor 
Party in Queensland, 1885-1915 , Brisbane, 1970.
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(3) Early histories and studies of Australia or works of 
comparative government which are general in out­
look»1
(4) Monographs which mention the state of party organ­
ization as a topic incidental to their main subject.
2This group includes biographies, political remini- 
3scences and the descriptions of the behaviour of
4interest or pressure groups.
1. A.Brady, Democracy in the Dominions, Toronto 1947; J. Bryce,
Modern Democracies, London 1921; C.M.H. Clark (ed.), Se­
lect Documents in Australian History, Vol.2, Sydney 1955;
C .A . Bernays, Queensland Politics during Sixty Years, 
1859-1919, Brisbane 1919; H.G. Turner, A History of the 
Colony of Victoria, 2 Vols . , London 1904 ; W.K. Hancock, 
Australia , London 1945. G. Greenwood (ed.) , Australia;
A Social and Political History, Sydney 1955.
2. J .A . La Nauze, Alfred Deakin , 2 vols., Melbourne 1965, J.
Reynolds, Edmund Barton, Sydney 1948; B. Mansfield, Aus­
tralian Democrat: The Career of Edward O'Sullivan 1846- 
1910, Sydney 1965; J.A. Ryan 'B.R. Wise: An Oxford Liber­
al in Free Trade Party' , M.A. Thesis, University of Sydney 
1966 ; F. Green (ed.), A Century of Responsible Government , 
Hobart 1957 ; L.F. Fitzhardinge , William Morris Hughes:
A Political Biography, Vol.l, That Fiery Particle, 1862- 
1914, Sydney 1964 ; H.V. Evatt , Australian Labor Leader:
The Story of W . A,. Holman and the Labor Movement, Sydney 
1940; D „A „ Denholm, 'Edward Nicolas Coventry Braddon, 1829
-1904: His Contribution to Tasmanian Politics, 1879-1899' ,
B . A . Hons. Thesis, University of Tasmania, 1963 .
3. G .H . Reid, My Reminiscences, London 1917; E.H. Collis, Lost
Years , Sydney 1948; A . B . Piddington, Worshipful Masters, 
Sydney 1929; B.R. Wise, The Making of the Australian Com­
monweal th , London 1913; W. Affleck, Reminiscences of Wil­
liam Af fleck , Sydney 1916; W.M. Hughes, Policies and Pot­
entates , Sydney 1950. W.M. Hughes, Crusts and Crusades, 
Sydney 1947.
4. W.A. Bayley, History of the Farmers and Settlers' Associat­
ion of New South Wales, Sydney 1957; U. Ellis, The Country 
Party , Sydney 1958; B.D. Graham, The Formation of the Aus­
tralian Country Parties, Canberra 1966; J.D. Bollen, 'The 
Temperance Movement and the Liberal Party in New South 
Wales Politics 1901-1904'. Journal of Religious History, 
Vol.l, No.3, June 1961; J.D. Bollen, 'The Protestant 
Churches and the Social Reform Movement in New South Wales, 
1890-1910' Ph.D., University of Sydney 1966; I. Campbell, 
'Groups, Parties and Federation' , in Groups in Theory and 
Practice, Sydney Studies in Politics I, Melbourne, 1962
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(5) Surveys of modern political scientists who briefly 
discuss the origins of the non-Labor parties as an 
introduction to their analysis of the modern party 
or political system.^
A Review of the Literature
The first signs of party development occurred between 
1887 and 1889 in New South Wales and have been documented by 
several historians, though interpretations of these events 
have varied considerably. Loveday and Martin have analysed 
the electoral campaign in 1887 and concluded that in that 
election there emerged
the first full-scale 'party organization in New 
South Wales; a structure based on a -f-ef icm 
of local bodies, allowing for group drviindividual 
membership3and directed by a central executive com­
prised of parliamentary and extra-parliamentary 
e1emen ts . 2
They have also suggested that in 1889 the Freetrade party 
effectively chose its leader, rather than being grouped a- 
round a dominant personality. In his article on the elec­
tion of 1889, Mansfield has supported their view that party 
methods, particularly pre-selection, were common and that 
therefore the Labor party was not the sole source of all 
innovations in electoral techniques. Both these studies 
were concerned with the process by which parties began to 
develop out of the faction system and with the first steps 
in the replacement of personal influence by party control. 
Neither of them has argued that parties had developed beyond 
a very rudimentary stage. Martin has also studied the poli­
tical situation in the 1894-5 parliament in New South Wales 
by examining the structure and sub-groups within the non-Labor 
parties of those years. He did not attempt to discuss how
1. L o F . Crisp, Australian National Government, 3rd e d . London
1962; J „D „ B 0 Miller, 'Party Discipline in Australia, I' , 
Political Science (N.Z.) Vol. 5 No.l, March 1953; J„D.B. 
Miller and B. Jinks, Australian Government and Politics, 
4th Ed„, London, 1971, J. Jupp, Australian Party Politics, 
2nd Ed., Melbourne 1968; L. Overacker, The Australian 
Party Sys tern, New Haven, 1952 .
2. Loveday and Martin, Parliament, Faction and Parties, p.136
the parties developed or to contrast them with earlier or 
later models,
Nairn has disagreed with many of the conclusions of 
Loveday, Martin and Mansfield about the early non-Labor 
parties. He has compared the embryonic non-Labor parties 
with the Labor party, using the stated aims, rather than 
the actual behaviour, of the Labor party of 1891 as a meas­
uring stick against which the non-Labor parties were judged.1 
He has also assumed that the structure and methods of the 
Labor party provide the definition of a political party and 
the argument between him and those he criticised was incon­
clusive partly because the latter did not share his view of 
what a party should be. Nairn was unrealistic in expecting 
non-Labor politicians to develop, or even to want, an organ­
izational structure based on the precedents set by Labor, 
since that example included several procedures that were 
alien to their political habits. The view that M.P.s should 
be delegates, rather than representatives, or that they 
should be formally restricted in their freedom to vote, was 
unacceptable to men whose careers often stretched back to 
1the period of faction politics. The organization which the 
non-Labor parties were to develop had of necessity to differ 
considerably from the Labor model which relied heavily for 
precedents on its trade-union background. Loveday, Martin 
and Nairn have agreed that new political methods were re­
quired because the faction system was unable to cope with 
the growing number of electors and the diversifying economy, 
but Nairn was wrong in claiming that, if new methods were 
to be effective, they had to be those which the Labor party 
adopted. The organizations involved in the elections of 
1887 and 1889 foreshadowed the lines along which the non- 
Labor parties did later develop.
What is most significant in these works for a study of 
the emergence of parties is that the non-Labor parties had 
already developed some party organization before the Labor 
party created a new political style. It was these early 
precedents that they developed in later years.
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1 . Nairn, The Political Mastery of Sir Henry Parkes, p.40-41.
Rydon and Spann have narrated the political events in 
New South Wales between 1900 and 1910 without analysing in 
detail their significance. Kiernan has discussed the problem 
of whether parties existed in Victoria between 1900 and 1910. 
However his criterion for a party - that it should have 'el­
ectoral organization such that a uniform policy is presented 
throughout the whole state' - was so restrictive that his 
conclusion that 'party was the exception, not the rule'^ may 
be more the product of his theoretical assumptions than
of actual events. Besides, he did not attempt to examine 
how any party actually acted.
It has often been suggested in descriptions of the Labor 
party that the older parties lacked the attributes of the 
Labor party and were largely irrelevant to the needs of the 
time. Details of the non-Labor methods are implied in com­
ments on what was new about Labor organization. Spence, 
for instance, has claimed that before Labor's appearance 
elections were fought on the unimportant sectarian issue, 
that Labor organization was the envy of the non-Labor par­
ties and that, while Labor had a specific programme of re-
2form, all other politicians were power-seeking opportunists. 
He has implied that the early non-Labor parties were no more 
than organized factions interested solely in office and not 
in the amelioration of the lot of the average working man. 
Gollan has written that
by the mid-nineties in New South Wales and Queens­
land, labour parties had emerged with a degree of 
organizational unity that no other political parties 
had. This^g^ve the party a tactical advantage which, 
particularly in New South Wales, gave it a strong 
influence on legislation. 3’
Here he has suggested that the other parties lacked the unity 
or cohesion both in the legislature and in the electorate to 
challenge the organization of Labor. He has admitted that
18
1. Kiernan, Party and Politics in Victoria, p. 31.
2. Spence, Australia's Awakening, p p . 143, 146, 147, 154,
191, 202, 216.
3. Gollan, Radical and Working Class Politics, pp. 175-6.
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the non-Labor parties already had some organization before 
1891 but has implied that they were relatively powerless, 
incoherent and ineffective compared with Labor. Fitzpatrick 
has interpreted the growth of the Labor party as a struggle 
for control over the means of production and has seen the 
non-Labor parties as representatives of the employer class, 
but he has not tried to discover what special characteris­
tics a party of the employer class might have or how these 
characteristics might have developed.
The non-Labor parties have received attention from 
Labor historians generally only as far as their incapacity, 
irrelevance and lack of organization could be contrasted 
with the organizational innovations, efficiency and social 
importance of the Labor party. They have not been analysed 
as organizations in their own right.
Most early histories of Australia or surveys of its 
government have provided little information about the early 
development of non-Labor parties, although generally they 
have paid considerable attention to the Labor party. Ber- 
nays and Turner did not mention any non-Labor organization 
or consider their political methods. Bryce and Brady have 
accepted the initiative-resistance theme and have argued 
that non-Labor parties were developed as a response to 
Labor. Hancock has popularised the term 'party of resist­
ance' and accepted the same thesis. One comment of Green­
wood was typical of these attitudes to party development.
He claimed
Labor's rigid cohesion was both distasteful 
and alarming to the other parties which were 
weak in organization and tactically flexible.
It also changed the whole character of poli­
tical activity by forcing the other parties 
into imitation since the formidable nature of 
the Labor machine could only be combated by 
similar if not identical methods. 1
In this passage Greenwood has clearly accepted the hypothesis 
that non-Labor organization was formed as a direct reaction
1. Greenwood, Australian: A Social and Political History,
p p . 200-1.
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to Labor's effective methods. In his select documents Clark 
has also ignored the growing non-Labor parties of the 1890's 
but included several excerpts on the Labor parties. Each of 
these writers was concerned with a broad view of Australian 
history and saw the Labor party as a significant part of that 
history while non-Labor organization was considered compar­
atively irrelevant. Details of its early development was 
therefore not included in their works.
Biographers of non-Labor politicians generally have not 
examined in detail the relation of their subjects to the 
party organization. Barton and Deakin would appear from 
their biographies to have had little interest in the party 
machinery, although this impression may have been produced „ 
by the lack of interest of the writers in such topics.
O ’Sullivan, on the other hand, had 'zest for party warfare' , 
in 1901 was the 'chief organizer of victory'  ^ and in 1904 
was chairman of the Ministerialist Election Committee. Yet, 
despite his subject's involvement in party affairs, Mans-
Afield has not discussed the problem of how political methods 
may have altered during his career, although he has men­
tioned briefly O'Sullivan's contradictory views on party 
action.^
The autobiographies and reminiscences of this period 
invariably have concentrated on personalities, political 
crises and important events, rather than the details of 
electoral manipulation and party discipline which were 
persistent problems and would scarcely have seemed worthy 
of discussion. We can learn almost nothing about party 
methods from these works.
Studies of pressure and interest groups are probably the mosl 
useful sources for learning about some aspects of party de­
velopment. The Country party historians have described in 
detail the base from which that party was later to grow, 
with particular emphasis on the early years of the Farmers 
and Settlers' Association and on the duties and problems of 
the country M.P. They have mentioned the existence of a
1. Mansfield, Australian Democrat, pp. 122, 169
2 . Mansfield, Australian Democrat, p.221-222
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'Country Party' in parliament within a major party around 
the turn of the century in New South Wales but have not 
examined the political situation which permitted an 'inter­
est' group to operate within another major party. While they 
illustrated the political methods of early country M.P.s, 
they did not analyse party organization.
Bollen has discussed the relation of the temperance 
groups to parties and included several instances in which 
these groups tried to infiltrate and use parties to secure 
their own objectives. He incidentally has thrown light on 
the party methods themselves, particularly as regards pre­
selection in the election of 1904 in New South Wales. Camp­
bell has put forward a developmental hypothesis with evi­
dence drawn from all states in which he described the growth 
of party in terms of its changing relations with pressure 
groups. His argument in brief is that at first parties were 
totally dependent on pressure groups, that they gradually 
became independent as they matured and that finally they 
were in a position to dictate terms to their supporting groups. 
His evidence was taken primarily from the decade, 1900-1910, 
when he considered that the non-Labor parties were only be­
ginning to gain their independence. Unfortunately his con­
clusions were based on such a wide variety of evidence drawn 
from different sources that he was never able to specify 
when any one party had reached any stage of his model of 
development and he did not test his hypothesis in relation 
to any particular party. Nevertheless his work did contain 
some useful information on party methods. One limitation of 
the work of both Bollen and Campbell for my present thesis 
is that, since their attention is focused on the activities 
of groups, they may have attributed to them an exaggerated 
influence on the affairs of the party. However they do pro­
vide the only detailed analysis which we have of early par­
ty behaviour.
Surveys of Australian government and of modern politi­
cal parties have often described the early development of 
parties, but because this topic was merely introductory and 
incidental to the main themes, the work has usually been
22
based on secondary sources and has sometimes been inaccurate.
Generally political scientists have accepted the initia­
tive-resistance theme as an explanation of the early develop­
ment of parties. Miller has written that in 1901
Political parties were diffuse and kaleidoscopic, 
formed around prominent individuals rather than 
dominant ideas, with the exception of the Labor 
party, 2
He has then attributed Labor solidarity to their trade
union heritage rather than to any coherent body of ideas.
Overacker's description of the pre-1910 non-Labor parties
was limited to a brief survey of the political situation
and she did not examine early party methods. However, she
has claimed that the non-Labor parties were forced to copy
3the organizational methods of the Labor party. Crisp has
agreed that the non-Labor parties were forced to organize
as a result of Labor's challenge but has seen the non-Labor
parties as more than merely forces of resistance. To him
the parties were the political instruments of the owners
and controllers of productive and commercial capital. The
non-Labor parties consequently had a distinct characteristic
of their own and were as responsible as Labor for dividing
4politics on class lines.
Jupp has given some credit to the non-Labor parties 
for early organization but has claimed that the local leagues 
lacked cohesion and therefore that Labor had a distinct ad­
vantage, He has admitted that machines had been developed 
by both parties before 1909 and argued that the main differ­
ence between the parties was that the non-Labor parties did
1. For instance, Jupp writes 'In Tasmania the already ex­
isting Tasmanian Progressive League, formed in 1904, 
was renamed the Tasmanian Liberal League in 1911. ' 
(Australian Party Politics, p.124). His source is 
probably Campbell, Groups, Parties and Federation, 
p.95 footnote 87. Unfortunately his statement is 
totally wrong; the Progressive League was founded in 
1907 and had nothing to do with the formation of the 
Liberal League, which was founded in 1909. Obviously 
these writers have to rely on secondary sources but 
this instance illustrates the paucity and inaccuracy 
of those sources.
2 „ Miller and Jinks, Australian Government and Politics , p . 3 8- 9.
3. Overacker, The Australian Party System, pp „ 197-208 , 313 .
i4. Crisp, Australian National Government, p.192, 201-2.
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not consider their parliamentarians as delegates. Behind 
his comments was the implicit assumption that the non-Labor 
parties would have benefited if they had used methods sim­
ilar to those of Labor. Like Nairn, Jupp has not shown that 
such methods were incompatible with the views of non-Labor 
voters and McP.s and that they could not have been used.
The non-Labor organization had to be tailored to suit the 
attitudes of its party members.
Quite apart from the general lack of research on the 
early non-Labor parties, two important gaps in the present 
literature clearly exist. First, there is no comprehensive 
or comparative study of emerging parties. Most works are 
either concerned with parties in only one state or primarily 
concentrate on New South Wales and Victoria, the largest 
and most influential states. Few of these are concerned 
with Queensland, almost none with Tasmania. Yet if a work 
purports to be a study of Australia, or even merely of 
Eastern Australia, these states should be included in a 
comprehensive coverage. Also there is not a comparative 
study of the emergence of parties even between New South 
Wales and Victoria, let alone the less important states.
This is the more surprising since the modern parties are 
basically federations of state parties. It either seems 
to be assumed, but not proved, that all parties of the 
same type developed along similar lines or that each party 
was sui generis. There is no attempt to make any compar­
ative study of their development.
Secondly, none of the literature explains how a party 
emerged, on what assumptions it based its actions and why 
it developed along particular lines. Writers have given 
attention to clashes of personality, to the changes in leg­
islation on particular topics and to the rise and fall of 
ministries, but not to the parties themselves or to their 
organization. Research on this subject has to be histori­
cal in approach because of the available evidence but it 
can still concentrate primarily on party organization and 
behaviour and not make these topics incidental to its main 
discussion.
10 Jupp, Australian Party Politics, p p „ 5, 119, 124-5.
Furthermore, no coherent theory has been formulated to 
explain the development of parties. Fitzpatrick and Gollan 
see the emergence of the Labor party in hazy Marxist terms 
as a manifestation of class consciousness and explain its 
internal methods by its dependence on a trade-union base 
and traditions, But these writers have not attempted a sim­
ilar Marxist analysis on the non-Labor parties or included 
the bourgeoisie as a coherent class in their analysis of 
political events. A class interpretation of the develop­
ment of parties can only be partly satisfactory if it is 
based on observation or research into only one section of 
society. Miller, Campbell and other writers interpret the 
development of parties in terms of the behaviour of support­
ing groups, yet they seldom try to discover how the groups 
may interact within the party framework. While they consis­
tently consider the effect of groups, they do not analyse 
the internal processes of the party which allowed the group 
to have that effect; the internal procedures are assumed 
but are not studied.'*' These group theories of party deve­
lopment are at present only partly satisfactory because they 
do not explain how the group activity helped to shape the 
party and its activities.
Any theoretical explanation of party development should 
be applicable to all parties and to all parts of a party's 
activities, even if it is only used in a more limited way.
At present there is no general explanation in the Australian 
literature which examines the activities of a party in all 
areas and which indicates how and why a party developed its 
structure and methods, what the stages of development may 
have been, what difference existed between parties and how 
it reacted with its environment.
The Subject of this Thesis
In this thesis I will attempt to fill at least some of 
these gaps in the Australian literature on political parties
24
1. The exception to this generalisation is B.D. Graham 
who does examine how groups interacted within the 
Country party, see The Formation of the Australian 
Country Parties. The events he described occurred 
after the other parties were fully organized.
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by examining and comparing the early development of the non- 
Labor parties in two states» The states, New South Wales 
and Tasmania, were respectively the largest and smallest in 
population in eastern Australia at the turn of the century 
and were a vast contrast to one another in size, geography 
and economic development» In the next two chapters some 
background information and a brief outline of party history 
for each of the states will be provided; thereafter the 
development of the non-Labor parties in the two states will 
be considered simultaneously. I must emphasise here that 
this thesis is not intended to be a history of the non-Labor 
parties in the two states; it is an analysis of the develop­
ment of their structure and activities, using the theoreti­
cal framework which I outlined in the previous chapter . ^  
Obviously no thesis which is concerned with parties only in 
two states can provide a comprehensive theory to explain 
the development of non-Labor parties in all Australian states; 
in this respect, the thesis clearly has limitations. Never­
theless I hope to illustrate by a comparative study that a 
party can not be completely understood unless all parts of 
its activities, the circumstances of its development and 
its reaction to the environment are analysed.
In New South Wales the analysis will begin in 1894 and 
end in 1907» Evidence later in the thesis will show that 
the party organization of 1894 had changed little from that 
of 1889, described by Loveday, Martin, Mansfield and Nairn.
In 1907 the model of future non-Labor organizations had been 
securely established. In Tasmania the parliament of 18 94- 
1897 has been analysed in detail. This was not only done 
to provide a comparable date at which to start the study 
but also to provide some information about the pre-party 
period in Tasmania, because there is no study of faction 
politics for the state, comparable to that of Loveday and 
Martin for New South Wales. The analysis of this parliament 
will provide some detail about pre-party politics in Tasmania 
and will permit a comparison with politics at a time when 
parties were first emerging. Thereafter the major part of 
the study will be concentrated on the period between 1903 
and 1912. By the latter date a modern non-Labor party was 
firmly established in Tasmania.
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Chapter 3
New South Wales at the Turn of the Century 
Introduction
During the decade 1894-1907 the foundations of modern 
political parties were laid in New South Wales. In 1894 
the two non-Labor parties were opposed on the fiscal issue - 
that is, on the alternatives of free-trade and protective 
tariff policies. The Labor party was then small, split and 
comparatively ineffective. Thirteen years later in 1907 
the non-Labor parties had combined into an alliance which 
opposed the growing Labor party. In 1894 only a few ques­
tions were contested on party lines; by 1907 such divisions 
were common. In 1894 party organization was unco-ordinated, 
ineffective and discontinuous; some politicians were sus­
picious of the idea of party and only reluctantly, if at 
all, accepted the restrictions which party membership placed 
upon them. By 1907 party organization had continuity and 
co-ordination, it comprehensively covered the whole state 
and politicians, especially the ones most recently elected, 
accepted the responsibilities of party membership in ex­
change for its by now demonstrable advantages. However the 
improvement in organization and the change in attitudes to­
wards party did not follow any regular pattern of develop­
ment. The tariff issue became irrelevant after 1900 when 
the success of the federal movement removed control of 
customs from the hands of the state government. At first 
no dominant political question replaced it as a cause of 
division between the two major non-Labor parties. They 
remained divided only by personality and tradition, not by 
policy, while the Labor party continued its 'support in re­
turn for concessions' strategy. In 1902 the formation of 
an anti-socialist party created a new political situation 
and from that date the party system which exists today has 
gradually developed.
Between 1894 and 1907 there were six elections - in 
1894, 1895, 1898, 1901, 1904 and 1907. The first two of
these elections were contested on tariff policy; in 1898 
the campaign was focused on the question of federation, with 
particular emphasis on the comparative ability of Reid or
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Barton to secure the best possible terms for New South Wales. 
The election of 1901 was fought on matters of personality, 
not policy, because both parties put forward similar prag­
matic programmes and were not divided by any ideological 
differences. In 1904 and 1907 the elections were contested 
by a ’socialist* Labor party and an anti-socialist Liberal 
party.
The development of the non-Labor parties can most use­
fully be studied by examining in detail five of these elec­
tions and the behaviour of the parties in the parliaments 
which follow the first four of them because from the analy­
ses the main trends of party activity can be discovered.
These detailed analyses will be made later in the thesis.
At this stage it is necessary to provide some background 
information for the study of politics in New South Wales 
by briefly describing the constitutional framework, the 
society and the economy and then by recalling the political 
methods of the pre-party factions and the first steps of the 
transition to party politics. Finally, I will summarize the 
main chronological events of party history in the period 
under analysis.
The Constitution
The constitution of New South Wales, like those of all 
Australian states^ , was based on the Westminster model and 
many of its conventions and precedents were taken directly 
from the British parliament. Its parliament had two chambers, 
the Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly. Mem­
bers of the council were nominated by the government for 
life and there was no legal restriction or limit on the size 
of the council. It both could and did block 'progressive'
legislation passed in the assembly by Liberal parties or at
2the instigation of the Labor party. Since the council
1. Before federation, New South Wales was officially a colony;
after 1901 it became a state of Australia. I will use 
the word 'state' to apply to New South Wales and Tas­
mania throughout the period for the sake of convenience.
2. For instance the Council rejected Reid's direct land and
income taxes in 1895, See's Female Suffrage Bill in 
1900 and Carruthers' Government Savings Bank Bill in 
19 04 .
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could not be dissolved, the only solution available to a 
government which found it obstructive was to swamp it with 
new nominees. This action, generally considered a last 
resort, was taken twice by Reid in 1895 and 1898. As par­
ties developed, so appointments to the council became accep­
ted as party actions.'*'
2With a few slight Imperial controls on its actions, 
the Legislative Assembly had full rights to initiate and 
alter legislation. Tradition required that a government 
had to maintain a majority in the assembly and that, if it 
was defeated on a censure motion or a major issue, it should 
resign. A premier could obtain a dissolution provided that 
no other cabinet could be formed which could gain a majority 
in the assembly. Elections had to be held every three years. 
The number of M.L.A.s was limited by statute - to 125 after 
1894 and to 90 after 190^1. The premier and the majority of 
his colleagues generally had seats in the assembly, while 
the vice-president of the executive council and occasionally 
the attorney-general sat in the council. Ministerial res­
ponsibility and government by cabinet were accepted as the
3rule. The Governor was primarily a figurehead but he did 
have some discretionary power and a right to advise and to 
be consulted. Although he could act only after taking ad­
vice, he was not bound to accept that advice and could, for
instance, refuse to grant a dissolution or make appointments 
4to the council. His power was therefore not entirely
5nominal," but the possible political significance of his 
power has so far not been studied.
Electorally the period under discussion saw few major
1. For a discussion of party action in the Council, see 
Appendix D„
2„ For a discussion of the powers of dominions and states, 
see A „B „ Keith, The Dominions as Sovereign States ,
London 1938,
3. Loveday and Martin, Parliament, Factions and Parties, 
chapter 5 „
4 In 1894 the Governor refused to nominate several pro­
tectionists to the Council at Dibb’s request and in 
1899 he refused to grant Reid a dissolution.
5. James Bryce, Modern Democracies, V o1.2 , p . 19 3 , H „ V . Evatt, 
The King and his Dominion Governors, London, 1936.
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changes. By 1894, manhood suffrage existed in the state.
With a few exceptions any man over the age of twenty-one 
who had resided in the state for twelve months and in the 
electorate for three months was eligible to vote. Those 
denied the vote included the military, the police, felons, 
habitual drunkards, rogues and wife-beaters. There was no r>!«>rc,l v/otinj
/ , s'Otmcj W 4 S  pes>rr>i ■absent &¥■ piura 1-' voti-ng-, In 1896 the period of residence
in the electorate was reduced to one month and the police
were enfranchised. In 1902 a bill introducing universal
suffrage was passed and women voted for the first time in
the election in 1904. In order to vote at the polls, an
elector had to produce his "elector's right", which was a
certificate of qualification. The loss of this right meant
that the elector could not cast his vote. Yht t/tcftfri rijhf s 
ftbil< Shed m  iQO I
In 1893 an electoral act reduced the number of members 
from 141 to 125, abolished all multi-member constituencies 
and instructed the electoral commissioners to divide the 
state into 125 sing1e-member electorates. The number of 
electors in any constituency was allowed to vary from the 
mean by up to 600 and, in drawing up the boundaries, con­
sideration was to be given to community or diversity of 
interest, to lines of communication, to existing boundaries 
and geographic features. The act of 1893 further ordered 
that all polls were to be held simultaneously throughout 
the state, thus preventing the government from arranging 
the contests in an order which was politically advantageous 
to it. In 1904 the number of seats was further reduced to 
90. Throughout the period, the 'first-past-the-post' system 
of non-preferential voting was used. Registration and voting 
were not compulsory.
The Society and the Economy
At the turn of the century New South Wales can be class­
ified into regions according to their main industries. The 
mines at Broken Hill in the Far West produced silver, lead 
and zinc; in the Lower Hunter the mines produced coal and
1. The following two paragraphs are based on the summary of 
electoral acts in C. Hughes and B.D. Graham, A Handbook 
of Australian Government and Politics , p p . 4 2 3-5 .
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in the Central and Northern Tablelands mainly tin. The pas­
toral industry was particularly important in the Tablelands, 
the Riverina and the Far Westf while the agricultural areas 
of the state were mainly situated on the Tablelands, the 
Riverina and coastal areas . Almost all dairy farming was 
in the coastal districts. The manufacturing industries were 
mostly in Sydney, although they were also found in the Lower 
Hunter and, to a lesser extent, in other districts'1'.
The products of rural industry, and particularly wool,
remained the main export of the state, despite the bank crash
2of 1893 from which pastoralists took a long time to recover
and the serious drought between 1900 and 1904. In 1894 the
wool clip provided 56% of the value of all exports; in 1902,
at the height of the drought, it still produced 41% while
in 1907 it accounted for 47%. Minerals, particularly coal
and silver, consistently produced between 12 and 15% of the
3state's export income. The production of agricultural 
crops increased rapidly before 1900 but then was badly re­
duced by the drought. For instance, wheat production fell 
from over sixteen million bushels in 1900 to one and a half 
million bushels in 1902 and this poor harvest seriously
damaged the fortunes of the small settler. Better years
✓followed and in 1906, a year of a bumper harvest, the state
4produced over twenty-one million bushels of wheat.
Trade and manufacturing industries both gradually in­
creased during the period 1904 to 1907. The value of manu­
factured goods expanded from five and a half million pounds 
in 1894 to over nine million in 1907 while the state's ex­
ports increased in value from £15,904,901 in 1894 to
5£37,724,837 in 1907 . Sydney was the hub of the state's
1. New South Wales Census of 1901, p.633-649.
2. T .A . Coghlan, Labour and Industry in Australia from the
First Settlement in 1788 to the Establishment of the 
Commonwealth in 1901, 4 vols. London, 1918, p.2045.
3 . New South Wales Statistical Register , 1907 , p .911.
4 . New South Wales Statistical Register , 1907 , p .913 .
5 . New South Wales Statistical Register, 1907 , p.911 ,
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trade and most exports passed through it.
As industry and mining expanded, the number of miners
increased from 30,000 to 40,000 between 1891 and 1901 and
2the industrial employees from 54,000 to 66,000. To these 
numbers must be added the itinerant rural workers, such as 
shearers. At the same time greater numbers of these men 
became unionised, following the early movements among rural 
workers, and consequently added to the strength of the Labor 
party to which some unions were affiliated. As a result of 
this expansion of the working class, of the union struggles 
of the great strikes of the early 1890s and of the hardship 
caused by the drought, industrial unrest was always likely 
to erupt. The Labor party consistently demanded measures 
to reduce industrial distress and to provide long term im­
provements in the condition of workers.
The expansion of the economy increased the demands on 
governments. The state government was always considered 
responsible for developing services for rural areas and for 
building roads, railways and bridges. Local residents often 
considered these public works to be more important than 
broader issues and local members were regarded as agents to 
present local demands and to mediate between the residents 
of their electorates and government departments. Govern­
ments were indeed active in developmental schemes; for in­
stance, the railways open to traffic increased from a mile-
3age of 2501 in 1894 to 3543 in 1907 - a 40% expansion.
At the same time the ministry was expected to provide land 
for settlement and to assist the settler in times of hard­
ship. In 1895 and 1901 bills were introduced to unlock some 
of the land which had fallen vacant when the pastoral leases 
expired and at various times bills were passed which gave 
aid to settlers or provided drought relief., The additional 
areas which came under cultivation during this period were
very large; in 1894, 1,688,524 acres were under cultivation
4and by 1906 this figure had been increased by 109%. In
1. Coghlan, Labour and Industry in Australia, p.2046.
2 . New South Wales Census, 1901 ; p . 6 3 3 -649 .
3 . New South Wales Statistical Regis ter , 1907, p .911.
4 . New S out h Wales Statistical Regis t er , 1907, p .912.
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the same period the population had only increased by 27% - 
from 1,239,25 0 to 1,573,224 people.'*'
Throughout the period, the government also introduced 
legislation to alleviate the social distress of the working 
man or to improve the quality of the social conditions; these 
bills included old age pensions, arbitration, early closing 
and local option measures.
While the success of federation meant that the state 
government no longer had control over tariffs, external 
affairs, postal services and other matters on which uniform­
ity between states was desirable, it still had control of 
the two major administrative areas, lands and public works, 
and could legislate on all social matters. Since it was 
only partly dependent on the commonwealth for finance, the 
powers of the state government had not yet markedly declined 
and, with the exception of the tariff, the problems which 
faced the government after 1901 were largely the same as 
those with which it had always been concerned.
2The Period of Pre-party Politics
In the first thirty years of responsible government in
New South Wales, factions, not parties, controlled the par- 
3liament. Groups of members formed around such leading
4politicians as Parkes, Martin, Robertson and Cowper and pro­
vided the nuclei on which majorities were based. These fac-
1 * New South Wales Statistical Register , 1907, p.905.
2. Loveday and Martin, Parliament, Factions and Parties,
is the main source on which this section is based.
3. Bailey claims that a faction has two basic characteris­
tics - the lack of any common ideology and the alleg­
iance of each follower to the leader who was respons­
ible for recruiting them. (F. Bailey, Stratagems and 
Spoi1s , Oxford, 1969 , p.52) . The factions in New 
South Wales fulfil both these requirements.
4. In this thesis I will not include biographical notes on
politicians. For New South Wales, this information 
can be found in The New South Wales Parliamentary Re­
cord or A.W. Martin and P. Wardle, Members of the 
Legislative Assembly of New South Wales 1856-1900: 
Biographical Notes , Canberra 1959. For Tasmania it 
can be found in Walch1s Almanac or F. Green (e d .) A 
Century of Responsible Government.
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tions could bring to government both stability and continuity.
Since a faction seldom had a clear majority on its own 
in parliament, the faction ministries had to be formed either 
by coalition between two factions or by the accretion of un­
attached groups or individuals. The ministry could sometimes 
rely on the support of independents but there were seldom 
enough of them to give it security. There was no formal 
organization to maintain a majority,but the faction cores 
gave regular support to their leaders. The cabinet itself 
was well established and it was accepted that members had a 
collective responsibility to the assembly, but many questions 
were regarded as 'open' and ministers publicly differed on 
these issues. Although a majority had to be maintained if a 
ministry was to stay in office, not all business, nor even 
all government measures, were regarded as vital to the inter­
ests of the ministry. Defeats of governments in divisions of 
the assembly did not always result in their resignation, al­
though defeats in censure motions or vital pieces of legis­
lation did. The struggle for power was fought primarily on 
personal grounds with the majority of politicians middle- 
class in origin. For instance, in 1887 pastoralists (14.3%) , 
lawyers (15.7%) , journalists (6.4%) and various types of mer­
chants (33.4%) dominated the assembly.1 2
In the electorate no formal party organization existed.
At times the faction leaders attempted to secure the election
of their supporters in various electorates but seldom in an 
2overt manner. Intervention was carried out by the leader 
as an individual. Elections were usually contested on osten­
sibly local grounds with the personality of the candidate 
and his local connections being particularly important.
Moral and economic pressure groups attempted to influence 
the elections on some occasions but neither created electoral 
organizations with any breadth or continuity. Organization in 
elections consisted almost entirely of personal committees but
1. A.W. Martin, The Legislative Assembly of New South Wales,
1856-1900; A . J . P ,H . , Vol.2, No . 1 , November 1956 , p.55.
2. A.W. Martin, Henry Parkes and Electoral Manipulation,
1872-8, Historical Studies, No. 31, November 1958, A.W. 
Martin ^ Electoral Contests in Yass and Queanbeyan in 
the Seventies and Eighties, J .R ,A .H .S . , Vol.43, part 3, 
1957; P. Loveday and Martin. Parliament, Factions and 
Parties, chapter four.
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these were seldom co-ordinated between electorates and rarely 
survived from one election to the next. Their resources 
were limited; the candidate, his friends and those who hoped 
to gain from his election supplied funds and aid. Further­
more, the extent of the organization varied according to 
the size of the electorate, the character and connections 
of the candidate and the number of electors. Personal con­
tacts were more influential in country areas than in urban 
seats.
The Transition to Party Politics
The first signs of early party development can be found 
in the 1880s. Disputes over the tariff became increasingly 
important and provided an opportunity for the political div­
isions between factions to be formalised and transformed..
In the elections of 1887 and 1889 two fiscal parties emerged 
to contest the campaign'*' and the state-wide alignments which 
had formed during the contests were carried into the follow­
ing parliaments and increasingly dominated them. In 1891 
thirty-six Labor members were elected for the first time 
and their official strategy of 'support in return for con­
cessions' clearly assumed the existence in the assembly of 
two other competing parties.
In parliament, the concept of party affiliation was 
gradually emerging. The incident which caused the defeat 
of the Dibbs ministry in 1889 was a vote which
in effect gave notice that principle,and not
attachment to a leader, was the real cement
of the preetrade party. 2
The selection of Parkes as leader in 1889 and of Reid in 
1891 showed that the party now had a part in choosing its 
own leader rather than merely supporting a dominant indi­
vidual. Direct election of a faction leader would have 
been unthinkable before 1889. Furthermore the members of 
the assembly were now more prepared to commit themselves to
1. Loveday and Martin, Parliament, Factions and Parties,
chapter six; Mansfield, Party Organization in the 
New South Wales Election of February, 1889; Atkins, 
Antecedents of the N.S.W. Protection Party, 1881-1889; 
Nairn, The Political Mastery of Sir Henry Parkes.
2. Loveday and Martin, Parliament, Factions and Parties , p .14 5.
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a fiscal faith and consequently, even if only unsteadily, to 
the parties which were emerging. The methods of parliament­
ary organization remained basically informal and without any 
rules of behaviour.
In the elections of 1887 and 1889, even though few mem­
bers may have been returned wholly because of their fiscal 
views, the important point was that parties had organized 
state-wide campaigns on the fiscal issue. Central committees 
in Sydney attempted to co-ordinate the campaign, provided 
candidates if required and endorsed others wherever possible. 
Local associations also endorsed or selected candidates. 
Furthermore, the results were interpreted in party terms 
and the election of 1889 was seen as a triumph for freetrade . 
In other words organization, however embryonic and informal, 
had begun to replace ortransform personal contacts in elect­
oral politics.
By 1894 contemporaries recognised three major parties 
in the assembly, the Freetrade party, the Protectionist party 
and the Labor party. Even though the legitimacy of party 
was sometimes challenged in 1894, its organization still 
only 'embryonic' and its efficiency limited, party action 
had begun to emerge. There was a direct link between the 
original organizations of 1887 and the ad_ hoc bodies created 
to contest the election in 1894. As we shall see, it was 
these earlier non-Labor models which were used as precedents 
by the later non-Labor parties and which became the founda­
tions on which the modern non-Labor parties were built.
A Description of Political Parties
In the remainder of the thesis, the development of the 
parties will be analysed topically and not chronologically. 
Therefore a narrative account of the progress and develop­
ment of the parties is required here to put various events 
into perspective and to act as a source of reference for the 
later discussions. The significance of events will not be 
analysed here; that will occur later in the thesis. This 
section will be subdivided as follows:
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(1) The Freetrade (later Liberal) party'*’
(2) The Protectionist (later Progressive) party
(3) The Labor party
(4) Other Parliamentary Parties - the Independent Parties
- the Country Parties
(5) Other Extra-Parliamentary Parties
- the Freetrade and Land Reform League
- the National Association
- the People's Reform League
The comments on the last three sections will be brief and in­
tended only to put these parties or groups into context for 
future reference.
The Freetrade or Liberal Party
In 1891 Henry Parkes resigned the leadership of the
Freetrade party after the defeat of his ministry. Much to
his disgust, he was replaced as leader by George Reid in a
2controversial caucus meeting. Between 1891 and 1894 Reid 
enhanced his reputation as an able leader while Parkes sulk­
ily refused to co-operate and claimed that Reid was person-
3ally hostile to him. In 1893 Pulsford drew up proposals for 
the creation of a network of local freetrade associations in 
every electorate but this movement failed to gain support and
1. The Freetrade party of New South Wales deliberately changed
its name to Liberal in 1901. The personnel remained 
the same and therefor the one must be considered as a 
direct continuation of the other. Similarly the Pro­
tectionist party re-named itself Progressive.
2. Contradictory accounts of this meeting appeared through­
out the 1890s. McMillan claimed that Reid received 
fourteen votes while thirty other members abstained 
from voting (Sydney Morning Herald (hereafter S.M.Hj 
3/8/94). Wise claimed that fourteen voted for Reid, 
eight against and eighteen abstained. He suggested 
that Parkes had been offered, but declined the leader­
ship (B.R. Wise, The Making of the Australian Common­
wealth , p.172-5) . In 1898 Neild claimed that the meet­
ing had deliberately 'shunted* Parkes out of the lead­
ership and that, after Wise refused to stand, Reid had 
been elected by a large majority (Daily Telegraph,
Sydney, (hereafter D cT .) 10/1/98) . Exactly what hap­
pened at that meeting can never be known , but the doubt 
and internal party divisions left Reid's right to the 
leadership open to challenge before August 1894.
3. Parkes to McMillan, published in S . M .H . 3/8/94.
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only a few branches were formed. By early 1894 the Protect­
ionist Dibbs ministry had become unpopular because of its 
strong actions during the bank crash of 1893 and because of 
its protective tariff policy. Support for freetrade was re­
gaining strength in the state but the freetrade movement it­
self was far from united. It contained three main strands of 
thought; the conservatives who favoured a pure free trade 
tariff but opposed direct taxation, the moderates who were 
prepared to accept some customs duties as a source of revenue 
and some direct taxation and the radicals who claimed that if 
freetrade was introduced, direct taxation of land and income 
must be imposed as an alternative source of revenue. This
group regarded direct taxation as an instrument of social 
2reform. A large number of freetraders from all sections of
the party announced their intention to stand in the election
of 1894 and threatened to split the vote, which would probably
have caused a loss of seats. In an attempt to prevent this
happening the parliamentary freetrade party formed the Free-
trade Council which was designed to choose between competing
candidates who had already announced their intention to go 
3to the polls. Local freetrade associations were formed to 
support and occasionally select candidates but these branches 
were neither founded nor co-ordinated by the central organ­
ization. The Freetrade Council succeeded in reducing the 
number of candidates by arbitration in some electorates but 
was unable to prevent the splitting of votes in others. 
Furthermore freetraders did not all campaign with the same 
policy. In his manifesto as party leader, Reid promised to
introduce freetrade, direct taxation, new land laws and local
4government but also emphasised the importance of federation.
At the same time Wise declared that the introduction of free-
5trade and direct taxation was the most important issue and 
Parkes claimed that federation was far more urgent than the 
fiscal question or any land legislation . ^  Despite these div-
1. S .M .H . 6/6/94.
2. Martin, Free Trade and Protectionist Parties in New South
Wales, p. 319-321.
3 • S,M,H. 10/5/94 .
4 • S .M .H . 2/7/94.
5. S .M „H . 14/6/94, 7/7/94.
6. S .M o H „ 3/7/94 .
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isions within the party, the election was still a triumph for 
it; it won fifty-eight seats in an assembly of one hundred 
and twenty-five members. This figure included twelve unen­
dorsed freetraders"*”, of whom eight immediately joined the 
parliamentary party.2
In a bid for the party leadership Parkes tried to claim 
all credit for the victory, even though he had avoided iden­
tifying himself with the other freetraders during the cam­
paign. When Dibbs resigned, the governor, regarding Reid as
the Leader of the Opposition, commissioned him, and not Parkes,
3to form a ministry. The former ministerial colleagues of
Parkes, particularly Carruthers, Brunker and Garrard, had
earlier played important parts in the deliberations of the
Freetrade Council and were now prepared to support Reid in
4 5preference to Parkes. Parkes reacted violently to his re­
jection and soon rumours of an alliance between Parkes and 
Dibbs were circulating.6
In office Reid had to act cautiously because of the 
divisions within his own party and particularly because of 
the pressure from the group of radical freetraders who had 
been elected for the first time. In November 1894 he intro­
duced federal proposals at the same time as the basic intro­
ductory measures which were required before a land or income 
tax could be levied. Despite his attempts to keep all parts 
of his party satisfied, he soon came under attack from his
own side of the house. Parkes condemned him for a lack of
7sincerity in his federal proposals while Wise accused him ofQreneging on his promise to introduce direct taxation ; but
1. Hughes and Graham, A Handbook of Australian Government
and Politics , p.431-2. For details of election results 
see Appendix A.
2 • S.M.H, 1/8/94 .
3. S.M.H. 31/7/94 .
4. See comments of Carruthers D . T . 14/7/94 and of McMillan,
S.M.H. 1/8/94, 3/8/94.
5. e.g. S . M .H . 3/8/94
6. S .M .H . 2/8/94, D,T, 21/7/94.
7. S,M.H. 14/11/94.
8 . S .M .H . 8/11/94.
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the other advocates of direct taxation who had been elected 
as adherents of the Freetrade and Land Reform League r e p u d ­
iated Wise and remained loyal to R e i d . 1 234 Despite the d e f e c ­
tion of Wise and Parkes, the Freetrade party remained united 
and easily defeated a censure mo tion moved by Dibbs in F e b ­
ruary , 1895 .
In May 1895, Reid introduced a bu dget which implemented
his electoral promises by reducing tariffs and introducing
2direct land and income taxes. He effectively answered the 
criticism of those who doubted his sincerity and, more i m p o r ­
tant, con so lidated his lead ership of the party. In May Parkes 
finally arranged an alliance with Dibbs, which had been under 
ne got iat ion for three months, and moved a no confidence motion
which claimed that federation should be considered before the 
3fiscal issue. He was unable to split the Freetrade party as
dec isi vel y as he had hoped and only two followers from it
joined the o p p o sition to vote with him on the motion which the
4min is tr y easily defeated. Most of Reid's important measures, 
including a land bill, direct land and income tax bills and 
a freetrade customs bill, passed the assembly, although a 
local government bill was amended in committee and quietly 
dropped. However the L egisl ative Council rejected his land 
and income tax proposals and Reid, po sing as a wronged d e m o ­
crat, fought an election on the issue of reform of the coun- 
5c i l . His party gained a decisive victory, winning sixty-two 
seats in the assembly.
Bet ween 1895 and 1898 Reid's freetrade m a j ority remained 
secure and he intr oduced a series of bills which improved 
social conditions. Then, in 1898, his party began to disinter- 
grate on the question of federation. In March 1897 represen-
1. See O'Reilly, S , M . H . 12/11/94.
2. D . T . , 10/5/95.
3. D . T . , 16/5/95.
4. James Martin and J.C. Ellis, but several others were
rumoured as possible defectors, see D .T . , 13/5/95,
15/5/95, 24/5/95.
5 . D ,T . , 2/17/9 5
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tatives of all states had met in a federal convention and, 
over the next twelve months, had drawn up a constitution. 
Opposition to the proposed constitution in New South Wales 
had become obvious in 1897 and the freetraders in particular 
were badly divided over the acceptability of it. The major­
ity of the party opposed it because they considered the con­
ditions of entry, particularly the financial provisions, to be 
disadvantageous to New South Wales. The radical members of 
the party, like the Labor party, also condemned the consti­
tution because it permitted the states with small populations 
to dictate to the majority of the people in Australia. A 
minority in the party, particularly Carruthers , McMillan 
and Thomson, advocated acceptance of the bill. Reid's pos­
ition was equivocal; when he opened the campaign for the 
referendum in which the electors voted on the bill, he claimed 
he would vote for it but advocated that it be rejected until 
better terms were obtained.’*' He also allowed J „ H „ Want to 
resign from the cabinet to lead the campaign against the bill 
and then re-appointed him after its defeat. Whether or not 
his actions helped advance the cause of federation may be 
debated, but he was certainly faced in New South Wales with 
a badly divided party. The majority of the electors of New 
South Wales voted in favour of the constitution, but, as 
their number did not reach the minimum of 80,000 votes which 
the referendum bill required, it was not accepted. The elec­
tion was then fought on the federal issue and particularly 
on the question of whether Barton or Reid could be better 
trusted to safeguard the interests of New South Wales in
negotiations with the other state premiers for a revised 
2constitution. Both leaders produced similar lists of amend­
ments to the bill as election manifestoes although Reid also
3added a series of promises of domestic reforms. With the
exception of a few ardent federalists who continued to support 
4Barton, most of the freetraders uneasily united behind Reid
1. D „T ., 29/3/98 (This was the famour Yes-No speech.)
2. An editorial in the Daily Telegraph was even entitled 'Under
which King?' D ,T ., 23/6/98
3. D °T - / 5/7/98, 11/7/98.
4. P.H. Morton, D. Thomson and W.H.B. Piddington all stood
as federal candidates supporting Barton.
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and formed a Liberal and Federal party which organized the 
elections by co-ordinating meetings and financing some cam- 
paigns and, most important, by providing and selecting can­
didates«. However the party organization was ineffective. 
Reid's party suffered severe losses, including the defeat of 
three ministers, and was only able to maintain a majority 
with the assistance of the Labor party.
After the election Reid tried to maintain the unity of 
his party by raising the fiscal issue wherever possible but 
he was now distrusted by some of his supporters. Further­
more, the Labor party believed that he had exhausted his 
democratic ideas and it was becoming impatient with him.'*'
The parliamentary session of 1898 was barren of any progress­
ive legislation. In his budget for 1898, Reid increased the 
tariff on sugar in a move which gained him the temporary 
support of the protectionist members who represented sugar­
growing electorates but alienated the more determined free-
2traders in the party. He finally split his party in 1899 
when, in the second referendum campaign, he supported a re­
vised constitution which still included the Senate as a 
states' house and other clauses which were considered un­
acceptable and undemocratic by radical members of his party. 
When the bill was accepted by the referendum, this wing of 
the party, led by Haynes and Cotton, determined to overthrow 
Reid but stated that they were not prepared to support the
opposition unless the conservative Barton was replaced by
3Lyne , who was regarded as more democratic.
In August, 1899, Lyne became opposition leader and
moved a censure motion condeming Reid for making an advance
payment to a member of parliament, J. Neild, for a report on
pensions, despite a promise to the assembly that he would not
do so. The Labor party also deserted the government on this
4issue and the ministry was defeated. After a half-hearted 
attempt to secure a dissolution, Reid resigned,^
1 . Spence, Australia's Awakening, p . 15 6.
2. D .T, , 13/11/98,
3 . Haynes, New South Wales Parliamentary Debates , (hereafter 
NSWPD) Series 1, Vo1.99, p.182-3.
4» For discussions of the fall of the Reid government, see
Mansfield, Australian Democrat, p.144-147 and below p.53. 
5. D „T. , 11/9/99 ~
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While Lyne was premier from September 1899 to April 1901, 
the state freetrade party had little purpose or cohesion. The 
tariff was no longer a cause of division between the parties 
because of the success of the federal movement and because of 
Lyne1 23s promise to sink the fiscal issue. Furthermore, the 
government legislation was mainly concerned with social mea­
sures such as old age pensions, arbitration and early closing 
which did not divide the assembly on party lines. Reid him­
self lost interest in state politics and not one censure m o ­
tion was pushed to a division in eighteen months. Political 
interest was centred around the federal elections of March 
1901 which were contested primarily on the fiscal issue.
Several prominent freetraders, notably Reid, McMillan and Thom­
son, were elected to the federal parliament, leaving the 
state party leaderless. With the transfer of the control of 
customs to the Commonwealth, the Freetrade party also lost 
its raison d'etre. In 1901 and 1902 it was primarily engaged 
in a search for a new leader and a new cause.
In March 1901 Lyne resigned after his election to the 
federal parliament and his successor, John See, attempted to 
form a coalition ministry and approached four prominent free­
traders. Two of them, Carruthers and Garland, favoured accep­
tance of the proposals but a hostile reaction from Reid, Ash­
ton and the Sydney press persuaded the wavering Brunker to 
reject the offer and the negotiations speedily ende d /  In 
April, Reid resigned the party leadership and entered federal 
politics. The most obvious person to succeed him, Carruthers, 
was rejected because of his failure to consult the party dur­
ing his negotiations with See and an undistinguished but loyal
2party member, C.A. Lee, was chosen as leader. The party then 
renamed itself the Liberal party because it claimed that, 
since the state government no longer controlled tariffs, all
3reference to the fiscal issue should be dropped from its name.
1. Reid to Carruthers, 10/4/01, Box 25, Carruthers Papers ,
ML.Mss.1638; Ashton to Carruthers, 6/4/01, Box 25, Car­
ruthers Papers, ML.Mss.1638; D .T . 8/4/01, 9/4/01, 10/4/01.
See also Mansfield, Australian Democrat, p.165-7.
2. D . T . 17/4/01; Lee had openly opposed the coalition,
D ,T . 10/4/01.
3. D .T . 1/5/01.
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The organization of the Liberal party in the election of 1901 
was ineffective. Lee's manifesto promised, among other things, 
to reduce the number of members and to introduce bills for 
arbitration, closer settlement, female suffrage, educational 
reform and superannuation for the police,"'’ Almost all his 
proposals were similar to those of the premier and the govern­
ment party. At the same time the Liberal party itself was
divided and an open split occurred between Lee and Carruthers.
2The latter issued an 'Unauthorized Programme' and, although 
it agreed in most respects with the policies of the two lead­
ers, it did indicate the lack of unity within the Liberal 
party. The election was a disaster for the party which lost 
several seats by split votes. Also some of its successful 
'endorsed' candidates were immediately found in the govern­
ment ' s ranks.
For twelve months, the party disunity continued- Lee
3was an inept leader, made tactical mistakes and was unable
4to co-operate with Carruthers. Many Liberal members regard­
ed themselves primarily as the New South Wales branch of the 
federal freetrade party which was led by Reid and were most 
active during the agitation against the federal tariff which 
was introduced in October 1901.^ The state government intro­
duced no measures which might have helped the opposition; 
their legislation concerned such domestic subjects as friendly 
associations, the female suffrage, railways and the re-settle­
ment of the western lands, which were mostly non-controversia1 
and unlikely to divide the house on party lines.
1. D ,T . , 17/5/01.
2. D .T . , 26/4/01.
3. His first censure motion condemned See for mistakes made
by the Lyne government, even though some new members, 
whose allegiance was in doubt, had explicitly stated 
that they would not vote for such a retrospective mo ­
tion. These men were the independents whose support 
a party leader needed to attract. D .T ., 8/7/01, 25/7/01, 
3/8/01.
4. In December 1901 Carruthers moved a motion attacking the
government over their failure to select a site for the 
Federal capital. Lee reprimanded him for failing to no ­
tify his leader of his intentions and by way of protest 
voted with the government against the motion. D .T „ ,19/12/01.
5. D .T . , 28/10/01 to 7/11/01.
In 1902 Lee failed to capitalise on the widespread de­
mand for a reduction of the number of M.L.A.s and for a re­
duction of state expenditure which had inspired the formation 
of the Taxpayers' Union and the People's Reform League. He 
also failed to unite his party and finally, in September 1902, 
resigned the leadership. A party caucus then selected C a r - 
ruthers as his successor.1 234 Immediately Carruthers, who has
been described with some justification as 'the greatest lead-
2er of the opposition that New South Wales has known', began 
to consolidate the parliamentary party and to organise his 
supporters in the electorate. In parliament he exposed a
series of ministerial blunders which began with the Friedmann
3affair and within fifteen months the number of his support­
ers had increased to fifty as a result of defections from 
the government and by-election victories of candidates en­
dorsed by the party. In the electorate, Carruthers founded 
the Liberal and Reform Association, a body which it was in­
tended should have sound organization and a branch in every 
electorate to secure the local selection of candidates. The
Liberal and Reform Association, which has been called the
4'prototype of the non-Labor parties' , quickly developed a 
widespread network of branches and a coherent party policy 
which demanded a reduction of the numbers of members of par­
liament, retrenchment of the expenditure, a 'return to res­
ponsible government' and water conservation. By 1904 the 
organization of the Liberal and Reform Association was well 
advanced and the election campaign was fought on a state wide 
basis. Carruthers' success as leader was partly due to his 
ability to provide a-cause around which his supporters could
1. D ,T ., 18/9/02, 19/9/02.
2. Collis, Lost Years , p.34.
3. Friedmann was a defendant convicted by a jury of re­
ceiving stolen goods. Wise, the Attorney-Genera1 , gave 
him a free pardon on the advice of the trial judge who 
believed him clearly innocent. Carruthers made poli­
tical use of this pardon by claiming that the Govern­
ment was overriding jury decisions. Ironically the 
Crown Prosecutor in the case, G.C. Wade, entered the 
Assembly in 1903 and became Attorney-General in Car- 
rut hers' Cabinet in 1904.
4. J.A. MacCallum, 'How Fares Par1i^amentary Government in
the Federal System' in G. Sawer (ed.) , Federalism in 
Australia, Melbourne, 1949, p.112.
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rally; he adopted an anti-socialist stance and accused the 
See government of being nothing more than a front for the 
Labor party. Consequently, the anti-socialist cause allowed 
the party to operate as a unit on almost any issue and pro­
vided a new ideology around which the party members could 
unite. In the election of 1904, some pre-selection problems 
did occur but the Liberal and Reform Association candidates 
won forty-six seats in a house reduced to ninety members.
Carruthers considered a coalition with the defeated 
ministerialists but, in the interests of party unity,1 234 formed 
a cabinet entirely from within his own party. For most of 
the parliament, and particularly in 1904, he was attacked 
periodically by members of his own party who argued that he
2had not reduced government expenditure with sufficient speed. 
However, most of the legislation promised in the party plat­
form was passed and the major achievements of the government 
included the introduction of local government and local op­
tion and a new crown lands bill. Its most notable defeat
occurred on its attempt to introduce a bill forming a gov -
3ernment savings bank; some Liberals opposed the measure on 
the grounds that the bill was socialist in outlook while the 
Legislative Council rejected it entirely. The government 
also re-established the state's finances on a firm basis, al­
though this was partly a consequence of the bumper harvests 
of 1905 and 1906. Its success, however, was overshadowed by 
the startling revelations of the Royal Commission into the
Lands department which tarnished the reputation of Carruthers,
4even though he was never directly implicated.
In the electorate the Liberal and Reform Association con­
tinued to hold regular meetings and to contest by-elections.
It was the first non-Labor electoral organization to have the 
continuity of existence to contest successive state elections, 
although it played no part as an organization in the federal
1. Brunker to Carruthers, 13/8/04, Box 25 Carruthers Papers,
ML.Mss. 1638 .
2. Fell, D.T. 13/10/04. Storey, D.T. 4/11/04. For later
criticism, see Storey, D.T. , 28/12/06, 12/2/07 .
3. Nine Liberal M.L.A.s opposed the government on this bill.
D ,T . , 4/11/04.
4. For the best description of these events, see C. Pearl,
Wild Men of Sydney, 1958.
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elections because it contained both freetraders and protec­
tionists. At the time of its formation Carruthers had explic­
itly stated that it would not be a nursery for federal free- 
trade politicians.'*'
In 1907 the party was placed, in Carruthers' words, on 
2a 'war footing' and contested the election on its record 
for sound administration and the fulfilment of its electoral 
pledges of 1904. Its new promises included some specific 
public works and generally a reduction of the level of tax­
ation. Carruthers also promised to assert strongly the
3rights of the state against the commonwealth government. 
Although the Progressive party refused proposals for fusion, 
its leader, Waddell, still joined the Liberal cabinet. In 
the elections, the Liberal and Reform Association secured a 
safe majority. Carruthers was unable to reconstruct his cab­
inet after the retirement of three of his ministers and was 
suddenly (and conveniently) taken ill. He resigned and ad­
vised the governor to send for Wade, who quickly formed a 
4ministry. By 1907 the Liberal and Reform Association was 
securely founded and in 1909 it adopted a new constitution^ 
which acted as the basis for the Liberal organization over 
the next decade until it was overtaken by an upheaval of 
federal origin and incorporated into the new Nationalist 
party .
The Protectionist or Progressive Party
In 1891 Dibbs formed a protectionist ministry and intro­
duced a protective tariff. However the depression of 1893 
created severe problems for the government and eroded its 
support until it was able to defeat a censure motion by only 
a single vote . Two of its most eminent ministers , Barton and 
O'Connor, also resigned over a breach of ethics. In 1894 the 
electoral organization of the party was poor. The central
1. D . T . , 10/3/03.
2 . D . T . , 30/1/07 .
3. D,T., 10/5/07.
4. Random Reflections and Reminiscences, p.61-62. Box 14,
Carruthers Papers, ML. Mss. 1638 .
5 . S,M.H., 2/4/09, 18/5/09.
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body was formed by M.L,A„s with a few non-parliamentarians
later co-opted into it, but its influence was small and its
bias towards sitting members in preference to other candidates
obvious. At the local level branches held several pre-selection
ballots but generally discipline among candidates was almost
non-existent, Dibbs appealed for support on the grounds of
his sound record of administration, promised to leave the
tariff which he considered sufficiently protective undisturbed
2and to introduce local government and new land laws. Like 
the Freetrade party, the protectionists were divided into 
sections. They included members of the 'Country Party' who 
wanted land reform, - and particularly the redistribution of 
land and the breaking up of large estates, - local govern­
ment, federation and water conservation, as well as large
3landowners who opposed any direct taxation of land. In the
election the party was badly defeated and failed to win a
single city or suburban seat; it consequently represented
country interests almost exclusively. Dibbs decided to meet
the assembly in the hope of gaining a majority with Labor
support and was widely criticised within his own party for
4failing to resign. When the governor refused to appoint 
his list of nominees to the Council because of the minority 
position of his party in the assembly, Dibbs finally resigned.^
In the parliament of 1894-1895, the protectionists con­
sistently attacked the direct taxation proposals of Reid, 
and despite the presence in the party of some members who 
favoured land taxation as a means of breaking up the large 
estates, the party gained the reputation of being conserva­
tive.1 23456 7 In May 1895, Dibbs and Parkes finally forged an al­
liance to defeat Reid. Some members of the party, particul­
arly Lyne , opposed this move and feared that the party would
lose all credibility by entering an electoral campaign in
7alliance with such a prominent freetrader. Others refused
1. S ,M,H, , 9/6/94, 12/6/94 , 16/6/94, 23/6/94.
2. S ,M.H. , 26/6/94.
3. Martin, Free Trade and Protectionist Parties in New South
Wales, p.316-17.
4. S ,M.H . , 30/7/94.
5. S ,M,H. , 31/7/94,
6. Martin, Free Trade and Protectionist Parties in New South
Wales, p.318.
7. D.T., 15/5/95
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to sink the fiscal issue in favour of federation, as Parkes 
proposed»'*' Lyne's fears were justified by the results of 
the election of 1895 which saw a further reduction in the 
numbers of the protectionists. Several leading party mem­
bers, including Dibbs, Kidd and Copeland, were defeated.
When parliament met, a caucus meeting elected Lyne as
2leader in preference to Crick or See,
In 1896 the parliamentary protectionist party formed
the National Protection Union with Lyne as president and
3W.F. Schey as secretary. In April 1897 this organization
convened a conference which included branches throughout
the state and which considered tactics for the election of 
41898. Towards the end of 1897 several pre-selection ballots 
and electorate conferences were held to choose candidates for 
the election. However the federal issue relegated protec­
tion to a subsidiary role and split the party. The majority 
suported the bill but Lyne opposed it. After the bill had been 
rejected in the referendum, the protectionists entered an 
uneasy alliance with Barton's Federal Association for the pur­
pose of contesting the election. Barton advocated some alter­
ations to the bill but Lyne remained very dubious about the 
value of federation. The parliamentary party insisted on
its own independence and refused to accept any dictation from
5the 'irresponsible' Federal Association, In some elector­
ates protectionists objected to being asked to vote for free­
traders who supported Barton while federalists disliked the 
endorsement of anti-federal protectionist M.L.A.s by the cen­
tral executive of the Federal Association.^ In spite of these
1. D .T . , 6/7/95.
2. D .T . , 14/8/95.
3 , Constitution and Rules of the National Protection Union, 
Sydney, 1896. National Library. No. 331 . 88099 4/NAT .
4. D.T. , 21/4/97 - 24/4/97.
5. D.T., 24/6/98, 25/6/98, 28/6/98, 29/6/98, 1/7/98, 7/7/98.
6. For instance, at Gundagai the Protectionists supported
Barnes who opposed federation but who had been endorsed 
by the central Federal Association because he was a sit­
ting M.L.A. The local Federal Association selected J.J. 
Miller, asserted their rights to select their own can­
didate and refused to support Barnes. Gundagai Times, 
15/7/98.
tensions the alliance made large gains and the combined party 
was only in a minority of four.
In parliament the divisions between the federalist and
protectionist wings of the party remained. Since Barton had
failed to win a seat, Lyne was elected leader unopposed.'*’
When Barton won a by-election, the party decided that he had
a better chance of uniting the party and deposed Lyne in his 
2favour. Ten months later, the position was reversed. Bar­
ton had failed to defeat Reid while federation had been a- 
chieved with the success of the second referendum. Lyne was 
paradoxically a more acceptable leader to the arch-protection­
ists in the party, to the radical freetraders who had deserted 
Reid and to the Labor party. This strange situation illus­
trated the political confusion of the time. Some M.L.A.s 
believed that the tariff question was still important, des­
pite the imminent transfer of customs affairs to the federal 
government; others claimed that social questions would be
the most important matters with which a state government now
3had to deal, Lyne was re-appointed leader in August, moved 
a successful censure motion over the payments to Neild and 
formed a government in September. His ministry included
two freetraders, Wise and Fegan . His promise to sink the
4fiscal issue - a necessary promise to gain the support of 
the radical freetraders - angered the extreme protectionists
5in the party and they formed a 'Protectionist' party within 
the ranks of government supporters.^ Most of the legislation 
of the Lyne government was social in outlook, including meas­
ures that dealt with pensions, early closing and arbitration. 
Wise was appointed to the Legislative Council in order to 
assist in passing the arbitration bill.
When Lyne won a seat in the federal parliament, his suc­
cessor, John See, tried to form a coalition government, but, 
having failed, formed a cabinet entirely from his own party.
1 . D ,T . , 17/8/9 8.
2 • D .T . , 6/10/98.
3. D ,T. , 17/8/98.
4 • D «T• / 24/8/99.
5. Copeland, D .T ., 24/8/99, Henry Clarke, D .T ., 26/10/99.
6. D.T., 11/6/00, 14/6/00.
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In May 1901 the party changed its name to the Progressive
party^ but its organization in the election of 1901 was
nominal. See's election manifesto contained a series of
2pragmatic promises and was similar to that of Lee . there 
was no real difference between the platforms of the two p a r ­
ties, With the support of the Labor Party and of most of 
the eighteen independents who had usually been government 
supporters previously, but who had preferred not to identify 
themselves with the party in the election. See was able to 
maintain a secure if declining majority throughout the pa r ­
liament. Much of his legislation was non-controversial and 
social, although the drought caused economic difficulties 
for the government. Even though reduction of the number of 
members in the assembly had been the first plank of his elec­
toral manifesto, opposition to this proposal from his own 
party and from the Labor party made See reluctant to act on 
it. Eventually public pressure forced the government to hold
a referendum on the subject and a large majority of the e-
3lectors voted for a house of ninety members. By 1904 clever 
propoganda by Carruthers had presented the government as a 
front for the Labor party and made the election a choice be­
tween socialism and anti-socialism. In June 1904 See sudden-
4ly resigned on the grounds of ill-health. When Waddell was 
asked to form a cabinet, Wise and Crick refused to serve 
under him on the grounds that they had superior claims to 
the premiership.  ^ The Progressive party had no electoral 
organization, its central body consisted entirely of M.L.A.s^ 
and it endorsed candidates in less than half the electorates 
- an implicit admission that the party relied considerably 
on Labor support. Waddell's electoral platform included 
closer settlement, local government, aid to settlers, water
1. D ,T . , 4/5/01.
2. D »T . , 27/4/01.
3. Electors had a choice between 125, 100 or 90 M.L.A.s. Only
one electorate did not have a majority for an assembly 
of ninety members.
4. D . T . , 10/6/04.
5 . D „ T . , 11/6/04.See also Wise to See, 10/6/04. Wise Papers ,
M.L. MSS 1327 and Wise to Waddell 14/6/04 Wise P a p e r s , 
M.L. A2646.
6 . D . T . , 13/4/04.
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conservation and prudent financial administration. It was
the traditional catch-all programme with no dominant theme.
In the election itself Waddell concentrated almost entirely
2on securing his own re-election and, despite requests, gave 
little assistance to other party candidates. In a disast­
rous defeat only sixteen progressives were returned. After
3meeting parliament and obtaining supply, Waddell resigned.
During the next year the party was singularly ineffec­
tive. With the Labor party now the official opposition,
Waddell was an indecisive leader and his party had no dis-
4cipline and little sense of purpose. 0"Sullivan and W.W.
Young consistently supported the Labor party while others
regularly voted with the Carruthers government. In 1907 a
series of caucus meetings considered fusion with the Liber-
5als but rejected the proposal in a ballot. Waddell had 
strongly favoured an anti-Labor fusion and immediately r e ­
signed to take office in the Liberal cabinet.* 56 The party
decided to postpone the election of a leader until after
7the 1907 election. However in that election the party as 
a distinct unit disappeared; several members joined the 
Liberals while the remainder became independent.
The Labor Party
In 1890 the Sydney Trades and Labor Council decided to 
contest the parliamentary elections and the need for p o l i t ­
ical action was emphasised the same year with the failure 
of the maritime strike. In the election of 1891 thirty-six 
Labor candidates were elected. In spite of the introduction 
of a pledge to vote according to the decision of a majority
1. D ,T . , 28/6/04.
2 . E.J. Brady to Waddell 8/7/04 , 20/7/04. NSW Ministerial
Election Committee P a p e r s , M.L. Uncat. 234.
3 ♦ D,T, , 2 7/8/04.
4. Spence commented that 'the remnants of the Lyne-See party
also sat with them (the Labor party) but were an u n ­
reliable set of men when any fighting was to be done' . 
Australia's A w a k e n i n g , p . 15 8 . The Progressive party
behaviour fully justified this criticism.
5. D,T, , 8/5/07.
6. D ,T , , 9/5/07.
7 . D . T 0 , 5/7/07.
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in caucus, the first Labor party was badly divided, partic­
ularly on the fiscal issue. Several members, pledged to vote 
for protection, were unwilling to support the Parkes govern­
ment and split from the party. Nevertheless Black enunciated 
the official, strategy of the party in his 'support in re­
turn for concessions' speech«^ In 1893 the annual confer­
ence attempted to increase the effectiveness of the party 
by introducing a pledge which demanded more rigid discipline, 
but all except two of the sitting M.L.A.s refused to sign 
it. In the election of 1894 two Labor groups went to the 
polls - the Independent Laborites, who were almost all 
sitting members, and the solidarity Labor party whose can­
didates had signed the new pledge. After the elections,
Cook, the leader of the Independent Laborites, was given 
office in Reid's cabinet while most of the remaining inde­
pendent Labor members were absorbed into the non-Labor par­
ties. Three rejoined the solidarity party before the e-
2lection of 1895.
The solidarity Labor party, a more cohesive and solid 
unit after 1894, elected McGowen leader and gave consistent 
support to the Reid government from 1894 to 1899. Although 
there was never any written agreement between the parties
3about the legislative programme that Reid should introduce, 
at election time the parties avoided opposing each other's 
sitting members. This pact was never formally signed, but
was clearly accepted by both parties and usually adhered
4 5to. In 1899 the Labor party became dissatisfied with Reid
and voted against him on the Neild censure motion. The cre­
dit for persuading the party to oppose Reid has been variously
1. G . Black. The Labor Party in New South Wales; A His­
tory from its Formation in 1891. Sydney n.d. p.5- 12.
2. G. Black, The Labor Party in New South Wales, p.12-14.
3. McGowen NSWPD Series l.Vol. 100..p,1195.-----  I i )
4 . Liberal and Federal Party Election Committee Minutes, 
p, 7b . , M.L. A2668, also New South Wales Ministerial 
Election Committee Minutes, 26/4/04, p.l M.L. Uncat.
MS S 2 3 4 .
5. Spence, ^Australia's Awakening, p.156; Black, The Labor 
Party in New South Wales, p .21.
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1 2  3 4attributed to Hughes, Holman, Griffith, and Spence, all
of whom were said to have approached Lyne and extracted pro­
mises from him. In the circumstances it seems likely that 
Lyne, an experienced politician, contacted as many Labor 
members as he could in order to strengthen his support within 
the Labor caucus. In other words, all the versions of 
approaches to Lyne by individual Labor members may be true, 
with the result that Labor's support for the censure motion 
was the cumulative effect of Lyne1 234s personal efforts rather 
than the responsibility of any one caucus member. Whatever 
the true explanation, the result was that Lyne became Premier 
in 1899 and for five years the Labor party gave him and 
his successors consistent support.
The internal affairs of the party were seldom placid. 
After the split in 1894, the party remained united until 
1900. Then two Labor members who had supported federation 
against the policy of the party left the party after pre­
selection disputes.5 67 In 1902 another member deserted the 
party over the Freidmann affair, resigned his seat and won 
re-election as an independent.^ In 1904 the parliamentary 
party tried to decide which seats in the redistributed elec­
torate thesitting members would contest and consequently
7partly ignored the Labor methods of pre-selection.
In 1904 the party became the official opposition after 
the decline of the Progressives and in 1907 it further in-
1. L J o  Fit zhardinge , W . M H u g h e s  in New South Wales
Politics, 1890-1900, J .R „A „H .S ., Vol.37 part 3,
1951. p . 160-1 .
2. H u V „ Evatt, Australian Labor Leader, p.118-121
3. John Perry attributed the arrangement to Griffith, who
had been the party secretary in 1899, NSWPD, Series 
2, Vol.26, p,100-1.
4. Spence, Australia's Awakening, p „156. Spence admits to
being actually approached by Lyne with a written set 
of promises. In fact he voted in favour of retaining 
the alliance with Reid (D „ T , , 7/9/98) . So in this 
case Lyne failed to make a convert.
5. R. Sleath and W.J„ Ferguson. Ironically these two were
the only Labor M.L.A.s who, as unionists, had been 
imprisoned for their parts in the strikes of the early 
1890s o Both won their seats in 1901 as independents.
6. S „ J . Law, see Black, The Labor Party in New South Wales,p .2 3.
7. D.T., 23/3/04.
creased its strength. After the 1910 election, it secured 
a narrow majority for the first time and McGowen became 
the first Labor Premier.
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Other Political Parties
In this section I shall only briefly describe those 
organizations which were primarily political in purpose. 
Interest or pressure groups which took political action 
will be considered later in the thesis.
Parliamentary Parties
Two 'Independent' Parties were formed, one in 1898,
the second in 1901. The former was convened1 *45678 by Edward
Terry, a wealthy merchant who had won the seat of Ryde
by treating all his electors to lavish picnics and who in
Parliament tried to win office by giving frequent banquets
2which members of all parties attended. Although some cau­
cus meetings were held, Terry refused to call a meeting if
he thought a problem might arise which would split the 
3party. Despite its nominal existence for two years, the 
politically naive Terry was the only person to take the 
Independent Party seriously.
In August 1901 R.A., Price called a caucus of independ-
4ents with the intention of forming a party. Although some
5meetings were held, the party never acted in a united 
fashion and by the end of the session had disappeared.
In 1894 a Country Party had issued a manifesto for the 
6 7election, held a caucus meeting and then became redundant3after the 1895 Land Act. In 1902 another Country Party was
1. D.T., 17/8/9 8,. Seven M.L.A.s were present.
2 . Collis, Lost Years , p.66-9.
3 . NSWPD, series 1, vol.99 , p . 13 9 .
4. D 0 T o , 8/7/01.
5. D .T„ , 11/7/01, 22/7/01, 13/8/01.
6. S . M «, H . , 7/6/94.
7. 31/8/94, 5/9/94.
8. C.G. Kerr, Political Protest and General Development
in Rural New South Wales; Ph.D. Univ. of N.S.W., 
1969, p .3 3 8 .
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formed within the Progressive party in parliament with
all its members supporters of the See government and from
rural electorates,* After a series of meetings the party
accepted a constitution which included a pledge to vote as
the majority of caucus decided. At the annual conference
of the Farmers' and Settlers' Association, the party offered
to act in the assembly as the political wing of the organiz-
2ation, but this proposal was rejected. At first the party
3concentrated on such rural matters as water conservation but
in October it was forced to make a decision on its attitude
in the Freidmann censure motion. The party caucus decided,
reputedly by one vote, to support the government. Carroll
immediately resigned and voted with the opposition while
4Rose voted as directed by the party and then resigned. The 
unity of the party was shattered and despite a continuous 
existence over the next year its influence was small.
Extra-Parliamentary Parties
The Freetrade and Land Reform League was founded in 
April 1893 by non-parliamentarians but B.R. Wise soon be­
came its leader. The League demanded direct taxation of 
income and land without exemptions. Its followers were
drawn from the more radical freetraders and included sev-
5eral leading single-taxers . The League created a strong
branch network and was reputedly the most efficient organ-
£
ization involved in the 1894 election. Wise claimed for
7it the majority of the credit for the freetrade success.
In August 1894 Wise made an attempt to create a ginger groupQwithin the parliamentary freetrade party but a split within
1. D „ T ., 24/4/02, Convened by Rose. In September, Gormly
was elected leader, Briner secretary and Carroll whip. 
D „T . , 11/9/02.
2. Farmers' and Settlers' Association, Conference Reports,
1900-1906, 1902 Report, p.69. Mitchell Library M.L. 
630.6/8.
3. D,T,, 29/7/02.
4. D ,T . , 1/10/02 , 3/10/02 , 13/10/02 .
5. e.g. Frank Cotton, Dr. Hollis, Lonsdale.
6. A „W . Martin, Free Trade and Protectionist Parties in
New South Wales, p . 3 2 0.
7. D „T . , 18/7/94.
8. New South Wales Legislative Council Petitions and Pro­
ceedings , p„251. Mitchell Library, A.285.
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this group occurred when the ambitions of Wise became too 
obvious.1 When Wise attacked Reid in November 1894, he was 
unable to keep the allegiance of his previous supporters who 
were generally satisfied with Reid's performance and became 
assimilated into the Freetrade party. With the loss of Wise, 
the League ceased to be an important political force.
The National Association, a strongly conservative, anti- 
socialist body consisting of businessmen and leading pastor- 
alists, also contested the 1894 and 1895 elections. It ig­
nored both the fiscal issue and the existing parties and 
advocated the election of 'good men'. Their nominees tended 
to be conservative. In spite of extravagant claims for its 
effectiveness by its secretary, William Epps, its influence 
was probably limited and it disbanded in 1898.2 34
The Federal Association was formed by Barton in 1898 to 
secure the acceptance of the Convention Bill at the first 
referendum. It included both freetraders and protectionists.
A series of branches were formed in April, 1898, and the 
referendum campaign was centrally co-ordinated with the 
speakers provided throughout the state. When the bill was 
rejected, the Association co-operated with the Protectionist 
party in the 1898 elections. Despite some tensions the com­
bined strength of both parties brought large gains. The 
Association supported Reid and Barton in their advocacy of 
the second convention bill in 1899 and then disbanded.
In 1902 two organizations were formed to demand retrench­
ment in the expenses of the state government and a reduction 
in the number of state M.L.A.s. The Taxpayers' Union included 
the same class of conservative businessmen who had been mem­
bers of the National Association and its policy was similar
4to that of its predecessor. The People's Reform League,
1» B.R. Wise to Varney Parkes, 31/8/94. Varney Parkes Papers. 
Mitchell Library, A.105 2,/
2 . A . W o Martin, Free Trade and Protectionist Parties in New
South Wales, p.321. S,M,H., 15/2/94, 16/3/94, 28/3/94,
14/4/94, 2/6/94, 6/7/94, 7/7/94, 12/7/94; William Epps,
'I am not Ashamed; My Apologia'. Mitchell Library ML 
MSS 1831; John Baptist Papers, Mitchell Library,Uncat.162
3. D .T ,, 26/3/98, 1/4/98, 2/4/98, 1/6/98, 8/6/98, 16/6/98.
4. D.T., 16/1/02, 25/1/02, 25/2/02, 3/4/02.
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founded in Camden, was an attempt to copy the successful
Ky ab ra m movement in Victoria. It soon formed a series of
bra nch es thro ughout the Sydney suburbs and in some country 
2ele ctorates. The two organi z a t i o n s  united in May 1903 un-
3der the name of the People's Reform League. Al t h o u g h  it 
was supposed to be a body designed for p r o p oganda purposes 
only, the League imme diately  became involved in political 
c am pa ig ni ng and the s e l e c t i o n o f  candidates and c onsequently 
clashed with the Liberal and Reform Association. Its p r e s ­
ident, John Stinson, was suspicious of the sincerity of
po li t i c i a n s  and his personal  antipathy towards Carruthers
4pre ve nt ed  any union b e t w e e n  the two bodies. In 1904, h o w ­
ever, a joint committee was created to avoid v o t e - s p l i t t i n g
5in the selection of candidates and it worked fairly e f f e c ­
tively. After 1904 the People's Reform League continued to 
act on a limited basis, a t t e mpting to keep the government on 
truly c on servative lines and r e g i stering voters. It played 
only a minor role in the 1907 election and, fully satisfied 
with the p e r f o rmance of the Wade government, declared itself 
re du nd an t in 1909.
1. D . T . , 25/4/02
2. D . T . , 7/5/02 , 8/5/02 , 14/5/02, 16/6/02, 17/6/02 , 29/7/02 ,
2 6 / 8 / 0 2 „
3. D ,T . , 17/4/03 , 28/4/03 , 2/5/03 .
4 „ D „ T . , 9/4/03, 28/4/03 , 1/6/03 .
5. D „T . , 23/4/04 .
6 . S „ M . H „ , 6/3/09.
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Chapter 4
Tasmania at the Turn of the Century 
Introduction
The character of politics in Tasmania changed markedly 
between 1894 and 1912«, In 1894 the Assembly was divided 
between two loose groups often called Liberal and Conserv­
ative, or, more commonly, Ministerialist and Opposition.
These groups were called 'parties' by contemporaries but 
were in fact little more than combinations of individuals, 
in which no one person was dominant or responsible for their 
formation or cohesion. By 1912 two distinct and coherent 
parties, the Liberal and Labor parties, existed. The par­
liament of 1894-6 was typical of most parliaments in Tas­
mania before 1903; there was no formal organization in 
parliament or in the electorate. Parties emerged gradually 
after 1903 but not according to any regular pattern of de­
velopment and by 1912 a well-organized non-Labor party had 
been formed.
In the period seven elections were held - in 1893, 1897,
1900, 1903, 1906, 1909 and 1912. In the decade, 1893-1903,
I will study only one parliament (1894-6) and one election 
(1893) in detail because the activity of groups in that 
parliament was similar to that of the following two. This 
analysis is necessary to provide a contrast between the 
party and pre-party period in Tasmanian politics. After 
1903 each election illustrates a gradual growth of party 
method and this development will be discussed later in the 
thesis. First a general background to Tasmanian politics, 
similar to that already provided in the previous chapter for 
New South Wales, must be given.
The Constitution
The Tasmanian parliament was divided into two houses, 
the Legislative Council and the House of Assembly. The 
council contained eighteen members who were elected for six- 
year terms by voters defined by a restricted property fran­
chise, Three members retired each year. The council could 
not be dissolved and was therefore able to thwart any min­
istry without fear of reprisals. In fact the usually old 
and conservative members were also often returned unopposed.
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Party labels were seldom adopted either in elections for 
the council or in its actual activities . ^
In the House of Assembly the number of members varied 
according to the electoral provisions. There were thirty- 
six MoH.A.s in 1893, thirty-eight in 1898, thirty-five in 
1903 and thirty after 1909. Ministries had to maintain a 
majority in the assembly and usually all but one minister 
had seats there. The chief secretary was usually the gov­
ernment representative in the council. Collective minister­
ial responsibility was accepted, although ministers who had
2been personally discredited sometimes resigned individually. 
Open questions on which ministers publicly differed gradually 
declined in number. The Governor could act only on the re­
ceipt of advice but, as in New South Wales, he was not ob­
liged to take that advice. Twice he refused to grant a dis- 
3solution and on another occasion he declined to postpone
the meeting of parliament to allow discontent in the premier's
4party to subside.
5In 1894 a limited franchise still existed in Tasmania. 
Voting for the assembly was restricted to those who owned 
freehold property of a rateable value of £40 per annum or 
whose wages exceeded £60 per annum. Plural voting was per­
mitted if property owners fulfilled the franchise require­
ments in more than one electorate.  ^ in 1898 all property-
1. For discussion of voting in the Council, see Appendix D.
2. Such as E.T. Miles in 1899 and A. Stewart in 1906.
3. 1904 and 1909. There was also a famous incident in 1914
when he attempted to coerce the Labor Premier into 
asking for a dissolution by making it a condition of 
being invited to form a Cabinet. After the ministry 
was formed, the Labor leader ignored this condition.
H V . Evatt . The King and his Dominion Governors , chap­
ter 4 .
4 . The Governor's Confidential Despatches , 3 0/6/06 .
State Archives of Tasmania.
5. This paragraph is based on Hughes and Graham, Handbook
of Australian Government and Politics , p . 587 -9 .
6. In 1897 590 electors had two votes, ninety-eight had
three votes and one person even had seven votes. J our - 
nal and Papers of Parliament, 1897 Vol.36, Statistics
of Tasmania p.93.
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owners received the vote and the wage barrier was reduced 
to £40 per annum. After federation, manhood suffrage was 
introduced and all men who had had twelve months residence 
in the island, except paupers, prisoners and lunatics, were 
permitted to vote. Universal suffrage was introduced in 
1902 and women voted for the first time in the elections of 
1906. Voting and registration were voluntary. In 1896 a 
candidate was permitted by law to incur electoral expenses 
of £100 for the first five hundred voters and £5 for each 
hundred thereafter, but in 1906, with the introduction of 
the Hare-Clark system, £100 was made the legal maximum ex­
penditure for any candidate.
Both the number of electorates and the electoral 
methods changed frequently during this period. In 1893 
there were eight two-member and twenty single-member elect­
orates. In 1897 this was changed to twenty-seven single 
member electorates with six members being elected for Ho­
bart and four for Launceston under the Hare-Clark system 
of proportional representation. Two West Coast seats were 
added in 1894 and 1898. In 1903 the state was re-divided 
into thirty-five single-member constituencies. Finally in 
1906 the state was sub-divided into five electorates which 
were identical with the federal constituencies, each re­
turning six members under the Hare-Clark system.1 In all 
the elections, the polls of every electorate were held 
simultaneou sly.
The Society and the Economy
Tasmania at the turn of the century can be subdivided 
into five economic and geographic areas. The main fruit-
1. The Hare-Clark system of proportional representation, 
as adopted in Tasmania, demanded that each voter 
express at least three preferences. When a candidate 
reached the required quota (one-sixth of all primary 
votes plus one), his surplus votes were then re­
distributed according to a prescribed formula. If no 
candidates had a quota, then the candidate with the 
least votes was excluded and his votes were distri­
buted, When only seven candidates remained, those 
with a quota and those remaining with the highest 
number of votes below the quota were declared elected.
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growing districts which had expanded their production rapidly 
in the 1890s'1' were in the south around the Huon. In the mid­
lands were the well-established pastoral properties which 
had been settled for sixty years. Although the hegemony of 
the Tasmanian gentry was now destroyed, the leading families, 
particularly the Camerons, the Pillingers, the Youls and the
Archers, still had a large influence over the politics of
2the small country electorates. In New South Wales the larg­
er population and the rapidly expanding areas of settlement 
meant that this class as a group was never as influential.
In the north-west the country was being opened up by the 
small farmers who had settled there in the second half of 
the century and who were still remote from major towns and
3poorly serviced by roads and railways. On the west coast 
the expansion of the mines and of the secondary industries 
which were connected to them, such as smelting, attracted a 
flood of mainland immigrants and this part of the island
4was in many respects different from the rest of Tasmania.
Smaller mining areas could also be found in the north-east.
Finally the two major cities, Hobart and Launceston, con-
5tained one quarter of the state's population; by contrast 
41% of the population of New South Wales lived in the county 
of Cumberland in 1901,,6
In 1894 wool and fruit were the main rural exports of 
the state, each with a value of around '£250,000 - the Tasman­
ian wool clip was only 3% of the value of that of New South 
Wales. By 1909 fruit, with exports valued at over £750,000, 
was almost twice as profitable as wool (only £400,000). Ex­
ports of minerals in 1894 were worth about £750,000, and in 
1906 £2,000,000. Copper and tin were the most valuable of
1 „ Coghlan, Labour and Industry in Australia , p . 217 7 .
2. H. Reynolds, 'Men of Substance and Deservedly Good Repute' , 
The Tasmanian Gentry, 1856-1875 , A .J .P .H . , Vol.15, N o .3 , 
December 1969, p.71-2.
3„ See H „ J „ W „ Stokes, North-West Tasmania, 1858-1910: The
establishment of an agricultural community, Ph.D. A.N.U. 
1969 .
4, See G. Blainey, Peaks of Lyell , 3rd Ed. Melbourne 1967 .
5, Census of Tasmania, 1901, p.276-9.
6, Census of New South Wales , 1901, p.633-49.
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the minerals.^ The total exports of the state increased 
from a value of £1,489,041 in 1894 to £3,431,250 in 1909 - 
an expansion of 120%. However, the total value of Tasmanian 
exports was still only worth about 10% of that of New South 
Walesu In rural areas, Tasmania saw few major changes; the 
number of people involved in agriculture increased from six­
teen thousand in 1891 to twenty thousand in 1911 when the 
acreage under cultivation was 34% of the same area in New 
South Wales. The industrial employees only increased from 
16,000 in 1894 to 17,000 in 1911. The increase in the num­
ber of miners was more rapid, particularly in the decade,
1891 to 1901, when their numbers increased from about four 
thousand to over five and a half thousand. Between 1891 
and 1911 the total population of the stae expanded from
146,667 to 191,211 - an increase of 30%. Tasmania's popula-
2tion was only 12% that of New South Wales.
Although some rural areas were unchanged, other parts 
of the state were developing rapidly and demanding govern­
mental assistance in opening up the country with public works. 
A promise of a road or a bridge meant more to a farmer in 
the north-west than a grandiose political scheme in distant 
Hobart. Furthermore, the rugged terrain made land communi­
cations difficult, with the result that sea transport through 
Burnie, Strahan and Launceston was the most convenient method 
of moving produce and so Hobart, unlike Sydney, did not dom­
inate the trade of its hinterland.
The greatest change to the Tasmanian way of life was 
caused by the arrival of many mainland miners and industrial 
workers who brought a new radicalism and a new industrial 
awareness to the island. At first this industrial movement 
was confined to the mining districts of the island, but it 
gradually expanded its influence to the main towns.
The government was always faced with the problems of 
providing public works for the developing countryside and,
.1 . Journals and Papers of Parliament , 1911, Vol.65, Statist­
ical Survey of Tasmania, p.6-7.
2 „ Census of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1911, p.1286,1291
Ä1so the number of Tasmanian miners was 15% of those of 
New South Wales; its industrial employees were 8%, its 
agriculturalists 25%.
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as industry grew, it had to develop policies and institutions 
for regulating industrial life and conflicts and improving 
the social conditions in which the workers lived. Federa­
tion made little difference to Tasmanian politics; the 
fiscal issue had never been a decisive factor^ in the affairs 
of a state which relied heavily on Victoria as a market and 
as a source of goods. The post-federation problems were con­
tinuations of earlier ones.
The Pre-Party Period
Two groups were predominant in Tasmanian politics be­
fore parties developed. They were not factions according
2to the criterion set up by Bailey or in the manner of the
early factions in New South Wales; the members of the group
never supported the leader as an individual but rather as
an equal who had been elected to lead the group in the as- 
3sembly. They were simply loose combinations of minister­
ialists or oppositionists who were either in or out of 
office and who owed each other little. In particular they 
were all electorally independent of one another. They co­
operated as individuals for the purpose of gaining power, 
without making specific commitments to one another.
In the 1870s power had alternated between two evenly 
4balanced 'parties' and a political stalemate was only re-
5solved in 1879 by the formation of a coalition government. 
Opposition to this government was recreated in parliament in 
1882 and a 'two-party' situation which lasted until 1902 
was formed. Caucuses of opposition members selected all 
their leaders in that time and the leader of the opposition 
was generally invited to form a government after the defeat 
of opposing ministries. Apart from these main groups the
1. Some historians have overemphasised its importance; see,
for instance, C.I. Clark, The Parliament of Tasmania:
An Historical Sketch, Hobart 1947, p.65-6.
2. Bailey, Strategems and Spoils, p.50.
3. For the difference between faction leaders and elected
leaders in New South Wales, see Loveday and Martin, 
Parliament, Factions and Parties, p .54.
4. J . A , Nockels, Tasmanian Politics and Factions in the 1870s,
B.A. (Hons) Thesis, University of Tasmania 1967.
5. Mercury, (hereafter M^) 29/10/79.
6. M. , 5/10/82 .
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assembly always included several independents who could not 
be relied upon to give regular support to a ministry. Some 
M.H.A.s were ministerialists in the most literal sense in 
that they gave support to all ministries in a desire to sec­
ure stability of administration.’*' The groups were neither 
inflexible nor exclusive. Any M.H.A. could join either party 
or transfer from one to the other without undue loss of pres­
tige. The groups were not divided by any vital distinction 
of policy and their attitudes could change according to the 
ideas of the leading members.
Ministries were generally formed from one group alone 
although coalitions could occur. A ministry had to maintain 
a majority in the assembly but its fate was at stake only on 
direct censure motions. Defeat on other motions, including 
some government measures, was not regarded as illustrating 
a lack of confidence in the ministry. The small number of 
members in the house increased the power of the individual 
whose vote could be more influential than that of his contem­
porary in New South Wales. With a majority of one in a div­
ision being fairly common, each M.H.A. had to be considered 
in political tactics and his requirements, which were 
usually local, satisfied.
Before 1902 politics was generally the activity of a 
limited social group. Established city or country families 
were often well represented. Most M.H.A.s were of a middle 
class background and had already proved themselves in other 
walks of life» Few were young. As a result power was kept 
in the hands of men who had an interest in conserving so­
ciety and in opposing radical change, although some M.H.A.s
from small farming districts and the occasional city member
2had more advanced ideas. However, the western mining dis­
tricts, populated largely by mainland immigrants, began in 
the late 1890s to challenge the ordered calm of Tasmanian
1. H.R. Dumaresq contested every election between 1891 and
1903 as a ministerialist even though four different 
ministries were in office during that time. Hughes 
and Graham, Handbook of Australian Government and 
Politics, p.592-7.
2. H. Reynolds, Regionalism in Nineteenth Century Tasmania,
T .H R A „ Vol . 17 No.l, p.25.
society and from these areas came the impetus which was to 
change its earlier political methods.
With politics dominated by personalities, the lack of 
formal organization is not surprising. In parliament infor­
mal caucuses were held at irregular intervals by both groups 
to discuss tactics. Whips were occasionally appointed. In 
the electorate few attempts were made to organize the voters. 
The allegiance of the member in parliament was of little 
account in the electorate; what mattered there was his 
success in promoting local demands. The electorates were 
often small geographically and had only a small number of 
electors. The structure of society was stable and deferen­
tial and the landowner or sitting member could often secure 
election without a contest. In 1897, 37% of the seats were
uncontested,in 1900 36%, in 1903 11% and in 1906 23%. In 
New South Wales uncontested seats never accounted for more 
than 10.4% of the seats (as in 1901) and usually for less 
than 4 % . ^
The Party in Parliament
Since party lines in Tasmania were indistinct, it is 
more profitable for the historical description to concentrate 
on examining party history in parliament and then in the 
electorate. Both surveys will cover the period 1893-1912 
but will only briefly mention the years between 1897 and 
1903 .
After the elections of December 1893, the allegiance
of many members, and particularly of those elected for the
first time, was sufficiently unclear for both groups to 
2claim victory. Even though a split between the two leading 
ministers, Henry Dobson and John Henry, was widely 
recognized, the government stayed in office and 
was able to defeat two censure motions in March 1894. Brad- 
don had begun to rally opposition members directly after the
3election and in February he had been elected leader, replac-
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1. Figures from Hughes and Graham. Handbook of Australian
Government and Politics , p.431-439, 593-596.
2. For details of party numbers, see Appendix A.
3. Launceston Examiner , 23/12/93 , 28/12/93.
ing Bird.'1' The opposition held a series of caucus meetings
2at which tactics were discussed and finally defeated the
government on its land tax bill and forced it to resign. A
party caucus then elected Braddon premier, although he only
3won the ballot by one vote from A.I. Clark. The caucus 
also persuaded Fysh and Moore to join the ministry. The 
new ministerialists had no common ideology but were gener­
ally considered to be more liberal and progressive than the
4ministers they replaced. In the new opposition Lewis was 
elected leader as a compromise to prevent the party being
5irrevocably split between Henry and Dobson.
Braddon was an able and vigorous administrator whose 
retrenchment of the civil service became a by-word for ruth­
lessness.^ He was an expert lobbyist who was often respon­
sible for persuading members to vote on his side in divisions. 
With the aid of able colleagues he had no problems in pass­
ing through the assembly his main government measures, but 
he was unable to control the council which consistently 
rejected a series of proposals which were designed to
7equalize the burden of taxation in the state. Braddon's 
main measure wad the introduction of a graduated land tax, 
but other minor taxes were imposed at the same time as 
drastic retrenchment took place. The main achievement of 
the ministry was to allow the state to recover economically 
from the bank crash of 1893.
After 1897 Braddon's political position deteriorated
8because he lost all his original colleagues who were replaced 
by mediocrities. The greatest burden of administration fell
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1. M . , 28/2/94.
2 . M. , 29/3/94.
3 . M. , 13/4/94,
4 , Reynolds, Regionalism in Nineteenth Century Tasmania, p . 2 1.
5 . M. , 18/5/94.
6 . FoC t Green (ed.) A Century of Responsible Government, p . 196
7 . For instance in 1894, the Council defeated the Income Tax
Bill (M, , 19/7/94) , the Probate Duties Bill(M. , 26/7/94)
the Assessment Bill (M. , 17/8/94), the Stamp Duties Bill
(M. , 23/8/94) . In the next two years, his legislation
produced similar reactions.
8. Clark resigned in October 1897 and became leader of the op­
position, Fysh became Agent-General in December 1898 and 
Pillinger died in May 1899.
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onto his aged and ailing shoulders and for the first time 
the ministry became completely dependent on one individual. 
Then, in August 1899, one of the new ministers, Edward Miles, 
was accused of corrupt practices and the ensuing scandal1 2 3
alienated sufficient supporters to destroy the Braddon gov­
ernment. Lewis then formed a government and maintained 
power with ease until 1903 but by that time he had become 
unpopular in the state, particularly because he introduced an 
income tax. In the election of 1903 the government was op­
posed by the popular Reform League and all three ministers 
were defeated. This election brought to parliament a large 
if unwieldy and internally divided group of supporters of 
the Reform League who were partly identified with the earl­
ier opposition, The first Labor party of three M.H.A.s, all 
from the West Coast, was also elected.
After the election William Propsting formed a ministry 
whose members were young and progressive. Their plans in­
cluded consideration of the abolition of the council which,
3not surprisingly, rejected many of their radical proposals.
In the assembly Propsting was supported by a large majority 
which was, however, united originally only by its opposition 
to the Lewis government. He lacked the ability to maintain 
the coherence of this group, especially when few of his 
measures became law, His aspirations were far-reaching but 
his achievements were few. He tried to alter the electoral 
system, to introduce proportional representation and to im­
pose property, land and income taxes. These measures were 
aimed at the wealthier classes and were suspect to many of 
his lukewarm supporters. Gradually his followers became 
disillusioned with his promises and several joined the op­
position which was now led by Captain John Evans. Prop­
sting was never defeated in the assembly but resigned in 
protest against the council's obstruction in July 1904, 
clearly expecting that Evans would be unable to form a min­
istry and that he would be granted the dissolution which
1. Governor ’s Confidential Despatches , 20/10/98. State
Archives of Tasmania,
2o Spence, Australia's Awakening, p,236-7.
3, Such as their Occupancy Tax (M^, 12/5/04) their Early
Closing Bill (M . , 20/5/04) , and their Constitution
Bill, (M. , 20/5/04) .
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he had requested but which the governor had refused. How­
ever, Evans, a competent if uninspiring leader,gained the 
support of several followers of Propsting who had been dis­
couraged by the government's radical ideas and who saw more 
promise of stable government under Evans.1 23 After Evans took 
office, his administration was sufficiently competent to 
maintain a safe majority. His ministry aimed to give sound 
administration, rather than to innovate. His measures were 
mainly concerned with uncontroversia1 topics. The influence 
of the opposition declined as its numbers fell and in Dec­
ember 1905 its leader, Propsting, won a seat in the council 
and resigned.
In the 1906 election Evans consolidated his position, 
although he was forced by the defeat of his attorney-general 
to reshuffle his cabinet. In his new ministry he included
2Propsting and D.C. Urquhart, both nominally oppositionists.
The Labor party doubled its numbers and included members 
who represented electorates other than those on the West 
Coast. The opposition was left with little alternative but 
to co-operate with Labor and immediately half its members, 
who anyway did not disagree with the Evans government on 
any matters of principle, deserted to the government ranks.
The government was never in danger of defeat, its legisla­
tion caused few crises and its majority was so large that 
strict party discipline was unnecessary. Several important 
social measures were passed; closer settlement was expanded 
and free education and proportional representation were intro­
duced. Evans had a capacity for letting anything controver­
sial drift by; his time in office was remarkably quiet and 
generally prosperous for the state. The opposition remained 
badly divided and even with the aid of the Labor party could
not seriously challenge the ministry. In 1908 both its lead-
3ers were given government appointments and left politics.
1. M__, 8/7/04, 9/7/04.
2. Hughes and Graham, Handbook of Australian Government and
Politics , p , -5-9-8-, X L - 6 .
3. Nicholls became a Judge after Alfred Dobson, the Agent-
General, refused the appointment. (M . , 1/12/08) .
McCall became Agent-General after Dobson fell overboard 
from a channel steamer and was drowned. (M. , 8/12/08) .
In 1909 the party was badly defeated at the polls, with 
only one member being returned.
In 1909 eighteen non-Labor and twelve Labor members 
were returned. The non-Labor members met in a caucus to 
to create a united party in June 1909. The leadership of 
Evans in the election had been poor because he had concen­
trated entirely on his own electorate and his position as 
leader was challenged. The caucus first agreed on a common 
policy and then elected Lewis leader with a majority of 
one vote over A . E . Solomon, a newly-elected member for Laun­
ceston. Evans came third.'*' The election of Lewis caused 
considerable dissatisfaction in the party because he b e ­
longed to a conservative tradition and several members im­
mediately made it clear that if the government was too slow 
to act, particularly in removing unpopular taxes, they 
would withdraw their support. For four months the govern­
ment was inactive and in October 1909 Ewing led a revolt 
against Lewis on the floor of the assembly, condemning him
2for his failure to keep promises made at the fusion caucus.
The ministry was defeated and a minority Labor government
formed. However, when Lewis refused to resign the party
leadership, the rebels were left with the choice of coming
to terms with him or of supporting a Labor government. They
3quickly re-negotiated another fusion. For the remainder 
of the parliament Lewis's position was secure although he 
faced opposition from within his own party in passing a 
wages board bill and there were rumblings of discontent from 
the backbenches about his conservatism. He introduced land 
taxation, consolidated the management of the railways, fin­
ally settled longstanding disputes in the Education Depart­
ment and legislated in a small way to improve industrial 
conditions .
In the election of 1912, the anti-socialist party was 
reduced to fifteen members and, after providing the Speaker, 
it relied for a majority on the one independent in the house.
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1 . 
2 . 
3 .
M . , 9/6/09, 10/6/09.
M , , 15/10/09.
M , , 21/10/09, 22/10/09.
Lewis's leadership in the election had been unin s p i r i n g  and, 
when cha llenged in a caucus, he resigned his p o s ition and 
Solomon was elected to replace him.'*' However the independent, 
Norman Cameron, was p o l i t i c a l l y  ambitious and d e t e rmined 
to act as king-maker. When the Liberals refused his demand 
that they make him premier, he gave them i nconsistent s u p ­
port and then in December offered to vote with the Labor
2party in a censure motion. The Speaker immediately t h r e a t ­
ened to resign so that he could vote with his party in the
3 4division, but Earle wi t h d r e w  his motion when Cameron's
terms for an alliance pr oved u n a c c e p t a b l y  high. Although
still undefeated, Solomon refused to govern at the whim of
an in de pendent and called a snap election in which Cameron
was defeated. With sixteen Liberals and fourteen Labor
me mbe rs returned, a clear two- party alignment was recreated.
The N o n - Labor Parties in the E lectorate
Like all elections before 1903, that of 1893 was c o n ­
tested in personal terms, with no broad issues or wide s p r e a d  
or ga niz ation. The leading p o l i ticians of each group issued 
m a n i fe st oes which p r o mised to introduce graduated land t a x ­
ation, to retrench g o v e r n m e n t  expenditure and to alter the
law on land, mining and the wood industry. There was little
5d if fe re nc e between the two policies. The leaders did not 
campaign on behalf of their supporters, each of whom was 
concerned only with his own electorate and presented his own 
par ti cu lar policy. O r g a n i z a t i o n  consisted almost entirely 
of local committees which canvassed the electorate. One 
electoral body, the Liberal Progressive A s s o c i a t i o n ^ , had 
some success. It org a n i z e d  the electors in Launceston, 
chose a candidate in a p r e - s e l e c t i o n  ballot, won one seat
1 . 
2 . 
3.
4 .
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6 e
M ., 6/6/12.
M » , 14/12/12.
M ,, 17/12/12.
M . , 18/12/12.
La unceston E x a m i n e r , 20/11/93, 4/12/93.
Seen as the p r e d e c e s s o r  of the Labor party by Spence, 
A ustralia's A w a k e n i n g , p.237-8 and by M,D. McRae, 
Some aspects of the origins of the Tasmanian Labor 
Party, T ,,H „R „ A . Vol . 3 , No . 1 . , December 1953 , p.24-5.
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and almost defeated a minister in another. However it made 
no attempt to extend its organization outside Launceston and 
disappeared in 1895,
After federation a widespread demand for the reduction
in the expenses of the state government caused the formation
of the Tasmanian Reform League, a body which followed the
example of the Kyabram movement in Victoria. The League
attacked the financial incapacity of the Lewis government,
produced a vague ten-point platform and formed a state
council which was sub-divided into northern and southern
committees. Several branches were founded; some of them
selected candidates but they seldom co-operated with one 
2another. This unusual electoral activity stirred the gov­
ernment into action. One minister, Edward Mulcahy, toured 
the state addressing meetings and defending his government's 
record. This tour was the first appeal by a politician to 
the island as a*whole in a state election. Generally there 
was little difference between the policies of Lewis, of 
the opposition and of the Reform League. All of them prom­
ised to reduce the numbers of the assembly, to balance the 
budget, to introduce local government and to submit all pub­
lic works proposals to a board of experts. The main emphasis 
was on the need for sound financial administration.3 In the 
election twenty adherents of the Reform League won seats 
and all three ministers were defeated. However the League 
disappeared in late 1903 after it had failed to create any 
permanent parliamentary or electoral organization.
The election of 1903 also saw the appearance of the
first Labor M.H.A.s and, three months later, the formation
4of the Tasmanian Labor party. As a reaction to what was 
seen as a threat of socialism, Lewis founded the National 
Association in April 1904. This association was formed to
1. Launceston Examiner , 31/10/93 , 21/11/93 , 25/11/93 , 27/11/93 ,
18/12/93 .
2 . Launceston Examiner , 5/2/03, North-West Advocate, 2/2/03.
3. Launceston Examiner , 30/1/03, 5/2/03 , 6/3/03 .
4. McRae, Some Aspects of the Origins of the Tasmanian
Labor Party, p.24-5; M., 8/6/03,
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oppose class and socialistic legislation - the two were al­
ways considered virtually synonymous - and 'to secure for 
our representatives in Parliament the exercise of their 
independent judgement, unhampered by any body of me n ' . ^
Designed according to its propaganda to represent the pro-
2ducing, manufacturing and trading interests of the state ,
it put forward the views of the conservative sections of
the community who were worried by the dangers of socialism
and it received donations from several Hobart businesses,
3including the Cascades Brewery. It had no direct connec­
tion with the Evans cabinet although its candidates always 
supported his ministry. In 1906 Evans's election manifesto 
included a series of practical reforms such as aid to settlers, 
subsidies for road building, closer settlement and local
government and generally promised to continue a policy of
4careful administration. The National Association did not 
produce any specific platform and its endorsement was prob­
ably of little help to candidates, none of whom used the 
National Association label as though it was an electoral 
asset. Although it was reported that numerous branches had 
been formed, the members had no part to play in the affairs 
of the Association which were run by an oligarchic council.
Its organization was ineffective. It stood for anti-social­
ism and did not put forward any constructive proposals, 
though had the Labor party been as socialistic as it pre­
tended, it might have been forced to provide a more definite 
policy.
In 1907 a group, led by N.K. Ewing, tried to alter the
image of the association by changing its name to the Progress- 
5ive League, by putting forward a series of planks which 
the League would support and by developing a new constitution 
which permitted branch participation in pre-selection.^ A 
fulltime paid organizer went on tour and founded several
1 . 19/4/04.
2 . 2/2/05.
3 . M ^ # 19/12/05.
4 . 26/2/05.
5 . 14/1/07 .
6 . NU, 7/5/07 .
P'T'QpO'y'~t<o^ >o I
branches. However the introduction of -pr of or ont4-a-l voting 
reduced the immediate necessity for party organization which 
was to prevent seats being lost by split votes. The Pro­
gressive League still held pre-selection meetings but these 
did no more than endorse candidates who had little in common 
except their anti-socialism. The organization of the League 
appeared to be based on a firm foundation of branches, but 
in the election of 1909 it organized no meetings and produced 
no comprehensive or generally accepted policy. Its name was 
not used as an electoral asset by candidates. After the 
election, it faded out of existence.
In 1909 the Farmers' and Stockowners' Association
examined the possibility of forming a new anti-socialist
party with strong roots in rural as well as urban areas.
It believed that earlier organizations had failed because
they were entirely centred on the cities,'*’ On its initia-
2tive, meetings in Hobart, Launceston and Longford laid
the foundation of the Liberal League which was officially
3organized in August when a constitution was adopted. This 
constitution introduced a state council, electorate commit­
tees and branches, with all members of the ruling body of
the League being elected from below. With the appointment
4of three organizers the League concentrated on creating
a firm branch network and by June 1910 over a hundred
5branches had been formed. In 1911 its first annual con­
ference included delegates from fifty-three branches The
League was not connected with the parliamentary Liberal 
party by an official link although its first president was 
the premier, Lewis. Several M.H.A.s held official party 
positions and the conference in 1912 was addressed by the 
new premier, Solomon. In the elections of 1912 and 1913 
the League endorsed the sitting M.H.A.s without question, 
although it denied that it desired to control the members in 
any way. It was a distinct extra-parliamentary wing whose
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main task was to support the parliamentary Liberal party 
electorally, Its policy was general and demanded progress­
ive government, the maintenance of states' rights, the 
introduction of closer settlement and the defence of the 
Legislative Council As premier, Lewis produced in 1912 
a manifesto which was similar in its general aims and sug­
gested short-term objectives for a government. In 1912 its 
organization, based on an impressive network of branches, 
was permanent and efficient and by then it had reached a 
similar stage of organization as the Liberal and Reform 
Association five years earlier. In 1917 it also became 
absorbed into the Nationalist party.
The Labor Party
After the failure of various organizations in the 
21890s, three Labor M.H.A.s won West Coast seats in the 
1903 election „ Three months later a conference of branch 
and union delegates was held in Hobart and the Tasmanian 
Labor party was formed. One other M.H.A., J. Jensen of 
Georgetown, immediately joined the party. In 1906 the 
Labor party increased its numbers to seven, including 
one seat from each of Hobart and Launceston. Although 
numerically stronger than the official opposition, the 
Labor party still acted as the third party in the assembly.
In 1909 the Hare-Clark system gave Labor the opportun­
ity of drawing support from areas in which a Labor candidate 
would have had no chance of success if single-member elect­
orates had been maintained. The party increased its num­
bers to twelve in the election. In October 1909 the Earle 
government held office for one week and then in 1910 the 
Labor candidates won all the seats in the Federal Senate 
election. This success was repeated in 1912 when Labor in­
creased its strength to fourteen and for a time the party 
considered an alliance with Cameron but then rejected his 
terms. By 1914 the party was strong enough to take office 
for an extended period with the assistance of an independent 
Liberal.
1. M^, 26/3/12.
2. See McRae, Some Aspects of the Origins of the Tasmanian
Labor party .
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Comparison Between Tasmania and New South Wales
Comparison between the states can be drawn in five 
relevant respects: these are the geographical, the econ­
omic, the social, the numerical and the political. New 
South Wales was of course a far larger state, distances 
between towns were much greater and electorates covered 
wider areas. The demand for railways, roads and inland 
transport was inevitably much more urgent than it was in 
Tasmania where fewer new areas were being opened up for 
settlement during this period. Furthermore, because 
Tasmania was an island, it had more outlets for trade and 
exports and they were closer to the areas of production. 
Consequently the degree of centralisation in the two states 
differed. In New South Wales Sydney was the hub of the 
state's trade and railways radiated from the capital whose 
position of dominance was unchallenged by any country town.
In Tasmania Hobart did not play the same central role; the 
northern and western regions of the island were centred on 
the ports of Launceston, Strahan and Burnie, did not de­
pend on Hobart for trade and, because of its geographical 
isolation, often ignored it. Exports were sent direct to 
the mainland.
Secondly, the economies of the two states differed;
New South Wales was, of course, a much richer state.1 It 
depended onthe wool clip for its exports and less on mineral 
production. Tasmania's main primary export was fruit and 
jam but the greatest wealth of the island came from its 
mines on the west coast. New South Wales was the more 
urbanised state with over 40% of its population living in 
the County of Cumberland while only 25% of the Tasmanian 
population lived in its two main towns. Yet despite the im­
portance of the pastoralists for the economy of New South 
Wales, a comparison of the social situation in the two states
1. In 1900/1 the gross public capital formation in New South 
Wales was £4,744,000; in Tasmania only £102,500 (or 2% 
of the New South Wales total) . In 1906/7 the compar­
ative figures were £3,285,000 for New South Wales and 
£219,000 for Tasmania. N.G. Butlin, Australian Domes­
tic Product, Investment and Foreign Borrowing, 1861- 
1938/9, Cambridge 1962, p.393,396.
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illustrates that the landed gentry were more powerful in 
Tasmania. In New South Wales the power of the squattocracy 
had been weakened in the early years of self-government and, 
except in the Legislative Council, their influence was 
limited; in Tasmania the landed gentry still maintained con­
siderable influence, particularly in the midlands. The 
growth of the industrial class in New South Wales and the 
spread of unionisation1 2 meant that the Labor party had a 
firm base on which to build; in Tasmania unions were slow 
to develop in areas outside the west coast, they were of­
ten suspicious of intervention in politics and a Trades and
2Labor Council was not formed until 1909. Pressure from
the working class was less important in Tasmania than in 
New South Wales. In neither state did the middle classes 
have any formal organizational base on which to build or 
from which to challenge the power of the unions.
A fourth difference was political. In New South Wales 
the divisions between the major parties in the 1890s were 
over the tariff question which was responsible for drawing 
up the political battle lines; after this issue had become 
irrelevant, a socialist against anti-socialist division 
gradually emerged. In Tasmania there was no distinct pol­
icy difference between the parties before the anti-social­
ist credo gradually gained influence; the differences had 
previously been matters of personality.
The states differed considerably in population and this 
is reflected particularly in the number of electors in each 
electorate. In Table 1, the mean number of electors in each 
electorate has been calculated for each state and then the 
number in each Tasmanian electorate expressed as a percent­
age of those of New South Wales.
1. I can not find any accurate or comparative figures for
the number of employees unionised in either state in 
this period »
2. M.D. McRae, The Tasmanian Labor Party and Trade Unions,
1903-1923 , T .H .R .A . V o l .5 , No.l, October 1955 , p.4-6.
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Table 1
Mean Electors per Electorate in New South Wales
and Tasmania^
No . Of M . P . s Mean Electors per Electorate Tasmania
as a %
N . S . W . TAS . N .S . W . TAS . of N . S . W .
1893/4 125 36 2059 8 3 0 1 2 40
1897/8 125 37 2416 819 2 33
1900/1 125 38 2 389 10 2 6 2 42
1903/4 90 35 7 6 6 1 3 4 1278 16
1906/7 90 35 8287 2 5 4 3 3 30
1909/10 90 30 9641 1 9 1 5 7 (31^ 2M.P.)
per 198<33 Per
M.P.)
1912/13 90 30 11533 20703 ( 3450 M.P.)
per 17 9 (29 per M.P.)
Within these figures there is a quite considerable range.
For instance, in New South Wales in 1901 Willoughby had 4854
electors, while Wentworth only 1706: in 1907 Northumberland
and Middle Harbour both had over 12000 voters on the roll while
the Clyde and Darling had under 6000. In Tasmania there was
a similarly wide variation; in 1900 Richmond and Glamorgan
only had 360 enrolled electors while West Devon had 1877 and
Zeehan 2957. In 1906 the largest electorate numerically was
Central Hobart with 3290, the smallest Franklin with 2057
electors. In 1901 only the largest of Tasmanian electorates
had as many voters as the smallest in New South Wales while
in 1906 the largest Tasmanian constituency barely had half
4the least number of any New South Wales electorate. In 
1909 the introduction of the Hare-Clark system gave to each
1. These figures have been calculated from figures in Hughes 
and Graham, Handbook of Australian Government and Politics 
p.428-440, p . 592-600.
2. Since some electorates returned two or more members, 
calculations have been on a basis of a voter per M.P.
3. Women voted for the first time.
4. The New South Wales figures have been taken from notes 
made by Hughes and Graham for their book and now held
in the Department of Political Science, R.S.S.S., A.N.U. 
The Tasmanian figures can be found in the Journals and 
Papers of Parliament, Statistics of Tasmania, 1901-1907.
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of the five Tasmanian electorates approximately twice as 
many electors as were contained in each single-member N.S.W. 
constituency.
Some of the possible implications of these similarities 
and differences can be mentioned. The importance of Sydney 
as the hub of the state's trade created a country against 
city rivalry which caused suspicion of the influence of 
Sydney residents over the politics of the state. In Tasmania 
there was rivalry between regions and particularly between 
the north and south of the island. In both states one 
result of this rivalry was a resistance in country areas 
against city politicians and against any organizations 
dominated by them. The middle classes had dominated the 
politics of both states in the pre-party era without any 
formal organizations; but they seldom had any extra- 
parliamentary base on which to found their electoral and 
parliamentary organizations. The Labor party, which developed 
at a different period in the two states, always had trade 
unions as a foundation for their movement. Obviously there 
were differences in the size of population, in economic 
development, in the influence of landowners and in the 
electoral systems and these differences may have affected the 
timing of party development; but nevertheless the structure 
of the states was sufficiently similar for the middle classes 
in both states to have access to similar resources with which 
they could build their parties.
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PART II THE NON-LABOR PARTIES IN PARLIAMENT
Chapter 5
Some Non-Labor Attitudes to Party and Party Action 
Introduction
Party organization is not essential for the functioning 
of parliament and the maintenance of a government and in the 
Australian states it did not develop until forty years after 
self-government. Governments could not, however, be maintained 
without some combination among members around which majorities 
could be built. In the early years the personal contacts of 
faction leaders were usually sufficient to maintain ministries ; 
to-day ministries depend on party machinery for majorities 
and rely upon discipline, not personal contacts, in the house. 
The action is now collective rather than personal. The 
transitional stage of party development can be traced by 
examining the increasing influence of the party as a 
collective unit,
During the period of faction politics, most M.P.s spoke 
of themselves as independent and free to vote as they pleased, 
but many of them were not. Besides the firm followers of 
the faction leaders, many others were influenced, however 
weakly, by a faction leader. As party methods became more 
efficient, the independence of the M.P.s in parliament 
declined and their voting became more predictable on a 
widening range of ideological and pragmatic issues. The 
notion that a member should be independent was gradually 
displaced by the belief that he ought to be loyal to his
party and to his leader and that the test of loyalty was
to vote with his party. That is to say, the parties
gradually gained control over basic resources, the votes of
members, although their control was never entirely complete.
The development of parties in parliament can be seen in 
their growing cohesion and discipline, in the appearance of 
a collective identity and in the declining independence of 
M.P.s.
Some Non-Labor Attitudes to the Role of Party
The emergence of the Labor party in New South Wales 
forced its opponents to re-state their views on what parties
80
should stand for and how they should operate. The Labor 
party was openly sectional in character and claimed a 
place in politics for itself as the representative of 
working class interests. It dogmatically regarded all 
other parties in similar sectional terms. Its organization, 
drawing heavily on trade union support, was relatively rigid 
and its tactics were believed to necessitate consistent 
solidarity. The Labor party's organization and tactics gave 
the non-Labor politicians an opportunity to explain what 
they took to be the role of party and to distinguish their 
own political methods from those of Labor and to its 
discredit. Even though their beliefs were often expressed 
implicitly in their condemnation of the Labor party and 
were perhaps little more than rhetoric, they were important 
not because they necessarily reflected party performance 
but because they created constraints within which the party 
had to develop its methods. For instance, the party could 
not openly adopt any disciplinary measures to secure solidarity 
in parliament if they encroached on the accepted independence 
of party members, even though this freedom may have been 
little more than theoretical.
In the first place, the non-Labor members accepted and 
believed that parties were composed of men who shared common 
principles and that they represented the people and not 
merely one class or section of society. Ashworth claimed 
that the role of party was
to reconcile or average the real interests of
all sections of the community, 1
and later he insisted
1. T.R. Ashworth and H.P.C. Ashworth, Proportional Repre­
sentation applied to Party Government; a New Electoral 
Sys tern, Melbourne 1900, p.12. T.R. Ashworth was 
President of the Freetrade and Liberal Association 
of Victoria. Though his views are not those of a 
politician from New South Wales or Tasmania, they 
do represent the most common beliefs of non-Labor 
politicians in those states and are quoted here as 
the most coherent available expression of those 
belief s .
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each r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  must repr esent all i n t e r e s t s ; 
he must be elected on a definite policy as to 
what is best for all the people. if he is sent 
in as the agent of one interest or one section 
of the people, he ceases to be a r e p r e sentative 
and becomes a delegate, 1
Parties were supposed to be based on principles, not
on interest, so that the good of the state, rather than the
adv antage of individuals or a section of society, was always
the cause of party action. Burke's d e f i nition of party
2was quoted to justify party activity. On another occasion 
Ca rr uth ers  claimed
Party gov e r n m e n t  is the best you can get; it is 
gov er nment by p r i n ciples which create parties.
Personal government is the worst a country can 
have, it is full of corr u p t i o n  and intrigue. 3
Wise too argued that parties were bound together by
polit ica l principles, not by the influence of individuals,
and that, party government was always for the good of the 
4whole state. The non- Labor  parties c onsistently claimed 
to be n o n - s ectional and to be based on common principles.
No n-L abor spokesmen r e g u larly attacked the Labor
party be cause of its sectional base and insisted that
Labor M.P.s were delegates of the Labor m o v e m e n t  which
laid 'immoral' rest raints on the individual freedom of 
5M.P.s. The p r e v ention of free disc u s s i o n  and debate, 
the coercion of members to vote against their cons cience  
on specific issues and the p o s s i b i l i t y  that members might 
be forced to act under i nstruction from an outside 
'irresponsible' o r g a n i z a t i o n  were all an athema to the early 
non-Labor members. Even if the P a r l i a m e n t a r y  Labor party 
seldom used its coercive powers or took directions from 
the exe cutive of the Labor Electoral League, the fact that 
the con stit ution of the Labor party allowed such actions 
was suff icient to horrify non- Labor members and to cause
1. Ashworth, P r o p o r t i o n a l  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n , p.22, my italics.
Also Storey, NSWPD Series 2, Vol.10, p.2 5 3 - 2 5 5  and 
in Tasmania, Solomon, M^, 26/6/12, for similar views.
2. e.g. Gilbert, NSWPD , Series 2, Vol.5, p. 409 .
3. D , T . , 15/6/01. See also NSWPD Series 2, Vol.2, p.125.
4. NSWPD Series 1, Vol.93, p p . 519-20.
5. Ashworth, Propo r t i o n a l  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n , pp.83-6, Solomon,
M . , 7/9/09..
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them to contrast their freedom and independence with the
bondage of the Labor members. They claimed that they could
say what they pleased on any subject, that they were not
forced to vote against their conscience and that they
supported measures, not men.^ In 1906, Colonel Ryrle, a
newly-elected Liberal member, boldly warned the government
during the address-in-reply debate that, if they did not
introduce progressive measures, he would cross the floor
2and put them out of office. McGowen, the Labor leader,
immediately retorted that such promises were often heard
but seldom believed and suggested that Ryrie had already
3been 'roped in' by the Liberal party. Indeed Ryrie's 
comments were little more than the usual non-Labor claim 
to independence which was a token gesture intended for 
public consumption and only occasionally taken seriously, 
when it was convenient.
Even the party leaders paid lip-service to the view 
that party members had the freedom to vote as they liked. 
Carruthers claimed
that we do not ask for slavish support but adopt 
the true principles of party, viz. to respect 
the conscience of individual members, only asking 
for adherence to pledges on the great principles 
which constitute the bond of co-operation. 4
He argued that, members should vote solidly with the party 
on the basic issues, because belief in these matters was 
the cause of their party membership, and that on other 
matters the party made no demands. The idea that the 
party should restrict the freedom of action of a member 
was always denied. Members claimed that no pressure was 
exerted on them before divisions and that they voted with 
the party because its actions agreed with their principles. 
In Tasmania the Liberal League made the usual point that
1. W, Anderson, NSWPD , Series 2, Vol.18, p.193; Jessep, 
NS WPP , Series 2, Vol.24, p.3187, Shipway, NSWPD , 
Series 1, V o 1 „ 7 3 , p „ 13 61 .
2 . NSWPD, Series 2 , Vo1 o 22 , p .28 .
3 . NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.22 , p.31-2.
4 . D„T0, 6/5/03.
5 . Booth, NSWPD, Series 2, Vo 1.18, p.14 1, Morton, NSWPD,
Series 2, Vo 1.5, p.513-514.
the freedom of members to act independently was vital for 
the success of parliamentary government and claimed that 
membership of the League
...while implying a general agreement with its 
political principles does not take away any of 
the rights of speech and of action which should 
belong to all members of parliament. 1
At the same time non-Labor members insisted that they were
not the delegates of any organization and that each of
them was a general representative and was responsible only
2to his electors. The proposition that an M „ P . should be 
restricted in his actions by any formal organization which 
came between him and his electors or that he should be 
forced to accept party decisions was seen as an attempt
to degrade the . . . party to the level of the 
solidarity party. 3
The distinction between the formalised methods of the Labor 
party and the informal procedures of the non-Labor parties 
was considered very important even if there was really 
little discernible difference between them.
Much of this rhetoric was aimed at discrediting the 
Labor party but it was still of some importance within 
the non-Labor parties, even though the claims for freedom 
of action by the non-Labor members may not have been 
reflected in actual performance. Nevertheless attitudes 
on the legitimate extent of party action are important 
because of the effect they had on the shaping of parties. 
While it is possible that these claims of indepndence 
were useful to a member who was defending his defection 
from a party on a specific issue and that they had no 
other constructive effect, they did prevent the development 
of party methods which formally restricted the member's 
freedom of action or openly coerced him into voting with 
the party„ Widely-held views on the role of party were 
therefore reflected in the formation of the organization,
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1. M^ _, 3/7/11, see also M^, 13/7/10, 14/2/12.
2. Levy, NSWPD , Series 2, Vol.22, p.129, also Solomon,
M , , 7/9/09.
3. J„ Ashton to Pc He Morton, 31/7/9 5, P .H . Morton Papers,
Mitchell Library A3039. For similar views, see Rose, 
NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.10, p.213, Carruthers D.T. ,14/10/02.
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even if not in actual party performance B In parliament, 
the need for co-operation was always accepted, but the 
methods used to secure it had to remain within well-perceived 
limits. Throughout the period, there was no change in the 
views of the role of party in parliament, although there 
was a considerable change in party performance.
The Roles of the Individual Member of Parliament
The M.P. was naturally far more than merely a party 
member; he was also obliged to perform several other roles 
which occasionally clashed with one another. Quite apart 
from his vague claims of being a general representative 
of all the people, each M.P. could also be the representative 
of his local electorate, the spokesman of some sectional 
interest or pressure group and a party member. Not all 
members fulfilled each role or placed the same emphasis on 
them. Nevertheless, the effect of these roles on party 
allegiance and solidarity must be examined because they 
presented problems for the party, which had to ensure that 
it had some claim to a member's allegiance , and for the 
member, who had to decide on priorities when roles conflicted. 
This could happen when, for instance, a party measure had 
an undesirable effect on a member's electorate.
In both states the M.P.'s role as representative of 
his district was considered to be vital to the welfare of 
the electorate. At a time when the central government was 
responsible for the development of the state and for 
building roads, bridges and railways, the M.P. was the main 
channel through which local demands could be made and 
replies from government departments relayed to the electors,  ^
With the lack of any effective local government in New South 
Wales outside the municipalities before 1906, the M .L .A . 
was the only person who could act at the central government 
level for local interests. His work was electorally important
1. This relationship between M.P. and constituency was 
made even closer in New South Wales in 1902 when 
the Minister of Works announced that all public works 
communications would be channeled through the local 
member whether he had originally presented them or 
not. D,T,, 21/4/02.
2 . See Chapter 10.
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and filled m uch of his time. One member of the assembly 
in New South Wales claimed he had to make two or three trips 
each week to Sydney on c o n s t i t u e n c y  business, even when 
the ass embly was not sitting;'*' another claimed that he
2spent most of his time in the Lands and Mines Department
whi le a third said he received 1500 letters in his first
3nine months as a member. In Tasmania the smaller
e l e c to ra tes meant that the member had even closer connections
with his c o n s t ituents and one member of the Lewis gove rnment
even res igned in 1909 to give himself greater freedom to
4adv oca te the needs of his electorate.
The demands of the e le ctorates o c c a s i o n a l l y  affected 
the party alle giance and b e h aviour of some members, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y  those who c onsidered that the needs of their 
e l e c to ra te took p r e c e d e n c e  over broader party issues.
For instance, John Gillies, who r e p r esented Maitland 
co ns t i t u e n c i e s  be tween 1891 and his death in 1911, frequently 
cha nged parties with the intention of bene f i t t i n g  his 
electorate. In 1891 he was elected as a freetrader but 
gave support to the Dibbs government. When a bridge was 
opened in his electorate, the Minister of Works stated it
5had been obtained by the p e r s i s t e n c e  of the local member.
In 1894 Gillies camp a i g n e d  as an independent freetrader 
and then gave consistent support to the Reid g o v e rnment for 
four years. He de serted Reid just before his defeat, 
sup ported Lyne , See and Waddell and in 1904 camp aigned as 
a m i n is te rialist. In 1907 he advocated fusion with the 
Liberal s and, when those pro^osa-ls failed, followed Waddell 
into the government ranks. His attitude to the relationship  
b e t we en  local problems and party alle giance is best 
summarized by two co mments he made in 1899. In general terms 
he claimed
1. Gillies, M a i tland M e r cury , 2 0/6/01.
2. Richards, D 0 T „ , 22/5/01.
3. McIntyre, D , T „ , 20/4/02.
4. Hope resigned his p o s ition as Ho norary Minister without
portfolio, M . , 27/10/09.
5. S . M . H , , 23/5/94. For charges that he sold himself to
Dibbs in ex change for local works, see D.T., 5/7/94.
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my ambition on entering Parliament was that 
...I thoughtmy presence in the assembly would 
be conducive to the public good and particularly 
to the good of the people of West Maitland. 1
He also suggested that the surplus shown in Reid’s 
budgetary accounts was illusory because the Maitland 
hospital had not received promised grants and then concluded
that being so, I have no hesitation in saying 
that the policy of the government has not been 
in the best interest of the people. 2
By consistently equating Maitland's demands with the 
national interest, Gillies was possibly unusual; but he 
was by no means the only member whose party allegiance was 
influenced by the requirements of his electorate. In 
1905 R . H . Levien, a former protectionist, promised to give 
the Liberal government consistent support, providing his
3constituents were well-treated. Dr. Andrew Ross, M.L.A.
for Molong, declared he was proud to be a 'roads and
bridges' member1 234 5and later deserted the See government
because his electorate had been neglected in the grants
5for public works. The fiscal issue had not prevented 
Gillies from changing sides when he wished, but Ross and 
Levien only deserted their party after the fiscal issue 
was irrelevant and there was no major division of principle 
between the two non-Labor parties. The influence of local 
demands had varying effects on party allegiance and often, 
of course, had none at all.
In Tasmania party allegiance could also be affected 
by local demands particularly in the period before strong 
parties were formed. The effect of local pressure on
1. NSWPD , Series 1, Vo1.100, p.1128.
2. NSWPD , Series 1, Vol.,99, p.156.
3. NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.18, p.362.
4. NSWPD, Series 1, Vo1.93, p.224.
5. NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.10, pp.439. Also in 1901 George
Anderson, an endorsed Liberal, immediately supported 
See, presumably at least partly because of the 
advantages that this might bring to his electorate.
politicians' actions is best shown by the demands for a 
West Coast railway in 1896 which divided the house on 
north versus south, rather than on party lines. As a 
direct railway link already existed between Zeehan and 
Burnie , the northern members could see no justification 
for an expensive and, to them, unnecessary line from 
Hobart to Zeehan, Describing the scene, Henry Dumaresq 
wrote
The people down here [Hobart] have gone railway 
mad and now want a Railway to the West Coast 
which would never pay for the grease for the 
wheels. They now want to give a company 400 
square miles of mineral country as well as very 
valuable water rights which may be most 
valuable to the colony a few years hence.
There is a great danger that many members may 
be induced to vote for granting these 
concessions ]ust to please their constituents, 
especially the Hobart members. As the elections 
will soon be coming on, the Hobart members will 
vote for anything to please the Hobart populace 
who care very little for Tasmania in general 
but very much for Hobart in particular. However 
I hope the Country members will show their 
independence and common sense but unfortunately 
two of the four northern members live in Hobart 
and one of them owns a newspaper so that I am 
afraid he will vote for the Bill, 1
With small electorates the M.H.AoS had to remain in
close contact with their electorates and most, though not
all, voted on matters of roais and bridges according to
the local wishes. Even after 1909, when the Hare-Clark
system had drastically increased the size of the electorate,
regional demands within the electorates could on occasions
2affect the votes of M„ H , A „ s .
A second role which the M„P, sometimes played was
1. Henry Dumaresq to Edward Dumaresq, 3/10/96. Dumaresq
Papers, Mount Ireh, Longford,
2, In 1914 the Labor government was kept in office by a
dissident Liberal who was dissatisfied with the 
Liberal government's failure to combat the potato 
blight which had devastated the farmers in the 
part of the electorate where he lived. M., 23/3/14.
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that of spokesman in the house for pressure groups.
Membership of external associations was accepted by
parliamentarians and certain members within the house were
often regarded as the leading spokesmen of sectional
interests in the community. Occasionally groups even
formed within a parliamentary party, such as the temperance
group which called a meeting in 1894 in an attempt to force
2local option through the house. In 1905 Carruthers called
3Jessep the leader of the Temperance party in the assembly 
and thereby recognised the existence of a distinct group 
within his party. Occasionally, as we shall see in chapter 
seven, the connections of a member with an interest group 
were of sufficient importance for him to threaten to oppose 
the party on the specific issues which touched on the 
interests of the group. At times therefore the party had to 
compete with pressure groups in its attempts to control the 
votes of members. Each of these roles of the M.P. could 
clash with his duties as a party member. The development 
of party can therefore be traced by considering how far M.P.s 
regarded themselves primarily as party members rather than 
local representatives or group spokesman.
The Difference Between Attitudes and Actions
There were two major constraints to the development of 
the party machinery and its control over the votes of members. 
Firstly, party members refused to accept formal or 
organizational procedures which restricted their freedom of 
action or speech because, as they said, they were responsible 
only to the electorate whose interests they served, and not 
to any party, Secondly, each member in both states had to 
fulfil several roles which were always in addition to and 
occasionally contradictory to their activities as a party 
member.
1. For a discussion of the sub-groupings within the party, 
see chapter 7 and for a discussion of party and group 
interaction, see chapter 11. Here I only intend to 
point out the possibly contradictory position of the 
M.P. in his differing roles as group spokesman and 
party member.
2 . S_lM_H_, 27/8/94, 23/10/94 .
3. D o T o , 4/9/05
In fact neither kind of constraint was a serious 
barrier to party solidarity because of the difference 
between the public attitudes of members and their actions.
To understand how a party developed, we must examine not 
what the M.P.s claimed was true of their behaviour but 
how they actually reacted to particular situations, how 
party machinery was developed within the constraints 
created by their public attitudes and different duties 
and how the party began to develop a collective identity.
In order to examine the development and change in 
party actions, 1 will concentrate on three areas. First 
I will calculate the solidarity of the parties in divisions 
throughout the period in both states to show which parties 
were solid, on what occasions and how this cohesion may 
have changed over time. This analysis will show how far 
the party control over the actual votes cast may have 
increased and will be based on both documentary evidence 
and evidence from an analysis of division lists. With 
the latter source it is possible to fill gaps where the 
documentary evidence, always thin, tells us nothing.
Secondly, I will examine the methods used to maintain 
party unity and examine the growth of the party as a 
collective entity and as it beeame clearly identified with 
ministries, political decision-making and strategy.
Thirdly I will consider the internal structure of the 
parties by identifying, wherever possible, groups within 
the party and by examining the causes of intra-party 
dissent. In this section I will trace the gradual 
disappearance of intra-party groups as openly separate 
units and their incorporation in the umbre1la-like identity 
of the party.
Two basic methods will be used for analysing divisions.
In calculating the solidarity of parties, I will use the 
Rice Index of Cohesion (R.I.C.) and the Index of Party 
Likeness (I.P.LJ Using the former method, the cohesion
1. For a full description of the methods of voting analysis 
see Appendix C c The basic reference for these methods 
is L .F „ Anderson et al. Legislative Roll Call Analysis, 
Evanston, Illinois, 1966. For use of the method, see P. 
Loveday, 'Support in Return for Concessions' , Historical 
Studies, Vol.14, No.55, October 1970.
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of a party is assessed so that, when it votes solidly, its 
R.I.C. is 1.00 and, when it is evenly divided, its R.I.C. 
is 0.0. The indices have been calculated for each 
party in each division. An R.I.C. of 0.80, for instance, 
indicates that nine-tenths of the party are voting together, 
with one-tenth voting with the opposition. The I.P.L. is 
a measure of the similarity in the voting of two parties 
in a particular division. An I.P.L. of 1.00 usually indi­
cates that both parties were voting solidly and together 
while an I,P=L. of 0.0 means the two were totally opposed.^ 
The means of both indices may also be calculated.
The internal structure of the party will be examined
2by a cluster analysis which compares the voting of each 
member of the house with that of every other member. The 
process shows which members of the party generally voted 
together and which members were opposed to one another.
The purpose of this method of analysis is to discover if 
any groups existed within the party.
It must be re-emphasised here that conclusions from 
these analyses of divisions will be coupled with documentary 
sources before any final comments are made. I do not 
suggest that these analyses can replace primary evidence 
as a means of interpretation, but rather that they provide 
some data on political behaviour which cannot be obtained 
from the rather scanty primary evidence and which can show 
what a party actually did, rather than what it claimed it 
was doing. An analysis of divisions can strip away some 
of the rhetoric and se1f-deceiving myths with which the 
non-Labor members often surrouneded themselves.
To employ these methods two basic difficulties must 
first be examined before the analysis is begun. The first 
is that of party identification. Before parties became
1. The formula for calculating I.P.L.s is such that when
two parties are evenly divided, an I.P.L. of 1.00 is 
obtained. The R.I.C.s can be used to distinguish 
these cases from the occasions when both parties are 
solid.
2. See Appendix C; for use of this method, see also D.B.
Truman , The Congressional Party; a Case Study, New 
York 1959 , and P. Loveday, 'Grouping M.P.s' , Politics , 
Vol.5, No.2, November 1970.
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strictly defined, the allegiance of some members was often
doubtful; they were elected as 'independent' freetraders,
protectionists or Liberals and claimed that they were only
partly aligned with the various parties. Since their party
membership may be only nominal, the question arises whether
they should be included in the calculations because, in
order to estimate the R.I.C. of a party, we must know who
belonged to that party. Since it is preferable for a
comprehensive study of party development to include all
possible M.P.s, I have decided to accept the figures of
Hughes and Graham'1 23' and count all those classed as, say,
freetrader or independent freetrader as members of the
freetrade party and later in the process to exclude those
who subsequently left the party. The distinction between
freetraders and independent freetraders is not always
2satisfactory or clear but to attempt to re-define elected
members would be to replace one subjective judgement with
another. The classifications of Hughes and Graham were
therefore used for the analysis of all but one session
in New South Wales. In 1903 a considerable re-shuffling
of parties had occurred and the original alignments of
1901 were almost meaningless. I therefore re-defined the
parties for calculations in that session by calling
'Liberal' any member who sought or considered Liberal and
Reform Association endorsement in the election of 1904
and 'Ministerialist' anyone who contested that election
under that title or was generally recognised as a supporter
3of the See government. Calculations which appear for 1903 
alone in the thesis are made with these new alignments. In 
Tasmania the fluidity of party membership created particular 
problems. The change of party by various members in the 
1903-6 parliament was so regular that I have assessed
1. Hughes and Graham, Handbook of Australian Government and
Politics.
2. For instance, in 1894 the Freetrade Council deliberately
made no selection in two suburban electorates because 
it considered them to be safe and was prepared to 
accept either of two freetrade candidates. Yet, by the 
criterion of Hughes and Graham, the refusal of the Free- 
trade Council to make an explicit endorsement meant 
that the successful freetraders in both seats were 
classed as 'independent' freetraders.
3. For new alignments, see Appendix A.
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government strength by examining the support granted the 
administration on specific issues, After 1906 I have 
generally ignored the opposition which split badly directly 
after the election and based my calculations on the 
behaviour of the ministerial party as defined by Hughes and 
Graham. R.I.C.s for Tasmanian parties have been calculated 
only for the period after 1906.
The second problem is caused by the differing importance
of divisions. At this distance in time it is impossible to
rate divisions in terms of importance, although contemporaries
clearly did not regard all divisions as equally significant/
Since a party's view of a division may not be related to its
2apparent importance nor accepted by the other parties, we
can not divide divisions into important and trivial or into
party and non-party divisions by a retrospective consideration
of their subject matter, although it would be reasonable to
suggest that divisions on pieces of government legislation
are likely to be more important than a series of gags moved
3on minor issues. Any categorisation of divisions must to 
some extent be artificial but it is necessary if a censure 
motion is not to be given equal weight with comparatively 
unimportant measures.2 34
1. i.e. T , H . Griffith, Albury Banner , 21/6/01; O'Sullivan,
Goulburn Evening Post , 20/1/98; Fleming NSWPP , Series
2, Vo 1.5, p . 34 8 .
2. P. Loveday, Support in Return for Concessions, p.399.
The problem does not exist for consideration of the 
House of Commons because the government whips consis­
tently acted as tellers whenever they required the 
party to vote for a measure. It is therefore possible 
to separate divisions into whip and non-whip categories, 
regardless of the actual reason for the divisions. See 
H. Berrington, 'Partisanship and Dissidence in the 
Nineteenth Century House of Commons', Parliamentary 
Affairs Vo1.21 , No.4, August 1968, p. 342 ; also S.H. Beer, 
Modern British Politics, London 1965, pp. 256-7 , 261-3 .
In Australian parliaments, the whips seldom acted as 
tellers, so such distinctions cannot be made.
3. For instance, Levy was once gagged ten times in the house
and twelve times in committee during the course of one 
evening. NSWPD , Series 2, Vol.6, p. 1274-1287 .
4. G.N. Hawker, (The Parliament of New South Wales, 1856-1965,
Sydney, 1971, p.67,) bases conclusions about ministries' 
control of the house on calculations which include all 
divisions. He assumes that, however important or trivial 
the subject matter, the ministry wanted to win every div­
ision. This would seem to me an unwarranted assumption 
if the views about parties in the 1890s are considered.
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One method of meeting this difficulty is to consider 
all divisions but to separate them into categories. I have 
sorted them into six categories - divisions on censure motions, 
on government bills, on all other motions moved by ministers, 
and on motions moved respectively by opposition members, by 
Labor members and by government backbenchers. This sub­
division separates two categories which would appear to be 
important for party control - censure motions and divisions 
on government bills - from those in which party control was 
probably not at stake. These will be discussed in detail in 
the next chapter. I do not suggest that party voting occurred 
only in these divisions but merely that party control of 
divisions was particularly likely in these cases and its 
increase or decline can be traced by an examination of them.
In the following chapter I will therefore consider the 
solidarity of parties and analyse the changing methods used 
to maintain or increase control of members. In chapter 
seven I will analyse the internal structure or parties and 
see whether the influence of interest groups declined as 
the party developed a more distinct collective identity.
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Chapter 6
The Growth of Party Solidarity and Identity 
Introduction
Party solidarity can be defined as a compound of cohesion 
and attendance. If a party did not vote solidly, it could 
not win divisions or, if it was in a minority, effectively 
challenge the actions or measures of the government. If 
party members did not attend divisions in the house, then 
the party could not successfully win divisions even though 
it was voting solidly. In modern parliamentary politics, 
parties have developed machinery and established precedents 
to ensure that their members maintain a high level of cohesion 
whatever the political situation and however large their 
majority may be. These methods only gradually emerged. In 
studying the early development of parties we must therefore 
ask whether the solidarity of parties changed and whether 
the methods used by the party became more accepted and 
formalised over a period of time.
The Solidarity of the Parties in the New South Wales Parliament
In both states I will concentrate on the two categories 
of divisions, censure motions and government bills, where 
party action can be expected. First I will report the solidarity 
of the parties in these divisions; then I will analyse the 
results and explain the situations which created them. When 
I have shown how the parties actually behaved, I will consider 
the methods used to maintain this behaviour .
First, then the censure motions. In Table I the mean 
R.I.C.s and mean absenteeism rates of the parties in New 
South Wales are reported.(See overleaf, page 95).
The divisions in the Freetrade party in 1894-5 were 
caused by the revolt of Parkes and his two personal friends 
and the defection of H.H. Brown, a convert to protection.'*'
Over fifty freetraders remained loyal to the party and its 
R.I.C. was always over 0.80 and on two occasions 1.00. On 
the first three censure motions in 1898 John Gillies, a
1. P.M. Weller, Disciplined Party Voting; A Labor Innovation? 
Labour History, No.21, November 1971, p.20.
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TABLE I : Censure Motions in New South Wales;
Mean R.I.C. and Absentee Rates of Parties'^ 
(Government Party underlined)
Parilament No . of Mean R.I.C Mean Absentee RateDivisions Fr.Trade Pr o t . Labor Fr. Trade Prot. Labor
1894-5 5 .91 .88 1.00 .21 .35 . 15
1898-9 7 .78 . 84 1.00 . 09 .11 . 02
1901-2 3 .82 . 94 1.00 .23 .13 .19
1903 3 1.00 1.00 1.00 .19 . 18 .15
1904-7 6 1.00 .63 1.00 . 08 .45 . 09
2Reidite who had declared his belief in protection, deserted
the party, but its R.I.C.s remained above 0.90. Then in 1899
the party was decisively divided over the issue of federation
when the "party of revenge", led by Haynes and Fegan,
condemned Reid for his support of an undemocratic constitution
and voted against the government on four divisions in
September 1899. The R.I.C. of the party fell to 0.54 and
this split explains the low mean cohesion for the freetraders
in 1898-9. In 1901 some endorsed Liberals, of whom the most
3notable was George Anderson, immediately announced their 
intention of supporting See and voted with him on censure 
motions with a resulting R.I.C. for the party of 0.80. Under 
Carruthers the party cohesion increased and, despite some 
tensions , the party voted solidly behind the Liberal government 
after 1904; none of those who voted with the party in the 
first censure motion of 1901 subsequently deserted it.
Before 1904 the cohesion of the protectionists did not 
differ much from that of the freetraders. In the 1894-5 
session the party voted solidly on the censure motions moved 
by the party leaders , but were divided in votes on two 
amendments to the censure motions which were moved by
1. There were no divisions on censure motions against the
Lyne government.
2. Maitland Mercury, 15/7/98.
3. NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.I, p.279-82.
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backbenchers. In other words, on the most essential
divisions they remained solid. On the first three censure
motions in 1898 the party voted together except for Meagher,
an independent protectionist who had proudly announced that
2he did not owe allegiance to any party and who supported
Reid because he believed him to be sincere in his attempts
to achieve federation. In November, 1898, Reid continued
his strategy of raising the fiscal issue at every opportunity
and attempted to split the opposition coalition of federalists
3and protectionists by promising to maintain a sugar duty in
his budget. This move forced the M.L.A.s from the sugar
growing electorates to choose between allegiance to their
party, whose leader had moved a censure motion condemning
the government's financial proposals, and their electorates,
who wanted a continuation of a sugar tariff for protective
reasons. Six protectionists supported the government and
4the R.I.C. of the party fell to 0.65. In 1899 some members 
objected to Lyne's promise to drop the fiscal issue and
5refused to oppose Reid in the censure on the Neild affair.
In these divisions the R.I.C. of the party was 0.78. In 
1901 the party was at first solid but gradually lost support, 
particularly on the censure motion on the Friedmann affair. 
After 1904 it disintegrated and on only one occasion out of 
six was it solid in the parliament of 1904 to 1907.
On censure motions the Labor party remained solid 
throughout while splits did occur in the non-Labor parties. 
However these splits occurred almost entirely between 1898 
and 1902 when the parties were in a state of re-definition 
after the removal of the tariff issue to federal politics
1. In March 1895 O'Sullivan tried to focus Dibbs's general
censure motion on the unemployment problem; in May, 
Schey , unhappy about the alliance with the freetrader 
Parkes, tried to add a demand for a fiscal referendum 
to the Parkes censure motion. In the first division 
the protectionist R.I.C., was 0.56, in the second 0.84.
2. NSWPP, Series I, Vol.93, p.90.
3. B.R. Wise to Sir James Walter 10/1/99. Walter Papers,
Mitchell Library, ML. MSS. 724.
4. Ewing, McFarlane, Pyers, Perry, Meagher, Stevenson.
All were members of North Coast electorates where 
sugar was the main product.
5. Ewing, Copeland, T.H. Griffith. For details of the Neild
and Friedmann affairs, see above chapter 3.
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and when there was no major difference of policy between 
the two non-Labor parties. Even then it is noticeable 
that the cohesion of the parties seldom fell below an R.I.C. 
of 0.80; that is to say, nine-tenths of the party were 
still consistently voting together.
Generally censure motions have received most of the
attention of historians and political scientists discussing
party discipline. Important historical events, such as
the fall of Reid in 1899, are studied in detail while the
actions of members on the basic humdrum matters such as
government bills - business which in fact takes up most
of the time of the house - are largely ignored.1 2 Yet a
government must not only administer; it must also legislate,
and to some extent try to transform a party's ideas and
electoral promises into law. In the long run its legislation
is far more important than the result of censure motions,
unless the latter happen to result in the resignation of
a ministry. Therefore the behaviour of members and the
steady conformity of party followers in divisions on
government legislation deserve greater attention than they
have so far received; it is here that the real test of
party control over members occurs. If a party intends to
pass its legislation, it must be able to maintain throughout
the session a level of cohesion sufficient to win the
necessary divisions. I do not suggest that all government
legislation is crucial or that defeat of the occasional bill
would mean that a ministry had to resign; but no ministry
could afford to lose so many divisions that its competence
and control of the house were called into question. Since
it is impossible to determine accurately at this distance
of time which bills were the most important, I have included
2in the analysis all divisions on government bills.
The mean R.I.C. of parties in the divisions on government 
bills was calculated for each parliament with the results 
shown in Table II.
1. See Berrington, Partisanship and Dissidence, p.339.
2. I have included as divisions on government bills all
those votes on motions to recommit or amend bills or 
to gag debates, besides the various readings of the 
bills .
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TABLE I I : Mean R „ I .C. of parti es in divisions on government
bills arranged by parliament with the government
party underlined.
Parliament No. ofDivisions Freetrade Protectionist Labor
1894-5 28 . 9 5 .74 . 88
1898-9 16 .77 .58 .68
1899-1900f 33 .42 .75 .71
1901-2 65 .60 .85 .69
1903 23 .78 .91 .86
1904-7 60 . 91 .50 .76
In 1894-5 the R .I .C .s of the freetraders in divisions 
on government bills ranged from 0.68 to 1.00 and in 1898-9 
from 0.55 to 0.94. In the same periods the protectionists' 
scores ranged from 0.0 to 1.00; that is, from being evenly 
divided to being solid. Between 1899 and 1903 the range of 
scores for both non-Labor parties ranged from near 0.0 to 
1.00. In the parliament which opened in 1904, the Liberal 
party supporting the Carruthers government had scores ranging 
from 0.42 to 1.00 on government bills.
The government party was the party with the highest 
mean R.I.C. in every parliament. Before 1904 the Labor 
party, which until that date was always in the position 
of giving support to the government, has the second highest 
figure while the opposition was always the least cohesive 
party. After 1904 the Progressive party did not hold the 
balance of power and therefore, if the other parties voted 
solidly, it was too small to be of any significant influence 
on the results of divisions and, anyway, it was usually 
badly divided.
In order to refine the figuresin Table II, we can also 
consider the number of occasions on which a party voted 
solidly or was divided on divisions on government bills.
To do this we must decide arbitrarily at what level a party 
can be described as solid. Since, as was evident in the 
previous chapter, the philosophy of the non-Labor parties 
was inhospitable to demands for complete solidarity and 
allowed members to vote against the party for personal or 
local reasons, it would be false to demand total solidarity,
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particularly as party identification is sometimes vague. 
Therefore I have decided to follow the example of Lowell 
and Berrington and to call a party 'solid' if nine-tenths 
of the party members present voted together;'*' that is to 
say, a solid party is one which has an R.I.C. of over .80. 
Following this criterion, the percentage of divisions in 
which a party voted solidly are reported in Table III.
TABLE III: Percentage of Divisions on Government Bills
on which the Parties voted solidly - Government 
Party underlined.
Parliament No . of 
Divisions
Divisions on 
Government Bills
Free-
trade
Protect- 
ionist
Labor
1894-5 28
as % of all 
Divisions
25 96 64 82
1898-9 16 20 50 25 44
1899-1900 33 35 12 45 36
1901-2 65 40 31 74 49
1903 23 29 74 87 74
1904-7 60 41 90 22 58
This table reinforces the conclusions drawn from Table 
II and suggests three things which sould be explained. In 
the first place, the government party was always solid 
more often than any other party. Secondly, the solidarity 
of all parties was clearly inter-dependent; whenever the 
opposition was badly divided and failed to vote solidly, 
the cohesion of both the government party and of Labor 
declined; when the opposition consistently voted solidly, 
the cohesion of the government party increased. The effect 
of inter-party competition on party development must 
therefore be examined. Thirdly, the cohesion of all parties 
drastically declined between 1898 and 1902 before it increased 
after 1903. This fluctuation can be partly explained by an 
examination of the type of bills on which divisions were 
fought to see what light this may throw on party development.
The greater consistency of the government party can
A .L . Lowell, The Government of England, 2 vols. New York, 
1921, Vo1.2, p.75-6; Berrington, Partisanship and 
Dissidence, p.340.
1 .
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be explained by the fact that a majority was needed to keep 
the ministry in office and that the government was inevitably 
implementing a programme for which it demanded support from 
its own members. The opposition, on the other hand, may not 
have been concerned as a party with some of the particular 
issues. Writing of the House of Commons in the nineteenth 
century, Berrington suggested this difference between the 
government and opposition parties:
'the obligation to initiate, and to lead, which 
rested on the government was not paralleled, to 
the same degree, by the duty of the official 
Opposition to criticize or to check. The 
government as the body responsible for day to day 
administration could not abdicate its duty to 
give a lead to the House on the issues which 
came before it. Often in declaring its position 
and putting on the whips the government was 
acting, not as the leadership of a party, but 
as the heads of executive departments. Party 
support was transformed into support for 
executive decisions often lying far outside the 
scope of normal party controversy, decisions 
which were tangential to the philosophies and 
interests of the two parties; to this extent, 
the government's backbench following was changed 
from a political party into an administrative 
party . ' 1
Later he pointed out that the government inevitably had a 
line of action to enforce but that the opposition need not 
have taken a stand on particular measures unless it wanted
His comments could be applied to Tasmania and New 
South Wales at this time. The government usually tried 
to gain party support for its measures while the opposition 
was often prepared to allow its members a free vote and as 
a result was more often divided in all parliaments.
Legislation was often non-controversial but still caused 
opposition from small groups within the house. Because 
the government's actions were 'constructive' and internal 
divisions might mean the loss of some piece of legislation, 
its party had to maintain a solid front in case the opposition 
challenged them. As a result the government party maintained
1 . Berrington, Partisanship and Dissidence, p.367.
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solidarity more consistently than its opponents.
The state of party competition also clearly affected 
the solidarity of the government party. As Lowell pointed 
out-
'no party can be maintained in fighting 
discipline unless it has another party 
to combat, strong enough to be a serious 
menace to its tenure of power.' 1
As a comparison of Tables III and IV shows, the cohesion 
of the government parties on divisions on government bills 
was highest at the time when party competition was most 
sharp.
TABLE I V ; The State of Inter-party Competition : the number of
divisions of all type s in which the three parties 
either supported or opposed one another where 
'opposed' means that the parties compared had an 
I.P.L. of less than .20 and 'support' means that 
they had an I.P.L. of more than .90 - in every case 
both parties being compared having an R.I.C. of 
over .80:
Parliament Total No, Qppo s ed Support
of F . T . / Labor/ F . T . / F . T . / Labor/ F . T . /
Divisions Labor Prot. Pro t . Labor Prot. Prot.
1894-5 112 2 26 24 3 5 1 1
1898-9 80 - 6 3 21 4 3
1899-1900 93 1 - - 2 1 4
1901-2 161 20 1 21 3 34 10
1903 78 40 - 40 1 48 2
1904-7 148 63 6 6 1 10 20
Party c ompetition was high in 1894-5 when on twenty -four
occasions the protectionists were opposed by two solid
parties, in 1903 when the Liberals were opposed by the combined 
strength of the other two parties on thirty-six divisions and 
in 1904-7 when the Liberal government was fairly often opposed 
by the solid Labor party. Between 1898 and 1902, parties 
were opposed to one another less frequently.
Before 1904 the Labor party always supported the government 
more consistently than the opposition party opposed it. In
1 . Lowell, The Government of England, Vo1.2, p.83.
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1898 it consistently voted withthe Freetrade party, even 
though the Protectionist party was not regularly challenging 
the government. It was only in the 1899-1900 period when 
Lyne was premier that the Labor party seldom voted solidly 
with the government; during this period, the opposition and 
the government never opposed each other. In other words,
it seems likely that the cohesion of all parties declined 
as the extent of party competition fell. When the opposition 
began to challenge the government again towards the end of 
1902, the government and labor parties once again voted con- . 
sistently together, as the figures for 1903 illustrate. A 
divided opposition released the government from the necessity 
of maintaining control over its votes , although it usually 
had the capacity to exert influence if threatened« The 
differing extent of party competition is, then, part of an 
explanation of party cohesion. How then can we explain 
this change in the extent of party competition?
Party competition was highest when the non-Labor parties 
were divided by distinct principles or interests or when a 
single non-Labor party was opposing the Labor party and its 
allies. When there was no recognized cleavage between the 
parties, a lack of disciplined voting in both parties followed. 
In 1894-5 most (19 out of 28) of the divisions on government 
bills were concerned with the fiscal issue and its corollary, 
the introduction of direct land and income taxes. The two 
non-Labor parties had opposing views on these important 
questions. The result was a high degree of party competition 
in these divisions. On other legislation, such as local 
government, the parties were given free votes. In 1898-9, 
fourteen of the sixteen government bills on which divisions 
were held concerned public works - matters which may have 
been regionally important but on which the parties, and 
particularly the opposition, did not vote solidly. Between
1899 and 1902 the situation changed; inter-party competition 
and party cohesion fell dramatically because all the parties 
had been divided over federation, because the transference
of the tariff to the federal parliament had removed the main 
difference between the two non-Labor parties and because 
neither non-Labor party had yet found a new role. The 
legislation in these years was concerned with such matters
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as the Sydney corporation, the harbour trust, old age 
pensions, women's suffrage and the settlement of lands in 
the wes tern districts. These were not issues on which the 
parties as units were divided; as the o p p o sition seldom 
voted solidly, the members of the g o v e rnment party, which 
itself was not always united on these matters, were similarly 
allowed to judge each piece of l egislation on its merits.
The low cohesion and Hack of c o m p e tition can be explained 
partly by the failure of either party to find a new role 
and partly by the lack of unity with i n  the opposition. 
Noticeably, when C a r r uthers became leader of the opposition 
and when its unity improved, the government's and the Labor 
p a r t y ’s cohesion also d r a m a t i c a l l y  increased.
Carruthers r e - v i t a l i s e d  the o pposition by leading an 
an ti- soc ialist crusade. In 1903 he warned that 'there 
will be a trial of strength from start to f i n i s h ' 1 and 
attacked most of the g o v e r nment's legislation, not only 
because of the possible inherent failings of the bills, 
but also because the Prog r e s s i v e  m i n i s t r y  was seen as a 
front for the Labor party and c o n s e q u e n t l y  was made the 
butt of the a n ti-socialist attacks. After 1904 the Liberal 
gov ern ment received solid support from its party on a wide 
range of issues, from the i n t r o duction of local government, 
local option and closer settlement, which had been part of 
the party policy, to less obv i o u s l y  important issues such 
as the sale of Cen t e n a r y  Park and the a s s e s s m e n t  of Sydney 
harbour rates. The diff er ence between this p a r l i a m e n t  and 
earlier ones was that, while in 1894-5 the party had been 
united on a specific issue - the tariff q u e stion - and 
its ramifications, by 1904 the party followed a general 
anti- soc ialist doctrine and the Liberal g o v e rnment was seen 
as a bulwark against the i ntroduction of socialism. Since 
the Labor party, which was accepted by many Liberals as 
the p e rsonification of socialism, attacked many of these 
measures, the Liberal members usually supp orted them, 
regardless of their apparent importance. On most occasions, 
of course, they approved of the g o v e rnment measures, but 
nev ertheless the broad threat of socialism ensured that the
1 . NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.10, p.60.
10 4
party now voted solidly on a greater range of issues. The 
new role for the party brought greater cohesion and more 
inter-party comp etition to the parliament.
Defeat in a division could also follow if absenteeism  
was too high or u n c ontrollable, A party therefore had to 
maintain an attendance rate at least high enough to win 
divisions and this requirement usually demanded at least 
as high an attendance rate as the other parties had. In 
Table I absentee rates in censure motions are reported.
The mean absentee rates in divisions on gove rnment bills 
are set out in Table V.
TABLE V ; Mean Absentee Rates of Parties in Divisions on
G overnment Bills arranged by Parliaments.
G o v e rnment Party Underlined.
No of Divisions Freetrade P r o t e c t i o n i s t  Labor
1894-5 28 .40 .47 . 34
1898-9 16 .42 .57 . 37
1899-1900 33 .60 . 55 .47
1901-2 65 . 49 ,46 .42
1903 2 3 .39 . 34 .33
1904-7 60 . 36 .56 .36
In the early parl iamen ts the Labor party appears to
have a lower absentee rate than the other parties - a
point which Black claims as an illus t r a t i o n  of the greater
dedicat ion of Labor members.^ However the figures in this
table are slightly deceptive because pairs were not reported
in the official p a r l i a m e n t a r y  papers and only o ccasionally
in newspapers. From the few instances in which pairs are
reported in the press, it is apparent that, although pairs
2were of ficially arranged by the parties, the Labor party
1. Black, The Labor Party in New South W a l e s , p.10.
2 r In 1898 Reid wrote to E.M. Clark requ esting him not 
to consider pairing with the o pposition since the 
latter were only granting pairs to suit their own 
convenience, Reid to Clark, 20/9/98. E J .  Clark 
P a p e r s , Mitchell Library, Uncat. MSS, 298.
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seldom provided them. The absentee rates of those parties 
which did provide pairs are therefore higher in Table V 
than they would be if those who paired were considered to 
have voted.
In the censure motions the attendance rates of all 
parties were fairly high and the addition of pairs usually 
accounts for all but two or three members. Because of the 
wide attention which such motions received, we know that 
parties always attempted to ensure the presence of almost 
all members on these occasions. On government bills, the 
difference between parties was not large, although the 
opposition always had the lowest rate of attendance and 
the government party usually maintained an attendance rate 
sufficiently high to ensure the winning of divisions. 
Absenteeism, like cohesion, was clearly partly dependent on 
the behaviour of the opposition. If it was divided, the 
government had no need to demand strict discipline from its 
supporters.
Two facts of particular interest have been shown by 
this examination of party solidarity. Firstly all parties 
varied in solidarity, not just the non-Labor parties. 
Whatever the other effects of the Labor party's new methods 
of caucus and discipline, the party did not in fact secure 
higher cohesion from its members than the non-Labor parties.
1. The Daily Telegraph occasionally reported pairs and
division lists. From this evidence I have compiled 
a table of pairs provided on some government bills 
and censure motions. Although the number of occasions 
is limited, the lack of Labor participation in the 
practice is obvious.
Occasions on which pairs were provided: arranged by
Parliaments.
Parliament No. of Divisions Freetrade Protect. Labor
1 894 - 5- 7 66 66 -
1898-9 5 21 27 5
1901-3 8 56 44 12
1904-7 8 30 24 18
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Although the parties used substantially different methods, 
the results were similar. There are, of course, some occasions 
where the non-Labor party failed to maintain solidarity, 
such as the Protectionist division over the financial censure 
debate in November 1898 and the Neild censure of 1899, but 
generally, on a wide range of issues, there is little 
difference between the results of the analysis for the 
various parties. Secondly, the parties began to vote 
cohesively on a broader range of topics. Whereas at first 
solidarity was primarily obtained in those divisions on 
matters that were connected with the central principle 
which had brought the parties together, later it occurred 
on a much wider scope of subjects as the vaguer anti-socialist 
raison d'etre of the party's existence was accepted. At the 
same time the solidarity of all parties in the house depended 
to some extent on the ability of the opposition to produce 
a united party which could challenge the government. These 
conclusions from an analysis of the actual behaviour of 
parties demand a study of the methods which parties developed 
to secure discipline when it was required on an increasingly 
broad range of subjects.
Solidarity in the Tasmanian Parliament
The solidarity of parliamentary groupings is more 
difficult to estimate in Tasmania because of the difficulty 
of defining the groups and identifying their members in 
the absence of recognized party affiliations and because of 
the frequency with which members crossed the floor. Since 
directly comparable figures are liable to be misleading in 
the early parliaments if they are based on any assessment 
of party alignment, I have calculated the degree of support 
given to the administration as an indication of governmental 
strength. Between April 1894 and 1909 only one ministry, 
Braddon ' s in 1899, was defeated in a censure motion in the 
House of Assembly. Generally the governments were able to 
maintain safe majorities on censure motions - the opposition 
never mustered more than ten votes between 1903-5 or more 
than eleven between 1906-8 in a house of thirty-five members. 
All censure motions after 1909, except those in September 
and October of that year, were fought on direct party lines.
In divisions on government bills the administration 
was occasionally defeated but usually managed to maintain 
a safe majority as is indicated in Table VI.
TABLE V I : Divisions on Government bills, expressed as a
percentage of all divisions on government bills 
during that session and arranged according to 
the percentage of those present who voted for 
the administration.
Parliament No. of Over 80% 70-80% 60-70% 50-60% Under 50%
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Divisions
included
1894-7 30 3 20 30 30 17
1903-4 19 5 11 21 47 16
1904-5 8 37 13 - 13 37
1906-8 27 7 14 33 29 14
Total in all
Parliaments 84 8 15 26 32 19
In eighty-four divisions on government bills , the
ministry was defeated fifteen times and only one o f the s e
the defeat of Dobson's land tax in 1894, brought about the 
resignation of a ministry. In 1903 two of Propsting's 
radical measures failed to pass the house'*’ but he gained a 
majority on the remainder; the only important defeat of 
the Evans government was on a worker's compensation bill. 
Yet between 1906 and 1908 those categorized by Hughes and 
Graham as ministerialists had an R.I.C. on divisions on 
government bills of only 0.51 while the Labor party had 
an R.I.C. of 0.93. The point was that the ministerial 
party could remain divided on many issues because it gained 
so much support both from independents and from those 
nominally defined as oppositionists (whose R.I.C. in these 
divisions was 0.33) that it was seldom in danger of defeat 
from a six-man Labor party and those members of its own 
party who did defect. The type of majority gained by the 
government in Tasmania before 1909 was similar to that of 
New South Wales between 1899 and 1901; as long as a 
majority was obtained, it did not matter who voted for the 
measures. Because the opposition was not a threat to the 
stability or security of the government, strong discipline
1 . An arbitration bill and an occupancy rates bill.
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within the ministerial party was not required. After 1909, 
when the Labor party increased in size, the cohesion of 
the Liberals 'improved. In seventeen divisions on government 
bills, the Labor party was solid (i.e. an R.I.C.of over 
0.80) on eleven and the Liberals on seven. The parties 
were directly opposed to one another on legislation regarding 
taxation, local government, railway management and public 
meetings; the Labor party was also solid on bills concerning 
the establishment of wages boards. In 1912 when the 
parties had almost equal numbers and the Liberals often had 
to rely on the casting vote of the Speaker /  Liberal cohesion 
increased dramatically and the party had an R.I.C. of 1.00 
on twenty out of twenty-six divisions, with its R.I.C. 
falling below 0.80 only twice. The Labor party was solid 
on eighteen occasions, but its R.I.C. fell below 0.80 on 
all others.
Between 1906 and 1908 the mean absentee rate on 
government bills was identical for all parties (0.25) 
while between 1909 and 1911 the Liberal absentee rate (0.25) , 
was higher than that of Labor (0.15) . Nevertheless, with a 
substantial majority of five in a house of thirty members, 
this lower attendance did not often place the party in 
danger of defeat.
As in New South Wales, the government parties usually 
managed to enforce discipline from their supporters when it 
was important and necessary. In the early years, support 
could be gained from all sides of the house to ensure that 
government legislation was passed and strict discipline 
was not required, When the party came under a more consis­
tent attack after 1909, cohesion improved. The methods of 
the party still were not those of Labor, but the effect was 
similar. Party discipline was now achieved at a higher 
level and on a broader range of topics than occurred earlier. 
Party methods must therefore be examined for both states 
because in both of them the behaviour of the developing 
parties followed similar lines.
1. On eleven of the twenty-six divisions held during the 
par 1iament.
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Methods of Maintaining Discipline in the non-Labor Parties
The non-Labor parties relied primarily on informal methods 
and personal contacts to maintain party discipline, rather than 
on the heavily regulated procedures of the Labor party. Since 
individual M.P.s claimed to be free agents who could not be 
coerced into voting along the party line,party machinery had 
to be developed which could control the member to some extent 
without undermining his apparent freedom or unduly restricting 
his activities as a local member. Patronage, one of the means 
of securing the loyalty of individuals during the faction 
period, was adapted to party needs. Party meetings were used 
to allow general participation in party affairs and to let 
the backbencher have a say in party strategy. From these 
methods of maintaining cohesion the parties developed a 
corporate identity which will be studied in some detail. So 
too will the role of the whip. The aim will be to see how 
these methods were developed and how effective they were in 
the situations where leaders felt that party discipline was 
necessary.
Party Meetings
Party meetings are the most obvious sign of a party 
identity, yet it is difficult to assess their importance 
because of a lack of evidence of what actually occurred in 
them. The non-Labor parties had no rules by which meetings 
were conducted or decisions reached, but the very existence 
of party meetings shows that co-operation occurred and that 
the party had some collective identity.
Precedents for party meetings existed in both states 
before the 1890s,^ but meetings were never called at 
regular intervals nor as a matter of right. Invariably they 
were used as a means by which leaders could gain support or 
consent for their own actions. Gradually, as parties 
developed, so the meetings increased in frequency, discussed 
more general topics and had a greater effect on political 
decisions.
An accurate estimate of the frequency of party meetings 
is impossible because it is evident that the newspapers did
1. Loveday and Martin, Parliament, Factions and Parties, 
p . 155-162 .
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not report all of them and because informal meetings could 
be easily held in the party rooms. It is probable that 
more meetings were held in both states than were actually 
reported. Nevertheless several conclusions about the 
growth of the party identity and the increasing control 
over party members can be drawn by studying the frequency 
of meetings and the reasons for which they were called.
TABLE VII: The number of non-Labor party meetings held by
government and opposition parties under each
ministry 
New South Wales
arranged by s täte.2
Ministry Reid Reid Lyne-See Carruthers
1894-5 1898-9 1899-1904 1904-7
Government 2 - 2 7
Oppo sition 8 15 15 9
Tasmania
Ministry Braddon Propsting Evans Lewis-Solomon
1894-7 1903-4 1904-9 1909-12
Government 1 2 2 25
Oppo sition 8 7 4 Not applicable
Before 1904 in New South Wales and 1909 in Tasmania, 
government parties seldom held meetings of supporters. In 
New South Wales Reid held one party meeting after he had 
agreed to form a ministry but before he selected his 
cabinet. At this meeting which was intended to consolidate 
his support and reinforce his position as leader, he wel­
comed eight M.L.A.s who had been elected without the
endorsement of the Freetrade Council and apologised for the
3mistake of the central branch in failing to support them.
The point of the meeting was to identify his government,
1. For instance, in Tasmania only three of the eight op­
position meetings between 1894 and 1897 and only eleven 
of the twenty-five government party meetings between 1909 
and 1912 are reported in the press. In both cases the 
source for the remainder was the Diaries of Sir Elliot 
Lewis, in the State Archives of Tasmania. These diaries 
are the only primary evidence in either state which 
contain evidence of this kind.
2. I have not included meetings held by minor non-Labor parties
such as, for instance, the Independent Party of 1898 or 
of 1901 or the Country party of 1902. The latter actually 
held eleven known meetings in four months.
3. S .M .H ., 1/8/94.
Ill
when it was formed, with the parliamentary freetrade party
which had expressed its support for him and to show that it
was a party, not a personal, administration. Reid's second
party meeting discussed organizational proposals for the
election of 1895 and not internal parliamentary affairs.1
In November 1902 See called a meeting of his followers with
the intention of explaining the government's plans to them
and of reducing the tensions in the party which had been
caused by the Friedmann affair. The fact that a premier
actually met his supporters to discuss plans was thought
2to be unusual by the contemporary press. In 1904 the 
Ministerialists held a meeting, which was poorly attended, 
to elect an executive committee to organize the election.3
In Tasmania also the government parties held few meeting*»
before 1909. Braddon called one caucus in 1894 which elected 
4the cabinet, two of the positions, those of premier and
minister of lands, being the subject of ballots. He held
none after he had become premier. In 1903-4 Propsting twice
called meetings to discuss with his followers his proposals
5to reform the income tax and the Legislative Council.
Under Evans, two meetings were held after the close of the
sessions of 1905 and 1908 to discuss electoral plans, not0parliamentary business. In both states the only meetings 
which actually discussed specific parliamentary business 
were those convened by Propsting. These exceptions can be 
explained by the radical nature of his proposals and the 
suspicion with which he was regarded by some of his followers. 
The meetings were designed to calm these fears. See's 
mid-session meeting fulfilled a similar but more general 
purpose. Otherwise all meetings were designed to discuss 
election prospects or to consolidate the party publicly. On 
no occasion were the ministers given instructions or advice
1. D . T . , 28/6/95.
2 . D . T ., 21/11/02.
3 . D . T ., 13/4/04.
4 . M_;_, 13/4/94 .
5 . M w 3/10/03, 25/5/04
6 . M. , 3/2/06, 6/11/08.
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on how they should act in parliament.
The meetings of the government party in 1895 and 1904 
in New South Wales1 and in 1905 and 1908 in Tasmania to 
discuss the forthcoming electoral campaigns were significant 
changes from faction politics because they illustrated that 
the party recognized that it had a collective interest in 
the elections, even if that interest originated in the 
ministry's desire to retain office. Furthermore the party 
now realised that electoral success, rather than parliamentary 
maneouvres, was becoming the decisive factor in the gaining 
and maintenance of ministerial portfolios and that its future 
depended on the continued existence of the present cabinet.
After 1904 in New South Wales and 1909 in Tasmania a
definite change in practice occurred as premiers kept their
parties better informed of their intentions and probably
allowed discussion of their proposals. Carruthers held
seven meetings during his premiership. Three were held before
the beginning of a session; at the first of these, which took
place after the party had won the election but before
Waddell had resigned, Carruthers was re-elected leader and
given a free hand to decide tactics and cabinet selection.2 345
At the other two, he informed the party what legislative
proposals he intended to introduce and took the opportunity
3to reduce any antagonisms within the party. Two mid-sessional
meetings were held at which Carruthers reported progress,
explained what legislation was still to be introduced and
4requested continued attendance at divisions. In the two 
final meetings, the party agreed to allow Carruthers to 
negotiate fusion with the Progressives^ and discussed, but 
did not alter, the electoral platform on which Carruthers
1. The Protectionists had also held a party meeting in 1894
when Dibbs was premier to discuss electoral organization 
for the campaign that year. S .M .H ., 9/6/94, 12/6/94.
2. D ,T ., 13/8/04.
3. D ,T ., 10/6/05, 26/6/06. In 1906 the party was reputed to
be unhappy about Carruthers' leadership but was charmed 
into enthusiastic support at the pre-sessional meeting.
4. D , T ., 21/9/04, 28/9/05.
5. D.T., 3/4/07.
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intended to fight the elections of 1907.^ Carruthers met
his followers more often than any of his predecessors, kept
them informed of government proposals and probably encouraged
comment on party action. For the first time he gave the
backbencher a chance to criticise party actions in private
and perhaps to affect decisions. This change implied that
the administration was a party one and that the party as a
collective body should be able to comment on its behaviour.
The party meeting was the main means by which the collective
view of the party could be ascertained. By 1907, the party
meeting was so well accepted as an integral part of the
machinery that Wade's pre-sessiona1 meeting with his party
2was regarded as conforming to recognized practice .
In Tasmania the frequency of government party meetings
3increased rapidly after 1909. Of the twenty-five meetings
two were held after the elections. In 1909 the anti-socialist
M.H.A.s decided to fuse to form a Liberal party and elected 
4Lewis leader. After the election of 1912 the new parliamentary
5party elected Solomon to replace Lewis. Both discussed party
policy for the forthcoming session. At two other meetings
which were held before the sessions of 1910 and 1912 M.H.A.s
were informed of the government's legislative plans and
given the opportunity to discuss them.6 In September and
October 1909, during the crisis which led to the formation
of a one-week Labor ministry, seven meetings were held to
discuss the government's financial proposals, ministerial
failures, and, after the split, the terms on which the party
7was prepared to re-admit the rebels. After the party was 
re-united, meetings were held weekly for the remainder of gthe session in an obvious attempt to maintain party unity.
1. D.T., 9/5/07.
2 . D o T 0 , 9/10/07.
3 . This increase may be partly a product of more complete 
information but is unlikely to be wholly so.
4 . M. , 9/6/09.
5 . M. , 5/6/12.
6 . M , 3/6/10, 25/6/12.
7 . M . , 30/9/09, 14/10/09, 19/10/09, 20/10/09,
Lewis Diaries, 23/9/09, 24/9/09.
21/10/09.
8 . Lewis Diaries, 3/11/09, 10/11/09, 17/11/09
174,2/09 .
, 24/11/09,
114
In the remaining two years of the parliament, meetings
were held fairly regularly. In 1910 they were almost monthly.^
In 1911 backbench criticism of the Wages Board Bill, which
was led by Ewing, forced Lewis to call three meetings to
2discuss amendments to the bill in the party room; a fourth
3meeting was held later in the session. Finally, at a
meeting in February 1912, the parliamentary party as an
independent body discussed policy and organization for the
4forthcoming election campaign.
In both states therefore the purpose of party meetings 
changed; at first they were a means by which a leader could 
consolidate support, but they developed into a channel by 
which the party as a body could discuss administration 
policy, criticise leaders privately and make strategic 
decisions. Although we can not know precisely what went 
on at these meetings, ministers certainly used them to 
keep followers informed and it is reasonable to suppose 
that followers made their opinions heard. The party in 
both states became more closely identified with the 
government and the government implicitly admitted that it 
was to some extent answerable to the party as a body. It 
could not be censured or coerced but it discovered that it 
needed the contact with its supporters which meetings 
provided. The administration had to keep the party informed 
if it expected consistent support. This is a strong indication 
of the growth of a collective identity of party and its 
connection with the administration in both states.
Opposition meetings were more common in both states 
because of the necessity to discuss tactics. In a government 
party many of the tactical decisions were made by cabinet; 
in opposition these decisions had to be made by party 
meetings because the party had no obligation to remain solid 
in order to keep a ministry in office, because the leaders 
had no patronage with which to maintain unity, and because
1. Lewis Diaries , 22/7/10, 5/8/10, 4/10/10, 9/11/10.
2. Lewis Diaries , 15/9/11, 21/9/11, 27/9/11.
3 „ Lewis Diaries , 15/12/11.
4. Lewis Diaries , 2/2/12, 3/2/12.
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there was no clear .-leadership group, corresponding to the
ministry, in an opposition party. A party meeting had to
decide what action the party should take and to persuade
members to vote for the resulting decision, although it had
no effective sanctions to coerce members into voting with
the party. Party meetings therefore were concerned with a
wide range of topics. In New South Wales in 1894-5 the
Protectionist party discussed the moving of a censure motion1 1
2and the wisdom of an alliance with Parkes. In 1898-9 five
3of their meetings dealt with problems of leadership while
4 5the remainder discussed federation , the budget and the Neild 
censure motion.0 it was said that informal party meetings 
were held daily, but how often they actually occurred is
7unknown. By 1900 it was the accepted practice for opposition
parties to hold meetings before each session to discuss0business and tactics. Between 1901 and 1904 the meetings of 
the Liberal opposition discussed similar topics; two meeting
9received the resignation of leaders and another two elected
new ones.10 In April 1902 Lee met his party in the middle of
the recess to discuss tactics'*1 and Carruthers called three
meetings to discuss specific proposals, including two censure 
1 2motions. The party also had two meetings at which electoral
1 3tactics were planned, and these meetings were held independently 
of external organizations on both occasions. After 1904 the 
Progressives held several meetings to discuss improved unity
1. D .T. , 27/2/95 , 28/2/95 .
2. D .T. , 11/5/95 , 15/5/95.
3. D ,T . , 17/8/98, 6/10/98, 11/4/99 , 24/8/99, 21/9/99.
4. D . T . , 26/8/98, 8/9/98.
5. D . T . , 5/11/98, 11/11/98, 18/8/99 .
6. D .T. , 30/8/99, 6/9/99.
7. D , T ., 13/8/98.
8. D „T ., Protectionists, 28/5/97, 17/5/98, 19/7/99, Liberals,
IT/6/00, 24/7/01, 29/5/02, 17/6/03, Progressives, 20/9/04,
6/6/05, 29/6/06.
9. D,T., 12/4/01 (Reid), 18/9/02 (Lee).
10. D . T . , 17/4/01 (Lee) , 19/9/02 (Carruthers) .
11. D .T . , 1/5/02.
12. D . T . , 1/10/03 (The Friedmann censure motion) , 16/7/02 (the
Fitzroy Docks Censure Motion), 20/1/04 (the Referendum Bill)
13. D.T., 1/5/01, 30/1/04.
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and fusion with the Liberals, but the former was never 
achieved and the latter proposal was defeated by seven 
votes to four in a caucus ballot.^
In Tasmania the opposition similarly had fairly regular
meetings. Between 1894 and 1897 two meetings were concerned
2with the selection of Lewis as leader, one with planning
3tactics for the session and the remainder discussed specific 
4proposals. During the Propsting ministry the opposition
5held meetings to discuss leadership and the advisability of
moving censure motions.1 23*56 7 The opposition to Evans discussed
7similar subjects at meetings between 1904 and 1909.
In both states the opposition meetings regularly discussed 
tactics, leadership and, in pre-sessiona1 meetings, the 
general political situation. They provided an occasion for 
members to identify with the party and a means by which 
members could participate in the making of decisions. The 
increasing frequency of party meetings and the broadening of 
the scope of discussion indicated the growth both of 
collective identity and of participation by all members in 
the party decisions.
It is one thing to discover that all members became 
concerned in producing a collective party decision, but we 
must also ask how binding these decisions were on either 
leaders or followers, remembering that both consistently 
declared that their votes were not affected by outside 
influences.
Meetings were never able to bind leaders to obey their
1. D T , , 3/10/05, 27/2/07 , 10/4/07, 8/5/07.
2. M^, 18/5/94, 23/5/94.
3. M^, 28/6/95. The meeting lapsed for want of interest.
4 „ Lewis Diaries, 30/5/94 (Customs Proposals), 5/7/94, 13/7/94,
23/10/94 (Assessment Bill), 3/9/96 (Gaming Bill), 13/11/96 
(Referendum Bill). The diary for 1895 is missing, so 
no meetings are recorded for that year.
5. Mj_, 22/5/03, 19/8/03 , 16/3/04 .
6. M^, 2/10/03, 7/10/03, 25/5/04, 26/5/04.
7. M^, 14/7/03, 20/5/06 (Leadership), 9/3/07, 15/7/08
( T a c t i c s )  .
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decisions, but gradually the value of consultation with 
the party became recognized. At a caucus in 1895 the 
Protectionist party discussed moving a censure motion on 
Reid but adjourned without reaching any decision.  ^ Before 
the meeting was reconvened the next evening, Dibbs had 
moved the no-confidence motion, a step which was bitterly 
resented by one party member who claimed that he should
. 2have been consulted. In 1902 Brunker , a leading Liberal,
claimed that he knew nothing of a censure motion on the
address-in-reply until Lee actually moved it and pointed
out that the party meeting the previous evening had been 
3indecisive. In both cases the freedom of the leaders to 
decide tactics without instructions from a party caucus was 
illustrated. More often the party meeting gave the leader 
a free hand to act as he thought best, particularly when
4the leader dominated the party. What is important is not 
that, in the style of faction politics, the leader occasionally 
acted without the specific authorisation of the party, but 
that the party was so growing in influence as a collective 
identity that even strong leaders saw considerable advantages 
in gaining the support of their parties before acting so 
that they could speak and act in the name of the party, even 
in some cases after a full discussion of their proposals.
Labor members often claimed that their opponents' party 
meetings were worthless and that the leader forced his will 
on the party and allowed them no part in discussing policy 
or tactics. Holman once claimed
'their [the Liberal] programme, if it exists, 
if it exists in anything except the inner 
consciousness of their leader, is still buried 
in the silent bosoms of the honourable member 
for St. George and whichever of his associates 
he takes into his confidence' 5
1. D . T „ , 27/2/95 , 28/2/95 .
2. G . Miller, D.T„ , 1/3/95.
3. NSWPD Series 2, Vol.5, p.464.
4. D -T . , 12/6/00 (Reid), 17/6/03 , 13/8/04, 7/4/07 (Carruthers) .
Carruthers was given a free hand to frame an amendment to 
the address-in-reply, to form his cabinet and to negotiate
a possible fusion with Waddell.
5. NSWPD , Series 2, Vo1.10, p.171.
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He clearly suggested that the party was little more than the 
personal following of the Liberal leader. The Liberal leaders 
insisted that they were not answerable to the party caucus or 
directed by it. In 1907 Carruthers put his possible electoral 
programme to a caucus meeting before it was announced, but 
hastened to point out that, while the caucus could vote on it, 
it could not dictate to the government what programme it should 
adopt.'*' On the other hand he did claim that the leaders 
usually took a consensus of opinion from the party followers 
and that only by these means were members committed to vote 
on the right lines. He described the process by which a 
censure motion was moved in the following terms:
When a vote of censure is moved or is contemplated 
an informal meeting takes place and the leader of 
the party makes known his intentions to his suppor­
ters who are left absolutely unfettered by any fears 
of expulsion or any charge of breaking pledges and 
who are simply expected to vote as their conscience 
and the public interest may dictate.
As a rule no leader strains the support of his 
followers by moving votes of censure recklessly.
It is to the credit of the unpledged parties in 
the past that they have almost invariably gauged 
the feeling of the party in such motions which 
are based chiefly upon violation of those 
principles which form the foundation of the unity 
of the party. 2
3Decisions at meetings were seldom decided by vote but by
general agreement,with leaders gauging the feeling of the
caucus. The party at no stage had any formal means of
coercing members to vote along party lines. When the Labor
party tried to portray the non-Labor party meetings as
being identical to their own caucuses, with the only exception
4that the non-Labor meetings were not truly democratic, the 
Liberal M.P=s rejected this comparison and emphasised the
i. D.T,, 9/5/07.
2 * D.T. , 23/4/03.
3, Only two instances of an actual vote are recorded between
1894 and 1907. In 1895 the Protectionists voted on the 
decision to ally with Parkes and three members, probably 
Lyne , Willis and Price, opposed the motion. D .T . , 
11/5/95. In 1907 the Progressives voted on the proposals 
of fusion with the Liberals. D .T . , 8/5/07.
4. A . H . Griffith, NSWPD , Series 2, Vol.10, p.236 ; McGowen,
NSWP D , Series 1, Vol. 100, pp.1192-3.
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lack of any means of coercion and the freedom of the members
to vote as they wanted, even after a party meeting.  ^ Ashton
suggested that Liberal M.L.A.s were expected, but not forced,
to vote with the party only on matters concerning the party 
2platform,
Tn fact the party leaders could and did exert moral
influence on members to vote with the party even if they
disagreed with some of the proposals. For instance, in 1895
the government whip was relying on several protectionist
members to help pass a controversial clause of the local
government bill and allowed several radical freetraders to
pair against the clause. At the last minute, the Protectionist
party held a party meeting and decided to make the division a
party vote. Those protectionists who had agreed to support
3the clause now felt obliged to support the party. In July 
1899 Crick wanted to censure the government, but the majority 
of his party preferred to await a more appropriate moment.
Crick announced publicly that, although he disagreed, he
4would abide by the decision. A decision of a meeting could 
therefore persuade the dissident members to agree, if only 
by moral pressure. If, of course, the split was too great, 
as it was in Tasmania in 1909 when some members of the party 
were totally dissatisfied with the leadership of Lewis, then 
the meeting had no method of preventing division. Nevertheless, 
generally meetings could be used to reduce internal differences 
and did assist in producing fairly united parties.
1. Rose, NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.10, p.213; Carruthers D -T ,,
14/10/02, The Labor caucus in fact ran on similar lines 
of consensus rather than coercion. In 1907 Edden claimed 
that only seven caucus meetings had been held throughout 
the whole parliament. (NSWPD Series 2, Vol.26, p.138) . 
Nevertheless the main difference was that, even if never 
used, the machinery of coercion existed in the Labor 
party if required.
2. D .T „ , 6/5/03.
3. D.To , 2/5/95. One member, when asked if his vote could
still be relied on, replied, 'It will depend upon 
whether the matter is treated as a party question'.
Some protectionists were disgusted by these opportunist 
tactics and abstained.
4 . NSWPD , Series 1, Vo 1 „ 99 , p . 114 .
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Attendance at party meetings symbolised identification
with the party and implied subordination of personal to party
interests. In 1894 eight unendorsed freetraders immediately
joined the parilamenta ry party by attending its first caucus
meeting.''’ In 1907 Varney Parkes and Colonel Mac ar thur-Ons low,
who had both defeated endorsed Liberal and Reform candidates,
were regarded as normal party members after their presence
2at the first caucus meeting. In Tasmania Whitsitt, an M.H.A. 
for Darwin, had not attended the fusion meeting of 1909 and, 
when he joined the Ewing rebels in 1909, his desertion was 
partly excused because he had not been committed at the meeting
3at which promises of support were made. In the early years,
identification with the party and attendance at party meetings
usually meant satisfaction with the party leadership because
the party was seen primarily in terms of supporting a group
of leaders. T,H. Griffith and Copeland openly left the
Protectionist party in 1899 when they disapproved of Lyne's 
4actions. However, as the party developed its own identity 
which was independent of the leader, so a member could 
criticise the leadership but remain within the party. In 
1907 Storey regularly criticized Carruthers, yet could 
consistently claim
I attended the party meeting^ and I am a good 
party man and a splendid sup^rter of the 
Liberal government, 5
The party meetings w.ere now the most obvious illustration 
of the existence of the party; loyalty to the party no 
longer needed to be synonymous with loyalty to the leader.
In two ways, therefore, an analysis of party meetings 
illustrated the development of party. First, the increasing 
regularity with which they were held, particularly by the 
government party, showed that non-Labor parties developed an 
independent and collective identity, quite apart from the 
existence of any leaders or individuals. Secondly, party 
meetings were used as an additional method of persuading
1 . S . M .H . , 1/8/94.
2. D , T . , 9/10/07,
3. M^, 14/10/09.
4. Griffith, NSWPD Series 1, V.0I.IQO, pp.1247-8 ; Copeland
D T. , 5/9/99.
5 . TSTS^ WPD , Series 2, Vo 1.26, p.235.
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members to vote with the party by allowing backbenchers 
greater participation in party or governmental decision­
making, particularly as the range of issues on which the 
party acted broadened. The parties never introduced new 
methods or sanctions for the leaders to use, but the meetings 
increased in importance as the participation of the backbencher 
became more common, and as precedents of collective party 
action became accepted. By increasing the information available 
to backbenchers and by drawing them into party affairs, the 
party as a collective unit increased its control over their 
votes.
Patronage
A second method by which a government party could maintain
support was by the use of patronage. I am only concerned
here with patronage as a means of maintaining intra-party
discipline and not with the general problem of political
patronage. Patronage was mainly of two types, the personal
and the electoral. The former was an offer which benefitted
the individual himself, the latter was a grant to his
electorate which in turn brought votes to the member. I
have already pointed out how concerned some members were to
forward the interests of their electorates and the willingness
of men like Gillies to support governments if their constituencies
were well looked after. Ministries were able to use promises
of local grants as a means of gaining or securing party
loyalty; in 1905 Carruthers was accused of openly courting
two doubtful supporters by promising to resume large estates
for closer settlement in their electorates.  ^ At the same
time opposition members consistently complained that their
electorates were ignored in the allocation of public works
2grants, just because they were not government supporters.
Often patronage in both states would be exerted quietly behind 
the scenes and, especially in the pre-party days in Tasmania, 
a vote for the government on vital divisions could assist
1. McDonnel, NSWPD, Series 2, Vol.18, p.185. The two M.L.A.s
were John Perry of Liverpool Plains and R. Levien.
Levien did agree to support the government after the 
premier's promise (S .M .H . ,13/3/05). So did Perry 
(D.T., 14/3/05).
2. Affleck, NSWPD Series 2, Vol.10, p.98. Briner, NSWPD
Series 2, Vol.22, p.359.
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in the inclusion of a grant for a road or bridge in the 
public works estimates.1 2345
The personal patronage by which ministries could attract
the support or maintain the loyalty of individuals had less
to justify it but was still common. On occasions patronage
was even used to remove potential rivals; in New South Wales
Barton and Copeland, both potential rivals for the leadership,
2were given overseas appointments by Lyne in 1900; in Tasmania
the two leading members of the opposition were also removed
from politics by appointment to official positions in 1909.1
Loyalty was encouraged by the rewarding of defeated members or
4 5of party workers; Schey and Garrard were both given official
positions after their defeat in elections. Nominations to
the Legislative Council were similarly used for party purposes:
in 1895 Reid appointed three of the major architects of the
Freetrade organization and one defeated member to the council;6 7
in 1899 his appointments included two defeated M.L.A.s and
7four Labor nominees. In 1901-2 over sixty men were recommended 
to See either by themselves or by others as deserving appoint­
ment to the council. Half of these recommendations gave 
record of service as party members or party workers as the 
main reason for appointment. In one instance the secretary 
of the Progressive Association asked See to appoint four 
leading manufacturers to the council as a reward for their 
contributions to party funds and on account of their willingness
1. M^, 11/5/91.
2. Reid, NSWPD , Series 1, Vol.103, p.59.
3. See Chapter 4, p.69.
4. Schey was the Secretary of the National Protection Union,
defeated in 1898 and rewarded directly Lyne took office. 
See Reid NSWPD Series 1, Vol.103, p.59.
5. Garrard, a minister from 1894-8, was defeated and made
President of the Sewerage Board. For equally political 
reasons he was later refused re-appointment by the See 
Government. D .T ., 24/5/04.
6. Party workers were A. Kethel, E. Pulsford, F.J. Smith:
the defeated candidate was R. Fowler.
7. Defeated M.L.A.s were G.H. Greene and A.J. Gould; Labor
nominees J. Wilson, J. Estell, J. Buzacott and J. Hepher , 
D . T . , 10/4/99.
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to start a pro-government newspaper.1 2345 Though See in fact
made no appointments at this time, there is no doubt that
many people regarded a seat in the council as a possible
reward for political services. Since membership of the
council was unpaid, it was presumably sought for prestige
and not for financial reasons. Even those who were not
appointed for directly political reasons could usually be
guaranteed to hold views and to vote generally in the
2interests of the party which nominated them. Positions
in the Legislative Assembly such as the chairmanship of
committees or places on the public works committee were
3often considered party gifts, even though recipients
sometimes denied that they felt obliged to support the
4government at all. In 1898 the Reid government nominated 
two protectionists who were unpopular with their party for 
selection to the public works committee, but these members 
were then replaced in a ballot of the house by others who 
had been more amenable to party discipline . ^
On some occasions personal patronage or expectation of 
it was more blatant. Rose was rumoured to have deserted 
the See government because it had refused to give him an 
official appointment.^ In 1898 Reid's advance payment to 
Neild to cover expenses incurred during the compiling of 
his report on old age pensions came at an opportune moment 
because his loyalty was in doubt. During a censure motion 
the party whip had tried to persuade Neild, then at a charity
1. H. Sparks to See, 21/5/01. See Papers, Vol.26. Mitchell
Library, A3675. In this volume there are over sixty 
letters received by See concerning appointments to the 
Council. They were all written between April 1901 and 
July 1902.
2. For a brief analysis of party voting in the Legislative
Councils, see Appendix D.
3. D . T . , 29/6/00 .
4. Wood, NSWPP , Series 2, Vol.21, p.4840.
5. D .T ., 1/12/98. Ewing and McFarlane, who had just voted
against their party on a censure motion, were replaced 
by Perry and Levien.
For his defence against these rumours, see Rose, NSWPD , 
Series 2, Vol.10, p.215-6.
6 .
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ball, to attend the division. The whip both phoned and 
sent a cab, but Neild refused to leave his evening's 
entertainment.1 2 Such direct method of persuasion, even 
if uncommon and falling short of bribery, were additional 
means of maintaining solidarity.
There is too little information available to draw any 
precise conclusions about the influence of patronage, but 
it seems likely that patronage was a more useful method of 
obtaining party cohesion when party alignments were in 
doubt and therefore, as party identification developed, 
patronage declined as a means of attracting support, although 
it remained useful for cementing the loyalty of wavering 
followers. When parties were clearly divided on matters 
of principle or policy, patronage was seldom sufficient 
to attract members from the other side of the house; when 
party members were dissatisfied or only on the fringe of 
the party, then the government could use patronage to keep 
these supporters within the party. Consequently the 
development of solid parties inevitably reduced the scope 
of patronage.
The Whip and Party Discipline
As we have seen, the non-Labor parties had no formal
rules or sanctions with which discipline could be maintained.
Party meetings became an accepted means of placing pressure
on members and of maintaining unity but were never controlled
by any rules of procedure nor gave leaders the means to
enforce any decisions. The only recognition of the fact that
discipline was necessary can be seen in the appointment of
the party whip. In both states he was the only paid party 
2official and, apart from the leader, the only public sign 
that the party actually had a corporate existence.
1. D . T . , 17/9/98. Lord Beauchamp, then Governor, once wrote
that he was disappointed in the general tenor of politics 
but that there was an absence of any bribery. 'Through 
and through politics appeared to me perfectly pure' .
(Diary of Lord Beauchamp, Mitchell Library, A3295). At 
the time this was written Hassell was making a fortune 
out of his position as minister for lands.
2. In New South Wales, the whip received an annual salary of
£900 made up of contributions from other minister's sal­
aries (D .T . , 1/9/04) . In Tasmania, the government whip's 
salary was reputed to be 100 (Launceston Monitor, 18/6/09, 
25/6/09). How, or even whether, the opposition whip was 
paid is unknown.
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The position of whip had existed in the early politics 
of both states but not consistently so /  because leaders 
were often responsible for collecting support themselves.
As the parties developed in the 1880s, so the role of the 
whip became accepted as a part of politics. In this period 
in New South Wales, the party whips were:
TABLE VIII; Party Whips in New South Wales Politics 1894-1907
Party Date Whip Reason for resignation
Freetrade 1894-8 F . Farnell Electoral defeat
Freetrade 1898-1901 J .S . Hawthorne Elected to Public 
Works Committee
Liberal 1901-7+ J . Nobbs
Protectionist 1894-8 J . Perry Elected to Public 
Works Committee
Protectionist 1898-1900 J . G . Carroll Dissatisfied with 
Government
Protectionist-
Progressive
1900-4 W . F . Hurley Appointed to 
Council
Progressive 1904-7 G. Briner (officially 
party secretary)
Country Party 1902 J.G. Carroll Disagreed with
Caucus decision
The whip was always faced with a lack of real power.
His duty was to organize the party and anticipate awkward
situations. In the early years he often approached members
of opposition parties in order to construct majorities on
issues which did not directly concern the basic principles
of either party. In 1895 Farnell relied on protectionist
2support to pass a clause in the local government bill while 
in 1898 Hawthorne was described as
that bland and insinuating official who on many 
occasions had whisked men from this side of the 
house to the other. 3
Personal charm, diligence and persistence were the main 
requirements of a whip who had no means of coercing members
1. For instance, Thomas Garrett was whip to the Cowper-Robertson
faction. Loveday and Martin, Parliament, Factions and 
Parties, p.115.
2. D .T ., 2/5/95.
3. O'Sullivan, NSWPD Series 1, Vol. 93, p.126.
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to vote with his party.
Within the party, the whip was responsible for anticipating
possible revolts and securing votes on party lines. When P.H.
Morton wanted to attack Reid over his customs proposals in
1895, Farnell warned Reid of the threat and Morton was
2persuaded to remain silent. In 1904 Nobbs acted as the 
link between Carruthers and potential ministers during the
3cabinet-making period of 1904 and was supposed to keep his
4party informed of opposition plans. As the rift between
parties became broader after 1903, so the role of the whip
became exclusively concerned with his own party. The whip
was always the servant of his party and could act only
under instructions; when Perry called a party meeting on
his own initiative to discuss the federal issue in 1898, he
5was accused by one backbencher of exceeding his powers.
The main task of the whip was to produce a solid vote 
for the party when it was required. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, contemporaries recognised a difference 
between party votes and free votes but, unlike the House 
of Commons, there is no way of deciding which divisions were 
party votes and when the whip tried, but failed, to maintain 
party solidarity. When the local government bill in 1895 
was defeated after a Protectionist caucus had decided to 
make it a party vote, Reid complained that this issue had
1. Farnell was said to be an efficient whip because he
was energetic, persistent, diplomatic and aware of 
impending developments in the assembly (D .T ., 4/4/95).
Perry was seen as the only practicable opposition 
whip in 1895 because he was efficient and popular 
(D,T. , 14/8/95) .
2. Ashton to Morton, 10/7/95. P.H. Morton Papers, Mitchell
Libr ary, A3 039.
3. D . T m  29/8/04, 30/8/04.
4. In 1905 Gardiner moved a second amendment to the Address-
in-Reply and, when Carruthers showed surprise, Gardiner 
claimed he had shown the details of the motion to the 
Liberal whip and that therefore Carruthers ought to 
have been better informed. NSWPD Series 2, Vol.18, 
p.378. See also D .T ., 30/6/97 for a whip's anticipation
of an opposition censure motion.
5. Richmond River Times , 21/4/98.
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always been regarded as a non-party matter,1 2*45 that he had rrot 
insisted on a party vote and that the Protectionist demand for 
a party vote was unfair. Such clear indications of a party's 
view on legislation are unfortunately few. However we can 
examine some occasions on which the effect of party pressure 
can be seen.
After the defeat of a clause of the local government bill
in 1895, O'Sullivan tried to take the business of the house
out of the hands of the government, but those freetraders
who had opposed the bill now quickly returned to vote with 
2their party. In 1905 Carruthers was prepared to accept the 
defeat of one clause of the shires bill in committee, but 
when he declared that a second clause was vital to the bill,
3his party immediately solidified behind him. The implicit
threat that, if defeated, the government would drop the
bill or even resign was sufficient to make party members
sink minor criticisms in order to ensure that the whole
bill was passed. The fate of the ministry was often consider-
4ed more important than a matter of minor principle. In 
1905 Fleming voted against the party candidate for the 
chairmanship of committee but declared
but were it a question of the life of the government,
I would sink all minor differences, as others would, 
and vote with them, because it appears to me they 
are a genuinely good government taken either individ­
ually or collectively. 5
1. DoT,, 1/5/95. Reid was later criticised by J.C. Ellis
for failing to make the issue a party matter. D .T ., 
23/5/95. P.H. Morton also claimed that local 
government should be made aparty question NSWPD,
Series 1, Vol. 78, p.7276.
2. D . T . , 27/4/95 .
3 • D-T . , 27/9/05 .
4. Molesworth (NSWPD Series 1, Vol.100, p.1264-5), declared
that the payment to Neild, although wrong, was not of 
sufficient consequence to justify the defeat of the 
Reid ministry. In Tasmania, see Bradley on the re­
appointment of the commander of land forces, Launceston 
Examiner , 11/7/95.
5. Fleming NSWPD Series 2, Vol.18, pp.472.
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Generally the non-Labor parties were able to maintain 
disciplined voting because they did not push their demands 
too far. Between 1904 and 1907, when their parliamentary 
discipline was at its tightest, several groups of members 
broke away from the party on specific issues, though the 
party was never in danger of defeat. In 1898 Reid had 
refused to insist on a party vote on an affair in which 
he had a personal interest, lest it appeared that the party 
was being used to further his own ends One M.L.A. claimed
that a party supporter was never forced to vote against 
publicly expressed opinions, even though he admitted "the 
crack of the whip" might change private or unstated convictions. 
A Labor member claimed that the Liberals in 1905 were 'as
3easily whipped as any party I have seen' and their solidarity
does suggest that they were at least as cohesive as any other
party. However, this solidarity was obtained primarily
because non-Labor parties allowed freedom to vote on non-
4essential divisions and only brought pressure on members 
on vital occasions, even then not always successfully. 
Furthermore, of course, once the party had gained a collective 
identity there was no longer a need to persuade individual 
M.L.A.s to support the party leaders because they were 
generally committed to the ideas of the party which they would 
support on all major issues.
Within this framework of some freedom to vote, party
leaders generally used personal persuasion to attract support.
In 1901 William Archer, M.L.A. for Burwood, complained that
before the election he was approached by two leading Liberals
who tried to persuade him to join their party and promised
that, if he did so, he would not be opposed by the Liberal
party in the election. When he refused, an official Liberal
candidate opposed him in the election. After he had won the
seat as an independent, he was again contacted by the two
5Liberals who made another effort to gain his support.
Personal contacts, not formal rules, were responsible for
1. NSWPD Series 1, Vol. 99, p.96.
2. Jessep, NSWPD Series 2, Vol. 24, p.3187.
3. Burgess, NSWPD Series 2, Vol.18, p.300.
4. See below, chapter seven.
5. NSWPD Series 2, Vol. 1, p.294-295. The Liberals were
J. Garland and J.J. Cohen.
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mai nt ai ni ng party unity. As a r e sult of these personal 
contacts, party discipline had a f lexibility which could 
be contrasted to the rigidity of Labor methods and which 
allowed the non-Labor parties to exert some control over 
their members without u n d e r m i n i n g  their widely stated views 
of independence.
In Tasmania the whips had e x i sted in early years''' but
were less well e stablished than in New South Wales because
in a small house the leader himself could more easily m a i ntain
contact with individual members. In 1896 Braddon turned a
mo tio n condemning the r e - a p p o i n t m e n t  of the commander of the
Land forces into a vote of con f i d e n c e  so that some of his
supporters who d i s a p proved of the appo i n t m e n t  did not oppose 
2the government. In 1894 Dobson, faced with the p o s s ibility  
of the defeat of the land tax bill, attempted to negotiate 
acceptable limits of taxation with two M.H.A.s who came
3from the biggest landowning families in the state. The 
personal negotiations failed and the m i n istry fell. In 
general party methods were similar to those of New South 
Wales. Freedom to vote on specific issues with which 
members disagreed, such as the wages board legislation, 
was permitted partly because it m i g h t  have been impossible 
to enforce soli darity on such an issue but also so that 
the all egiance of members was not we a k e n e d  by a clash with 
the party on a minor issue. The n o n - Labor disc ipline was 
de sig ned  to m a i ntain at least an illusion of independence, 
so that it could in reality m a i n t a i n  solidarity when necessary.
Conelu sions
Party d i s c ipline is clearly not simply a r eflection of 
party methods. The non-Labor parties and the Labor party 
used dif fe rent methods to ma i n t a i n  cohesion in divisions 
and to secure acceptance of their legislative proposals, but 
the results were not si g n i f i c a n t l y  different. On no occasion 
did the governing non-Labor party have poorer d i s c ipline in 
its voting on g o v e rnment l e g i slation than the Labor party.
1 . 
2 . 
3 .
M . , 13/5/91, L a u n ceston Ex aminer , 23/11/95 .
M . , 9/7/96.
M . , 10/5/94.
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The Labor methods of pledge and caucus control were by no 
means the only way in which a party could maintain discipline 
in that period; the other parties did not need to follow the 
Labor example because they could usually gain similar results 
with different methods that were more compatible with their 
attitudes to politics. When divisions on particular issues 
did occur, their flexibility of approach often permitted the 
party to re-group without recriminations.
In both states this analysis of voting behaviour and of 
party methods indicated that the non-Labor parties increased 
their control over party voting. In the first place, the 
range of issues on which the party took a stand broadened 
considerably; in 1894 in New South Wales the parties maintained 
a high rate of cohesion on divisions relating to the fiscal 
issue but allowed freedom of action on other matters. By 
1907 the vague and broad 'anti-socialist' ideology brought a 
wide selection of issues, some of which were primarily 
administrative, into the category of party issues. Since the 
choice was then between a Labor or a non-Labor government, 
the party usually saw a need for cohesion on these proposals 
and voted solidly. The lack of unity in New South Wales 
between 1898 and 1902 and in Tasmania before 1909 can be 
explained by the lack of any specific principle on which 
the party could be based apart from the demands of sound 
administration. Since the legislation in these periods was 
non-controversial, the parties did not demand solidarity; as 
the cleavages between parties increased, so did party
I1
competition and party voting. Party solidarity was generally 
achieved when required, not as a matter of course. Unnecessary 
pressure was seldom exerted on members. Yet by 1907 in New 
South Wales and 1912 in Tasmania the party control of votes 
was sufficiently complete to maintain consistently cohesive 
parties on a broad range of issues. Their methods of maintain­
ing this discipline may not' have changed, but their results on 
a broad range of issues certainly did.
Simultaneously with the development of party discipline, 
we have seen the development of a party identity. Even though 
party meetings were still unable to bind leaders or followers 
and still had no official existence or role, they were held
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more regularly and could discuss the behaviour of the 
administration which they supported. The collective opinion 
of backbenchers was becoming more important to ministers.
Furthermore as the collective identity of the party and 
its voting solidarity over a wide range of issues grew, so 
the internal groups which had been obvious in the parliamentary 
parties began to disappear and the individual M.P. became 
more fully identified with the party.
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Chapter 7
The Party’s Relations with Groups and Members 
Introduction
In the previous chapters, I showed that non-Labor M.P.s 
consistently claimed that they were free to vote as they 
pleased and that they had to fulfil several functions, some 
of which occasionally made contradictory demands on them. 
Party methods of discipline were therefore developed which 
could be effective on an increasingly broad range of topics 
without appearing to restrict or regiment M.P.s. Party 
members were not expected to give support on every issue 
and were permitted to oppose the party on some occasions, 
but nevertheless the party acted more cohesively and 
developed a sense of collective party identity as the 
period progressed.
Since the party only gradually gained cohesion and 
members did oppose the party on some issues, we must 
attempt to discover on what occasions members or groups 
opposed the party, what effect these actions might have 
had on the party development and how the relationship 
between the party, on the one hand, and the groups or 
individuals, on the other, may have changed as the parties 
developed a collective identity. There are basically two 
questions demanding analysis - first, whether groups 
existed within a party and what their relations with it 
might have been and, secondly, how the relationship between 
members and their party changed. In both cases the 
existence of groups or of dissenting members must be 
discovered through cluster analyses or documentary evidence 
and their behaviour explained.
In this analysis I will first consider any groups 
within the government parties in New South Wales, then 
groups in opposition parties and finally groups in the 
Tasmanian parliament. Then I will examine the relationship 
between individual members and their party.
Groups in the Government Parties in New South Wales
In New South Wales three important groups were formed 
within government parties in parliament while several other 
members or groups of members in the assembly had close
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links with external interest groups. The three groups 
within the government parties were the Freetrade and Land 
Reform League men of 1894, the Protectionist party of 1899- 
1900 and the Country party of 1902; those which had links 
with external organizations which I will consider were the 
parliamentary representatives of the temperance, liquor 
and Protestant groups.
In August 1894 five radical freetraders invited
freetrade backbenchers to attend a meeting which was intended
'to consider the best means of organizing the Democratic
forces of the country' and to produce a four plank platform.'*'
2The meeting was attended by about thirty members, but the
group immediately split when Varney Parkes accused Wise
3of using it to forward his own ambitions. In November,
Wise attacked Reid's failure to introduce direct taxation
at the first opportunity but was disowned by O'Reilly who
claimed that Wise had spoken without the authority of the
4thirty M.L.A.s who were members of the League . In
February 1895 a second caucus discussed a proposal to block
the land and income tax assessment bill until the levels of
5exemptions from the taxation had been announced, but no 
action was taken. In spite of the fact that many of these 
radicals doubted Reid's sincerity, they distrusted Wise's 
ambition more. After the budget of 1895 had introduced 
the desired taxation measures, the majority became absorbed 
into the freetrade party and ceased to maintain a separate 
existence.
On one occasion the votes of some of the radical members 
had helped to defeat a government measure. In April 1895
1 . Petitions and Proceedings of the Legislative Council, M .L . 
A285, p.251. The convenors of the meeting were Wise, 
Ashton, Bavister, Millen and Varney Parkes.
2. Martin, Political Developments in New South Wales, p.88-89.
3. Wise to Varney Parkes, 31/8/94, Varney Parkes Papers,
M . L a A1052.
4. S ,M,H . , 12/11/94.
5. S , M . H . , 27/2/94 .
6. Wise to Carruthers 31/7/95, Box 14a, Carruthers Papers
ML MSS , 1638 .
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Reid introduced a clause in the local government bill
which effectively prevented the proposed municipalities
from raising revenue from an unimproved land tax. Several
freetrade M .L .A „s were annoyed by this clause and, since
the bill was not considered a party question, were allowed
to pair or vote against it.'*’ When the protectionist leaders
insisted on a party vote, the opposition of these freetraders
was sufficient to defeat the clause. On other occasions
2these members usually voted with the government. The 
cluster analysis indicated that some Freetrade and Land 
Reform advocates had marginally higher scores with the
3 ,Labor party than with the remainder of their own party, but 
to describe them as a distinct group would be too extreme. 
They should be seen as a ginger group within the party which 
wanted to ensure the introduction of the land and income 
taxes and the reduction of customs duties.
Two points of significance arise from the behaviour
of the members of this group. In the first place their
action in convening a meeting and discussing a separate
platform was not considered to be incompatible with their
membership of the parliamentary freetrade party, even
though the meeting was held after the party members had
committed themselves to support the Reid government and
after the caucus had identified the party with the ministry.
The policy which the cabinet pursued was seen largely as
government, rather than as party, policy because there
was no way in which the party could express its opinions
on government administration except in private conversations
4or public statements. This group did not see it as 
inconsistent with supporting the ministry to formulate a
1. D „T ., 12/4/95, 1/5/95. The dissident radicals were
O'Reilly, Ashton, Millen, Wilks, Dick, Fegan, Moore, 
Affleck ,
2. On one other occasion four radicals, Ashton, Haynes,
O'Reilly, Wilks, opposed a motion to receive the 
committee resolutions on the land and income tax 
assessment bill.
3. Wilks, O'Reilly, Hawthorne, Moore, Ashton, Bavister, Fegan,
Dick, Newman. These members generally have agreement 
scores with Labor of over 0.80 while many of their 
scores with their own party drop as low as 0.70.
4. See Martin, Political Developments in New South Wales, p.90.
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platform for whose implementation the group would press, 
because this was the only way in which the strength of 
backbench opinion could be illustrated. In spite of their 
strong feelings on the subject of direct taxation, the 
group as a group did not attempt to pressure the government. 
Its meetings were a forum for radical discussion within the 
party, rather than a means of determining an independent 
parliamentary strategy. They did not threaten the government 
with withdrawal of support. The group ties were not strong 
enough to justify any concerted attempt to defeat the 
government, particularly since there was no alternative 
section of the house that would be more inclined to introduce 
the desired legislation. The tendency for the ties to party 
to be stronger than the connections with the group was true 
of all groups throughout the period.
In 1900 a backbench group of the Protectionist party 
became dissatisfied with the promise of Lyne to drop the 
fiscal issue and formed a 'Protectionist' party within the 
government party with the intention of persuading Lyne to 
re-adopt protective tariffs. Despite meetings and continual 
criticism of the Premier, this party did not attempt as a 
group to force Lyne's hand. It remained an ineffective 
forum for complaint
In 1902 a Country party was formed by members of the
Progressive party. It harmoniously discussed matters
2concerning rural affairs, but was divided on other political 
matters and after the Friedmann affair it ceased to act as 
a political unit. Its separate existence was formally 
recognised - in November 1902 the party leader, James Gormly , 
attended a meeting with other party leaders to discuss
3methods of alleviating the rural hardship caused by drought 
- but its influence was small. The cluster analysis does 
not indicate that they consistently voted together. The 
formation of this group suggests that its members met to
1. D -T ., 11/6/00, 14/6/00.
2 . Such as water conservation (D .T . , 31/7/02) , the rabbit
act and the stock and pastures act (D .T . , 11/9/02) .
3. D,T„, 27/11/02.
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discuss legislation and to formulate proposals which 
they would like the cabinet to adopt, because there 
was no other means for a group to push its political 
demands. Despite their protestations of independence, 
the Country party would clearly not have been prepared 
to defeat the government since this would have replaced 
the country-orientated Progressives with the city-dominated 
Liberal party. It was not searching for direct power but 
for a means of more effective representation of its 
interests within the government party.
The most consistently vocal interest-group representatives
in this period were the temperance advocates who, after 1902,
co-operated closely with the supporters of the Australian
Protestant Defence Association (A.P.D.A.) . This group was
different from those so far considered because it was
concerned primarily with one issue and attracted support
from all parties; nevertheless its activities after 1904
still illustrated the changing position of groups within
the government parties. Before 1901 the parliamentary
advocates of the temperance movement included members of
all three parties and attempted to introduce local option
as a private member's bill. In 1894 an official meeting
of the Local Option parliamentary committee was held and
a motion demanding the introduction of local option passed
through the house. ^ However no legislation eventuated
since, like all advocates of private bills, its supporters
were faced with the problems of a lack of time and a
2difficulty in raising sufficient interest. After 1901
interest in the introduction of temperance measures remained
3alive in all parties, but the New South Wales Alliance -
1. S CM ,H . , 27/8/94. The motion was passed by thirty votes
to twenty-seven.
2. For instance, in 1898 Henry Copeland tried to introduce
a Sunday Trading Bill and wrote to E ,M . Clark, another 
U.L.V.A. supporter, asking him to be in attendance 
when the bill was discussed. Copeland to Clark 13/4/99. 
E.M. Clark Papers, M.L. Uncat. MSS. 298. The member 
introducing such bills was responsible for persuading 
members to attend and vote at all.
3. In 1903 a petition from a local option league was intro­
duced by three Labor members (McGowen, J. Storey,
A. Griffith) , two Liberals (Carruthers, Morton) and 
three Progressive (Thomson, Hall, Archer). D.T., 25/9/03.
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a body which had united several temperance organizations - 
realised the value of working through a party. It encouraged 
participation in Liberal and Reform Association affairs, 
entered an unofficial alliance with that party and had a 
local option plank added to the Liberal platform.  ^ Several 
of the new Liberal members elected in 1904 were strong 
temperance advocates. In 1905 the Carruthers government 
introduced and passed a bill which established the local 
option principle.
Despite their vocal demonstrations, their widespread 
electoral organizations and their theoretically large group 
of parliamentary supporters,the temperance movement was 
ineffective until it worked through a party and persuaded a 
government to take up its cause. Before then an independent 
parliamentary group had found it impossible to introduce 
and pass any piece of legislation, let alone one as complex 
and time-consuming as the liquor act of 1905 which introduced 
local option. At times the group made menacing threats - 
in 1905 Fegan claimed
The temperance party in this country will not be
satisfied with promises any longer. They will
require measures, not promises. 2
But generally such statements carried little weight. The
pressure to ensure that the bill was passed - if indeed
such pressure was necessary after it had become part of
the Liberal platform - came from within the party and not
from any inter-party alliance. It was significant that
despite a large electoral membership the interest group
could only be successful when it decided to work through a
party. Furthermore, the radical freetraders and country
M .L ,A .s had seen a necessity for forming a formal group in
order to influence the decisions of a government which
was based on their party, but, although rumours of a meeting
3of temperance members existed, they did not appear to adopt
1. J.Do Bollen. The Temperance Movement and the Liberal 
Party in N.S.W. Politics, 1900-1904, p .17 0.
2 . NSWPP Series 2, Vol.18, p.354.
3. D .T « , 7/7/05. The meeting was convened by Jessep, who
was called by Carruthers 'the leader of the temperance 
party'. D.T., 4/9/05.
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similar tactics in 1905, even though the government introduced 
a bill on local option which did not fulfill all their hopes.
There was considerable external pressure group activity, 
but no group formed within the Liberal party. It seems 
probable that, since the government programme was now more 
directly identified with the whole party and backbenchers 
now had greater opportunities to criticize or advise the 
government at party meetings, such methods were no longer 
necessary.
It is significant that these groups were all formed 
within government parties and that no similar bodies appeared 
in the opposition parties. In the opposition, pressure 
could be applied on a government more openly on the floor 
of the assembly. In some respects the meetings of these 
groups fulfilled similar functions to opposition party meetings 
in that they gave an opportunity for backbenchers to express 
their dissatisfaction of the party leadership - an opportunity 
which was otherwise lacking in government parties before 
1904.
Occasionally individual M.L.A.s in the government party 
were recognized as the spokesman of outside interests and 
thei r position sometimes clashed with the views held by the 
party. For instance, E.C.V. Broughton, a Liberal, claimed
'I am here to champion the cause of the liquor 
sellers.' 1
despite the local option clause in the party's platform.
He opposed the government legislation which introduced
local option and was reputed to have been given a free hand
2on the issue by the party managers. When a party member 
strongly opposed the party on a particular issue, he was 
probably not forced to vote with the party. His support on 
most other issues was too important for the party to create 
a clash on one piece of legislation. Actions of this type, 
however, were exceptional after 1904. M.L.A.s sometimes 
threatened to take a stand against the party but were often 
not forced to make a decision. Robert Booth, an extreme 
Protestant, claimed he did not regard the question of free
1. NSWPD Series 2, Vol.20, p.2571.
2. NSWPD Series 2, Vol.26, p.138.
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education as a party matter and that, if it were, he would
not vote with his party.'*' Another Protestant reputedly
attacked the government for its failure to ensure fair
treatment of Protestants in the public service but did not
2threaten to leave the party. Group interests within the 
government party were seldom seen as important enough to 
destroy a piece of government legislation; when the attorney- 
general in 1905 added a clause to the local option bill, 
allowing publicans eight years grace if an electorate had 
voted for total abolition, the temperance members of the
Liberal party voted for the clause, which they disliked, for
\fear of defeating the bill as a whole and thus possibly
causing the resignation of the ministry. Party allegiance
was nearly always stronger than group alignment, particularly
when the collective party identification increased after
1904. There was only one occasion when a cluster analysis
of a parliament in New South Wales showed the existence of
a specific group within a government party. In 1898-1899
a group of freetraders opposed Reid because of his support
of the federal constitution in the second referendum and
determined to defeat him at the first opportunity. They
voted against their party leader on several occasions and
3appear as a distinct group in the cluster analysis. This
group later founded the short-lived Democratic League of
4New South Wales. In all other government parties there 
was no distinct group who opposed the ministry, although 
individuals members often did. This supports the view that, 
whereas the party allowed members to oppose the party on 
specific issues, its discipline was usually strong enough to 
prevent the consistent disloyalty of a coherent group.
Groups in Opposition Parties in New South Wales
As we have seen, opposition parties were usually less 
disciplined than government parties and their members had
1. NSWPD Series 2, Vol.22, p.290-1.
2. R . J „ Anderson, The Watchman, 2 2/5/0 5.
3. Haynes, Cotton, J.C.L. Fitzpatrick, Fegan and Nicolson
can be identified as a distinct group.
4 . D .T. , 14/2/00.
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a greater freedom to vote as they pleased on a wider range 
of issues. Since they were not committed to support a 
ministry, several groups within the opposition party can be 
identified from the cluster analysis or from documentary 
sources. However, in every case these internal divisions 
disappeared when the party took office.
Regional groups can be identified within the opposition
protectionists in 1894-5 and in 1898-9. In those divisions
in 1894-5 when the party was most divided - that half of the
divisions which can be termed the 'low cohesion' set’*’ -
four M.L.A.s from the Riverina consistently voted together
and in 1898 these members, with some other local members,
were considered to be part of a solid regional group.1 2 345 In
1894 a further set of three members from the Southern
3Tablelands also voted together. In 1898-9 five M.L.A.s
from neighbouring northern electorates consistently voted
together in a low cohesion set of divisions with agreement
4scores usually over .90 and three other northern members
5had high scores with this group. This set of divisions 
included several votes on public works and on the timing of 
parliamentary sittings - both matters of considerable 
importance to country members who were faced with problems
1. To obtain a low cohesion set of divisions, all those
divisions on which the party was not solid are ranked 
according to R.I.C. and then are subdivided into two 
groups at the median R.I.C. A cluster analysis of 
the high cohesion set can be used to discover when 
individuals or small groups do not vote with the main 
party; the low cohesion set usually indicates the 
distinct groups within the party when it was badly 
divided.
2. Those who appear as a group in the analysis are Hayes
(M.L.A for the Murray) , T. Fitzpatrick (Murrumbidgee) , 
Chanter (Deniliquin) and Gormly (Wagga Wagga). In 
1898 Byrne (Hay), T. Griffith (Albury) and Abbott 
(Wentworth) were included by the press. D .T ., 17/8/98.
3. O'Sullivan (Queanbeyan), Rose (Argyle), Chapman (Braidwood).
4. Cruickshank (Inverell) , Wright (Glen Innes) , Levien
(Quirindi), W. Piddington (Uralla-WaIcha ) ,Sawers (Armidale)
5. Perry (Ballina), Pyers (the Richmond), McLaughlin (Raleigh).
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of regular travel to their distant electorates. When Lyne 
formed a ministry in 1899, these regional voting groups within 
the protectionists disappeared because party discipline was 
now demanded on a wider range of issues.
Freetrade members generally represented city or suburban 
electorates and, with the exception of high agreement scores 
between the two Newcastle members, Dick and Gilbert, in 
1901, no regional groupings can be identified. Regional 
groups were more obvious in the protectionist party when 
in opposition because its membersgenerally, represented rural 
seats and came from regions in which the electorates had a 
greater identity of interest with one another than could be 
found in city or suburban areas.
Occasionally the cluster analysis indicated the
existence of factions within an opposition which can not
be explained in regional terms. In 1894 an examination of
the scores of individual protectionists with members of the
other two parties suggested that three groups with different
attitudes towards these parties existed within the protectionist
party, even though the agreement scores within the party did
not show that the men in these groups co-operated among
themselves. The scores of members with other parties
suggested that one section of the party was strongly opposed
to the Labor party and less opposed to the freetraders;  ^ a
2second group was equally opposed to both parties while a 
third section was more strongly opposed to the freetraders 
than to the Labor party. The last group included the more
3radical members of the party. Even though the members of each 
of these groups may not have co-operated among themselves, 
these results illustrated internal party divisions.
1. Dibbs, T. Fitzpatrick, Kelly, See,Morgan, McFarlane.
2. Perry, Kidd, Copeland, Rawlinson, Ewing.
3. Rose, Barnes, T. Jones, Carroll, O'Sullivan, Miller,
Chanter, Pyers, Ross, Gormly, Crick, Wood, Stevenson, 
F. Clarke. O'Sullivan and Miller joined the Labor 
party in 1910 and 1901 respectively; Wood was 
elected in 1894 as an Independent Laborite ; Gormly, 
Rose, Crick and Chanter were champions of the small 
settlers. See A.W. Martin: The Free Trade and
Protectionist Parties in New South Wales, p\316-8.
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Between 1899 and 1902 the Freetrade party was badly
divided and distinct voting groups within the party can
be identified. After Reid's resignation, some of his
ex-ministerial colleagues were the only members to oppose
Lyne ' s ministry with any consistency."^ After 1901 the
party was split, with one group regularly opposing the
2government, another supporting it on many occasions and 
many of its members being between these two positions. 
Although there is no obvious connection between these 
members, the lack of any cause for the party to follow and 
the resulting freedom of voting can explain this fragmented 
opposition. When Carruthers became leader and opened his 
anti-socialist campaign, these groups within the party 
disappeared.
Generally, regional and voting groups can only be 
found in opposition parties where discipline was more 
relaxed than in government parties. Although groups 
within parties clearly continued to exist, they became 
absorbed into the party and presumably pressed for local 
concessions more often within the party rooms than on the 
floor of the house. This change was yet another sign of 
the increasing dominance of party in determining the 
behaviour of M.L.A.s.
Groups in the Tasmanian Parliament
The more relaxed discipline of Tasmanian politics 
before 1909 and the small size of the house reduced the 
necessity for any formal links among groups in either 
government or opposition parties, although some groups of 
this nature did exist.
In March 1894 a caucus of country members , convened 
by a government supporter, discussed the ministry's
3legislative proposals. In 1903 a 'Country' party, whose
members came from both sides of the house, discussed
4Propsting's occupier's tax and assessment bill. In 1909
1. Brunker, Cook, Hogue, Young.
2. Latimer, Millard, Brunker, Moxham, McKenzie often voted
with the government; Gilbert, Dick, Levy, Lonsdale,
J. Fitzpatrick, Fleming and Nobbs often opposed it. 
The party leader, Lee, belonged to neither group.
3. Mj_, 30/3/94 .
4. Daily Telegraph (Launceston) 2/10/03, 3/10/03.
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Hope was called the "chairman of the Farmer's Party in 
the last parliament".'*' In none of these cases did the 
groups hold regular meetings or pursue any consistent 
programme. In a small house formal ties between members 
with similar interests was unnecessary.
Between 1904 and 1909 the government party included 
most of the members who supported the liquor interests 
while the opposition contained most of the temperance 
advocates. The premier, Evans, was an ex-president of
2the Southern Tasmanian Licensed Victuallers’ Association
while the National Association which supported the ministry
3received donations from the Cascades brewery. The
leader of the opposition introduced a local option bill
4which was supported by the churches but defeated by the 
5government. However after the fusion of 1909 the different 
opinions within the party on the temperance question were 
usually subordinated to the good of the party as a whole.
The only division in 1912 when ten of the fourteen Liberals 
were not solid was on a temperance question, so the split 
within the party on this issue remained but did not hinder 
it from acting together on a broad range of other issues.
Less demanding party discipline in Tasmania also 
resulted in regular regional groupings before 1909. In the 
1894-5 parliament, a group of members from Hobart and the 
surrounding electorates of Glenorchy and Kingborough^ voted 
together fairly consistently and supported the government 
in vital divisions. A second group of country members can 
just be identified, even though some of its members were 
regarded as government supporters and others voted with the
1. North-West Advocate, 28/4/09.
2. Daily Telegraph (Launceston) , 16/7/03.
3. Nk_, 18/12/05, 19/12/05.
4. M^, 13/8/06, 14/8/06.
5. M_*_, 13/8/06, 25/8/06.
6. Crowther and Gill (both Kingborough), Hamilton (Glenorchy),
Bradley, Crisp, Mulcahy and Hiddlestone (various 
Hobart electorates) . The other two Hobart M.H.A.s 
were ministers.
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opposition when the fate of the ministry was at stake. 
Furthermore, these two groups opposed each other on eight 
divisions which divided the house on town versus country 
lines.
Distinct regional groups also can be identified in 
the parliaments between 1903 and 1909. Among the supporters
of the Propsting government was one group of northern
2 3M.H.A.s and another of Launceston members. When Evans
took office, he was supported by a group of five country 
4members. After the election of 1906 a further three 
M.H.A.s joined this group . ^  At the same time two M.H.A.s
6from electorates near Hobart consistently voted together.
After 1909 the regional groupings disappeared because
party discipline became stricter. In the earlier years
members had often been able to vote in a division to suit
the interests of their electorate, regardless of their
party affiliation. Members from the same or adjoining
constituencies co-operated and voted together on matters
affecting their electorate, even though they may have been
7members of different parties. Strict party discipline
finally subordinated the interests of these groups to
those of the party as a collective unit. It is likely
that regional interests were now considered in party meetings
and did not cause members to vote against their party so
often.
Individual Members and Their Party
In a previous chapter I explained the views that members 
had of their own independence and the restrictions which
1. Dumaresq (Longford), Archer (Selby) were pro-Government.
McKenzie (Wellington), von Stieglitz (Evandale) and 
WoolInough (Sorell) opposed it.
2. Allen (Westbury) , Bennett (Cambria) , Gibson (N. Esk) ,
Murray (Latrobe), Youl (Longford).
3. Batchelor, Sadler, Storrer.
4. Allen, Murray, Hope (Kentish) , C. Mackenzie (Wellington) ,
Wood (Cumberland).
5. R. Mackenzie (N. Esk) , Best (Deloraine) , Bennett.
6. Rattle (Glenorchy) , Brownell (Franklin) .
7 . C.B.M, Fenton, Launceston Examiner , 2 4/6/96.
these views placed on the development of the party. These 
theoretical views did not change during this period, but 
the actual attitude of members towards the parties did.
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Members occasionally voted against specific issues when 
they disagreed with party policy. In all parliaments, party 
members sometimes coupled an announcement of their intention 
to oppose the party on particular pieces of legislation to a 
general statement of loyalty to the party. In 1895 P.H. 
Morton opposed the introduction of a land tax and stated he 
felt bound,
notwithstanding that.I belong to the party now in 
power, which I have supported right through, to  ^
point out where I think the Government are wrong.
In 1905 S.J. Kearney opposed the North Coast railway bill 
and stated,
While I am a supporter of the Government, giving 
them support where I think they deserve it, I did 
not come into the House with a view to assisting 
them to pursue a spirited policy of public works.
His defence of his defection - the right of all members to 
select the issues which he would support his party without 
necessarily becoming estranged from that party - was similar 
to that of Morton. What did change, however, was the general 
nature of issues on which this opposition took place. Morton 
opposed the party on an issue which had been a central part 
of Reid's electoral manifesto. He himself had opposed the 
land tax in the campaign and, despite Reid's promises, was 
not electorally bound to support it. After 1904 the members 
were generally identified with the party programme and 
expected to support the legislation which implemented it.
1. NSWPD Series 1, Vol.78, p.7276. See also explanation of
defection from the Protectionist party on the Income 
Tax Bill: Willis, NSWPD Series 1, Vol.78, p.6998,
Chapman, NSWPD Series 1, Vol.78, p.6996.
2. NSWPD Series 2, Vol.24, p.3091. See also Fleming's
statement quoted in chapter 6, p.127 and Levy's 
statement on the District Courts Amendment Act which 
ran 'How can I conscientiously vote against the 
motion for the recomittal, however much I may desire 
to be loyal to my party and the Attorney General? I 
do not look at this Bill from a party standpoint'. 
NSWPD Series 2, Vol.19, pp.1617.
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Often backbenchers defended their opposition to the party 
on specific issues by pointing out that this legislation had 
not been part of the policy which they, as party members, had 
been pledged to support. Some of the Liberals who opposed 
the government savings bank bill in 1904 were careful to 
explain away their disloyalty in those terms.^ The only party 
member to defect on legislation concerning the party's 
electoral programme was Broughton who opposed the liquor bill 
- and the reasons for this vote have already been indicated. 
Most of the Liberal defections were on minor issues which may 
have been relevant to particular problems but were not a 
central part of the government's legislation.
Often this backbench opposition was caused by the clash
of party policy and the demands of the M.P.'s electorate.
When the fate of the ministry was not in the balance, a
member often opposed his party because of the votes which
such an action might win him in his own electorate. In
1904 three Liberal M.L.A.s from coastal electorates opposed
a government bill which imposed charges on goods being
transhipped for export because of the detrimental effect of
2such a charge on coastal trade. Several M.L.A.s from the
North Coast opposed the building of a Maitland-Grafton
railway because they did not want to see all their trade
being sent to Sydney before export. They argued that a line
from the Tablelands to the Coast was a more urgent requirement.
In 1906 pressure from several suburban M.L.A.s forced Car-
ruthers to drop the clause in his local government bill which
4introduced a Greater Sydney municipality.
1. D .T . 4/11/04. The bill was opposed by nine Liberals.
2. Wood, NSWPD Series 2, Vol.16, p.1315-1316; Coleman, NSWPD
Series 2, Vol.16, p.1319. The third M.L.A. who opposed 
the bill was Morton.
3. F.J. Thomas, NSWPD Series 2, Vol.19, pp . 2172-2174 ; Kearney,
NSWPD Series 2, Vol.24, p . 3 0 91 .
4. D.T., 10/10/06. For other examples: in 1894 Moore opposed
a Land Bill because of its possible effects on small 
settlers in his electorate (NSWPD Series 1, Vol.76, 
p.4608) . Millard opposed a Land Bill for similar reasons 
in 1905 (NSWPD Series 2, Vol.21, p.4721). In 1905, R.J. 
Anderson, M.L.A. for Balmain, supported a motion demanding 
the local tendering for a bar dredge on the grounds that 
the contract could create employment in his electorate 
(NSWPD Series 2, Vol.18, p.1009).
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Even before 1904 opposition to the party for local
reasons seldom forced a member to leave the party, although
this could occur. When Reid proposed to remove the protective
tariff on dairy produce, three South Coast M.L.A.s asked
him to review the decision. When he refused to change his mind
two accepted the decision,'1 2*4' but the third, always a doubtful
supporter of the freetrade party, decided that the decision
2forced him to join the opposition. In 1898, as we have seen, 
Reid's attitude to the sugar tariff forced several protec­
tionists to vote with him and against their party on a 
censure motion. Generally, however, local pressures were 
only a secondary influence on members and after 1904 no 
member deserted his party on a major issue for local reasons.
While M.P.s still voted against their party on less 
important matters after 1904, their attitude towards the 
party and the government shows a more significant change.
In the early years party loyalty was seen in terms of 
support for a ministry. Later the support was directed 
towards the collective identity of the party and the cabinet 
was regarded as part of the party leadership and not as a 
totally separate body. We have already seen how the 
increasingly frequent party meetings allowed members to 
criticise and participate in government actions; at the 
same time the party itself became the object of backbench 
loyalty.
In 1894 the majority of freetraders re-affirmed their
support for Reid before he formed a cabinet, but one
member, W.H. Wilks, claimed he would reserve his support
3until Reid had announced his ministry's policy. Three
months later a second party member threatened that, if the
ministry did not fulfil its promises within eleven months,
4he would cross the floor of the house. When the 'party
1. Reid to Morton 30/5/95. Morton Papers M.L. A3039.
2. D . T . , 11/5/95. Alexander Campbell deserted the paty,
Morton and Millard remained loyal.
3 * S .M .H ., 1/8/94.
4. S.M.H., 21/11/94 (Affleck).
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of revenge' c o n demned Reid in 1899, its members claimed
that it was Reid who had de s e r t e d  his p rinciples and that
they wer e the only true freetraders,'*" The fact that they
had r e v o l t e d  against Reid p e r s o n a l l y  rather than against
the F r e e t r a d e  party g e n erally was emphasised in 1901 when
these m e m b e r s  rejoined the party di rectly after Reid had
2res ig ne d the party leadership. The basic j ustification 
for these actions was set out by Haynes:
It is the duty of a man, if he is animated by 
any p r i n c i p l e  at all, to r e c o llect that when 
he follows another as a leader, he follows him 
only as the figurehead of a set of principles.
The m o m e n t  he plays false to those principles, 
there is nothing to do but to leave him. 3
During the See a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  some members who deser t e d  
the g o v e r n m e n t  justified their actions by claiming that the 
g o v e r n m e n t  had shifted its po s i t i o n  and that they had been
4forced to leave the party if they were to remain consistent. 
In these instances, the party had become almost synonymous 
with the gove rnment; party m e m b e r s h i p  entailed support of 
a sp eci fic ministry. If a member was d i s s a t i s f i e d  with 
the g o v e r n m e n t ,  he was forced to leave the party.
As the pa rty dev e l o p e d  a collective identity, so loyalty 
was d i r e c t e d  more to the party, less to the leader. After 
1904 Fell and Storey, both occasional critics of the Liberal 
gov er nm en t, were able to attack the party leaders w i t h o u t  
lea ving the party. Fell argued that he was a loyal p a rty 
member, but that it was the duty of a back b e n c h e r  to keep his 
party on the right path by p e r s i s t e n t  c r i t icism wh e n e v e r  it
5was justified. Storey was more violent, p a r t i c u l a r l y  in
his d e n u n c i a t i o n s  of C arruthers whom he regarded as a0
po li ti ca l o p p o r t u n i s t  and a poor leader. Yet at the same
1. D .T ., 10/4/99, 22/6/99, 30/8/99, NSWPD Series 1, Vol.98,
p p .54-7 (Fegan) , pp.65-8 (J. Fitzpatrick) , p p . 88-91
(Cotton) , p p . 101-110 (Haynes) .
2. D .T . , 17/4/01.
3. NSWP D , Series 1, V o 1.99, p.18 3.
4. D .T . , 1/4/03 (George), 15/4/03 (Broughton), NSWPD Series
2, V o 1.5 , p,258 (O'Connor).
D .T . , 13/10/04, 10/2/06.5 .
6 . D . T . , 8/3/06, 7/2/07.
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time he claimed to be a good party member /  In 1906 some
Liberal M.L.A.s were supposed to be dissatisifed with the
ministry but reports pointedly denied that anyone was
2thinking of leaving the party. Since the party was now 
the object of loyalty and not the cabinet, there was still 
scope within the party for those who disagreed with 
ministerial decisions or the efficiency of the current 
leadership.
In Tasmania, this change of emphasis occurred more 
rapidly. After the first fusion meeting of 1909, some 
Liberal members at first stated that they were only prepared 
to support the Lewis government if it fulfilled certain
3conditions. When the government failed to act as required,
these members brought down the ministry in October 1909.
After the re-fusion there were no further demands of this
nature. Party meetings increased dramatically in frequency
an'd backbenchers were able to identify more completely with
the party because they now had scope to criticise the
government; when legislation on the controversial wages
boards was introduced, Lewis called three party meetings to
4discuss amendments. The party was thus fully identified 
with the administration; loyalty was now to the party, 
rather than to the personalities included in the cabinet.
CONCLUSIONS
Three basic points of significance arise from this 
analysis. Firstly, formally organized groups, which normally 
existed only within the government parties, often represented 
a section of that party which wanted to promote certain 
demands or interests. Whether or not they claimed to be 
independent of the party, they never voted, or tried to vote, 
as a body against the party which they supported. They were 
in fact a useful forum within the government party for a 
discussion of the administration and for the development of 
proposals on matters of particular interest to others. As 
the party developed machinery which allowed backbenchers
1. D . T . , 21/6/06.
2. D. T. , 13/7/06.
3. M_^ , 30/6/09 (Ewing) 2/7/09 (Evans, Best, Sadler) 7/7/09
(Rattle)
4. Lewis Diaries , 15/9/11, 21/9/11, 27/9/11.
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within its framework to comment on government affairs, so 
these groups disappeared and the members became fully 
identified with the party. By expanding its influence, the 
party increased its control over members; they were 
inextricably connected with the party's actions because 
they could participate, however nominally, in making decisions.
Of course, this collective identity reduced the 
flexibility of the non-Labor parties. In the early period 
distinct groups could be formed within the party. After 
the party had become recognised as a body working towards 
a specific goal, any group whose interests clashed with 
that of the party was forced to subordinate itself to the 
party's aims or become separate from it. Consequently, the 
Country party later had to form a separate group from the 
main non-Labor parties. At earlier periods when the party 
identity was less distinct, it had been able to operate as 
a group within a major party.
Secondly, the policy of the cabinet became more fully 
identified with the party that supported it. At the 
beginning of the period, the policy was very largely that 
of the cabinet; by the end of the period the increasing 
alignment of members with the party and with its platform 
ensured that the party as a collective body became 
responsible in part for the government's policy and 
certainly became more fully identified with it.
Third, the growth of a party identity permitted 
members who were dissatisfied with the leadership to remain 
within the party. Before 1904 the party was invariably 
considered almost synonymous with the leadership and the 
cabinet. A dissatisfied member had little option but to 
leave the party. After 1904 he was able to remain within 
the party because criticism was now permitted and the party, 
not the leaders, were the object of loyalty. The fragile 
inter-personal relationship which had tied a member to his 
leader and his party'*’ were replaced by the more explicit 
bonds of a recognised group, the party.
1. For a full discussion of the changing role of the 
leader, see below chapter 12.
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In general during this period the groups within the 
parties became less distinct as the party increased its 
control on a broader range of issues and developed processes 
by which members became more fully identified with their 
party. While party membership had anyway u su'al ly been 
the most important reason for their voting habits, by 1907 
its greater influence, especially compared to local or 
group demands, was now widely recognised. An M.P.'s 
role was known to be that of a party member.
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PART I I I : The non-Labor Parties in the Electorate
Chapter 8
Some Aims, Assumptions and Problems
of the non-Labor Parties in the Electorate 
Introduction
In the thirty years between 1885 and 1915, electoral 
politics were transformed in both states, chiefly because 
parties, and not only the Labor party, destroyed the independence 
of the candidate in this sphere of politics too. This change 
took place gradually and had a number of different facets.
For instance, broad issues of state-wide relevance became 
more important than parochial ones; parties developed an 
image of themselves as a collective identity which they put 
before all electors; they co-ordinated campaigns, propaganda 
and finance; they devised new procedures for selecting party 
candidates and it became generally recognized that elections 
were contests between parties. The importance of local 
connections for the election of members was steadily reduced.
Parties had to develop organizations which were 
designed either to replace the political methods which had 
been used successfully during the faction period or to 
adapt these techniques to their own use. Since the Labor 
party was based on a trade union movement which had played 
almost no effective part in pre-party elections and which 
gave it an organizational foundation on which to build, it 
could develop political techniques which were different 
from those of the faction period. The non-Labor parties had 
no such choice; many of their members had been in parliament 
during the faction period and were familiar with the earlier 
methods of winning elections; in addition they had to build 
on the local political connections which had been developed 
during the period of faction politics because they had no 
other social or organizational base, similar to that of 
Labor, on which they could rely. They had to design their 
organization and procedures in such a way that they could 
addpt earlier political techniques to their own advantage.
In order to explain how the non-Labor parties shaped 
their organization, I will first examine in this chapter
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the assumptions on which the non-Labor parties were based, 
the aims of the parties and the problems which the expanding 
parties had to face, particularly those problems created 
by existing political traditions. In the next chapter, I 
will show how these parties expanded their activities by 
co-ordinating campaigns and finance, by formulating a party 
policy and generally by acting as a collective organization.
In other words, I will illustrate how the parties developed 
the available political resources, such as ideology, finance 
and organization, to their own ends. In chapter ten, I will 
show how the non-Labor parties developed their methods as a 
response to the existing pressures of the political environment 
and with the intention of adapting existing political methods 
to their own advantage.
Some Basic Assumptions on the Role of Electoral Organizations
All members of non-Labor parties were agreed on two basic 
principles which underlaid all electoral organization. They 
believed that a party should represent all classes and that 
the electoral organization should have no control over 
parliamentary representatives. In both these areas they 
distinguished themselves from the Labor party because it 
openly claimed to represent the interests of the working 
classes and because the parliamentary Labor party was 
supposed to be the mouthpiece of its extra-parliamentary 
organization. While these assumptions may or may not have 
accurately defined the position of these parties, they are 
important because they imposed restraints on the type of 
electoral methods which the party could develop. The party 
could not adopt electoral techniques which were obviously 
contrary to them.
In 1903 a Liberal and Reform Association pamphlet 
specifically claimed that the organization was supported by, 
and legislated for, all classes and suggested that representation 
of any one class, whether conservative or radical, would be a 
violation of the basic principles of democracy.'*' Individual 
members also claimed that they represented all sections and 
classes in the community and denied that the Labor party was
1. Liberal and Reform Association Officers and Platform, 
Sydney 1903, M.L. 329, 21/L.
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the true representative of the working classes.
In Tasmania the National Association claimed that it 
represented all sections of society and that its main task 
was to elect candidates who would agree to
act as an independent representative of the 
community as a whole , to support legislation 
on broad and truly liberal principles and 
oppose class domination. 2
The Tasmanian Liberal League also stated that it had
3been formed to forward the interests of all the community.
In neither state did a non-Labor party accept that it should 
act as the representative of a single class or that its 
policy was not designed to benefit the whole community.
Secondly, non-Labor members consistently argued that 
an electoral organization had no right to dictate to or 
attempt to control those representatives which it had 
helped to elect. The organizations themselves accepted 
this limitation on their powers without concern. The 
National Association clearly stated that its aim was
to secure for our representatives in Parliament 
the exercise of their independent judgement 
unhampered by any body of men. 4
In 1909, Ewing tried to use the electoral organization 
as a power base in a bid for the premiership. He claimed 
that the Progressive League had endorsed the premier, Evans, 
on condition that he allowed the newly-elected anti-socialist 
members to elect their own leader. His story was corroborated 
by the secretary of the League but denied by Evans, by two 
other M.H.A.s present at the same meeting and by the chairman 
of the committee which endorsed the candidates.^ The 
executive council of the league declared that no such agree­
ment had taken place and stated
1. For instance, Carruthers, D .T . 24/6/04, 26/7/04, Law,
D . T . , 1/7/04; Storey, D .T . , 8/1/04; MacMillan, D .T . ,
26/7/04; G. Anderson, D .T . , 11/6/04.
2. M^, 19/4/04, 12/12/06.
3. M^, 21/7/09. For a development of this theme, see Ashworth
and Ashworth, Proportional Representation, p.22, 83,
113-117, 134.
4. M_;_, 19/4/04.
5. M . , 1/3/09, 2/3/09, 3/3/09.
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That this Committee is of the opinion that the 
object of the Progressive League with regard to 
elections is to promote the return of candidates 
representing the moderate party and opposed to 
Labor socialistic views and must be confined to 
this.
That it is beyond the province of the League to 
discuss, and the League does not discuss and 
does not attempt to discuss, how Ministries 
should be formed or generally to impose conditions 
on the conduct of approved candidates in the event 
of their being elected, with regard to matters of 
administration. 1
The Liberal League similarly stated that it had no right to
2give instructions to members of parliament.
In New South Wales, Carruthers insisted that the
electoral organization should not try to dictate to the
parliamentary party. He was prepared to report the progress
of his government's legislation to meetings of the council
3of the Liberal and Reform Association, which he convened 
on his own initiative, but he denied that the council could 
advise him on how to act, and
in conclusion he asked the ladies and gentlemen 
present [at a Liberal and Reform Association 
Council meeting] not to continue the battle for 
reform so ardently as many appeared desirous of 
doing. The Government was doing all the fighting 
now . 4
The power to decide what actions should be taken lay 
entirely in the hands of parliamentarians and not of the 
electoral organization. On another occasion Carruthers 
stated that he refused to listen
to those who wished to tell Parliament how it 
should do its work and whose dictation the ^
Government claims to have properly resisted.
Even John Stinson, the president of the People's Reform League 
and a man who was deeply suspicious of the sincerity and
1. Mj_, 4/3/09.
2. M^, 2/2/12.
3. D ,T. , 22/12/04 , 15/12/05 .
D .T ., 4/9/05, my italics.4 .
5 . D „T . , 22/12/04 .
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integrity of politicians, agreed that, once elected, M.L.A.s 
were free to act as they wished in the assembly,'*' In both 
states the independence of elected members was a fundamental 
article of faith about party action.
The Aims of the non-Labor Parties
The basic aim of all non-Labor organizations was to win 
elections; all other functions were subsidiary. The party 
originally evolved primarily as an electoral machine because 
of the need to organize electoral contests to prevent seats 
being lost by split votes. From this basic function sprang 
other duties which were usually designed to increase the 
efficiency of the party as an electoral machine and to 
provide the numbers necessary to form a government in the 
parliament. In New South Wales improved pre-selection 
techniques were necessitated by the electoral bill of 1893 
which created sing1e-member seats and ordered that all 
contests be held on the same day. Since the first-past-the- 
post system was used, a vote split between two candidates 
of the same party would allow a candidate from another party 
to be elected on a minority vote. Pre-selection and discipline 
among party candidates was the first requirement of electoral 
organization; other duties developed from this base.
The Freetrade Council was designed primarily to arbitrate 
between freetrade candidates who had already announced their 
intention to stand and consequently to prevent the loss of 
seats by split votes. It was concerned only with selecting 
winners and was not worried about what other views a 
candidate may have held, provided he was a freetrader. Reid 
stated that the Freetrade Council was onl_y intended to arbitrate 
on those occasions when a candidate was not unanimously agreed 
upon locally and then claimed
the most important and practical question 
arbitration can be invoked to determine is the 
name of the freetrade candidate who commands 
the greatest amount of confidence in the con­
stituency. The only definition we would attach 
to the term 'freetrade' candidate is this - one 
who pledges himself to tariff reform and also 
to oppose the present and any future Protectionist 
government. 2
1. D T v , 10/8/03, See also Ashworth and Ashworth, Propor­
tional Representation, p.7 for similar views.
2. S .M .H ,, 2/6/94.
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The Freetrade Council did not design any formula by which 
arbitration was tobe carried out beyond this general criterion 
of local strength; each case was considered on an ad hoc basis. 
Furthermore, it did not extend its activities beyond the 
endorsement or selection of candidates. Party was regarded as 
an unfortunate necessity, a product of a need for some 
organization in order to secure electoral success.
In the following eight years, the non-Labor parties did
not create any organization with much more comprehensive
objectives, although particular bodies did sometimes fulfil
additional functions. The Liberal and Federal party of 1898
produced candidates to stand for seats which may otherwise
have been uncontested;^ the National Protection Union had a
detailed constitution which included the regular election of
2officials and a branch network. However none of these 
organizations effectively contested more than one state 
election or had any continuity of existence. They were still 
primarily organizations formed for the purpose of winning 
particular elections. The general attitude to parties is 
exemplified by an unguarded remark of O'Sullivan who claimed 
after the 1901 election victory,
We had better disband now, we can always get a
fresh set [of men] at another election. 3
He saw no necessity for organization except at election time, 
because activity during that period was sufficient for its 
purpose of electing party M.L.A.s.
The first organization in New South Wales which 
deliberately expanded its functions was the Liberal and Reform 
Association. Carruthers determined to alter the whole concept 
of party organization after his election as leader of the
1. Liberal and Federal Party Election Committee Minutes , 1898 .
M.L. A2668.
2 . Constitution of the National Protection Union. (National 
Library, N -331-880994). In 1898, the heads of 100 
local firms had joined theParty and ninety-seven local 
branches had been formed. See Schey, D .T ., 23/3/98.
After federation the National Protection Union became 
wholly absorbed in federal politics.
3. Reported by O.C. Beale to A. Deakin , 15/2/09. Deakin
Papers, N ,L . No.663.
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opposition. He condemned the old methods of organization 
by which an electoral body was formed in the two months 
before an election and realised that a party should have 
continuity of existence, a large participating membership 
and careful articulation between all sections of the party.1 
The purpose of the party was still to win elections, but 
several subsidiary objectives were introduced to facilitate 
that aim.
The Liberal and Reform Association intended to produce 
a policy or platform on which all candidates could campaign, 
to form a branch network with well-defined links between the 
central body and the branches, to permit members to participate 
in decisions and to allow the election of officials at all 
levels of the party. The organization was to consist of 
several constituent parts, all of which had distinct roles 
to fulfil in electoral contests. Consequently the basic 
functions of party grew more complex, even if the aim 
remained the same.
In Tasmania the aims of all organizations were also
electoral success. The National Association's organization
was never well co-ordinated nor did it have any clear
conception of what it should do as a body to assist candidates
in elections, Its successor, the Progressive League, had
a more complex constitution, but its methods were never
2well-defined or effective. The Liberal League, however, 
carefully allocated responsibility for local organization, and 
ensured direct articulation and the participation of members 
in decisions. Its subsidiary aim of producing a viable and 
effective organization forced it to participate in a greater 
range of political activities; therefore its organization 
grew more complex.
In both states the main aim of the parties was to win 
elections. To achieve it, they developed organizations which 
responded to existing environmental pressures and used methods,
1 . D . T . , 14/10/02 , 22/10/02 , 25/11/02 , 20/12/02 and
particularly 25/10/02.
2. P .M . Weller. The Organization of the Early non-Labor 
parties in Tasmania, T .H .R .A . , Vol.18, N o .4 , October 
1971 , p .140.
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such as the local pre-selection of candidates, as a means of 
adapting already existing vote-winning techniques to their 
own advantage. At the same time, they expanded their activities 
and developed a 'party' approach to some of the problems which 
a political campaign created, These new functions were 
originally carried out only because they helped the party 
achieve electoral success. Before considering how their 
actions matched up to their aims, it is necessary to examine 
the problems which any developing party had to face and 
which were caused by the traditional political methods which 
had been utilized by faction politicians.
Some Problem^ facing a Developing Party
The techniques of faction politics could neither be 
absorbed nor removed at one step. Many of them continued to 
be useful in winning votes throughout the period. The most 
obvious problem facing any party organization was the fact 
that many candidates were elected by virtue of their local 
connections within the constituency and consequently for 
personal, rather than for party, reasons. A few examples 
of the close ties of M.L.A.s with their constituencies in 
New South Wales will illustrate this point.
In Maitland, John Gillies, an M.L.A. from 1891 to 1911,
was proprietor of the local newspaper, an alderman, secretary
and treasurer of the Volunteer Water Brigade and the Northern
Hunt Club and on the committee of the Maitland Hospital
Board and the Hunter River Agricultural Association.'*' He
2also consistently attended local functions. In Tenterfield
C .A . Lee - who in parliament was as strongly a party adherent
as Gillies was a locally oriented independent - was a local
storekeeper, an ex-mayor, president of the Hospital Board,
on the committee of the local agricultural association and
delegate of the Sunnyside branch of the Farmers and Settlers'
3Association to that body's state conference. Both these
1. A.Wo Martin and P. Wardle, Members of the Legislative
As sembly. p.85.
2. Maitland Mercury , 18/3/04.
3. A o W „ Martin and P. Wardle, Members of the Legislative
Assembly , p . 12 6 . Tenterfield Star, 2/7/98.
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members were recognised as efficient 'roads and bridges' 
members, but many others had similar records of local service 
which gained them votes on a personal basis. These local 
connections were strongest in country areas where a strong 
sense of community may have existed, but they could also be 
found in suburban seats. For instance, John Nobbs , the 
Liberal whip after 1901, was called the 'Father of Granville', 
had been responsible for naming the suburb in which he had 
lived for thirty years, had founded the local Australian 
Natives Association and was president of the local fruitgrowers' 
association . ^
Sitting members invariably had a record of service to
the locality as M.L.A.s which they could use as a reason for
2 3securing re-election. Haynes and Rose both ran columns
in the local papers in which they reported their successes
in representing local interests; Barnes at Gundagai was said
to have had no ideas beyond those associated with his 
4electorate. Even the Treasurer, John See, based an appeal 
for re-election in 1894 on the amount of money he had
5procured for the electorate during his term of office.
Failure to act as a local agent, even in suburban seats, 
could damage a member's electoral prospects. In 1898 a 
meeting of Burwood electors claimed that they had been virtually 
disenfranchised for four years because McMillan had shown no 
interest in local affairs. They demanded that a man who put 
the electorate first be chosen and in the election McMillan was 
defeated by a local mediocrity. In 1898 the Gundagai Times 
demanded that a local man be elected because he alone would 
know the needs of the constituency and complained
we have been represented in the past by big-wigs 
in the city who thought their only requirement 
was the commission to vote on party issues. 7
1. Martin and Wardle, Members of the Legislative Assembly, p.161.
2. Wellington Gazette, 24/2/98.
3. Goulburn Evening Pos t , 6/1/98.
4 . D .T . , 3/7/94.
5. D -T . , 10/7/94.
6. D .T , , 11/6/98.
7. Gundagai Times , 19/4/98. Bruce Smith and J.H. Want had
both recently held the seat.
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In Ballina John Perry, the party whip in parliament, was 
attacked on three grounds - Tintenbar still had no post 
office, the unexpended road vote earmarked for Ballina had 
been spent in neighbouring Lismore and there was still a 
swamp in the middle of Ballina. His performance as a leading 
member of his party in parliament was not considered relevant.^-
Not surprisingly, a large number of members had some 
personal connection with the constituency which they represented.
TABLE I : Percentage of M.L.A.s in Country Seats with Known
Local Connections. 2
1894 1898 1904
No . %Local No . %Loc al No . %Local
Freetrade/Liberal 26 81 21 7 5 21 71
Protectionist/
Progressive 42 64 51 62 14 100
Since the Freetrade Party was city-based, the high
percentage of local men among its country M.L.A.s probably
indicated that local support was a useful addition to any
party vote, although the percentage declined slightly
during the period as the party became better organized. In
the Protectionist party, these connections may have been
less important because their policy was one that was
directly attractive to country voters. However, in 1904,
when the party's organization was poor, it is noticeable
that all the successful Progressive candidates had some local
connections. In all parties a fairly large percentage of
members for country seats had local connections. On those
occasions when candidates did not have any local ties, they
often emphasised that, in spite of this disadvantage, they
would still take special care of the interests of the 
3community. The need for a candidate who had a record of
1. Richmond River 'Times, 14/7/98. Not surprisingly, one
disillusioned and sensibly anonymous M.L.A. exclaimed 
"Hang reform'. Blow ideals! I am nothing but a dancer 
on a departmental doormat." (Albury Banner , 31/5/01) .
2. Based on Wardle and Martin, Members of the Legislative
Assembly and the brief biographies of new members pro­
duced by the Daily Telegraph after each election. Local 
connections include business ties and past or present 
residence.
3. e.g. Goulburn Evening Post, 28/6/98.
local service also meant that the non-Labor M.L.A.s were 
older and more successful in the society in which they 
lived than Labor members who could rely instead on trade 
union support/
The importance of local connections and service as an 
influence on voting was explained by an M.L .A. in 1901 who 
pointed out that the local member was the only agent for the 
electorate ,
hence the result, frequently noted with suprise by 
those uninstructed in the workings of the system, 
that in country politics neither distinction nor 
eloquence nor acknowledged ability has been able 
to contend successfully with an established reputation 
for attention to local wants. 2
At the same time, parties were faced by a problem of 
jealousy between towns and regions which did not make any 
widespread organization work easily. In 1901 the Ballina 
Beacon objected to a speech in the town by the premier in 
favour of the local member, who was one of his ministers, 
and claimed
the time has not yet come when a Grafton man can 
come to Ballina without protest and put his finger 
in the local election pie. 3
In the electorate of Gundagai , the rivalry of the two main
towns in the electorate was so strong that the residents
of one were noticeably loath to vote for a representative
of the other. As a result this inter-town rivalry was
probably as important as any party alignment in deciding the
4result of the election.
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1. In 1901 the average age of the Progressives was 51.5 years,
of Liberals 47.4 and of Labor 40.6. See V.M. Jansen. 
Social Background of Members of the New South Wales Leg­
islative Assembly. 1901-59. M.Ec.Univ. of Sydney,
1962 . p c 48 ,
2. D . T ., 6/4/01.
3. Ballina Beacon, 25/6/01.
4. In 1898 the Gundagai resident, who was not an impressive
candidate , gained 54% of the Gundagai vote and only 
0.8% of the Cootamundra vote. (Gundagai Times, 2/8/98).
In 1901 a different Gundagai resident received 67% of 
the Gundagai vote and 11% at Cootamundra (Gundagai Times. 
5/7/01), In both elections the same two Cootamundra 
residents contested the poll and together received 33% and 
32% of the Gundagai vote in the 1898 andl901 elections 
respectively and 98% and 89% of the Cootamundra vote.
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Often local jealousy was aimed at politicians from 
Sydney and any candidate imported by a party was regarded 
with suspicion. The local party members feared lest a 
Sydney clique might take
every opportunity of jockeying local men out of 
the political hunt in order to send along the 
shoddy article from Sydney. 1
This distrust of Sydney-based politicians was widely expressed
2in all parts of the country.
The party was entering a political arena where local 
services and connections were important in a successful 
election campaign. All the intricacies of electoral campaigning 
are best summarized in a lengthy quotation from a letter by 
a Progressive candidate for the Clyde in 1904. His opponent, 
Captain Millard, was a well-established local member who had 
held the seat since 1894.
I would like you at once to make an effort to get 
the Tilba Tilba polling booth reinstated as it 
means a loss of nearly 70 votes to me if it is not.
It is too evident that Tilba Tilba and Central Tilba 
fight each other - the relationship is like that 
of the Capulets and the Montagues in the play, and 
at Tilba Tilba a separate booth was held for many 
years. They blame Capt. Millard and his nominee 
Shepherd the returning officer for the Clyde and 
they unanimously avow that rather than go to 
Central Tilba to vote they will not vote at all.
It all arises from Capt. M. [sic] refusing to nomin­
ate a local popular storekeeper at Tilba Tilba named 
May for a J„P. while he got the storekeeper at 
Central Tilba made a J.P. The Tilba Tilba people 
waited on me to have it reinstated and guaranteed 
that everyone there would plump for me as a protest 
against Capt. M. and his nominees. This was one of 
his strongholds in the past; it takes in electors 
of Tilba Tilba, Digman's Creek and Mt. Dromedary, 
in all about 70 votes. It is a close go and I think 
I will beat him but it is necessary for me to get 
that block vote. Something must be done without 
delay. There were originally three booths, one at 
M t . Dromedary, one at Tilba and one at Central Tilba 
and the original recommendation was to take M t .
Dromedary away. But when Millard saw the trouble 
that arose over the J.P. business and felt that 
they were all against him and knowing their strong 
antipathy for Central Tilba would prevent them from
1 . Quirindi Gazette , 29/3/04 .
2. Richmond River Times, 28/3/01, Moruya Examiner, 7/6/01,
Goulburn Evening Post , 9/5/01.
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going there to vote - in which he was right - 
he, it is said, averted their influence against 
them by getting the booth taken away. It must 
be put back at any cost, as they have openly 
declared if I can do that they will all go for 
me. The Government can do it - they can even 
control the conduct of the Returning Officer.
The feeling between them is that each place 
is led by a man named Bates who are brothers in 
a very large way but who are deadly opposed to 
each other. The Bates of Central Tilba is 
father-in-law of the deputy returning officer 
for the Clyde and bosom friend of the Returning 
Officer and Capt. Millard. 1
This extract shows the type of social connections and 
local knowledge which a member could build up within an 
electorate. A party had either to compete against these 
connections or to develop an organization which could 
turn them to its own advantage.
In Tasmania the small electorates and the absence of 
any clear principle dividing the political groups ensured 
that support from local connections was indispensable in 
winning any election. It was a fairly common remark that 
a strong candidate
was so thoroughly identified with the district ^
as to make his election ....  a foregone conclusion.
M.H.A.s were regarded as local agents. The fact that
instruments of local government were weak, poorly financed
and dependent on the state government for what they did
get helped to produce a response which has been called a
3"what's in it for us obsession". Members were invariably
responsive to the needs of their electorate to the extent
that the Mercury suggested that in the Huon they did not
speak of 'one man, one vote', but of 'one man, one jetty'.
Even the state treasurer told his electors to consider how
5many roads and bridges he had got for the electorate.
1. J. Keenan to E. Brady 26/7/04. 
Committee Papers, 1904. M.L.
Ministerial Election 
Uncat. 234.
2 . Daily Telegraph 
Frank Archer ,
, (Launceston) , 
a candidate for
19/12/93. Speaking of
Selby.
3 . H „J o W . Stokes . North-west Tasmania 1858-1910: p.217.
4 . M. , 15/8/92 .
5 . M. , 16/3/03.
1Local contacts were usually important. Many members 
were local landowners or had local business connections. 
Nearly all were well-established members of society. Often 
they had graduated to the assembly from minor public offices - 
many had experience as local mayors, aldermen and councillors 
or as district magistrates; sometimes they had both.
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TABLE II: Percentage of non-Labor members
House of Assembly with Official 
Government or with Experience as
in the Tasmanian 
Positions in Local 
Magistrates. 1
1895 1904 1910
Local Government 54 75 77
Magistrates 54 56 50
Total number of non- 
Labor M „ H „ A „ s 37 32 18
In 1901 all four members for Launceston were simultaneously 
local aldermen. Clearly most members had a record of service 
to the community and probably had gained some votes for this 
reason. Furthermore, their earlier service acted as a sign 
that they were proven and respectable members of the community.
A further problem which faced parties in their early
years of development was a distrust of the legitimacy of
party action. Some candidates in 1894 denied that the party
had any right to select candidates and that pre-selection
2was an usurpation of the rights of the electors. In other
electorates, committees put pressure on their candidates not
3to accept or submit to party nomination. In 1901 one 
candidate described the Liberal party as
a political Tammany ring, who were endeavouring to 
rob electors of their power and make mere voting 
machines out of them. 4
Even up until 1904 the claim that parties had no right to 
interfere with the elector's choice was still used, but more
1. Based on details in Walch's Almanac, Hobart - an annual
publication with details of all public positions held 
in Tasmania. As some members were both magistrates 
and local councillors, the figures are not additive.
2. G. Eager, D , T . , 6/7/94, F. Cotton, S . M .H . , 30/5/94 .
3. J„ Graham, S . M „H . , 21/6/94, G. Anderson, S .M .H . , 27/2/94 ,
12/5/94 .
4. A „ Allen, D „T „ , 14/6/01.
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often as a justification by a candidate for his refusal to 
withdraw when unselected^ Therefore, in the early years of 
development, the parties had to prove their legitimacy so 
that electors and candidates would be prepared to accept 
party intervention and action.
In Tasmania, older members also regarded the emergence 
of electoral organizations with suspicion. In 1903, N.J.
Brown wrote
I have never consented, and never will consent, 
to be the delegate of any individuals or of any 
separate interests. Except as to questions upon 
which I may have arrived at a well-considered 
opinion, I give no pledge or promise. As to 
other matters that may claim attention, I can 
only say that I will act in accordance with my 
best judgement. 2
Henry Dumaresq, M „ H „ A . for Longford, refused to be 'interviewed'
3by the representatives of any League or organization.
Furthermorethe party also had to prove that it could be 
of assistance to candidates and could affect the result of
Ielections - in 1894 Dowel O'Reilly showed considerable 
scepticism of the value of party organization when he said
I must continue to respectfully doubt their [the 
Freetrade Council] ability to foist any repre­
sentative on the electors of Parramatta against 
their united will. 4
5Candidates often claimed to be independent or stated that0they stood only because of a local requisition even after 
they had received party endorsement. Party effectiveness 
and party legitimacy had to be established by the non-Labor 
party before their methods could be fully accepted.
In order to explain how parties developed their methods,
I will analyse their actions in two areas. First, I will
1. J.S. Hawthorne, D . T . , 2/5/04, F. Walsh, N.S.W. Election
Handbills and Leaflets, M.L., Q329, 21/N.
2. Midland N e w s , 28/2/03.
3. Caroline Dumaresq to Mary Dumaresq, 12/1/03. Dumaresq
Papers , Mount Ireh, Longford.
4 . S,M.H. , 27/6/94 .
5 . McLean, S .M .H . , 13/3/94.
6 . Fowler, S.M.Ho, 14/6/94, Barton, S.M.H., 2/6/94.
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examine how the non-Labor parties developed activities which 
had not been attempted in earlier years such as campaign 
co-ordination, policy and branch formation and the development 
of centralised propaganda and finance. Then I will examine 
how the parties moulded their organization to utilize those 
factors which had been electorally important in the faction 
period and which I have described here. In both chapters 
I will show how the party developed a collective electoral 
identity, how the acceptance of party methods increased and 
how the organizations became more complex. In the final 
chapter of this section I will consider the changing 
relationship between the party and interest groups in the 
community.
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Chapter 9
The Growth of Party Control I ;
The Expansion of Party Activities 
Introduction:
In the faction period, politicians seldom co-ordinated 
their electoral campaigns, issued a common policy or 
announced their affiliation to any party. As the non-Labor 
parties developed, campaigns were gradually co-ordinated, 
policies more widely accepted and contests ceased to be 
between individuals and became struggles between well-defined 
groups. To trace this development, I will examine several 
aspects of party action which were new to politics in both 
states and which indicated the growth of a collective party
identity.
The Development of Co-ordinated Campaigns
The willingness of party leaders to speak throughout 
the state on behalf of party candidates and in support of 
party policy was a clear indication that a non-Labor party 
was developing an identity. Candidates became more 
identified with the organization and in return expected 
assistance in the campaign. Therefore the ability of a party 
executive to co-ordinate its speakers, to identify and arouse 
supporters to work and vote for its candidates and to provide 
candidates where necessary was an indication that a party 
was developing and expanding its electoral techniques.
In 1894 leading politicians made no attempt to 
co-ordinate the campaign of their parties or to ensure that 
all parts of the state were provided with speakers to promote 
their cause. The Freetrade Council announced the places 
where Reid intended to speak and Reid, but not his leading 
lieutenants, made tours of rural districts. It is possible 
that the leading members of the freetrade party, most of whom 
were suburban M.L.A.s, did arrange their appearances in 
conjunction with the Freetrade Council, but no details are 
known. In 1898 the executive of the Liberal and Federal 
party co-ordinated the speaking appearances of its leading 
members. Reid toured several country areas before concen­
trating his campaign on Sydney and its suburbs. Leading 
party members spoke in marginal electorates, particularly
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Ashburnham, in an attempt to swing seats to their party.
In Paddington, where the sitting member was ill and unable 
to campaign, a series of meetings were organized for party 
members to speak on his behalf. In Warringah, where the 
executive only decided at the last minute to oppose the 
Bartonite candidate, several speakers gave support to the 
party candidate."*' Party action was seen as an essential 
part of the campaign, even though the party was only formed 
three weeks before polling took place. In this respect the 
campaign of 1898 was clearly different from that of 1894.
In 1904 the Liberal and Reform Association carefully
co-ordinated tours throughout the state. In the months
before the election a series of educative 'meet-the-electors'
2meetings were held to lay the foundations of the campaign.
As polling day approached, several leading members of the
party toured country areas and then addressed meetings mainly
in the city. Carruthers addressed twenty-six meetings in
the country and twenty-five in the Sydney area during the
months before the election. Other members also co-operated
3with the executive of the party in this respect. By
contrast the organization of the Progressive party was
reminiscent of earlier elections. Candidates throughout
the state pleaded for a supporting speech from a party
4leader, but to no avail. Waddell, at the best of times an
indecisive leader, was so concerned about losing his own
seat that he refused to leave his electorate to speak on
5behalf of other party members. Even when help from party 
leaders was available, it served only to emphasise the 
party's lack of cohesion; in Surry Hills, one member spoke
1. For details of the 1898 election, see the Minutes of the
Liberal and Federal Party, M.L. A2668.
2. For instance at Burwood, D .T . , 24/3/04 , at North Sydney,
D „T . , 25/3/04 , at Woollahra, D .T , , 26/3/04.
3. Ashton toured the northern coastal districts, the South
Coast, Monaro and the Far West, D .T . , 2/8/04.
4. i.e. McLaurin's request for support from O'Sullivan, n.d.,
Ministerial Election Committee Papers, M.L. Uncat. 234.
5. E. Brady to Waddell, 8/7/04, Waddell to Brady 20/7/04.
Ministerial Election Committee Papers , M.L. Uncat. 234 .
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in favour of the endorsed party candidate while O'Sullivan, 
the chairman of the election committee, supported an 
independent.’*' The Liberal and Reform Association was far 
more advanced in viewing the campaign on a state-wide basis 
than any of its non-Labor predecessors.
In Tasmania the development of co-ordinated campaigns
similarly illustrated the growth of a party. In 1903
Mulcahy was the first minister who toured the island to
defend the actions of his government. Previously most
ministers had restricted their campaigns to either the
northern or the southern part of the island. In 1909
Evans was criticized by the press and by his party for his
2failure to speak on behalf of other candidates; with the
election being fought for the first time under the Hare-Clark
system, he had felt unsure about his own election and had
concentrated his efforts in his own electorate. His critics
assumed he had a responsibility wider than that of securing
his own re-election, even though the lack of effective
organization prevented any widespread co-ordination of
meetings. In 1911 the Liberal League appointed a committee
to run a campaign against the acceptance in a referendum of
the proposals of the Federal Labor government for increased
3Commonwealth powers. In the Wilmot electorate, L. Atkinson,
M.H.R., and Walter Lee, M.H.A., divided the electorate
between them in order to concentrate their efforts in the
4areas where they were known. Parliamentarians and other
5party members also spoke at meetings throughout the state
and the final defeat of the proposals was attributed to0good organization and co-ordination. In the election of 
1912, the role of the Liberal League as a co-ordinator of 
campaigns was less obvious because the Hare-Clark system 
encouraged competition for votes between the members of the 
same party as well as between parties. Each candidate ran
1. D. T . , 11/7/04 , 14/7/04.
2. , 6/5/09.
3. M^ _, 4/2/11.
4 . M. , 6/3/11 .
5. M_, 21/4/11.
6. M. , 12/5/11 .
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a personal campaign within the party ranks. Nevertheless, 
the regular speeches of leading party men like Ewing outside 
his own electorate in favour of the Liberal party as a whole 
indicated that the Liberal League co-ordinated the campaigning 
of its members to some extent.
A second important function which most modern parties 
would fulfil is that of providing candidates for a constituency 
where none were readily available. No party has ever been 
committed to contest every seat, but the growing preparedness 
of the non-Labor parties to contest all seats which could 
conceivably be won and to provide candidates for this 
purpose was another indication of their growing identity.
The Freetrade Council only made a choice between
candidates who had already announced their intention of
going to the polls: it had no need to provide candidates
in most seats. In 1898 Reid declared that his party would
contest all seats which might possibly be won.'*' For this
purpose the party executive maintained a short-list of
candidates who were prepared to contest any seat. Several
of these men did stand at the request of the party. Some
constituencies were still unable to produce a freetrade
candidate; the local freetraders at Cowra pleaded for a
candidate with a big reputation because they believed that,
with three protectionists standing, he might win on a split 
2vote. However, no candidate was produced. The provision 
of candidates by the central executive of a party had 
occurred in the late 1880s when the polling dates of electorates 
were spread over a period of weeks. Consequently candidates 
defeated in one electorate could contest another, allowing 
a leading party member more than one chance of election. In 
1898 all the polls were held on the same day and a party had 
to organize its candidates with greater care. Therefore the 
practice of providing candidates illustrated a new attitude 
towards party action in that the leaders felt that all voters
1. D .T . , 14/7/98,
2 . Liberal and Federal Party Election Committee Minutes,
ML.7T2668. Griffin was asked to contest Tumut and later 
transferred to Eden-Bombala. Danahay contested Uralla 
Walcha and Rolin Warringah. Waine was persuaded to 
withdraw from Flinders and stand for Phillip. All these 
imported candidates lost.
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should have the oppo r t u n i t y  of voting for a member of their 
party w h e r e v e r  possible.
In 1904 the Liberal and Re form Asso c i a t i o n  was able to 
move c a n d idates from electorate to electorate because of 
its im proved co-ordination. Thomas Rose originally intended  
to co n t e s t  Q u e a n b e y a n  , but before the p r e - s e l e c t i o n  was 
held, he was invited by the Bathurst branch of the Liberal  
and R e f o r m  A s s o c i a t i o n  to contest their seat. Since 
C a r r u t h e r s  had v i s ited Bathurst a few days before, this 
in vi ta ti on may have o r i g inally emanated from the central 
exe cu ti ve of the party.^ Later the Belubula branch invited 
Rose, who was known as a good country r e p r e s entative, to 
oppose the pr emier, Waddell, in its electorate. When Rose 
accept ed the invitation to contest Belubula, the Ba t h u r s t  
br anc h invited Sir James Graham, a V i c e - P r e s i d e n t  of the 
Lib era l and R e f o r m  A s s o c i a t i o n  and ex-Lord Mayor of Sydney, 
to c o n te st the seat. On another occasion, James Fallick, 
a sit ting m e m ber, was de feated in a suburban p r e - s e l e c t i o n  
bal lot  and was shifted to contest the Singleton seat. It 
was not new for candidates to change seats because they 
feared defeat, but it was an i nnovation for a party to 
juggle their c a n d idates b e t ween seats in order to improve 
their chances. No earlier o r g a n i z a t i o n  had the influence 
to at te mpt such moves.
Be fore 1909, no Tasmanian o r g a n i z a t i o n  tried to pr o v i d e  
ca nd ida tes for any seat. After 1909, under the new electoral 
system, the p r o v i s i o n  of candidates was u n n e c e s s a r y  be cause 
s u f f ic ie nt were always prepared to stand and the party's 
main task was to endorse them in the m u l t i - m e m b e r  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s .
The Fo r m a t i o n  and A r t i c u l a t i o n  of Branches
The f o r m ation and a r t i c u l a t i o n  of branches was not 
simply a matt e r  of extending the influence of the party in 
the el e c t o r a t e  but was also intended to c o-ordinate the 
activi ty of can d i d a t e s  in the party's name and to secure 
control of their resources. As long as the branc h e s  were 
formed by c a n d i d a t e s  as the basis of their bid for electoral  
success and were not part of a wider party structure, the
1. Go ul b u r n  Ev e n i n g  Post, 3/5/04.
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party had no control over their activities or the types of 
campaign they ran. When the central executive of the party, 
and not the individual candidates, was primarily responsible 
for the formation of branches and the branches had a formal 
role in the structure of the party, then the party developed 
an integrated structure and a distinct identity which gave 
it some influence over local nominations and campaign 
proceedings, However the development of a branch structure 
meant that a party had to define its purpose and identify 
itself to voters in the polity. At the same time, the 
question of the power and influence of the branches and of 
whether they would be content only to assist in campaigns 
or whether they demanded a greater influence on party affairs 
was inevitably raised. The creation of branches created 
problems as well as advantages for a party.
In New South Wales no central executive attempted to form 
a branch network before 1904. Pulsford's proposal in 1893 
to set up a freetrade branch in every electorate had not been 
successful. In January 1894 Reid visited the Botany electorate, 
advised the local freetraders to form a local Freetrade 
Association and promised to speak in favour of the candidate 
which the branch selected,^ He did not make any effort 
himself to form the branch; that was to be left to the 
initiative of the local freetraders. They later formed a 
branch, but were not able to gain support from all freetraders 
in the constituency. A second branch was formed which 
supported a different candidate and split the vote. Often 
local branches were little more than the personal committee 
of candidates; this tendency remained the same in the elections 
of 1898 and 1901.
In 1902 Carruthers claimed that a branch system, founded 
at local level in the weeks before an election, was of limited 
advantage to a party. He realised that a systematic effort 
to form a co-ordinated branch network was required and that, 
if branches were to be formed in every electorate, much of
the original impetus had to come from the central executive. 2
1. S,M.H,, 21/2/94, 9/5/94.
2 . D.T, , 25/10/02.
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The Liberal and Reform Association was concerned with the
formation of branches from its inception. In March 1903 it
announced a plan by which organizers were appointed with the
responsibility for founding branches in groups of electorates
and at the same time electors themselves were encouraged to
form branches. After the central association had been firmly
established, M.L.A.s and a few extra-parliamentary supporters
held a series of meetings throughout the state and formed local
branches wherever possible. Carruthers himself concentrated on
the suburban areas while his leading followers were responsible
2for action in country districts. This systematic approach to 
the problem was continued until the election of 1904. Party 
organizers such as Leon Broinowski and A .G . Huie were 
particularly active in the early months of 1904 when they founded 
new branches and, if necessary, resuscitated old ones. In A-ug-ue t
7* P c* 7* S C./i'ii m  g t f\J L  CftH. At f-C C  n f  • Ciins n  •‘"f ^i.1  f -  1 0  i C tn s l i />
1903 ,. the pa|ty c-ORference w-a-s atfondcd -fey- d-e-l-e-gate-s cri— s-ixty
tf^V-T i t  ' *  hc>ti( l O C A  ui ( I t n i i'/ >-£/f r-r*i/Tj n e t  Va !\J  TV ' f f i .  6 c S O b /? CS O i t t y f i i n  U j h i c h
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Not only were the branches of the Liberal and Reform 
Association often formed by representatives of the central body, 
they were also the first branches which had a definite role 
to play in the structure of the party. In 1897 the National 
Protection Union had formally permitted branches some 
representation on its central body, but, since all decisions 
were to be made by the executive, this representation did 
not mean that branches had any part in the making of major
1. D,T,, 10/3/03.
2. D °T « / 7/5/03 - 22/5/03. It is difficult to establish
precisely when a branch was formed because of the 
unreliability of the press. For instance, the Daily 
Telegraph once announced the formation of a branch at 
Ballina, However the local correspondent of the Telegraph, 
who also happened to be Perry's election committee 
secretary, denied that a branch had been formed and 
claimed that the Telegraph had decided to claim that a 
branch had been formed, regardless of the actual outcome of 
the party meeting. Richmond River Times, 30/5/04, 2/6/04.
D „T ., 11/8/03.
S ,M.H. , 30/5/03 , 11/8/03 .
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decisio ns. Party conferences, to which branches m i g h t  send
del ega tes, were rare; a freetrade conference had been held
in 1889 and a p r o t e c t i o n i s t  one was convened in 1897, but
these were unusual events. By contrast, the branches of the
Liberal and Re form A s s o c i a t i o n  had r ecognised roles as part
2of the whole organization. Al t h o u g h  conferences were not 
annual events before 1909, two were convened in August 1903 
and April 1904 to which branches could send delegates. In 
the only extant copy of the Liberal and Reform A s s o c i a t i o n  
co nst itu tion - that of 1909 - me thods of appeal from the 
branch es to the central e x e cutive and rules for the s e l e c t i o n  
of the branch delegates to the central executive were
3formalised. The branch was conse q u e n t l y  a d e m o n s t r a b l e 
part of the general party machine, rather than an isolated 
body whose influence was limited to its own c o n s t i t u e n c y  
because it had no way of i nfluencing other sections of the 
party. The p a r t i c i p a t i o n  of the central body in the for m a t i o n  
of br anc hes identified all sections of the party with its 
corporate existence. It did not matter that not all br a n c h e s  
were founded by central r e p resentatives. By entering the 
general area of branch formation, the party accepted that 
the branches had a role in the party structure because, as 
we shall see in the next chapter, they could bring add i t i o n a l  
electoral support to the party.
In Tasmania all electoral organ i z a t i o n s  accepted the
nece ssi ty to form branches but were slow in d e v e l o p i n g  any
intra- party a r t i c u l a t i o n  which gave to the branches any
influence in the party. Both the National A s s o c i a t i o n  and
the Pr og ressive League appointed full-time o rganizers whose
main re s p o n s i b i l i t y  was to form branches thro u g h o u t  the 
4state. For instance, W.E. Sadlier, the National A s s o c i a t i o n
organizer, visited the Huon, the N o r t h - E a s t  and the North- 
5West, but whether many of the branches he formed con t i n u e d
1 . C o n s t i t u t i o n  of the National Protection Union , N . L . ,
N 3 31 „ 8 8 0 9 9 4 / N A T „
2. For details of branch duties and powers, see chapter 10.
3 . C o ns titution of the Liberal and Reform A s s o c i a t i o n , 
M.L.329, 21/L.
4. M^ _, 2/11/04, 4/7/08.
5 o M. , 15/2/04 , 30/3/04 .
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to exist is doubtful, especially since they had little to do 
and no important role in the making of decisions, even that 
of pre-selection. The National Association was controlled 
by an oligarchic central executive which did not seek advice 
from the party members. The Progressive League accepted the 
Principle that branches should be represented on the state 
council and created procedures by which this could be 
achieved.^ However no part of this organization appears 
to have had any real effect on the elections.
The Liberal League appointed three organizers who
2energetically formed a number of branches. The constitution 
ensured that the wishes of branch could be heard by the 
council of the league and all officials were elected from 
within the party framework. The state council was elected 
by members of the electorate committees, the latter by 
the branches. Direct channels of communication consequently 
existed from the branch to the council. Furthermore the 
establishment of annual conferences, the first of which was
3held in 1911, illustrated to the public the new collective 
identity of the party as a whole and showed that the branches 
were now an integral part of the party.
The growth of a we 11-articulated party with an integrated 
structure ensured that for the first time the party maintained 
a continuity of existence. The early parties in New South 
Wales were often formed just before the election - in the 
case of the Liberal and Federal party a mere three weeks 
before the poll - and, despite some intentions to remain in
4existence as a social club, they disappeared within three
months. The National Protection Union was founded two years
before the election of 1898, but after the success of
federation it was no longer a force in state politics. Branches
usually disbanded after an election, although there were a
5few exceptions. The Liberal and Reform Association expected
1. M„ , 7/5/07.
2 . M. , 11/9/09.
3 . M. , 21/6/11.
4 . Minutes of the Liberal and Federal Party E 1e c tion Committee,
ML A2668 , p.36, S.M.H., 20/7/94 .
5. The Liberal Association of Warringah held regular meetings
after 1901. D.T., 2/5/02, 3/11/02, 13/6/03.
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its branches to remain active and to hold regular meetings.
Some fell dormant after their formation but others were 
consistently active, particularly Ashfield and Belmore 
in 1906.  ^ Branches now had broader objectives and, as an 
integral part of the party which itself remained continuously 
alive, had a consistent role to play.
In Tasmania the National Association and the Progressive 
League maintained a regular existence at central level and a 
few branches of both held meetings which were usually of a 
social rather than a political nature. The women's branches 
in particular held regular recitals or smoke concerts, but 
did not appear to be particularly concerned with political 
activity. Since the constitution of the Liberal League 
demanded the election of delegates to the electorate council 
and annual meetings, many of its branches held regular meetings 
and were consistently active.
The Growth of a Party Policy
A common policy for all candidates of the same party 
is an obvious characteristic of most modern parties.
Furthermore the policy in general terms is usually settled 
before candidates seek endorsement. Before this, in faction 
politics, each candidate issued his own manifesto which did 
not commit any other candidate. Even the manifestoes of 
faction leaders were regarded as little more than personal 
statements of their intentions if they gained office.
Gradually most candidates accepted a general policy and 
contested the election under its banner. Parties did not need 
to have any explicit ideology, but they invariably produced 
for electoral purposes a policy or platform which they 
promised to implement if elected. I am not concerned here 
with the content of the policy which any party advocated 
nor directly with the extent to which such policies were 
implemented,, I am interested in the degree to which 
candidates accepted a broad party policy, the timing of this 
acceptance and the uses to which party leaders put their 
electoral policy.
D,T. , 9/3/06, 20/3/06. For details of branch duties
and powers, see chapter 10.
1.
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During the 1880s in New South Wales, faction leaders 
had begun to produce platforms of a more general nature, 
demanding particularly the implementation of a policy of 
freetrade or protection, but their policies were still 
constructed by them individually. In 1894 Reid's electoral 
manifesto was not developed with the aid of the Freetrade 
Council or any other group.^ Most of his planks, particularly 
those advocating the introduction of direct land and income 
taxes, had been announced publicly a year before when Reid 
tried to reduce the effectiveness of the Freetrade and Land
2Reform League by adopting the major part of their platform.
Obviously the manifesto was more than a personal statement
because it included the proposals which any freetrade
government formed by Reid could be expected to implement;
but it did not commit other candidates and they were not
forced to follow it. Wise propounded the alternative policy
of the Freetrade and Land Reform League but was still
3regarded as a party member. Other endorsed candidates laid
4personal programmes before their electorates. They did not 
feel obliged to follow Reid's proposals or even to discuss 
them. Reid himself accepted this independence and stated that
in the freetrade party there is room for every 
honest difference of opinion consistent with 
the cardinal freetrade principle that the state 
has no right to impose taxation so as to take 
the money out of the pockets of one citizen to 
put it in the pockets of another. 5
Reid's speech, however, was not intended only as a 
means of attracting votes. It was also meant to attract 
support from candidates and to consolidate the party. His 
policy was deliberately vague so that different sections of 
the freetrade movement could interpret it as they wished 
and happily support him. In 1894 many candidates were 
prepared to stand as freetraders, but not all were prepared 
to identify themselves with the parliamentary freetrade
1. S,M,H,, 2/7/95.
2. B , R . Wise, 'A Year's Stewardship' , Sydney 1895, M.L.
042/P77, p»2.
3. S . M .H , , 7/7/94.
4. S „ M o H , , 13/3/94 (McLean) 5/6/94 (Hogue).
5 . SoMoHo, 28/5/94.
179
party. If Reid's policy was suitably attractive to these 
candidates, they might be more inclined to support him in 
parliament if they were elected. This did occur when eight 
freetraders, who had been elected without the endorsement of 
the Freetrade Council, immediately joined the freetrade 
parliamentary party.'*' Reid deliberately refused to take a 
stand on the local option issue because he knew his party was 
divided on this matter and feared that anything he said might
2be interpreted as party policy and cause the loss of support. 
His policy was intended to consolidate his own party and at 
the same time to attract the votes of electors.
In 1898 and 1901 the party leader remained responsible
for constructing the platform. In 1898 Reid again used his
electoral policy as a means of uniting his party, particularly
as the divisions in the party which had been created by the
federal issue were becoming dangerously large. At one point
he considered contesting the election on the fiscal issue on
the grounds that it would help to close the splits in the
party unity, but he was then persuaded that federation was
3the only realistic issue. He therefore produced a policy
which could keep within his party not only those who were
strongly opposed to federation but also those who favoured
the constitution of 1898. His demands for amendments to
the convention bill were aimed at uniting his own party.
Since federation was inevitably the major issue of the
election, many candidates identified with his policy primarily
because it was directly acceptable to them. In 1901 some
members issued personal manifestoes without waiting for the
formal party statements of See and Lee. Carruthers
ostentatiously issued an 'Unauthorised Programme' before Lee
made his policy speech and claimed he would not sacrifice his
4principles if he disagreed with his leader. The leader's 
policy was still considered to be an individual's statement of
tintent, even if he did represent the parliamentary party.
1. S ,M,H. , 1/8/94 „
2. D .T . , 4/7/94.
3 0 A „ B . Piddington, Worshipful Masters, p .6 2 . 
4. D . T . , 26/4/01 .
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In 1904 this situation changed considerably. The
Liberal election policy of that year was formulated eighteen
months before polling day by the party and not by the leader.
Candidates knew what platform they would be supporting before
they sought party endorsement because the party had developed
a collective identity which included an explicit basic
policy. Even though the party in fact played little part
in forming the policy, the policy was presented as if the
party had played a large part and this was important because
it identified the party as a whole with the platform. When
Carruthers founded the Liberal and Reform Association in
December 1902, he proposed a ten-point platform which he
thought would be acceptable and then, in February, submitted
this programme to a provisional committee for consideration.^
The platform was intentionally general in outlook, demanding
a return to responsible government, financial retrenchment, a
reduction in the numbers of both houses of parliament and an
elective Legislative Council. The committee accepted most of
the platform, changed the plank demanding an elective council
to a general one suggesting reform of the council and added
a clause demanding a thorough reform of the liquor trade. A
move to commit the party to supporting local option was
2rejected at the meeting but the clause was added three months
3later. The party programme was therefore primarily the 
invention of Carruthers but, after amendments, was accepted 
by the party.
The two party conferences, held in August 1903 and 
April 1904, were also intended to identify the branches of 
the association with the party policy and they spent a large 
proportion of their time discussing it. Carruthers claimed 
that party members should not only vote
but they should take the opportunity [of the 
conference] of becoming associated with the 
Council of the Association and assisting to 
frame the platform of the party. 4
1. D .T . , 20/12/02, 10/2/03.
2 . D .T . , 10/3/03.
3 . D .T . , 27/5/03.
4. S . M . H . , 28/3/04 . My italics
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Although the party conferences do not appear to have altered 
the wording of the platform, their discussion of it served 
to identify them, and the candidates which they endorsed, with 
the programme. Whereas earlier policy speeches had been 
primarily the creation of the leader and were designed to 
attract candidates and electors, the Liberal and Reform 
Association platform was the product of a collective body 
which committed candidates before they stood for endorsement. 
Occasionally candidates were not required to support every 
plank of the platform - in Ballina Temperley was endorsed 
with a proviso tht he maintained a free hand on the matter 
of local government1- but generally they were prepared to 
seek party endorsement because they agreed with the already 
announced party policy and were prepared to support it.
In Tasmania the development of a party policy followed 
slightly different lines because the electoral organization 
had a distinct and separate identity from the parliamentary 
party, whereas in New South Wales the party leader was 
always the parliamentary leader. Before 1909 the manifesto 
of all party leaders was regarded as a personal statement 
of intention. In 1903 the opposition M.H.A.s held a caucus 
meeting to discuss policy but then did not all identify
2themselves with the programme that their leader propounded.
The National Association and the Progressive League had no 
detailed electoral programmes. In the 1906 and 1909 elections 
the premier, Evans, announced government policies which were
3designed to attract support but which were not intended to 
commit other candidates, even though the parliamentary party 
held meetings to discuss tactics before each of these 
elections,
The Liberal League could not produce a detailed platform 
like the Liberal and Reform Association in case such a 
statement might appear to bind its parliamentary representatives 
without their having been consulted. It did produce a 
platform which provided a general framework within which the 
parliamentary party could operate, without any M.H.A.s being 
offended by its planks. The League's platform demanded
1. Richmond River Times, 7/7/94.
2 , Launceston Examiner, 13/2/03.
3 . M „ , 26/2/06, 19/2/09 .
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(1) A policy of Progress
(2) For the Federal Constitution, resists Unification
and stands for State Home Rule.
(3) Preferential voting for Federal elections.
(4) To assist in the selection of suitable parliamentary
candidate s .
(5) Settlement of Crown Lands; compulsory purchase of
private lands for closer settlement.
(6) To defend the Legislative Council against efforts
at abolition.
(7) Direct taxation to be left to states.
(8) Wages Boards and good conditions for workers.^
The premier's manifesto was essentially a set of short-term
proposals which fitted this general approach to local politics.
Again, candidates were not required to agree to all planks
3of the party's general or specific proposals. The essential 
difference between the election of 1912 and earlier ones was 
that the general policy had been discussed at the conference 
of 1911 and that all candidates knew what policy party 
endorsement would commit them to follow.
Party participation in the formulation of electoral 
policy not only showed that the party was developing a 
collective identity so that the party as a unit advocated a 
particular policy but also that candidates usually accepted 
the party's policy before they received endorsement. 
Consequently they lost much of their independence of cam­
paigning because they had to act within a prescribed 
framework which the party created by its definition of its 
vague ideological commitment. As policy formulation became 
the prerogative of the party, so candidates became more 
closely identified with and subservient to the party as a 
whole.
The party could never force obedience to its policy as 
a sine qua non of party membership, as the Labor party claimed 
to do; it could only suggest that its policy be adopted. 
However, as the policy of the party became more distinct and
1. 26/3/12.
2 . 15/2/12.
3 . See Lewis, M „, 14/2/12
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as members who joined the party were prepared to accept it, 
the party ideology itself acted as a means of securing 
compliance, even if the party had no sanctions. The use of 
ideology was merely one of the ways in which a party exercised 
control over its members.
The Party Control of Propaganda and Finance
The extension of party control over finance and propaganda 
was a further indication of an emerging party identity.
Election contests in the early period of Australian politics 
were often expensive^- and the cost was generally borne by the 
candidate who had to pay for printing the pamphlets and 
circulars, for the rent of halls and for the more dubious 
practice of 'treating' voters on polling day. In a modern 
election the party usually bears a large share of the costs 
which a candidate incurs. In analysing the development of 
parties it is less important to know what the actual cost 
of an election was than to understand what part the party 
organization played in meeting that cost by subsidising 
candidates.
Most party organizations appointed literary and financial
committees, but there is little evidence of their actual
activities. The literary committees were responsible for the
production and circulation of party pamphlets or supporting
literature. Sometimes their literature was printed by
sympathetic firms or organizations at no cost to the party.
In 1898 the Daily Telegraph published a special election
edition for King Division where the party leader, Reid, was
standing and distributed 30,000 copies without charging the
party. A further 100,000 special election copies were
available if required. At the same time the Departments of
Lands and Mines issued circulars which were used by the party 
2as propaganda. How far these moves were a result of direct 
party initiative is unknown.
1. In 1856, it cost each candidate approximately £300 to £600 
to win a seat in a four-member Sydney electorate. See 
P. Loveday, The Development of Parliamentary Government 
in New South Wales, Ph.D. Univ. of Sydney, 1962, p.91-2.
2 . Liberal and Federal Party Election Committee Minutes,
M.L. A 2 6 6 8 , p.22, 24.
In 1904 the Liberal and Reform Association was better
organized; under the energetic chairmanship of Broinowski,
the literary committee circulated 500,000 copies of the
pamphlet 'Reform' and a series of other pieces of propaganda.’'’
The latter concentrated on three themes - the maladministration
of the See government, the influence of Labor's 'irresponsible'
caucus over the government and the credibility and constructive
proposals of the Liberal and Reform Association in general
2and of Carruthers in particular. Because of a lack of 
evidence, any accurate conclusions about the increasing party 
use of information and propaganda as a means of gaining votes 
are impossible, but it does appear that the Liberal and 
Reform Association was the first body to organize electoral 
literature on a wide scale and on behalf of the party as a 
whole, rather than in support of individual candidates.
The finance of parties is shrouded in secrecy and we
have little evidence of either the income or the expenditure
of the parties. For the early organizations, the sources
of finance were mostly ad hoc contributions given at election
time. For instance, in 1898 the Liberal and Federal party
appealed for contributions to place itself on a secure
financial basis and was immediately offered £10 by W.H.
Mahony, M.L.A„ for Annandale. On another occasion, £10 was
3received from the firm of Angus and Robertson. In 1901 
the Liberal party expected all prospective candidates to 
make some contribution to party funds but did not insist on
4it or specify the size of the contribution. The National
Protection Union allowed firms to become members and was
5presumably partly financed by them. In Tasmania the 
National Association accepted donations from several businessesgin Hobart including the Cascade brewery. Before parties
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1 . D,To , 12/8/0 4.
2. Liberal and Reform Association Election Pamphlets,
M .L o 32 9 , 21/L .
3. Liberal and Federal Party Election Committee Minutes, p.22,
27; on another occasion Want was asked to contact the
Hon, E . Webb, M.L.C., to get some funds for the party,(p.29)
4 . D T . , 16/5/01.
5 . Constitution of the National Protection Union, N .L .
N331,880994 - NAT; see also Sparks to See, 21/5/01. See 
Papers, Vol.26, M.L., A3674.
6, M . , 18/12/05, 19/12/05.
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were well-co-ordinated, it seems probable that they 
depended for income on contributions and gifts and had no 
regular source of money,
The Liberal and Reform Association Was the first body 
to organize a regular source of finance, although it 
insisted that it depended entirely on personal subscriptions 
and contributions and not on donations from capitalists. In 
February, 1904, Carruthers claimed that the total income of 
the association was between £ 600 and £700.'*' Later, when 
the membership of the Association was larger, he claimed
The Liberal Party will not jeopardize its integrity 
or independence by accepting one shilling from any 
union or association or any kind whatever, the 
party holding it to be wrong to accept any aid 
which afterwards might be looked upon as a price 
for its policy. The only financial assistance it 
gets is from its own members who number about 
90,000 and whose subscriptions range from about 
3d per quarter to one shilling per quarter and in 
a few cases run to £5 or £10. 2
After the campaign he admitted that one outside 
organization, the People's Reform League, had given £20 
assistance to one candidate and a few pounds to another, but 
denied that money had been accepted from any other non-party
3source. In an attempt to ensure that a regular income from
personal contributions was forthcoming, the Liberal and
Reform Association formed a 'Central branch' which any man
who contributed one guinea per annum to the association, or
any woman who gave five shillings a year, was eligible to
join. In February 1904 this body was reputed to have three 
4hundred members and in the next years new members were 
5welcomed. Only individuals were permitted to join this 
body which has been described as the first 'confidential 
group which collected and disbursed party funds'.1 23456 In fact
1. D .T . , 5/2/04.
2. S .M .H . , 19/7/04, (also a similar comment D .T . , 23/8/07) .
On these figures the income of the Association in 
1904 would have been somewhere between £4,500 per 
annum and £18,000 per annum.
3. D .T , , 9/8/04.
4. D .T ., 5/2/04.
5. See Carruthers to Varney Parkes when the latter joined the
centralsbranch, 8/4/07. Varney Parkes Papers . M . L . A10 5 2.
6. J«A. McCallum, How Fares Parliamentary Government, -p . 114~. m
Souje-i' i £ d ^  i ?/Z ro* 11 in , n  • h  if- ,
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this body appears to have been ineffective as a means of 
keeping the party well supplied with funds. In December
1906 the association was supposed to be almost bankrupt and 
only kept solvent by personal contributions from ministers, 
even though all its officials were unpaid.''' In January
1907 the secretary of the Liberal and Reform Association
complained that he had sent out 150 letters asking for
financial help to contest the by-election at Blayney and
that only five had replied. The donations he did receive
2covered only one-tenth of the costs. Obviously the 
income of all parties was greater than that publicly 
acknowledged and some services were offered free. In 1898, 
for instance, a local wine and spirit merchant offered to 
pay all printing costs incurred by Reid in the campaign in
3his own electorate. This type of gift probably played an 
important part in financing elections without being 
officially noticeable. Nevertheless the Liberal and Reform 
Association was the first organization to formalize a 
method by which it could, as a party, receive regular 
subscriptions and donations.
It is even less clear how parties spent their money
and how far candidates were or expected to be financed.
In 1898 the Liberal and Federal party executive asked the
Sydney resident, C.J. Danahay , to contest Uralla-Walcha
and agreed to pay £25 towards his expenses, but refused to
4aid an independent ministerialist candidate at Cowra. In 
1904 the Ministerialist party sent a city businessman,
J.G. Macdonald, to contest the far northern seat of Gough. 
Macdonald received £25 from a local grazier and £10 from 
the central committee but still complained that he was 
short of money. Macdonald claimed that the editor of a 
local newspaper, the Inverell Times, had demanded a deposit 
of £25 to be spent on drinks as the price of any publicity
1. D .T „ , 24/12/06.
2 • D -T , , 11/1/07.
3 . Liberal and Federal Party Election Committee Minutes,
M .L .A2668 , p .18.
4 . Liberal and Federal Party Election Committee Minutes ,
M .L .A2 668 , p „8 , 18.
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and that he had spent over £50 in one hotel. He pleaded
for the loan of money which he promised to repay at a
later da te.  ^ In a by-election in 1900 the ministry agreed
to pay the expenses of Daniel O'Connor in exchange for a
written promise of support. When O'Connor deserted the
party in 1902, Crick instigated legal proceedings to recover
the money on the grounds that O'Connor had broken his
2contract. He won the case, but only as an individual and 
not in any capacity as a party official.
Often candidates expected to pay their own costs. In 
1901 J.M. Conroy rejected an offer of financial assistance 
in his campaign for the Warringah seat and pointed out that
3he was well able to bear the costs himself. In Moruya in 
the same year, a wealthy Sydney publican reputedly spent 
£700 on the election - a sum which he could well afford
4but which his party certainly could not. In 1907 Carruthers 
claimed that most of the money received from ordinary 
subscriptions had been spent in the cost of work which preceded 
the selection of candidates.  ^ He did not say how the 
campaign itself was financed.
There is too little evidence available about the methods 
of party finance to draw any substantial conclusions about 
the extent to which the more developed parties tried to 
meet the expenses of the campaign. Nevertheless the Liberal 
and Reform Association did organize a formal system by which 
finances were raised and in Tasmania the Liberal League laid 
down in clauses 25-31 of its constituion^ which part of the 
party was responsible for and could use contributions to the
1. Macdonald to Brady, 26/6/04, 20/7/04, 26/7/04. Ministerial
Election Committee Papers. M.L. Uncat. 234.
2. D •T ,, 30/6/03.
3. J.M. Conroy to S.C. Sadler, 4/6/01. Conroy Papers , Dixon
Library ADD 900.
4. J. Keenan to Brady, 19/7/04. Ministerial Election Committee
Papers . M.L. Uncat. 234 . The candidate was J.J. Smith, 
later Lord Mayor of Sydney and founder of 'Smith's 
Weekly ' .
5 * D .T . , 2 3/8/07 .
6. M . , 5/8/09.
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party. It would be pointless to pretend that subscriptions 
or personal contributions were the only source of income, 
but there is evidence that it was recognized that the parties 
needed some formal and regular means of raising money to meet 
the growing costs of party administration and of campaigning.
The Growth of Candidates' Affiliation with Parties
In the previous chapter, I showed that many candidates 
were suspicious of the party's intervention in the electoral 
arena. One indication of the growing identity of a non-Labor 
party was the degree to which a candidate was prepared to 
connect himself openly with the party. This affiliation 
with a party can be seen in four ways; first, the candidate 
was prepared to put himself forward as a party man; secondly, 
he accepted its policy; thirdly, he was seen by others as a 
representative of a party and finally the party was 
prepared to support him and to appeal for votes for him as 
the party representative.
It is impossible to decide at this range of time how 
far electors identified with the parties and how far their 
votes were cast for personal, rather than party reasons.
Any comments on this subject must therefore be impressionistic.
Party action in elections and the idea that people
might cast votes for party reasons was clearly recognized
in New South Wales in 1894. For instance, the Sydney Morning
Herald claimed that Thomas Bavister's win in the Ashfield
electorate in 1894 showed the popularity of the freetrade
movement because, as a former bricklayer, he was not
popular with the propertied classes.^ Also the paper assessed
the popularity of freetrade in the state by adding up all
2the votes cast for freetrade candidates and interpreted the
3result of the election as a victory for the freetrade party.
In 1904, it was claimed that the support for the premier,
Waddell, in his own electorate would be given to him personally
4and not to his party. In other words, the difference between
1. S . M .H . , 18/7/94.
2. S.M.H,, 19/7/94.
3 „ S , M ,H _ , 23/7/94 » Elections had also been interpreted in
these terms in 1887 and 1889, see Loveday and Martin, 
Parliament, Factions and Parties, p.141-148.
4 . D„T, , 2/7/04.
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votes cast for personal or for party reasons was recognized 
throughout the period, Gradually candidates in this period 
usually became more fully identified with the party, were 
recognized as party members and supported by the executive. 
The change in attitudes towards the party policy have 
already been discussed.
In 1894 some candidates who received endorsement from
the central branch or from a local freetrade association
were not prepared to commit themselves fully to the party.
Endorsement by a party did not mean that a candidate felt
committed to it - in 1894 the Freetrade Council officially
supported Sir Henry Parkes, even though he was not prepared
to identify himself with any party led by Reid. Of the
endorsed candidates, some declared that they were independent
and others that they were only standing in response to a
local requisition.1 23 In Newcastle J „C . Ellis was annoyed
that the local freetrade association had arranged for Reid
to address a meeting on his behalf, because he did not want
2to be publicly identified with Reid. J.A. Hogue had 
openly sought the support of a party and had been selected 
by the Glebe Freetrade Association, yet he claimed
He did not look to the fact [his party endorsement] 
for support. He would trust for votes on his own 
merit and the views which he would proceed to 
enumerate . 3
Obviously he believed that to be standing purely as a party 
candidate might suggest a lack of independence and might 
cause the loss of some votes from electors who supported him 
personally, but did not support his party.
Yet some candidates did regard party endorsement as an
asset. In Denison, Harris refused to start campaigning until
4he had been endorsed by the Freetrade Council; another 
freetrader advertised himself as 'the freetrade candidate
1. McLean, S »M.H . , 13/3/94, Fowler, S .M .H . , 14/6/94.
2. Ellis to Parkes, 11/7/94. Parkes Correspondence, M.L.
A .883 , p . 1127-8.
3. S , M » H , , 5/6/94.
4 . S »M .H . , 4/7/94 .
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(selected by the Freetrade Council)'.1 These men thought 
that party endorsement was useful presumably because they 
believed that some votes were cast for party, rather than 
for personal reasons.
The definite affiliation of candidates with the party
only occurred gradually. In 1898 endorsement was still
considered irrelevant to electoral success by some candidates
who were prepared to stand independently of their party.
One condition of the coalition in the election of 1898
between Barton's Federal Association and the parliamentary
Protectionist party was that two leading anti-federal
protectionists,Levien and McLaughlin, were to be refused
endorsement. Neither of them was worried by the prospects
of campaigning without party support and both won easily.2 34
However, a more common, but by no means general, attitude
was expressed by the Liberal candidate for Camperdown in
1901 who claimed that he would only stand if he received
3the party nomination. The electoral advantages of 
identification with a party were becoming more widely 
recognized.
The organization and pre-determined policy of the
Liberal and Reform Association meant that candidates who
sought party support usually had to identify themselves
with the party. Carruthers argued that every candidate
who won the party selection gained in electoral strength
because he believed that many votes were now cast for the
party as an organization and for party candidates as
4representatives of that organization. Furthermore, the 
party in 1904 supported its candidates more wholeheartedly 
than in previous years. In 1894 the Freetrade Council had 
refused to choose between freetrade candidates in Botany 
and St. Peters because it believed that both seats were 
safe for the freetrade cause and that, provided a 
freetrader who supported the parliamentary party was elected,
1. Shipway, S . M ,H . , 8/7/94.
2• D .T . , 7/7/98.
3. D .T. , 29/5/01.
4. D .T . , 6/5/04 .
it did not matter which of the two candidates was successful.'1 23*5'
In 1904, the party executive committed itself more completely.
For instance, in Leichhardt Carruthers supported Booth and
claimed that Hawthorne, a party colleague in the assembly for
ten years, must be defeated because he had refused to submit
2to the party pre-selection. In Waverley the local federal 
member claimed
I do not come forward in the interests of Mr.
Jessep, as Mr. Jessep, but as the Candidate 
on whom has devolved the responsibility of
fighting, in Waverley, the battles of economy 
and good Government, 3
and he also argued that once the party had made a selection,
all party members should support the candidate. Support
was now being demanded for candidates as party members
rather than as individuals. In 1894 party leaders tentatively
claimed that all they were trying to do was to point out to
electors the freetrader most likely to win the seat and
4to suggest that he should receive their vote. In 1904 
the Liberal and Reform Association was demanding a vote 
for the party candidate and condemning all Liberals who 
refused to submit to party pre-selection. Candidates were 
widely identified with the party and could be recognized 
as party candidates by voters.
In Tasmania the identification of members with parties 
was uncommon before the formation of the Liberal League.
Some candidates in 1903 were prepared to accept endorsement 
by the Reform League but still considered themselves 
independents . No candidate used his connection with the 
Progressive League or the National Association as a means 
of extra appeal in the elections of 1906 and 1909 and indeed 
all that most of their party candidates had in common was
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1. S . M .H o , 11/7/94, 12/7/94.
2. D „T „, 29/7/04. This statement was made despite an earlier
promise to support Hawthorne personally and despite 
Hawthorne's own active efforts on behalf of the 
Liberal and Reform Association. D .T ., 16/4/04.
3. Letter signed by T „ H „ Kelly. J.M. Conroy Papers, Dixon
Library, ADD 899.
4 „ See Carruthers, D ,T . , 14/7/94.
5. Boatwright, North-West Advocate, 17/3/03. Bennett, 
Launceston Examiner, 31/3/03.
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their anti-socialistm. Some members remained suspicious of
party ties; in 1911 Whitsitt claimed that the Liberal League
was unreasonable in expecting a pledge of support from a
candidate in a by-election when the government proposals
for that session was still unannounced'*' and later he
declared that he did not care whether he was endorsed by
2the Liberal League for the 1912 election. Generally,
however, candidates were eager to secure the endorsement
of the Liberal League. One declared that he was standing
3only because he had 'the sanction of the Liberal League' 
while the Speaker, Sir George Davies, a politician who had 
in 1903 opposed the idea of party, expressed his annoyance 
that he was left off the party's list of endorsed candidates. 
Generally, most candidates in both states accepted the 
existence of parties, were prepared to stand as party 
candidates and to affiliate in the elections with these 
parties.
Conclusions
During this period the non-Labor parties increased their 
activities in several areas; candidates now became identified 
with the party and with its policy while the party itself 
developed a distinct identity so that it appeared to be a 
well-defined group. The alliance of individuals who had 
campaigned during the faction period had become a well-co­
ordinated group who assisted one another and advocated 
similar policies. Each candidate could be seen as part of 
a larger body and usually added to his local appeal a 
statement of his party affiliation and his views on major 
issues. As the party became more widely influential, so its 
central control over resources such as ideology, manpower and 
finance increased and the individuality of candidates, who 
had previously stood purely on their own appeal, decreased.
1. NU_, 7/6/11.
2 „ M^ _, 10/1/12.
3. Cotton, M_, 10/2/12 .
4. M „ , 15/4/12.
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Chapter 10
The Growth of Party Control II:
The Adapation of Existing Political Methods 
Introduction
Any party which attempted to build its electoral power 
and influence without using sanctions on candidates and 
without the advantages of the supporting organizations 
which the Labor party had, could not replace the techniques 
of faction politics and impose different ones on the 
electorate. Nor could it ignore them. Candidates using 
the old electoral techniques had assets which a party 
could use to its own advantage if it could find ways of 
adapting and controlling them. The main problems with 
which any party had to deal were local jealousies and 
localism, but these electoral influences also gave them 
opportunities for gaining votes. Many electors were 
suspicious of any intervention in electoral politics by 
anyone not resident in the area and most contests in the 
faction period were won by candidates who ignored all but 
local affairs. This can be described as localism, meaning 
all those local influences significant in elections, such 
as personal connections, local services in obtaining roads 
and bridges, inter-town rivalry and social position, which 
may affect the results of an election.^ Any party had to 
pay attention to these forces, particularly in regard to 
candidate se1ec1 1 on and the organization and power of its 
branches.
The Selection of Candidates
As we have seen, pre-selection was the basic activity 
of most early non-Labor parties. They had to ensure that 
only one candidate from their party stood in each electorate 
so that he had a good chance of success. The central 
executives of the early non-Labor parties were primarily
1. B.D. Graham has defined localism as "the rural interest 
in obtaining concessions for district needs through 
the local member of Parliament". (The Formation of 
the Australian Country Parties, p.51). I regard this 
as merely one part of the general network of local 
influence which I have here called localism.
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concerned with producing winners; they realised that, with
the existing local traditions, a man known in the constituency
or chosen by electors would have greater hopes of victory than
any outsider. The Freetrade Council encouraged local selection
of candidates wherever possible and stated that it would only
intervene in the choice of candidates if the local freetraders
were unable to decide among themselves to support a single
man. When it did intervene, the Freetrade Council claimed
that it would base its choice purely on the grounds of
strength in the electorate.'*' Whenever the local freetraders
were active, the Council was prepared to accept their
proposals; it endorsed the selection of the Tamworth Free-
trade Association which was made months before the 1894 
2election and at the last moment it changed its selection
for the seat of Uralla-Walcha at the request of the local 
3branch. The Council claimed that it was not biased in 
favour of sitting M.L.A.s - and one at least was not selected 
because the other freetrader in the electorate was considered
4stronger locally - and that it had no intention of forcing 
any candidate on an electorate without the consent of the 
local freetraders. The Council emphasised the desirability 
of local selection and the disadvantages of a central 
organization making any unilateral choice.
In the following three elections, all the party
organizations followed the example of the Freetrade Council.
The branches of the National Protection Union organized
5pre-selection ballots throughout the state and in one seat, 
Moruya, any elector could vote in the pre-selection whether 
he was a member of the local Protectionist Association or 
not.* 6 The Liberal party in 1901 similarly stated it would
1. S . M . H . , 2/6/94,
2. S,M.H „ , 10/7/94.
3. S.M.H, , 13/7/94.
4. S.M.H. , 2/6/94. The unselected M.L.A. was Jeanneret who
was contesting West Macquarie.
5. e.g. , D ,T . , 28/1/98 (Annandale) , 8/7/98 (Narrabri) ,
Goulburn Evening Post, 8/2/98, Gundagai Times , 15/2/98,
Maitland Mercury, 8/3/98, Western Post, 10/2/98,
Tenterfield Star , 8/3/98.
6. Moruya Examiner , 25/3/98, 1/4/98.
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accept the nominations of any local branches and even
endorsed candidates supported by branches of the federal
2Freetrade and Liberal Association. In fact in 1901
almost all sitting members received automatic endorsement
regardless of local wishes.
In practice the central bodies were forced to play a
larger part in the selection of candidates than they wished
because branches were seldom well organized and because
there were no rules for pre-selection contests so generally
accepted that the unsuccessful candidates were prepared to
bow to the party decision. Each case was treated separately
and often by different methods. In 1894 the local branch
3occasionally held a ballot or the candidates and their
representatives met to decide who had the best chance of
4success and therefore who should withdraw. More often
the branches merely acted as a forum in which a candidate
could state his views or show off the strength of his
support before the representative of the Freetrade Council
made a final selection. In 1898, the Liberal and Federal
executive tried to persuade Levy to retire from Fitzroy;
when he refused they changed their approach by asking the
£sitting member to step down to prevent a split vote.
Provided the party won, it did not matter which candidate 
represented it. One detailed account of a freetrade 
pre-selection will illustrate the problems which a party 
faced in the 1894 election and the obvious lack of an 
acceptable selection method.
1. D .T ., 24/5/01,
2. D .T . , 16/5/01 (Woronora) ; for Armidale , see G.S. Harman,
Politics at the Electoral Level, M.A . , Univ. of New 
England, 1964, p.305.
3. At Woronora, 340 votes were cast in a ballot contested by
three candidates; S .M .H . , 16/6/94.
4. i.e. West Macquarie, S .M .H . , 7/7/94; Marrickville,
S .M „H . , 22/6/94; Balmain North, S .M .H , , 29/6/94.
5. For instance, Carruthers made decisions, either by himself
or as one of a board of three in the following seats; 
Darlington, Waterloo, Denison, Balmain North, Balmain 
South, Leichhardt, Botany, Paddington, S .M .H . , 12/7/94.
6. Liberal and Federal Party Election Minutes, M.L. A2668,
p . 24 .
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In 1894 the sitting member for the Glebe, Bruce Smith,
decided not to seek re-election and left vacant a safe
freetrade seat. The local Freetrade Association decided
that it was sufficiently representative of the freetraders
in the electorate to select a candidate and called for
nominations. Six were received, of whom two were local
aldermen,  ^ At the start of the meeting Alderman Cary
claimed that, although in previous elections he had retired
in favour of Smith, he was not prepared this time to stand
down for anyone. Later in the meeting he angrily rejected
a proposal that all candidates should sign a pledge to
retire if unselected and withdrew from the ballot. Abrams
and Cole also retired and then the nomination of Eager, who
was not present and who later indicated his refusal to
2accept a party decision, was withdrawn. In the ballot
3Hogue defeated Wilkinson by fifty votes to eleven and later 
won the election by defeating Cary and Eager, who stood as 
independents, and three other candidates. The events of 
this meeting illustrate two points of particular significance; 
in the first place Cary's nomination remained before the 
meeting despite his declaration that he refused to retire, 
and secondly the proposal of the pledge, and therefore the 
discussion of the method of pre-selection, took place after 
nominations had been received. Obviously the local 
associations had no guidelines on which to run their meetings. 
Pre-selection meetings were each based on an 'ad hoc 1 
process, designed to suit different situations, and the 
absence of rules added to the internal p~ar-ty disputes over 
the results.
The party leaders preferred candidates to be selected 
locally because they realised the value of local support 
and because they knew that the central executives were 
self-appointed, that they had not been elected as representatives
1. The Aldermen were Cary and Abrams. The other candidates 
were F.B. Wilkinson, S. Cole, G. Eager and J.A. Hogue.
2«, Eager to Parkes, 16/7/94. Parkes Correspondence, M.L. , 
A882 , p . 42 2-3 .
3 . S tM.H, , 22/5/94 .
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of the whole movement and that this fact was the cause 
of some dissatisfaction in the electorate. In 1894 Reid 
admitted that the Council was a self-appointed body but 
pointed out that, with no other organization and with 
the failure of an attempt to form branches which could 
make local selections, it was merely doing the best that 
it could in the circumstances."*" Carruthers claimed
The Freetrade Council have simply performed a 
very difficult and very painful task in selecting 
candidates to guide the freetrade electors. Their 
aim in selecting has been to ascertain the candi­
date who has the best chance of success as a 
freetrader. They have named the candidate and 
asked the electors who support the freetrade 
policy to rally around at the poll. The Freetrade 
Council is not infallible. It may have made 
mistakes, but the only way that it is possible for 
a victory to be gained is for the electors to 
accept in good faith the inquiries made by the 
Freetrade Council and the result of these inquiries 
as evidenced by their selection. 2
In other words, the Freetrade Council only interfered 
where local selection did not take place and then 
considered local conditions as the basic criterion for 
selection .
In 1903 the Liberal and Reform Association insisted 
in its constitution on local selection of candidates 
whenever possible because of the votes that such a choice 
could bring to the party. All selections were to be made 
by local branches; if more than one branch existed in a 
constituency, a combined council of branches was established 
to select the candidate. Occasionally these councils 
co-operated with the representatives of other organizations 
such as the Women's Liberal League or the People's Reform 
League. The rules for pre-selection were clearly 
established;
The branch shall not proceed to the recommendation 
of any candidate for Parliament until so requested 
by the president of the Central Association. A 
meeting shall then be regularly convened by 
circular sent to every member. The recommendation 
should be immediately forwarded to the President
1. S . M ,H . , 17/7/94. 
2 . D .T . , 14/7/94.
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of the Central Association, setting forth the 
name and address of the candidate and when 
more than one candidate is proposed at the 
meeting, the names and addresses and respective 
number of votes recorded for each. Every 
consideration will be given to such recommenda­
tions but the final selection shall rest with 
the central executive. 1
The local branch had the power of selection, even though 
the central executive retained for itself the right of 
veto .
In fact, the branches were free to select whom they
pleased and in some cases a very large number of members
of the Liberal and Reform Association voted in these ballots.
In Canterbury the members of four different branches cast 
21389 votes; in Botany, a sitting member was discarded by
the votes of 1863 men and he accepted his defeat and
3contested a different electorate. In Burwood , 2065 of
4the 2883 eligible branch members voted. Even in the
country seat of Orange 1897 members of the local Liberal
5and Reform Association branches cast their votes. Not
all ballots were so widely representative - in Balmain
6 7138 people voted and in Phillip only ninety-three
but often the party candidate was selected by a large
number of local residents who could then be expected to
vote for him in the p o l l .
In the pre-selections, the initiative nearly always
came from the local branches. We have already seen how
two Liberal and Reform candidates, Rose and Graham, were
both invited to contest Bathurst and that it is probable0
that this was arranged by the party leader. It is 
notable that the actual invitation to Rose did not come 
from the central executive but from the branch. When the 
safe seat of Ashfield became vacant in 1905, two leading
1 . D .T . , 6/3/07.
2 . D o T . , 1/6/04 .
3 . D . T . , 23/5/04 .
4 . D .T . , 21/5/04 ,
5. D o T  . , 2/7/04.
6 o D o T . , 2/6/04 .
7 . D .T . , 24/5/04 .
8 . See a b o v e , p «,17 2 .
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party members, Sir James Graham and John Garland, sought 
the party nomination but were easily defeated by a well-known 
local alderman who had been prominent in temperance and 
protectionist movements in the previous decade. The latter 
received 188 of the 372 primary votes in the ballot; Graham 
got fifteen, Garland only seven.1 23 Indeed, in the pre­
selection contests, candidates often appealed to the party 
stalwarts to vote for them for local reasons. In Botany, 
R.J. Anderson pointed to his record as an alderman and 
as an owner of a local tannery while his opponent claimed
that he was a suitable party candidate because he had lived
2in the area for forty years.“ Many others had records of
3service in municipal government or in local affairs. Local 
appeal was therefore an important explanation of a 
candidate's party selection, quite apart from his later 
electoral success.
The central executive had the power to refuse to
accept a local selection but was very loath to use that
power. Carruthers said he would refuse to attempt to
influence any ballot because such interference would
4undermine the very basis of the organization. The organ­
ising secretary of the Liberal and Reform Association
claimed that the central executive would never use its
5veto to overturn a local selection. In 1904 the central 
executive endorsed all local selections, even when sitting 
members were defeated. In one case, Leichhardt, the 
candidate selected by the local Liberal and Reform 
Association branch was known to be a Protestant fanatic 
and the branch was reputed to have been packed by A.P.D.A. 
supporters, but the central executive still declared its 
support for the locally selected candidate. In 1904 the 
executive did demand that one ballot be recontested after 
an appeal by a defeated candidate. The Camperdown branch
1. D ,T , , 8/5/05.
2. D , T . , 21/4/04.
3. Henley at Burwood, Perkins at Cooma and Moxham at
Parramatta all mentioned thier municipal service. 
Creswell at St. Leonards pointed to his long 
association with the local rowing club.
4 D . T . , 8/1/04, see also 26/3/04.
5 . D „T. , 17/5/07.
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was said to have been 'engineered as a committee for Clegg'
and membership cards had been handed out with instructions
to vote for him in the ballot.^ Nevertheless, the grounds
for the decision for a new ballot were not that the branch
had been packed, but that an electoral re-distribution had
added new areas to the electorate and therefore some Liberal
and Reform Association members had been denied the chance to 
2vote. The principle of local selection was upheld at the
same time as the appeal. The central executive was
primarily concerned with setting the timetable for nominations
3and local selections and for actually making selections
4where no local branch existed or where some branch wanted
5the responsibility removed from its shoulders.
In 1907 the central executive of the Liberal and Reform 
Association was more inclined to support sitting members 
because they had given three years consistent support to 
the Liberal ministry, but nonetheless they still advocated 
local selection and generally accepted it, particularly in 
the safe seats of Goulburn, Newcastle and Sherbrooke which 
had been held by ministers who were retiring from politics.
One minister not retiring had to face a pre-selection
6ballot which he narrowly won by sixty-six votes to forty-six. 
On another occasion the central executive withdrew its 
endorsement of S.J. Kearney as candidate for Armidale at
7the request of the local association which wanted a ballot.
The ballot was won by a former M.L.A., Lonsdale, who had 
been defeated in a pre-selection at Newtown in the same 
month. Kearney had refused to participate in the ballotQand retired from politics. In Waverley, the executive 
supported the sitting member despite local agitation and
1 . D .T . , 19/4/04 .
2 . D . T . , 4/5/04 .
3 . D o T o , 23/3/04 , 26/3/04 .
4 . D .T . , 5/10/03 (Glen Innes by-election) 23/6/04 , (King) .
5 . D . T „ , 3/5/04, The Mudgee branch
choose between John Haynes and
a sked 
Robert
the executive to 
Jones, both ex-M.L.As
6 . D.T. , 15/6/07 .
7 . D . T , , 14/5/07 , 22/5/07 .
8 . Harman , Politics at the Electoral Level , p.316-18. The pre-
selection defeat of Creswell, M.L.A. for St. Leonards, was 
endorsed by the executive who supported the man who beat 
him .
claims that he had been selected without support within his 
electorate.
In Canterbury, however, the central executive refused
to endorse Varney Parkes who had been selected by the local
branch and continued to back the sitting member, T.F.H.
Mackenzie,, This case showed the importance of local selection
of candidates. Parkes was a former representative of the
district and was determined to regain his seat. To become
acceptable to the party, he joined the central body of the
Liberal and Reform Association ; ^  to improve his support in
2the electorate, he joined the Orange Lodge. His supporters
canvassed the electorate and joined as many voters as
possible to the local branch of the Liberal and Reform
Association. With these increased numbers, he was decisively
endorsed by the local branch as their candidate. His opponent
declared that he had packed the branch with his supporters,
and even with Labor voters, and refused to recognize the 
3decision. The central executive then declared that the
branch had been formed unconstitutionally - despite the
fact that it was formed in 1903 and had since then had the
one president - and declared the selection of Parkes to be 
4void. Nevertheless, Parkes easily won the election. It
was significant that, by declaring the branch unconstitutional,
the central executive avoided over-ruling a local selection.
As Parkes' success illustrated, the value of local selection
was that it involved electors in the party process and laid
a firm basis of votes on which a party could build and
which it could use to assist in the actual electoral
canvassing during campaigns. The increase in total party
membership was probably partly due to the ability of members
to participate in pre-selection ballots. In August 1903,
5Carruthers claimed there were 10,000 party members, in May 
1904 there were 25-30,000 while in August 1904 he claimed
201
1. Carruthers to Varney Parkes, 8/4/07. Varney Parkes Papers ,
M.L. A1052.
2. D,T,, 18/5/07-
3. D„T,, 25/4/07, 7/5/07.
4. D „T „, 24/4/07, 9/5/07, 29/5/07, 10/6/07, 16/7/07, for
details of the dispute.
5 „ S .M .H . , 11/8/03 .
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that the party now had between 75,000 to 100,000 financial
members/ Three years later, the party membership stood at 
270,000, The illusion of power and the opportunity to 
participate which local selection offered, helped to boost 
party numbers and therefore party funds and provided the 
necessary labour force for electoral campaigning.
However, the local selection of candidates could
produce problems, particularly where some branches were
little more than personal committees of candidates . ^  In
elections before 1904, several branches were of this kind;
in Balmain South in 1901 two Liberal candidates were backed
by different branches, each of which claimed that the other 
4was bogus. After 1904 the instances of branches being 
packed were probably less common but packing could still not 
be prevented. For instance, in the Canterbury electorate 
in 1904, nominations for the party selections closed on 
7 May, the enrolments of members who would be eligible to 
vote in the ballot did not close until 23 May and the 
ballot was held on 25 May. The names of candidates were 
therefore known over two weeks before the enrolment of 
members closed. Since most new members probably joined with 
a view to voting in the pre-selection, it was not surprising 
that branches were often said to have been packed. In the 
Camperdown branch in 1904, Clegg had announced his 
candidature early in the year; in January 1904 the branch 
had 333 members; in the next two months a further 270
5joined and by early May there were over 1000 members. The 
party leaders realised the problems which local selections 
could cause but intentionally did nothing. Carruthers 
declared realistically that there was nothing wrong in enrolling 
friends in a branch and denied that a branch could be packed
1. D „T. , 9/8/04.
2. D o T . , 23/8/07.
3. W.J , Ferguson, an ex-Labor member, claimed that this was
also true of some Liberal and Reform Association branches, 
D „T a , 7/4/04.
4. D.T,, 26/5/01, 31/5/01, 19/6/01.
5. D.T», 19/4/04 - 20/5/04.
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so that a weak candidate was chosen. He argued that, once 
selected, every Liberal and Reform Association candidate 
gained strength from the party.1 The point was that, as 
any financial member was eligible to vote in the pre-selection, 
it was impossible to decide who were or were not true 
Liberals and who were merely voting for friends. Besides, 
to the Liberal and Reform Association it was more important 
that a large number of electors should become identified 
with the party because this provided a strong electoral base 
on which to build a majority. Local selection was intended 
to serve this purpose as much as to secure a man who could 
gain votes with local ties.
Occasionally the party was prepared to play down the 
'party' affiliation of members if a candidate had a strong 
personal following in an electorate where party intervention 
might actually hinder his election. In Tenterfield,
Maitland, the Clyde and Goulburn , all of which were held 
by well-established members before 1904, branches of the 
Liberal and Reform Association were seldom active because 
these members did not require aid from the party. In 
Goulburn party activity increased noticeably in 1907 when 
Ashton retired and a new member had to be selected. In 
1908 Archdale Parkhill summarised the party's position in 
the northern districts as follows:
... it is easier to organize against Webster [the 
Federal Labor M „ H . R . ] than for state purposes.
In the first place because Jones [State Labor 
M .L „A . for the Gwydir] somehow is personally 
popular and people are not anxious to shift him 
and in second place because Mr. Moore [Liberal 
M.L.Ao for Bingara and Minister for Mines] wins 
his fight on personal grounds which it is best 
not to disturb just now. 2
Since the party was designed to produce electoral success, 
there was no point in interfering in an electorate where a 
member who was loyal in parliament could win on personal 
grounds.
When a local candidate was not available, the Liberal
1. D cT„ , 6/5/04. In 1915 Wade admitted that branch packing had
taken place, Fighting Line 1914-15. Vol.2 No.6, pp . 6 and 
Vol.2 No.13, p.ll.
2 U Parkhill to Carruthers, 29/6/08. Carruthers Papers, Box 1, 
M.L. MSS 1638.
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and Reform Association suggested that local men were not
really needed to represent the party. In Singleton
Carruthers supported the Sydney resident, James Fallick,
and claimed that it was irrelevant that the sitting
member lived in the area whereas Fallick did not and said
that a loyal party member, not a local agent, was required.1 2
He was merely making the best of the situation; the results
of the election illustrated the value of local ties. Three
Liberal and Reform Association candidates who had state-wide
reputations, but who were contesting seats with which they
had no connection, were defeated by sitting members with
local connections. One of the latter was the premier; the
other two were men of little ability but with a reputation
2of looking after their own electorate. Local influence 
was still an asset and the results justified the attempt of 
the Liberal and Reform Association to select candidates for 
local reasons who would then support them in parliament, 
thus coupling for party purposes the party and the local vote.
In one further aspect the Liberal and Reform Association 
pre-selection methods combined local and party appeal to its 
own advantage. Before 1902, the parties demanded that any 
candidate seeking endorsement take two steps; first he had 
to announce his intention to run and then he had to provide 
evidence of his local strength to win the party endorsement.
To produce the latter, candidates usually circulated 
requisitions which were signed by electors and presented as 
an illustration of the breadth of their support. Some 
candidates became so convinced that they could win the 
seat regardless of party support that they refused to submit
3to party nomination; in other cases, hardworking committees 
did not want their efforts negated by the retirement of 
their candidate at the demand of an external body. Then, if 
unselected, the candidate had to make the positive step of 
withdrawing his candidature. The National Protection Union 
introduced pre-selection ballots which occurred before
1. D.T., 5/7/04.
2. Graham was defeated by W.W. Young at Bathurst; Garland
by Levien at Tamworth and Rose by Waddell.
3„ Anderson to Parkes, n.d., Parkes Correspondence . M.L.
A 87 I , p p .473-5.
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candidates were announced, but not in any widespread or 
systematic basis.
Under the constitution of the Liberal and Reform 
Association, candidates usually stood for party pre-selection 
before they announced their intention to go to the polls. It 
was easier to withdraw if unselected because any campaigning 
had generally been carried out only within the party. 
Furthermore, the acceptance of party selection before 
publicly becoming a candidate fully identified the candidate 
with the party. Occasionally the party might be forced to 
accept in parliament a candidate who was not totally loyal 
but was too strong to defeat elector ally , but such instances 
were not common. Usually the pre-selection methods 
successfully combined local appeal and party loyalty and 
therefore increased the party's capacity to win elections.
In Tasmania the results of all elections before 1909
can be explained in local, rather than party, terms.
Electoral organizations did not impose candidates on an
electorate or dispute local selections. In 1903 the Burnie
branch of the Reform League chose its own candidate but
refused to recommend the same man to the Penguin branch,
despite the fact that both branches were in the same
electorate. Its spokesman insisted that every branch must
2decide for itself whom it would support. The National
Association endorsed candidates but did not consult any
branch members before reaching their decision. In 1909
electoral committees of the Progressive League backed slates
of candidates in each electorate, but many of those endorsed
had nothing in common except their anti-socialism. One
reason given for the introduction of the Hare-Clark system
was that it would reduce the necessity for machine politics
and allow each individual to be elected on his general 
3merits. The premier further claimed:
At one time a candidate's popularity depended a 
good deal on the good he could do for the little 
part of the State he represented, but under the 
new system the election took a wider range. 4
1. David Fell of Lane Cove, D.T., 18/10/04.
2. North West. Advocate, 12/2/03 , 13/2/03 , 22/2/03.
3. M^, 26/9/06.
4 . M . , 16/4/09.
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In spite of these claims, non-Labor candidates were still 
partly elected for local reasons. The main difference 
after 1909 was that the Liberal League adapted its methods 
to allow this localism to act to its advantage.
The Liberal League was not permitted by its constitution
to show any preference among its selected candidates,1 but
by endorsing candidates from different parts of the
electorate, the personality of individual candidates was
used to attract votes locally. When electors had been
educated to vote down the party list, those votes originally
cast for local reasons remained with the party if preferences 
2were allocated. Consequently, the Liberal League used
the local ties of candidates to attract votes and, because
of the multiple endorsements that were required by the
system, few of the tensions that existed between locality
and party in New South Wales were apparent in Tasmania. Each
area could have its representative as a Liberal candidate.
The local press advised electors to put the local Liberal
candidate first on their list so that each Liberal got a
3share of the primary votes. One candidate could stand as
a local and a party candidate without the roles being at all 
4contradictory. The Hare-Clark system allowed the party to 
use localism to its own advantage within the party framework. 
Local issues were still strong and many votes were probably 
cast for local reasons, but now candidates could not rely 
purely on their own reputation in the enlarged electorates 
and needed party organizations. The two forces were 
therefore combined to the ultimate benefit of the parliamentary 
party which received the support of members elected with 
party assistance.
A comparison between the two states shows how far the 
development of party machinery was a response to electoral 
need. In New South Wales a split vote could cause the loss 
of the seat, so strict organization was required; in 
Tasmania it was less likely to do so after 1909 and tensions
1. M_o_, 21/6/11.
2. See below, P-216
3 . Deloraine and Westbury Advertiser, 2 7/4/12.
4. North West Advocate, 26/4/12.
207
in the organization scarcely existed. In New South Wales 
the large size of the electorates reduced, but did not 
vitiate, the value of local connections, so that the vote 
for party became more important. In Tasmania the small 
size of the electorates made local contact almost essential 
before 1909; the party only gained influence over the 
electoral process when the number of electors rapidly 
increased.'*'
Powers and Independence of Branches
The central executives of parties had to ensure that 
their activities did not arouse feelings of jealousy among 
the local branches, who objected to restrictions on their 
independence of action or felt that they had no influence 
on party decisions. In the early organizations in New 
South Wales the central executives had no direct connections 
with the branches and clashes between branches and the 
executive inevitably occurred; the Liberal and Reform 
Association attempted to mould its organization so that the 
executive did not appear to dictate to the branches and 
left to them at least an illusion of independence. The 
party's methods of attempting to prevent any local jealousy 
arising can be studied by examining how the causes of this 
rivalry were removed and how the branches were allocated 
specific duties within the party framework.
In New South Wales all parties were originally based
in Sydney and their executives worked from there. The
early parties were also formed primarily by M.L.A.s because
they were the only organized group which represented the
party ideology and had the common interest of securing their
2own re-election. The executives were accused of being
biased towards sitting members, of being unrepresentative
and of attempting to direct local affairs in the interests of
3a central clique. The executives did tend to favour sitting
1. See Chapter 4, Table I.
2. The Freetrade Council was formed by M.L.A.s, S . M .H . ,
10/5/94, the Protectionist Committee also by the 
parliamentary party, S . H . , 9/6/94. In 1898, t tie
parliamentary party similarly was responsible for 
the formation of the Liberal and Federal executive, 
D .T , , 25/6/98.
3. See the accusations of T.W. Taylor, S .M .H ., 4/6/94.
members. In 1901 the Liberal party issued its first list
of endorsed candidates, which included thirty-two M.L.A.s,
a mere three weeks after the party was formed; the next day
it announced that it would endorse any local selections.
This practice was understandable because a sitting member
had already proved his capacity to win and the party process
was concerned primarily with producing winners. However,
it is not true that the executive was so swamped by sitting
members that such decisions were inevitable or that it was
totally unrepresentative of party opinion. The Freetrade
Council included freetrade representatives from all parts 
2of the state. The Liberal and Federal party had a general 
committee to which were added throughout the campaign the 
names of leading freetrade advocates throughout the state.
The executive of the Liberal and Federal party held fifteen 
meetings and in all but one of these sessions the non­
parliamentarians were in a majority. In that other meeting 
the number of M.L.A.s and non-par1iamentarians was the same. 
Although all the sitting members who were on the executive 
represented suburban electorates, they could still not 
spend too much time away from their electorates during a
campaign and consequently most of the decisions were taken
3by non-parliamentarians. Non-parliamentarians were 
included on the party executive and particularly on the 
general party committee, whose powers were purely nominal, 
to illustrate to the state, and particularly to the 
freetraders in country areas, that the party was not purely 
run by sitting members for their own benefit and that it 
was representative of all parts of the state, even though 
not, for reasons of time and organization, elected.
The Liberal and Reform Association formed an elected 
and representative council so that the organization appeared
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1. D.T . , 25/5/01 , 26/5/01.
2. S .M .H . , 2/6/94. Representatives on the Freetrade Council
came from Manning River, Newcastle, Cootamundra ,
Goulburn, Bourke , Bathurst, Albury, Woollongong and 
Armidale .
3 . Minutes of the Liberal and Federal Party Election Committee , 
M .L „ A2668. Only three of the nine M.L.A.s who were mem­
bers of the Executive attended two-thirds or more of the 
meetings; nine out of ten non-par1iamentarians were 
present on at least ten of the fifteen meetings.
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to be dominated less by its p a r l i a m e n t a r y  members. Its
first council consisted of t wenty-four M.L.A.s and twenty-
four other members.'*’ Two months later, twenty-four women
2were also elected- At the annual m e e ting each year, this 
council had to be r e - e lected by m e m bers of the A s s o c iation. 
Even though competition for the positions appears to have 
been slight, the fact that c o u n cillors could be elected 
allowed the body to appear more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of the 
movem en t as a whole.
Criticisms were often voiced that local branches were
3not con sulted sufficiently, but in general the central 
exe cutive did try to give the b r a n c h e s  independence of 
action for two good reasons. Firstly, because as we have 
seen, local activity was a d v a ntageous to a party's election 
prospec ts and secondly, quite simply because they had no 
power to force branches to accept any decisions. In 1894 
the Freetrade Council could only cajole members into 
support ing their decisions  and pr omise an u n s e lected 
can didate that he would have p r e c e d e n c e  in the next election. 
If the central executive and the b r a nches disagreed, the 
usual result was a vote split be t w e e n  the two freetrade 
candidates. Since br anches were sometimes little more than 
candidate's committees, the co nflict was reduced to a 
personal level .
The formation of the Liberal and Reform A s s o c i a t i o n 
did not include any sanctions on local branches because 
they could not have been enforced. Clashes between the 
central executive and the branches could only be solved by 
compromise, not by the use of specified rules. For instance, 
in Macquarie in 1904, the Liberal and Reform A s s o c i a t i o n 
executive selected Phillips as a candidate because, at 
the date specified in its p u b l i s h e d  timetable for the
1. D .T . , 10/3/03.
2. D .T . , 2/5/03.
3. For instance, Al d e r m a n  Richards of B o w r a l , on the choice
of the Free trade Council, S .M .H . , 14/7/94, and local
criticism of the choice of J.C.L. F i t z patrick in 1904, 
D .T . , 29/7/04 .
4. See Reid to A. Ralston, p u b l i s h e d  in S .M .H . , 11/7/94.
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selection of candidates, no local branch existed which could
make a selection. Within the next two months, branches were
formed at Dubbo and W e l l i n g t o n  and some local members wanted
the selection re-opened. The local paper claimed that the
ex ecu tiv e had no right to make a selection without consulting
local opinion and accused it of trying to foist a candidate
on the country electorate. A second candidate was then
proposed. For two months the two sections of the Liberal
and Reform A s s o c i a t i o n  in the electorate argued over the
sel ection and, al though a last minute compromise led to the
wi th dra wal of the second candidate, the seat was lost.'*' In
C a n t er bu ry in 1907, no s e t t lement was reached be tween the
br an ch  and the central executive and both candidates went
to the polls. Precisely because the executive had no way
of forcing its d e c i sions on the branches, it usually took
care to avoid such disputes by specifying what the r e s ponsibilit ie s
of the branches were and by allowing them freedom of action
in these areas .
In 1894 the B o tany Free trade Asso c i a t i o n  declared that 
its pur pose was
... to secure the regis t r a t i o n  of voters and the
return to Parl i a m e n t  of a liberal freetrader as ^
the re p r e s e n t a t i v e  of the electorate of Botany.
In the same election the W a r r i n g a h  freetrade branch claimed 
it had been formed to create some unity among the large
3number of freetrade cand idates and to endorse one of them.
In 1909 the c o n s t i t u t i o n  of the Liberal and Reform 
Ass oc ia ti on de fined the nine duties of each branch as follows:
(a) To advocate the Constitution, Principles and 
Platforms of the Liberal and Reform Association.
(b) To select a c a n d i d a t e a n d  work for his return 
to P a r l i a m e n t .
(c) To act in co ncert with the Council in furthering 
the objects of the Association.
(d) To gen e r a l l y  supe rvise the o r g a n i z a t i o n  of the 
party wi thin the electorate.
(e) To enrol as many bona fide persons as possible 
as members of the local branch.
1. W e l l ington G a z e t t e , 25/4/04, 5/5/04, 9/5/04, 23/5/04,
29/7/04.
S ,M . H ., 21/2/94.2 . 
3 . S . M . H . , 19/6/94.
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(f) To see that every person eligible as an 
elector is on the Electoral Roll.
(g) To assist the selected candidate on the day of 
election with the staff necessary to conserve 
his interest and to secure his election.
(h) To promote social intercourse between members 
and their political friends, by means of 
entertainment etc,
(i) To keep an Electoral Roll of the electorate,
and to keep the same marked from time to time 
showing the known supporters of the Liberal 
party thereon. 1
The basic duties of the branches remained the same -
2candidatese 1 ection and voter registration. What was new 
was that branch duties were now defined by the party 
constitution and not by the branch itself. The branch 
knew what it was supposed to do and what the powers of the 
central executive were; therefore disputes over what either 
group should do became less likely, even though sanctions were 
still absent.
In fact the functions of the branches were similar
to those fulfilled by personal committees and sometimes
the branches and committees were almost synonymous. In
Goulburn the local branch of the Liberal and Reform
Association met Ashton's personal committee and the combined
group then selected him as the Liberal and Reform Association 
3candidate. In Ballina the local Liberal and Reform
Association branch selected Temperley and then formally
4became his campaign committee.
A further requirement of the branches of the early 
parties was to persuade electors that a candidate would be a 
respectable representative by showing the breadth of support
1. Liberal and Reform Association Constitution, p.ll.
2. The Secretary of the National Protection Union claimed
the registration ofvoters was the basis of all success­
ful organizations. D . T . , 21/4/97. The People's Reform 
League clearly agreed - see its pamphlet, The First 
Step (M .L . 324/P) which encouraged electors to enrol.
Obviously when party managers enrolled branch members, 
they ensured that they were registered to vote.
3. Goulburn Evening Post , 2 8/4/04.
4. Richmond River Times, 7/7/04.
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which he received from leading members of the community. 
Widely-signed requisitions were the most obvious method 
by which this impression could be achieved. In 1894 J.M. 
Conroy's local secretary at Wyong tried to persuade him 
to stand by pointing out that the most influential people 
there supported him and therefore he would get the votes 
there .1 23
On election day there is less direct evidence of 
party activity although candidates and their committees 
obviously did try to 'persuade' candidates to vote in their 
favour. Since much of the election day activity was 
probably illegal, it was seldom published. One illus­
tration of what was probably typical behaviour will be 
sufficient. At Mudgee in 1898 the Protectionist candidate 
and the secretary of the local Protectionist League 
reputedly 'treated' electors to drinks before they voted. 
Another elector was promised by a pawnbroker, who was on 
the Protectionist committee, that he could retrieve his 
watch without cost if he voted as instructed; yet another 
was promised the contract to paint the race-course grandstand 
by the course trustees who also happened to be on the 
committee of the Protectionist branch. The freetrade
candidate denied in his turn that he had promised co get
2work for two labourers if they voted for him. Since no 
candidate endorsed by the Liberal and Reform Association 
had his election disputed, it is impossible to say how 
far party members participated in such activities, although
3it seems probable they did.
In Tasmania tensions between the branches and the 
central executive seldom occurred. Before 1909, the branches 
had no influence even over pre-selection and were primarily 
designed to attract voters by social functions. After
1. Tonkin to Conroy, 20/2/94, J.M. Conroy Papers, Dixon
Library, Add.899.
2. Details from Legislative Assembly of New South Wales:
Votes and Proceedings 2nd Session, 1898, Vol.I, 
p p .421-487.
3. See Macdonald to Brady, 26/7/04, 29/7/04, Ministerial
Election Committee Papers, M.L. Uncat.234, for 
details of some campaigning practices and 'treating' 
by F.J. Thomas, the Liberal and Reform candidate for 
Gough.
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1909 the large electorates produced by the Hare-Clark system 
meant that each branch had to participate in a general 
campaign over an area considerably wider than its own sphere 
of influence, The Liberal League did advise what the 
activities and duties of its branches should be - particularly, 
to register voters and purge the roll'*' - but no instances of 
clashes occurred, The annual conferences after 1911, the 
process of intra-party articulation and the lack of decisive 
duties for any one branch removed the danger of local 
branch jealousies and the need explicitly to give to the 
branches any independence of action.
Central branches always realised the advantages of local 
action, encouraged local activity and retained, by necessity, 
a decentralised structure. They did not usually attempt to 
impose their decisions on the branches. In the early parties 
any interference by the Sydney-based executive could be 
interpreted as an attempt to impose control over branches 
which had no direct link with it. When the constituion of 
the Liberal and Reform Association defined the duties of 
the branch in relation to all party activities, criticism 
of interference was reduced provided the central executive 
did not usurp the duties of the branches. The formalisation 
of rules was designed to leave the branches a considerable 
amount of independence, so that the local freedom would not 
be infringed while the advantages of local knowledge and 
support would be utilised to the party's advantage. The 
local loyalties which might have restricted the growth of 
a state wide party were subtly brought within the party's 
sphere of influence and turned to its advantage.
Towards a Party Vote
In this chapter I have shown that parties tried to use 
the advantages of local influence to increase their own 
power. As the period developed, it seems likely that local 
connections themselves were often no longer sufficient to 
win elections and that the party had greater control over 
candidates and voting. The increasing predominance of 
voting for party candidates can not be proved, but some 
indicators suggest that party affiliation was growing in
1 . M. , 5/8/09 .
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importance to candidates.
In New South Wales, two main indicators can be used 
- the percentage of seats in which the unendorsed candidates 
who supported the Liberal and Freetrade doctrine opposed 
endorsed candidates and the percentage of the vote which 
the endorsed candidates received in these seats.
TABLE I ; The Percentage of seats in which endorsed and 
unendorsed freetrade or liberal candidates 
opposed one another and the percentage of total 
votes cast for both type of candidates obtained 
by the endorsed candidate.
Election % of seats in which endorsed Vote for endorsed 
and unendorsed candidates candidates as % of
opposed each other total Freetrade or
Liberal vote. .
1894 44 63
1898 10 82
1901 17 60
1904 2 0 67
1907 10 57
It is noticeable that the number of occasions on which 
endorsed candidates were opposed by unendorsed candidates 
of the same persuasion declined, but the percentage of the 
vote obtained by the party candidate in these particular 
seats did not increase. During this period, the total 
percentage of votes in all electorates obtained by endorsed 
freetrade or liberal candidates increased from 28% in 1894, 
to 33% in 1901 and to 45% in 1904 and 1907.
The figures in Table I suggest«' that parties increased
their control over candidates, but that voters still did
not vote for men purely because they were party candidates.
The number of occasions when endorsed freetraders or
liberals were opposed by other members of the party declined,
but those who were still prepared to run obviously had
2personal electoral support. The increasing influence of
1. In 1894, the endorsed freetraders in these seats received
32,019 of the 51,134 votes cast for all freetrade candi­
dates in these seats; in 1898 endorsed candidates got 
10,159 out of 12,330 votes; in 1901, 14,838 out of 24,903,
in 1904, 32,648 out of 48,651 and in 1907, 25,107 out of
44,291.
2 . The nine independent Liberals who opposed endorsed Liberals
in the 1907 election included five former members and two 
who had regularly contested the electorate in earlier 
years. In other words, all were already well-known.
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the party had removed from contention those weaker candidates 
who now had no hope of success without party endorsement and 
who therefore accepted party decisions. Since fewer party 
members now refused to accept party decisions, more people 
voted for party candidates, although we can not know 
whether their vote was cast for personal or for party 
reasons. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that the Liberal 
party gradually expanded its influence equally in all regions 
of the state .
TABLE I I : The percentage of the total freetrade or liberal
seats won in a region expressed as a proportion  ^
of the percentage of total seats in that region.
Election City- Northern Central Southern Western
Suburban Districts Districts Districts Districts
1894 1.7 1 2 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.3
1898 1 . 7 0.3 0.9 0.6 -
1901 1.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 -
1904 1.4 1.0 0.8 0.7 -
1907 1.0 1.4 1.0 0.9
In 1907 the percentage of Liberal seats in all regions
except the Western districts was in almost exact proportion
to the percentage of total seats in that region. Whereas
in 1894 the freetrade party depended on the suburbs for much
of its support and less on country areas , by 1907 it was
drawing support equally from all regions While aggregate
data can be misleading, these figures suggest that party 
organization was now effectively extended to all sections of 
the state and that the party drew its strength from all 
parts of it.
In Tasmania direct evidence from parliamentary commissions, 
set up to investigate the working of the Hare-Clark system, 
enable us to trace the development of disciplined party 
voting in the elections of 1912 and 1913. In 1909 a committee
1. In the Northern, Central and Southern districts, I have
included all seats in the coastal areas, on the 
tablelands or on the western slopes.
2. For instance, in 1894, 53% of all seats held by freetraders
were in the city or suburbs, 32% of all seats were in 
the same area. The proportion of freetrade seats to
total seats is therefore or 1.7.3 2
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reported that no group except the Labor party showed any
sign of discipline.'*’ In 1912, only 719 votes were lost to
a party by short voting and only 829 by cross voting, even
though over 70,000 votes were cast. The difference between
2the losses of the two parties are not significant. In 
1913 the number of electors who voted only for one party 
increased even more.
TABLE III: The percentage of electors who voted only for the
candidates of one party and the percentage who 
voted for all the candidates of one party before 
casting a vote elsewhere - organized by party 
and electorate. 3
Percentage of Electors who Percentage of Electors who 
voted for candidates of voted for all the candi-
only one party. dates of one party.
Electorate Labor Liberal Labor Liberal
Bass 92 93 89 90
Darwin 90 90 79 79
Denison 91 91 76 74
Franklin 90 91 82 80
Wilmot 88 87 88 79
Total 90 91 82 8 0
There is no significant difference between the results 
of the two parties. The Tasmanian Liberal League had attempted 
to attract voters by endorsing candidates from different parts 
of large electorates. There is no way of discovering whether
1. Report of Committee on the General Election of 1909.
Journals and Papers of Parliament, Tasmania, Vol.61,
1909 , No . 34 , p .7.
2. Report on the General Election of 1912, Journals and Papers
of Parliament , Tasmania, Vol.67, No.11, p.11-12, 1912.
The Hare-Clark system demands that an elector votes for 
three candidates but does not oblige him to vote for 
more. A 'short' vote was cast when an elector does not 
place all candidates in order of preference so that, 
when preferences are allocated, his ballot paper was 
exhausted when, had he voted for more party men, the 
party would still have gained value from his vote. A 
cross vote occurs when an elector jumps from one party 
to another. In 1912 the Liberals lost 382 votes by short 
voting and 457 by cross voting; Labor losses were 337 
and 372 respectively.
3. Report of Committee on General Election of 1913. Journal
and Papers of Parliament, Vol. 69, No.11, pp . 51-53, 1913.
electors originally cast their votes for party or local 
reasons but Table III does show that party voting was 
accepted, because only 10% of electors changed party 
after making their original choice.
In both cases, these indicators suggest that votes 
for a party increased. The party's ability to use other 
factors in the electorate to its own advantage was clearly 
an important asset in the development of this party vote.
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Chapter 11
The non-Labor Parties and Pressure Groups 
in the Electorate
In troduc tion
In the previous chapters we have seen how the parties 
developed an organizational structure in the electorates and 
how they came to terms with localism. In addition to that, 
some of the interests in the electorates were organized into 
pressure groups and these, like the parties themselves, were 
relatively new forms of political action and were still in 
the process of extending their influence. Some of these 
interests had attempted to obtain influence in elections or 
in parliament or on the administration by their own 
independently organized activity since the 1870s and 1880s.'*’ 
The parties had no choice but to contend with them. Unlike 
the Labor party which relied heavily on the trade unions, 
none of the non-Labor parties were themselves based on a 
single or particular interest and each of them included 
representatives of diverse interests in the community.
Campbell has hypothesised that parties and pressure
groups went through three stages of relationship in this
period. In the first stage the party was structurally,
financially and otherwise dependent on supporting groups;
in the second the party played off one supporting group
against another and in the third, the stage of comparative
maturity, it became independent of the groups and forced
them to rely on it. The formation of a branch structure was
one indication of a party's growing independence. He claimed
that the groups gave the party continuity of existence at
local level and were effectively the rivals of the party
2machinery for the loyalty and support of members. Campbell 
assumed that the party organization was determined to become 
self-reliant and that it was consequently constantly in 
conflict with other groups until they had been reduced to a
1. See Loveday and Martin, Parliament, Factions and Party,
ch . 4 , p p .10 0-10 5.
2. Campbell, Groups, Parties and Federation, pp.48-50
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subordinate position and he suggested that the party 
unwillingly depended on group support because it had no other 
alternative. The hypothesis depends on the assumption that 
the parties did not want to depend on group support. I have 
shown in the previous chapters that the party organization 
was designed to use local influence to its own advantage and 
I would argue that parties were prepared to accept support 
from groups at the local level as an integral part of their 
electoral strategy and that they did not object to dependence 
on them in individual constituencies because of the mutual 
benefits which accrued to both. The relationship between 
groups and parties did not progress steadily from stage to 
stage as Campbell suggested, but instead it varied dramatically 
according to the aims, strategies and influence of the groups 
themselves.
Of course, a large number of what might be regarded as 
interest groups in the states did not independently participate 
in elections. Some of them, like the pastora1ists, were 
already well-represented in the legislature. Others had long 
since obtained favourable legislation or had developed 
satisfactory relations with the administration. Some did not 
have the numbers or the popularity to influence electoral 
results. Of those that were formally organized, some still 
did not participate directly in politics; their welfare 
could usually be secured by personal contact with parliamentary 
leaders or representatives. The Chambers of Commerce and 
Manufactures in New South Wales, neither of them in themselves 
well-established bodies, pretended to be non-political , 
although gradually, as a Labor government became an increasingly 
likely possibility, both began to realise the value of 
formally entering politics.  ^ The Employers' Federation,
2formed in 1902, was more definitely anti-socialist in outlook. 
Some of the members of these organizations did actively 
participate in the affairs of the Peoples' Reform League, but 
the organizations themselves did not participate in electoral 
affairs.
1. D .T . , 19/9/05, 9/11/06 (Chamber of Manufactures) , 27/7/04
(Chamber of Commerce).
2. D.T., 23/8/02, 28/9/04.
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In Tasmania similar groups had such close ties with the
electoral organizations that independent action was not
necessary. One of the signatories of the circular which
convened the foundation meeting of the National Association
was chairman of the Chamber of Commerce^ and many of its
2original council were Hobart businessmen. When the Employers'
3Federation was formed in 1908, its first secretary, G.F.
4Douglas, was also the paid organizer of the Progressive League.
The Tasmanian Liberal League was formed at meetings which
were convened on the initiative of the Farmers and Stockowners'
5Association and many of its leading members, and even some
of the Liberal parliamentarians, were on the executive of
the Employers' Federation or the Chamber of C o m m e r c e T h e s e
7organizations often claimed to be non-political, because 
their direct personal links and often common membership with 
the non-Labor parties made it unnecessary for them to become 
openly involved in electoral contests. This absence of 
electoral activity did not mean that these interests were 
unimportant to the non-Labor parties, but only that they 
need not be considered in a discussion of the development 
of non-Labor electoral organization.
Before considering the activity of those groups which 
competed in the electoral arena, it is necessary to classify 
them. Several typologies of groups have been suggested, but 
few of those concerned with more developed polities are 
directly relevant to this study, even if they are generally
1. M^, 12/4/04, 19/4/04.
2. I.e., H. Jones, a jam manufacturer, C.E Webster, general
merchant, W.H. Burgess, wine importer, W.M. Williams, 
draper, G.P. Fitzgerald, retailer and director of the 
Cascades Brewery, C.E. Davies, proprietor of The 
Mercury , M., 23/4/04.
3 . M^, 11/8/08.
4 . Mj_, 4/7/08, 18/8/08.
5 . Mjl, 11/6/09.
6 . M w 19/8/09, 28/8/11
7 . M. , 31/1/12.
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valid»- I will therefore divide groups first into local and
wide-based categories and then I will sub-divide the latter
category into single-interest and multi-interest groups. By
'local' I mean those groups which participated in electoral
activity only in one or two constituencies. Progress
Associations or Fruitgrowers' Unions are typical local
pressure groups; althoughin both cases, organization on a
2state-wide basis did develop, the central executive never 
involved the branches in a co-ordinated electoral strategy.
The local associations each participated individually in 
only one or two seats. A wide-based group was one which 
had a series of co-ordinated branches and which developed 
a general electoral strategy which was then put into effect 
by its branches. Those which were concerned with promoting 
a particular policy, such as the temperance movement, or 
which defended a specific interest, such as the Licensed 
Victuallers Association and the Protestant Defence Association, 
I have termed 'single interest' . A 'multi-interest' group 
was one which took a stand on a series of inter-related 
issues which in themselves could constitute an electoral 
platform. In New South Wales the main multi-interest, wide- 
based groups were the Freetrade and Land Reform League, the 
People's Reform League and the Farmers and Settlers' 
Association. The strategies of these groups and the parties' 
reactions to them differed considerably and are important in 
understanding the approach of the non-Labor parties to 
politics and in explaining how and why they developed along 
particular lines.
1. J. Blondel, Voters, Parties and Leaders, London, 1963,
p.160, divides them into protective and promotional 
groups. A.Potter, Organized Groups in British National 
Politics , London, 1961, prefers to call them spokesman 
and promotional groups. In fact, such distinctions 
are often difficult to uphold in detailed studies, see 
P.B. Westerway,'Pressure Groups', in Forces in Australian 
Politics , Sydney, 1963, pp. 120-22 , and T. Matthews, 
'Pressure Groups in Australia' in H. Mayer (ed. ) 
Australian Politics; A Second Reader, Melbourne, 1969, 
p p .2 3 6-8 .
2. The Progress Association Union was formed in 1902. D .T .,
3/4/02, the Fruitgrowers' Union of New South Wales in 
the same year, D . T . , 21/4/02. Neither played any part
in electoral politics.
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The Non-Labor Parties and Local Groups
The local groups often may have affected the result in 
particular electorates but had no broader importance. For 
example, in the Ballina electorate, the Murwillumbah and 
Tintenbar Progress Associations and the Alstonville Agricul­
tural society were all addressed by the sitting M.L.A., John 
Perry, during his election campaigns /  The Sugar Defence 
League, formed to protect and promote the interests of the 
industry, held meetings during the campaigns of 1898, 1901
and 1904 and in each case supported Temperley, a member of
2its committee, against Perry. In the Wellington electorate
in 1901, a Werris Creek Railway League, a Federal Capital
for Canoblas Association and the Neurea and Baker's Swamp
Progress Association held meetings which were addressed by 
3candidates. Candidates were sometimes connected with these 
groups and often would directly seek their support. As far 
as the central executive of the party was concerned, these 
local groups were part of the edifice of local support which 
candidates built for themselves and which the parties tried 
to attract by encouraging the local selection of candidates 
and the independence of branches. The party accepted that 
each candidate had to establish connections with these 
groups at local level and, as we have seen, included consid­
eration of these groups in its strategy to attract local 
votes. It did not try to compete with these groups for 
membership; indeed in 1898 one paper claimed that a party
was sensible not to start its electoral activities more than
4three weeks before an election. The party accepted the 
existence of local groups in their strategy of choosing 
candidates with local appeal. The groups themselves had no 
effect on the style of development of the early non-Labor 
p a r t i e s .
The Parties and the Wide-based Single-in terest Groups
A wide range of single-interst groups participated in 
electoral activity in several seats, held meetings, endorsed
1. Richmond River Times, 10/3/98, 11/4/01, 30/5/04, 19/5/04.
2 . Richmond River Times , 3/2/98, 10/3/98, 31/3/98, 28/3/01,
9/5/01, 23/4/01, North Coast Beacon, 16/3/04.
3 . Wellington Gazette, 10/5/01, 20/5/01.
4. Goulburn Evening Post, 22/1/98.
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candidates and questioned them on their views on a particular 
topic, ^ but only a few of these groups were either large 
enough to be effective or sufficiently well-established to 
plan any deliberate strategy in a wide range of seats. I 
will therefore concentrate attention on the activities of 
three important single-interest groups and on their effect on 
the development of parties.
The New South Wales Alliance was an organization which
combined several individual temperance bodies such as the
Local Option League, the Independent Order of Good Templars,
2the Women's Christian Temperance Union and the Rechabites.
It was a peak organization, interested in co-ordinating the
influence of subordinate organizations for political purposes.
Most of its members were Protestant and came from the
3respectable middle-class sections of society. In the early
years of party existence, the Local Option League had limited
its activities to suburban constituencies and its lists of
endorsed candidates did not include anyone from seats which
were distant from Sydney. The election of 1895 was the first
time that it endorsed candidates in country electorates.
Although, as Bollen pointed out, 137,000 votes were cast in
41891 for candidates endorsed by temperance bodies, it remains 
impossible to estimate how many of these were cast for 
temperance, rather than party, reasons. Most of the time the
1. Groups which were active in the 1894 election included the
Single Tax League (S .M .H . , 3/2/94 , 2/3/94, 28/3/94) , the
Christian Elector's Association (S.M.H. , 17/2/94, 3/5/94) ,
the Landowner's Defence League, (S.M.H., 25/4/94, 26/4/94,
31/5/94), the Property Owner's Defence League (S.M.H., 
28/6/94 , 11/7/94, 12/7/94) , the Municipal Association
(S.M.H, , 5/7/94) , the Anti-Humbug League (S.M.H. , 25/1/94 ,
2/2/94, 1/3/94) ,the City Railway Extension Association
(S.M.H. , 14/7/94) , the Australian Federal League (S.M.H. ,
14/7/94) , and the National Association (see above, 
chapter 3). In 1901 they included the Early Closing 
League (D .T . , 2/6/01) the Municipal Association (D . T . ,
9/6/01) , the Womanhood Suffrage League (D .T . , 25/6/01)
and the Restaurant Employees' Association (Rydon and Spann, 
New South Wales Politics, pp.13-14) . None of these groups 
consistently tried to work through a party.
2. D.T., 19/3/03.
3. J.D. Bollen, J?he Temperance Movement and the Liberal Party
in New South Wales, pp.163-5.
4. Bollen, The Protestant Churches and the Social Reform
Movement in New South Wales, p.232.
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temperance organizations promoted their cause through petitions, 
mass meetings and the representations of those members of 
parliament who espoused their cause. It is certain that a 
large number of branches of the various organizations were 
incorporated in the New South Wales Alliance, although precise 
estimates are impossible.
In the early years the strategy of the temperance groups
was intended to influence politics at the parliamentary,
rather than the electoral, level. Since the parties at this
time were primarily electoral machines organized in the months
before an election, they had no continuity of organization
or predictable procedures. The leaders of the groups
consequently concentrated on influencing candidates, rather
than the party as a whole , in the hope that a large number of
committed candidates would be returned to the assembly and
would promote their cause. While the temperance leaders
preferred to support a candidate who was also endorsed by a
party, they were prepared to run a candidate purely on the
temperance i s s u e /  In 1894 the Local Option League endorsed
seventy-seven candidates from all parties, although the
majority were freetraders. In twenty-eight of the thirty-eight
seats for which candidates were endorsed, more than one
candidate was selected, with the result that a block vote of
temperance supporters was not directed to any particular
candidate. Endorsement was a sign that a candidate had
respectable temperance views and that he had promised to
support the cause in the assembly. It was intended to commit
candidates as well as attract votes for them. In the elections
the temperance movement did not directly co-operate with
either of the political parties, although its leaders did ask
the Protectionist and Freetrade parties to take the views of
candidates on local option into consideration when deciding
2whom the party would endorse. The Protectionist committee
3rejected the suggestion outright while Reid refused to take 
a stand on the question because he knew that his party was 
divided on it and that any commitment by the leader might
1. S . M .H , , 28/2/93 quoted in Bollen, The Protestant Churches
and the Social Reform Movement, p. 235.
2. S.M.H., 29/6/94.
3 . S.M.H», 3/7/94.
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cause the party to lose votes.
In the following elections, the temperance organizations
followed the same strategy of endorsing candidates rather
than trying to influence the executive of a party, although
on at least one occasion a branch did work through a party.
In 1901, a deputation of the Temperance, Moral and Social
Association of Marrickville met the executive of the Liberal
2party and secured party nomination for their nominee. Such 
actions were unusual.
After 1901, the leaders of the New South Wales Alliance
decided to change their strategy and work in co-operation
with a party. The growth of party in parliament had made
their original tactic of electing committed M.L.A.s ineffective.
Inter-party groups committed to causes had never been
particularly effective in parliament, but the growing rigidity
of party lines and the declining opportunities for legislation
sponsored by private members made the introduction of a
measure as complex as a local option bill almost impossible.
Gradually political necessity brought this change in the
3attitude of temperance leaders. Such a strategy was 
particularly appropriate in relation to the Liberal and Reform 
Association which had predictable pre-selection methods and 
a policy formulated by the party.
In March 1903, a clause was added to the original policy
of the Liberal and Reform Association which demanded a
4thorough reform of the liquor trade. Two months later this
plank was altered to give full support to local option. In
1904 Carruthers addressed a local option meeting in his own
5electorate and identified himself with the movement. After 
the electoral victory of 1904, a local option bill was 
introduced as part of the government's policy. The large 
number of temperance advocates in Liberal ranks had been 
responsible for the introduction of this particular objective 
into party policy.
1. D ,T . , 3/7/94.
2 . D . T . , 27/5/01, 30/5/01.
3 . Bollen The Temperance Movement and the Liberal Party,
p . 1 694 . D „ T . , 3/5/03. F
5 . D . T . , 22/6/04.
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One reason for the close alliance between the temperance
movement and the Liberal and Reform Association was the
co-operation between the Progressive party, the Labor party
and the representatives of the liquor trade. The Licensed
Victuallers Association had occasionally tried to influence
the results of individual electorates for many years before
parties developed,^ Its members were mostly publicans and
in 1907 it claimed that it would attempt to influence the
230,000 hotel employees throughout the state. Its actions
were generally defensive as it tried to protect the interests
of the trade against the demands of the temperance movements.
It was closely identified with the Protectionist party, and
3particularly with Dibbs , in the years before 1894 . Later
it developed strong connections with the Labor party and in
1902, J.J. Power, Labor M.L.A. for the Lang division of
4Sydney, was its president. Unlike the temperance associations, 
its activities covered the whole state from 1894 onwards. The 
temperance bodies became involved in country electorates 
only af ter 18 95.
Despite its unofficial connections with the Labor party
there was no direct co-operation because some Labor candidates,
particularly McGowen, Griffith, Catts and G.D. Clark, were
strong temperance supporters. In every election the Licensed
Victualler's Association acted independently; it appointed
5parliamentary committees to run the campaign, extracted 
pledges of support for compensation from candidates and usually 
published a list of M.L.A.s who were supposed to be committed 
to the principle of compensation.6 Occasionally it claimed
7that candidates had been converted by its electoral campaigns.
1.
2 .
Loveday and Martin. Parliament, Factions and Parties, p.103
D .T . , 14/2/07.
3 . In 1894 Dibbs as 
Association. S
Premier attended the annual picnic of the 
.M,H, , 21/3/94 .
4 . D .T „ , 11/4/02.
5 . S.M.H., 7/4/94, 21/7/94, 3/8/94. D.T., 12/7/94, 3/3/98,
13/7/04.
6 . S.Mo H . , 21/7/94 , D.T., 30/7/98, 20/9/07.
7 . Such as J . Perry and Ewing. S.M.H., 3/8/94.
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In 1907, after the Liberal government had introduced a local
option poll which was to be held simultaneously with the
general election, the Association formed a Liquor Trades
Defence Association and asked all publicans to contribute to
1a political fund, After the election Carruthers claimed
that the trade had spent thousands of pounds to ensure the
defeat of several Liberals who were strong temperance
2supporters and the accusation was not denied. The liquor 
trade had entered into an informal alliance with the Labor 
party, although it never tried to work through the party 
structure .
The Australian Protestant Defence Association (A.P.D.A.), 
on the other hand, and to some extent the temperance bodies 
were prepared to work through a party at local level to promote 
their cause. The A.P.D.A. was formed with the intention of 
returning protestants to parliament and defending the state
3against the Roman Catholic Church. Its founder, Rev. Dill
Macky, was the driving force behind the movement, which was
4financed by several anonymous Sydney businesses. In August
51902 only sixteen branches had been formed, but by the
annual general meeting of 1903 there were 116 branches. At
first, the branches were confined to the suburbs of Sydney,
but after October 1902, they were formed in numerous country
towns such as Wellington, Kiama , Maitland, Tamworth and Wagga 
7Wagga. The numbers enrolled in the branches ranged from 
thirty to two hundred and thirty, with an average size of
3around seventy or eighty. The A.P.D.A. regularly held mass 
meetings at which the evils of Romanism were unveiled and 
a sectarian appeal was made to the audience to defend their 
religion.1 23*56789
1, D,Te , 8/2/06., 25/7/06.
2, D,T ., 16/9/07, 17/9/07.
3, The Watchman , 1/2/02.
4,, See S.Do Stevensen (nee Dil1-Macky)Papers . M.L. MSS. 1385.
5. The Watchman , 2/8/02.
6. The Watchman , 8/8/03.
7. See The Watchman. 23/8/02-14/3/03 for Lists of branches.
8. A o B . Marshall, Some Aspects of the Australian Protestant
Defence Association 1901-4. Government III thesis Univ. 
of Sydney, 1961, p .20.
9. The Watchman, 11/10/02, 18/10/02, 9/4/04, 11/7/07.
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The Liberal party refused to become connected with the 
A.P.D.A. and Carruthers vehemently protested that the Liberal 
and Reform Association was not a Protestant party.  ^ Neverthe­
less, many Liberals as individuals were connected with the 
A.P.D.A, Robert Booth was a Liberal M.L.A., secretary of
the local branch of the A.P.D.A, and Deputy Grand Master of
2the Loyal Orange Lodge. Ten Liberal M.L.A.s attended the
3first annual general meeting of the Association,' while
4several members were present at Protestant demonstrations.
Yet during the election campaign both the party and the 
interest group denied that they had any alliance.
During the election of 1904, the A.P.D.A. co-operated
with the Loyal Orange Lodges and formed a Protestant Political
Joint Committee which was responsible for selecting the
candidates for whom supporters were supposed to vote. This
committee produced a series of questions to be put to all
5candidates before they could receive endorsement. At the
same time the protestants, and possible to a lesser extent
the temperance supporters, decided to ensure that candidates
favourably inclined towards their cause were endorsed by
themselves participating in the pre-selection ballots of
the Liberal and Reform Association. For the first time the
methods of a party were predictable enough to permit such a
strategy. Occasionally their moves were successful. In
Leichhardt the local branch of the Liberal and Reform
Association was reputedly formed by A.P.D.A. members who had
selected Robert Booth as the Protestant candidate on the
previous evening , A month later this branch selected Booth
6as the party candidate. In Parramatta the Protestant 
Political Council insisted that it was eligible as an 
organization to participate in the pre-selection ballot of
1. S .M.H . , 23/5/03 .
2 . The Watchman, 28/4/06, D.T. , 14/2/06.
3 . Jessep, Law, Fallick, Hurley 
Moxham, Mackenzie, Nobbs ,
, Davidson, Affleck, 
The Watchman, 2/8/02
4 . D.T,, 13/7/06, 13/11/06.
5. D . T . , 31/7/03 , 30/7/04 .
6 . D „T . , 14/4/04 , 14/5/04 .
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the Liberal and Reform A s s o c i a t i o n . 1 234 It later withdrew  
its request, decided that its members should act only as 
ind ivi dual members of the Liberal and Reform Asso c i a t i o n
2and then endorsed the candidate selected by the latter body.
In other seats, the A.P.D.A. delayed the selection of their
can di da te until the Liberal and Reform A s s o c i a t i o n  had made 
3their choice. O c c a s i o n a l l y  candidates who were endorsed
r e p u di at ed the support and denied that they had been approached
by the A.P.D.A, although in one of these cases there is no
doubt that the A.P.D.A. had in fact been active in the 
4electorate. How wide sprea d the influence of the A.P.D.A. 
was remains unknown - in Lei c h h a r d t  one corre s p o n d e n t 
suggested that only 120 of the 627 branch members who
5u n a n i m o u s l y  selected Booth were me mbers of the A.P.D.A. If 
this is true, then their influence may have been exaggerated. 
Nev er th eless, the methods they employed were an indication 
of the changing r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the party and the s i n g l e ­
interest groups.
The Liberal and Reform A s s o c i a t i o n  p e r mitted any 
fin ancial memb e r  to p a r t i cipate in the selection of candidates 
and, as we have seen, this procedure was intended to encourage 
the support of groups in the local electorates. What those 
local groups may have r epresented was not considered important, 
and, by accepting the support of the P r o t e s t a n t  or temperance 
groups, the party u n d o u b t e d l y  helped its own cause. The 
groups, of course, had little alte rnative but to work through 
the party. A l t h o u g h  the A.P.D.A. claimed that it did not 
support any party, it also po inted out that it would be
1. Bollen. The Temperance Mo v e m e n t  and the Liberal Party, p.171.
2. D . T . , 8/7/04.
3. For instance Botany, D ,T . , 4/6/04, Glebe, 10/6/04.
4. E n do rsements were repu diated by W. Millard (Tilba T i m e s ,
3/8/04) and by P.E. Stirton and F.J. Thomas (D . T . , 3/8/04) .
Yet on one instance in Thomas's c o n s t i t u e n c y  of Gough,
'The Church of England here was d e c orated with boughs 
tied with orange ribbons on the Sunday when I arrived 
[at Emmaville] and a m e e ting of the Loyal Orange Lodge 
was held in the church after the service when the parson 
took a strong line against the g o v e r n m e n t ' . Macdonald to 
Brady, 26/7/04, M i n i s t e r i a l  El ection C o m m ittee P a p e r s .
M.L. Uncat. 234.
5 . D . T . , 8/7/04.
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'vainglorious' to run candidates purely as protestants and 
advised all electors to vote for the Liberal candidate/
The unofficial co-operation was mutually beneficial to both 
groups; the party gained additional parliamentary members 
while the group gained parliamentary representation.
The fundamental factor explaining this relationship
was that., as the Protestant and temperance leaders
realised, a single-interest group may have had wide support
throughout the state but did not have sufficient votes in
a single electorate to win without party support. Campbell
has suggested that a party may have been prepared to
co-operate with a group only if it could provide considerable
2assistance in some area. Nevertheless, the party was 
prepared to accept the influence of groups in its own 
activities in the electorate partly because it could not 
prevent such action without undermining a fundamental part 
of its party organization but also, b'ecause the groups were 
only concerned with a single interest and consequently did 
not try to undermine the freedom of action of the party 
on a broader range of issues. The Liberal and Reform 
Association was prepared to accept a plank supporting local 
option and to allow temperance advocates considerable 
freedom in the pre-selection ballots, because any members 
elected under their influence would probably support the 
party loyally on the majority of issues which were 
not concerned with local option. Since these groups were 
not a threat to the general independence of the party and 
might bring considerable electoral support, the party 
accepted their participation in branch activities. It 
never regarded itself as a rival of these groups or competed 
with them for membership. Instead it followed its strategy 
of attracting local support wherever available through the 
predetermined procedures of its organization.
In Tasmania the small electorates which existed before 
1909 made organized group activity as difficult for interest 
groups as it was for parties. A candidate relied primarily
1. The Watchman , 30/4/04. For a time the A.P.D.A. even
supported a catholic who was a Liberal candidate. He was 
S.J. Kearney of Armidale. The Watchman,16/1/04, 2/4/04.
2. Campbell, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups in
Australia, p,51.
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on local support, which included some group support. The
small size of society meant that many of the single-interest
groups whose counterparts were active in New South Wales had
no need to be involved in Tasmanian politics. For instance,
the Licensed Victuallers had close connections with the
government and the non-Labor electoral organization between
1903 and 1909. The premier, Evans, had been a former president
of the Licensed Victuallers Association'*’ and the chairman of
the National Association, G.P. Fitzgerald, was a director of
the Cascades Brewery. In 1906 the National Association was
accused of being nothing more than a clique, dominated by
2the liquor trade. The close connections between the trade
3and some M.H.A.s remained after 1909 The temperance
4associations made some endorsements but, because formal 
organization played only a small part in elections, seem to 
have done little more. Their endorsements, like those of the 
same groups in New South Wales, were designed to influence 
affairs inside the Assembly.
The introduction of the Hare-Clark system altered the 
relationship of groups and parties. The parties could endorse 
candidates who represented several sectional groups within a 
constituency while the groups could draw support from all 
sections of the enlarged electorates and had a chance of 
securing the election of a party candidate who was committed 
to support their particular cause. One commentator suggested 
that in Wilmot
The Druids will help Mr. Curwen a little, the P.A.F.S., 
(sic) Curwen and Hayes; the Hibernian vote will go to 
Lyons, Mulcahy and Cameron, the sporting vote to Field, 
the temperance vote to Best, Hays and Lee but as only 
a limited number will vote any of these tickets, they 
are not going to have a very important bearing on the 
result. 5
1. Daily Telegraph (Launceston) , 16/7/03. Its patron then was
Senator Edward Mulcahy.
2. M^ _, 18/12/05, 21/12/05, 5/2/06, 6/2/06, 6/3/06, 8/3/06, 9/3/06
3. Edward Mulcahy, M.H.A. after 1910, was a former president
of the Association. M ., 15/3/06, 1/6/06.
4. *!Ll ' 5/2/06, 27/2/09.
5. Deloraine and Westbury Advertiser, 27/4/12.
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Each of these candidates was able to attract some votes to 
the p a r t y  because of their group connections and, if the 
vo tin g was disciplined, the p r e f erences would remain with 
the party. The o p p o r tunity which the electoral system offered 
for m u l t i p l e  e n d o r sements allowed most s i ngle-interest groups 
in Ta sm ania to graduate without tensions towards some 
id en ti f i c a t i o n  with one of the parties. After 1909 there is 
no evi de nce of any group endorsing separate lists of 
c a n d id at es .
In Tasmania the sudden enla rgement of the electorate and 
the flexible party p r e - s e l e c t i o n  process which this electoral 
syste m created m e a n t  that parties were never d e p endent 
d i r ec tl y on par t i c u l a r  groups for support. The party was 
able to use group support at the same time as forwarding its 
own cause; the two were not contradictory.
The Part ies and W i d e - b a s e d  M u 1t i - i n t e r est Groups
The decisive factor in determining the nature of the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  be tween parties and single - i n t e r e s t  groups 
was the inability of these groups to win elections on their 
own and the i ndependence which the parties maintained  
be ca us e the m a j o r i t y  of issues were of no concern to these 
groups. The m u l t i - i n t e r e s t  groups, on the other hand, 
espou sed  a series of i n t e r -related causes and were able to 
a t t ra ct  votes from a wide range of electors. Whe n  these groups 
d e c id ed  to take direct electoral action, and p a r t i c u l a r l y  when 
their p l a t f o r m  was similar to that espoused by the p a r l i amenta ry  
par ti es , they thr e a t e n e d  the independence and even the 
exi st en ce of the p a r l i a m e n t a r y  parties. As a result, parties 
were forced to regard such or g a n i z a t i o n s  as rivals and they 
had to absorb them as rapidly as possible. If a wide-based 
group did not attempt to challenge the independence of the 
party, then the two could generally co-operate. The Freetrade 
and Re fo rm League, the People's Reform League and the 
Tas m a n i a n  Reform League belonged to the first type of m u l t i ­
int er es t group which challenged the power of the parlia m e n t a r y
1. In the federal elections of 1910, the Loyal Orange Lodge 
did i s s u e  a list of selected candidates which differed 
in only one instance from the Liberal list. Mulcahy, 
a catholic, was omitted. M . , 12/4/10.
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party; the Farmers and Settlers' Association entered electoral 
politics without being identified with or challenging any 
party organization.
The Farmers and Settlers' Association was formed at 
Cootamundra in 1893 to protect the interests of the small 
farmers and to ensure that when the leases of the Central 
Division expired, sufficient land was made available for 
settlement. Originally the Association drew its strength 
from the Riverina, but gradually it expanded its branches 
throughout the state. In 1894 twenty-eight branches had 
been formed and by 1899 150 delegates attended the annual 
conference which was held in Sydney. The conferences 
discussed a wide range of rural affairs, such as conditional 
purchases, interest rates, closer settlement, rail freight 
charges, water conservation and compulsory arbitration.'*’
The Association had originally been formed in the land crisis 
of 1893-4 but, after many of its demands had been incorporated 
in the Land Act introduced by Carruthers in 1895, it remained 
in existence as the permanent representative of the small 
settlers.
Ob viously the Farmers and Settlers' Asso c i a t i o n  was a
political organization, but it carefully refused to become
identified with any party. At its annual conference in 1902,
a motion suggesting that the recently formed parliamentary
Country Party should be asked to represent the Association
caused a long debate which illustrated a considerable
division of opinion on party strategy. Some M.L.A.s who
were delegates and members of other parties opposed the motion
which was defeated by forty-seven votes to thirty-four. The
feeling of the majority was that, if the Association became
identified with any parliamentary group, it would lose its
2independence and reduce its effectiveness. In 1904 the 
Association decided that, while the individual branches had 
the right to support any candidate regardless of his party,
1. Bayley. A History of the Farmers and Settlers Association,
p. 44-52 .
2. Farmers and Settlers' Association Conference Reports, 1902.
MoL. 630.6/8. p.69-72. Among the M.L.A.s present were 
Lee and Fleming (Liberal) and Clara (Labor) ; T. Brown a 
federal member, was also prominent.
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the organization as a whole would maintain its previous stance
and refuse to become identified with either party. The motion
was only accepted after a long debate. At the same time, the
Association produced an electoral platform which it intended
to advocate during the campaign of 1904.^ In 1905 the
resolution permitting selection of candidates by branches was
changed so that branches were directly encouraged to choose 
2candidates. The endorsement of Fitzpatrick in the Cootamundra
by-election of 1906 caused a severe split in the Association
and the pro-Labor group led by Trefle and Brown, which had
3been influential, was now clearly in a minority. Gradually,
without officially altering its policy of independence as an
organization, the Farmers and Settlers' Association moved
4towards supporting the Liberal party.
The Farmers and Settlers' Association never directly 
clashed with a non-Labor party because it refused to take a 
stance which fully identified it with any party organization. 
Although its objectives were broad and concerned most areas 
of country life, its refusal to attempt to compete with the 
parties meant that no rivalry existed. Other organizations, 
however, did cause parliamentary parties to take more 
decisive action.
The Freetrade and Land Land Reform League was founded in 
April 1893 and B ,R . Wise became its leading spokesman.
According to its secretary, William Harding, it was formed 
to shake the freetrade movement out of its apathy and to 
force it to accept a policy of direct taxation.5 It was a 
league formed primarily by electors and not manipulated by
1. Farmer s and Settlers' Association Conference Reports , 1904,
M o L . 
were
630.6/8, p .27- 
represented.
29, 64. At least seventy-four branches
2 . Farmer s and Settlers' Association Conference Reports , 1905,
M.L . 630. 6/8, p .91 .
3 . Farmers and Settlers' Association Conf erence Reports , 1906,
M.L. 6 3 0. 6/8, p .2 0 , 27-28 .
4. For a full description of all the above, see B.D. Graham,
The Formation of the Australian Country Parties, p.55-65.
5* S.M.H, , 2 6/4/9 3 quoted in J . A R y a n ,  "B.R. Wise, an Oxford
Liberal in the Freetrade Party', p.315. Much of this 
section is based on chapter nine, p.315-45, of tjiis thesis. 
See also Wise to Carruthers, 26/10/- (probably 1893), 
Carruthers Papers, Box 14a, M.L. MSS. 1638.
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the parliamentary party. Its supporters were representative 
of all types of city interests, including lawyers, journalists, 
manufacturers and businessmen. At first the League was based
primarily in Sydney, but its branches were soon formed in all
2parts of the state and in the election of 1894 it endorsed 
candidates who accepted a land tax,
Reid, as leader of the opposition, clearly realised
the possible electoral strength of the new organization
because the parliamentary freetrade leaders formally met
3the leaders of the League, Reid then took the opportunity
of identifying himself with the new movement and accepted
4the policy of direct land and income taxation. As party
leader he committed any cabinet that might be led by himself
to this policy, but his followers as individuals were not
committed. Since the party was divided into conservative,
5moderate and radical groups, Reid had to pursue a policy 
of conciliation if he was to continue leading a united party 
and if the parliamentary party was not to be dominated by 
this new movement. Reid's strategy was that, by adopting 
the main parts of the policy of the Freetrade and Land Reform 
League, he could reduce its independence and reclaim the 
leadership of the freetrade movement for its parliamentary 
representatives,
During the election of 1894 the Freetrade Council and 
the Freetrade and Land Reform League co-operated successfully 
despite an acrimonious exchange of letters between Harding 
and Pulsford on the possible effects of the League's taxation 
proposals and its electoral results.^ After the election
1. See W.Hc Wilks, S.M.H. , 31/8/93.
2. See details of branch activity in Northumberland. Conroy
Paper s Add 0 8 99 , Dixson Library.
3. See Wilks, S.M.H,, 31/8/93.
4. See B.R„ Wise, A Year's Stewardship, Sydney, 1895, M.L.,
042/P77 for details of events during this year.
5C A J .  Martin, Free Trade and Protectionist Parties in New 
South Wales, p.319-322.
6, S.M.H. , 21/5/94 , 1/8/94 (Pulsford) , 23/5/94, 26/5/94, 19/7/94
(Harding) . The Freetrade Council selected 101 candidates, 
the Freetrade and Land Reform League fifty-six. In only 
seven seats were different men endorsed-.
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M.L.A.s who had been prominent members of the League were 
quickly absorbed into the parliamentary party and, when Reid 
fulfilled his promises by introducing the direct land and 
income taxes, remained as a satisfied part of his following.^
The League appeared as a direct rival for political 
influence to the parliamentary party because it was campaigning 
on a broad range of issues which were sufficient to secure the 
election of a candidate and which were so similar to the 
position espoused by the parliamentary freetrade party that 
it threatened to steal some of its electoral support. The 
leader of the parliamentary party therefore adopted its policy 
in order to re-assert his own position of authority and to 
prevent the formation of a parliamentary clique which might 
challenge him. He succeeded in absorbing the group elected 
primarily under the auspices of the League. Obviously the 
League was seen as a rival influence and caused a direct and 
rapid reaction; it achieved this effect only because its 
platform was sufficiently broad to make independent and 
successful electoral action a possible strategy for it.
In 1902 the People's Reform League was formed and in
1903 it absorbed the Taxpayer's Union. Its members were all
non-parliamentarians and, if an official of the organization
decided to stand for parliament, he had to resign his office.
Before 1904, no M.L.A.s were therefore involved in its 
2organization. The People's Reform League was conservative
in character, anti-socialist in doctrine and closely connected
with the Employers' Federation and the Chambers of Manufactures 
3and Commerce. It was effectively, but not exclusively, 
representative of business interests. The League originally 
claimed to be an educative organization but immediately began 
to organize a series of branches, particularly in seats which
1. Whiddon, Dick, V. Parkes, Storey, Ashton, Affleck, Wilks,
Mahony and Millen, all elected in 1894, had been 
identified with or even members of the executive of 
the League.
2. D „ T . , 25/9/02 , 9/4/03 , 4/7/03 .
3. Its motto was 'Security and Freedom are all that industry
requires'. D.T., 4/4/04.
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were held by opposition members. Branches were also formed
2in country areas. It claimed to be a people's movement and
3was determined that it would not be dominated by politicians;
instead, its president, John Stinson, declared that its
4intention was to control the parliamentary opposition. Its 
platform demanded the reduction of the number of members of 
the assembly and retrenchment of the state expenditure.
Its platform, its electoral activity and Stinson's threat
meant that it was offering a direct challenge to Carruthers,
the leader of the opposition. In an attempt to regain the
leadership of the anti-government movement, he founded the
Liberal and Reform Association. In this organization he
ensured that the leadership remained in the hands of its
parliamentary representatives. He adopted a policy which
was almost identical to that of the People's Reform League
and with considerable energy he and his parliamentary
colleagues laid the foundations of a branch network which was
soon to be larger than that of his rivals Personal antipathy
between Stinson and Carruthers made close co-operation between
the two organizations difficult to achieve, but finally an
appeal committee was formed in April 1904. This committee was
responsible for arbitrating in disputes between the organizations
and included two members of the parliamentary party, two
representatives from each of the Liberal and Reform Association
and the People's Reform League, one delegate from the Women's 
7Liberal League
1. D .T , , 1/6/03.
2. D „T ,, 24/1/03, 9/2/03 for lists of places where country
branches were formed. It appointed a country organizer who 
was responsible for forming branches. Albury Banner ,
6/5/04, 13/5/04.
3. D ,T. , 4/7/03.
4. D,T,, 9/4/03.
5. The only actual number available for the membership of the
People's Reform League are those of 1906. Then the League 
had 7244 members D .T ., 19/4/06. An estimate of the Liberal 
and Reform Association numbers at this time would probably 
be 50,000.
6. D.T., 1/6/03, 2/6/03, 3/6/03, 10/8/03, 11/8/03.
7. The Women's Liberal League, which was dominated by its pres­
ident, Mrs. Molyneaux Parkes, espoused similar causes to 
the other Liberal organizations and was particularly active 
in the election of 1904 when women voted for the first time. 
It insisted on maintaining its own independence from the 
other bodies .
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and two leading citizens. On some occa sions members of
branches of both o r ganizatio ns in the same electorate voted
2in the same p r e - s e l e c t i o n  ballot. Several members of the
People 's Reform League, notably Thomas Henley and David Fell,
were elected and became members of the p a r l i a m e n t a r y  Liberal
Party. The People's Reform League remained an independent
or ga niz ation, acted as a critic of the government, p a rticularly
3when Car ruthers introduced the g o v e rnment savings bank bill, 
and ge ne rally continued to r e p resent business interests.
Bas ic ally Carruthers' strategy towards the People's 
Reform League was the same as that of Reid in 1893 towards 
the Fre et rade and Land Reform League. Both were faced by a 
m u l t i - i n t e r e s t  group which was trying to form an independent 
branch  organ i z a t i o n  and which did not want leadership from 
the p a r l i a m e n t a r y  party. In both instances, the leaders 
reacte d to this threat to their independence and electoral 
support by adopting the main parts of the po licy of the rival 
org an i z a t i o n s  and gradually abso rbing them into the 
p a r l i a m e n t a r y  party. The strategy towards these groups was 
very d i f f erent from that which was adopted to the single -interes t 
groups. The mult i - i n t e r  es t o r ganizations did have the electoral 
support to win seats and therefore were a threat to the 
p a r l i a m e n t a r y  repres entatives; the single interest groups did 
not have that support and could be used without threatening 
the exist ence of the party.
In Tasmania only one similar o r g a n i z a t i o n  emerged. In
1902 the Reform League was founded at Burnie . Like the People's
Re for m League in New South Wales it had been formed in imitation
of the Kyabram League in Vi c t o r i a  and de manded a reduction of
the me mbe rs of p a r l iament and a r e t r e n c h m e n t  of g o v e rnment 
4expe ndi ture. In the north of the state it rapidly developed 
and was the first political orga n i z a t i o n  to form a wide ly-based  
series of branches. It was p a r t i c u l a r l y  strong in Launceston, 
but there was also a committee formed in the southern part of 
the island.
1. D .T . , 23/4/04. The two 'citizens' were Want and McMillan.
2. For instance, B u r w o o d , D .T . , 21/5/04.
3. DoT , , 18/10/04, 6/4/05.
4 . M o , 1/1/03 .
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The opposition, led by W.B. Propsting, quickly identified 
itself with the movement. Many sitting members accepted its 
platform and appropriated its popular support. As a result 
the leading members of the opposition were returned with its 
assistance/ The new members who had been endorsed by the 
League became their followers. Therefore as in New South 
Wales, the politicians quickly put themselves at the head of 
an organization which appeared to have such wide electoral 
support that it might threaten their seats or their independence.
The Dependence of Parties on Pressure Groups
The party's attitude to pressure groups did not depend 
on its stage of development as much as on the breadth of 
their support. The party accepted and expected the support 
of local groups for a candidate; it accepted that widely- 
based single-interest groups might dominate particular branches 
and have their nominee selected as party candidate. It did 
not accept the activities of multi-interest groups, particularly 
those who were opposed to M.P.s but espoused similar policies 
as the parliamentary parties. The differentiation between 
groups can be explained by the different effect which groups 
might have on the parliamentary behaviour of its members.
All members were expected to have local connections and 
to represent local interests; as we have seen, the party was 
usually prepared to allow its members freedom of voting
on these matters. Furthermore, it accepted that some of its 
members had connections with external groups on a particular 
issue and might disagree with the party on it; this connection 
was permissable as long as the member remained loyal on most 
other matters. But the party could not accept in parliament 
a group which was united on a series of principles which were 
similar to its own and which might be expected to challenge 
its general position. These groups had to be absorbed into 
the parliamentary party if the latter was to retain its 
independence and unity.
The party depended on groups when it considered them 
useful; if the group was a threat to its independence, the 
party could and did react to reduce its effectiveness.
1 . M . , 2/4/03.
Dependence, particularly in the cases of 
was a matter of convenience to the party 
necessity.
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individual branches, 
and not purely of
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PART I V ; Leadership in the non-Labor Parties and Conclusions
Chapter 12
The Power and Position of the Leader 
in the non-Labor Parties
Introduction
Bailey has argued that in a faction followers were
recruited directly by the leader, that they had no common
ideology and that they only supported the leader in exchange
for particular returns. In a party he claimed that leader
and followers were united by common beliefs. He called the
former type of relationship 'transactional' and the latter
'moral'.  ^ Loveday and Martin have pointed out that in the
faction system in New South Wales some members supported
leaders because of common attitudes and this implied that
the arrangement was not entirely transactional in Bailey's 
2terms. Nevertheless, the faction was still kept together 
by the personal efforts of the leader. He received support 
as an individual and his followers co-operated primarily 
because they were 'his' supporters. It is implied in both 
texts that in a party the leader was supported in his 
capacity as party leader and he had obligations to his 
followers collectively, and not just individually. In 
particular, he had to advocate the principles of the party 
and uphold its symbols. The loyalty was directed to the man 
as holder of a party office rather than as an individual.
When the leader left that office, the loyalty was transferred 
to his successor. There was a distinction between the 
position and the incumbent which became increasingly clear 
between 1890 and 1910.
In the period of faction politics, leaders held the 
factions together by maintaining personal loyalty to themselves. 
They were never obliged to consult their followers; they were 
in a position of undisputed leadership, but they did not have 
total freedom of action. They had to act within the limits 
which, although unstated, were understood, if they were to retain
1. Bailey, Strategems and Spoils , p . 3 9-52 .
2. Loveday and Martin, Parliament, Factions and Parties, p.46-49.
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support. The adherents of modern parties gave support to a 
leader only as long as his actions were consistent with the 
aims of the party or as long as they could not legitimately 
remove him. Since support for a party was more formally 
organized than it was for a faction and since the party developed 
a collective identity, the leader was faced with more constraints 
on his actions than his faction counterpart. Nevertheless, 
he also gained strength from the collective power of the party 
as a distinct entity.
The non-Labor parties were the direct descendetnts of 
the factions and inherited many of their basic assumptions 
about the personal power and independence of the leader. They 
rejected any suggestion that the leader should be restricted 
by explicit rules as the leader of the Labor party w a s /
Gradually a series of informal precedents developed which 
implicitly defined the power of the leader, even though no 
rules were ever formulated. The growth of a party identity 
meant that loyalty was granted to the leader in his capacity 
as party leader rather than as an individual. As a result 
the personal power of the leader became more limited, but his 
potential influence as party leader was more secure , more 
widespread and probably greater. This change in the relation­
ship between the leader and the party can be analysed by 
examining the selection and dismissal of leaders and the 
changing attitude of the party towards the selection of cabinet.
The Selection and Dismissal of Party Leaders
In a faction the leader held his position because of his 
personal ability and because of the resources at his disposal 
for securing support; in a party he was selected by his party 
and was liable to dismissal. The growing acceptance of a
1. The leader of the Labor party was supposed to be no more
than a 'primus inter pares1 . He was responsible to caucus, 
bound by its decision and had to undergo re-election, 
which was usually a ritual, at the beginning of each 
parliament. As chairman, rather than leader, of the 
party, he had no more than an equal voice with other 
party members in making decisions on party strategy.
His scope for action or initiative was carefully 
delineated by formal party rules, even though in 
practice Labor leaders usually had more freedom than 
the rules formally allowed.
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party's right to select leaders was an important indication 
of the development of a collective party identity.
In 1894 Parkes lamented that leaders could now be chosen 
by the parliamentary party and claimed
'a man should become leader by commanding others' 
sympathy by superior acquirements.' 1
The belief that a man should become leader only because of his
personal characteristics was already outdated. By then
parliamentary parties were responsible for the selection of
the leader unless he became party leader by virtue of becoming 
2premier. In 1907 in New South Wales some party members 
believed that even a premier should be selected by his party.
By 1912 in Tasmania the right of a party to elect a leader, 
and even one who was certain to become premier, was well- 
established. In New South Wales four leaders, Lyne, Barton,
Lee and Carruthers, were originally chosen as leaders of the 
opposition by their party. Three men, See, Waddell and Wade, 
became party leader when they accepted a commission to form a 
government. In Tasmania all leaders were chosen by their 
party and in 1894 and after 1909 this selection occurred after 
the party had defeated the government or won an election and 
was about to take office.
The non-Labor parties in New South Wales never actually 
elected leaders by any formal method, but the most acceptable 
candidate for the position usually emerged and possible 
opposition was discouraged by informal methods. In 1895 See 
and Crick were both possible contenders for the leadership but
3refused to oppose Lyne; in 1901 Carruthers, already discredited
by his negotiations with See for a fusion government, refused 
4nomination and in 1902 he was elected unopposed despite rumours
1. S .M .H ., 27/11/94. Leaders in the pre-party period in New
South Wales were only chosen by groups which were not 
factions, e.g., Loveday and Martin, Parliament, Factions 
and Parties , p.161, for example of Stuart in 1882.
2. Parkes himself had been the first leader whose selection was
ratified by a party meeting, (Loveday and Martin. 
Parliament, Factions and Parties, p.146-7,) although this 
interpretation of events has been challenged by Nairn;
The Political Mastery of Sir Henry Parkes, p.24-25.
3. D . T . , 14/8/95.
4 . D „ T . , 17/4/01 .
244
of several other possible candidates.'*’ Other party members 
probably gauged the feeling of the party before deciding 
whether they would stand. The non-Labor parties never had 
any formal rules governing the selection of leaders, but they 
could and did discourage candidates from standing. As the 
party developed a collective identity, its supposed views 
obviously had to be considered. The process of choosing the 
leader was still undemocratic and, in some respects, reminiscent 
of faction politics; the leader effectively emerged and then 
was endorsed by the members of the parliamentary party.
However, unlike the faction leaders, the party leaders were 
not self-selected; the party clearly wielded a veto over the 
choice of leaders, could prevent a man being chosen and had 
to be prepared to support the man who finally emerged. 
Consequently, although all leaders may have been formally 
elected unopposed, they were always chosen with the tacit 
approval of the party, which had often blocked or discouraged 
other possible candidates.
Furthermore, the party also had the capacity to dismiss
a leader , even though it never directly used this power . In
1898 Lyne resigned the leadership of the opposition because
the rank and file members of the party made clear their
belief that Barton had a better chance of uniting the party.
In 1899 Barton resigned in his turn because of dissatisfaction
2among his supporters. In 1902 Lee lost the confidence of 
his party because of his inability to provide energetic 
leadership and, officially on the grounds of ill-health,
3resigned his position. In 1907 Carruthers was distrusted by 
his party and, when faced with obstructive opposition to the
4reshuffling of his cabinet, resigned. In this instance, 
party opposition even caused the downfall of a premier. The 
party never formally moved a vote of no confidence in a 
leader but, just as it could make clear to aspiring leaders 
that they had no chance of winning the leadership, so party
1. D . T . , 18/9/02 , 19/9/02 .
2 . D . T . , 19/7/99 , 17/8/99, 2_4 / 8 / 9 9 .
3 . D . T . , 20/8/02 , 17/9/02, 18/9/02.
4 . D . T . , 1/10/07. For his b-itter comments on this incident,
Random Reflections and Reminiscences, p.62. Carruther s
Papers, Box 14, M.L. MSS. 1638.
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members could indicate to leaders their dissatisfaction with 
them and by informal methods force their resignation. The 
leader in opposition was elected and could effectively be 
dismissed by the parliamentary party.
Three party leaders gained their position because they
became premiers and, before 1907, there was no criticism of
this process. In 1904 Crick and Wise both criticised the
choice of Waddell because they considered they had better
claims to the premiership. They did not deny that the
governor had the right to ask anyone to form a cabinet or
that that nominee should become party leader. When Carruthers
resigned in 1907, he advised the governor to send for Wade
without consulting any of his colleagues.'*’ When Wade faced
his first party meeting after forming a cabinet, he was not
required to undergo any formal process of endorsement, although
Sir James Graham did complain that, as he had had no part in
the selection of the new leader, his relationship with the
2party might be altered. For the first time, the idea that 
a premier automatically became party leader was challenged.
In New South Wales, a member who replaced a party colleague 
as premier was still not selected because he was a party 
leader, although, if a ministry was defeated, the leader of 
the opposition was automatically asked to form a cabinet.
In Tasmania parliamentary groups had elected leaders for 
a long time. In 1879 two leading ministers were discarded by 
their group during coalition proposals in preference for two
3other members of the party. All leaders of the opposition 
after 1882 were selected by party meetings. In April 1894, 
after the defeat of the Dobson government, Braddon was 
invited to form a cabinet. He gave to his party a free choice 
of ministers and in a ballot he defeated Andrew Inglis Clark 
by one vote. A.T. Pdllinger was selected as minister for
1. Random Reflections and Reminiscences, pp.61-2. Carruthers 
Papers , Box 14. M.L. MSS.1638
2 • D .T . , 16/10/07 .
3, M_^ _, 23/10/79 , also J.A. Nockels, Tasmanian Politics and
Factions in the 1870s, p.62.
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Lands and Works in preference to C.B.M. Fenton and the party as
a whole also asked Fysh and More to join the ministry.1 In
May 1894, Lewis was elected leader of the opposition as a
compromise because the two leading party members were personally
2opposed to one another.
In 1903 the remaining supporters of the Lewis government
selected first Patterson and then Evans as party leader. On
the second occasion they also elected by ballot three of their
3number to join Evans on the opposition front benches. In 
July 1904 Evans became premier and most of those he selected 
as colleagues had originally been chosen by the party. Before 
1909 parliamentary parties always elected the leaders of 
the opposition; after 1909 the Liberal parliamentary party 
deliberately selected a leader on the understanding that he 
would form a government.
After the election of 1909 Evans as premier called a
caucus of anti-socialists. After insisting on a discussion of
policy to ensure that the new party had some common principles
on which to operate,he agreed to allow the new party to elect
4a leader by ballot. Lewis defeated Solomon by one vote.
Evans, who had come third in the ballot, then resigned and
advised the governor to send for Lewis. In 1912 Lewis's
leadership of the party came under severe criticism and
consequently he resigned and did not contest the leadership.
Solomon defeated Ewing and then, in his capacity as party
5leader, formed a government. In other words, the party 
selected a leader who took office because he was party leader.
He did not become party leader because he was premier, as 
occurred in New South Wales.
Although the process of party selection of leaders had 
developed further in Tasmania in 1912 than in New South Wales
1. M^, 13/4/94, also C.I. Clark, The Tasmanian Parliament: An
Historical Sketch, pp.65-66. Encel claims that this 
ballot was only held to remove a deadlock between various 
sections of the party. (Cabinet Government in Australia, 
Melbourne 1962, p.122) . I can find no evidence for this 
view and regard the incident, even if exceptional, as part 
of a Tasmanian tradition of party participation in 
leadership selection.
2 . M. , 25/5/94.
3 . M. , 16/3/04.
4 . M. , 9/6/09 .
5 . M. , 5/6/12.
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in 1907, in both states there was a distinct tendency for the 
party to elect leaders and for leaders to hold office only 
so long as they maintained the confidence of their party.
Whereas in 1894 Parkes could be considered as a possible 
governmental leader despite the fact that he was not a party 
leader, in later years only a man who was obviously the 
selection of his party could form a cabinet. The man became 
important in his capacity as a party official rather than as 
an individual.
The Party and the Selection of Cabinet
Although the non-Labor parties had few elected officials 
before 1912, the growing identity of the party can be also 
distinguished in the changing role of the party in the 
formation of cabinets.
No party member had a definite right to cabinet office.
In the non-Labor parties, cabinet members could be chosen as 
the result of political deals, as a means of satisfying 
different parts of the state or even of the party or for many 
other non-party reasons. No non-Labor member argued that 
the party, rather than the leader, had the right to select 
the members of the cabinet. Yet gradually in this period 
the party effectively developed a veto over cabinet selections, 
even though they never had any constructive powers.
In 1894 Reid called a party meeting after he had been 
requested to form a cabinet but before he made any appointments. 
Parkes exclaimed in horror that
it means the Governor's commission is to be dragged 
before some party and its verdict is to be taken as 
to how the commission is to be performed; in other ^
words, the Government is to be constructed by caucus.
Parkes misunderstood the situation, or at least pretended 
to, in order to give himself a reason for attacking Reid. He 
assumed that a party meeting would have some influence in the 
selection of the cabinet and, in doing so, he failed to 
distinguish between the different types of party meetings 
which the Labor and non-Labor parties held. His reaction was 
typical of a faction leader who refused to accept the idea that
1 . S.M.H . , 31/7/94 .
supporters should play any part in the selection of cabinet.'*’
However, neither Reid himself nor his supporters intended
the meeting to restrict the power of the leader. Reid used
the meeting to consolidate his position as leader and to
extract party approval for his acceptance of the commission.
The party identified itself with the future cabinet without
2limiting Reid's choice. Joseph Cook, ex-leader of the 
Labor party, was included in the cabinet, even though he had 
not been present at the party meeting.
In 1898 Lyne's cabinet included representatives of 
supporting groups ; the Bartonites were represented by Wise 
and the 'party of revenge', which had been responsible for 
the defeat of Reid, by Fegan. In this instance the leader 
had to satisfy the various parts of the party to gain their 
support, but there was still no direct evidence of any group 
openly demanding representation in the cabinet.
In 1901 the opposition Liberal party objected to its 
leaders making any coalition proposals without the party 
as a whole being consulted and some of the leading members 
of the party accepted this limitation on their actions. In 
an attempt to form a ministry of 'All the Talents' , See 
approached Carruthers, Garland, Brunker and Ashton. If his 
plans were to be successful, a majority of the old 1 234freetrade' 
party had to follow their leaders. Garland and Carruthers 
were interested in the proposals but, when Reid was consulted, 
he advised
. . . .that whatever may be done should be with the 
approval of the party or at least the leading 
members thereof. 3
4Ashton similarly believed that the party should be consulted. 
When the plans collapsed, Carruthers was accused within the 
party of being personally ambitious and was passed over in 
the party's search for a new leader. Throughout the
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1. For a similar reaction from Parkes at an earlier date, see
Loveday and Martin. Parliament, Factions and Parties,
p . 62 .
2. S .M .H ., 1/8/94.
3. Reid to Carruthers, 10/4/01, Carruthers Papers, Box 25.
M . L . M S S .16 3 8 .
4. Ashton to Carruthers, 6/4/01, Carruthers Papers, Box 25.
M.L. MSS.1638.
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negotiations the government party had remained silent. Its 
members did not openly challenge the right of the premier 
to select ministers, even from the opposition. The opposition 
party, on the other hand, considered that before its members 
took office, the party should at least be consulted.
By 1904 a strong feeling had developed that cabinet
positions should go only to loyal party members. Carruthers
was given a free hand by the party to form the cabinet but,
as soon as rumours of a possible coalition with the Progressives
circulated, he was informed by Brunker and others that such
proposals were unpopular among his own backbenchers and that
it was vital not to offend the backbench members of the party.'*’
If coalition plans did exist, they came to nothing. Generally
the members of the party considered that, as they had worked
loyally for the party cause, they should receive the rewards 
2of office. In 1907 Waddell and Perry were only included in 
a Liberal and Reform cabinet after a party meeting had 
specifically supported the moves for fusion.
In Tasmania the parties developed a similar influence 
over the selection of cabinet ministers; that is, they could 
occasionally prevent choices by leaders without being able 
to direct them in any way. The actual selection of cabinet 
ministers in 1894 by the party was exceptional, although in 
1904 Evans selected his cabinet primarily from those chosen 
by his party colleagues to sit on the opposition front 
benches. When in 1906 he included two opposition members 
in a reshuffled cabinet, he tried to postpone the meeting of 
parliament to allow any antagonisms created within the party
3by these actions to subside. Even though he acted without 
the consent of his party, he still needed party endorsement.
In 1912 the unpopularity of Lewis and Hean, which was 
illustrated by their rejection by the party meeting, ensured
1. Brunker to Carruthers, 13/8/04, Carruthers Papers, Box 25,
M.L. MSS.1638. Reid favoured a coalition but told 
Carruthers that'the solidarity of your own victorious 
brigade is the first consideration'. Reid to Carruthers, 
10/8/04, Carruthers Papers, Box 25, M.L. MSS.1638.
2. Storey, NSWPD , Series 2, Vol.26, p. 23 5 .
3. Governor's Confidential Despatches, 30/6/06. State
Archives of Tasmania.
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that neither could retain office; no one considered accepting 
the independent, Cameron, as a minister because he was not a 
member of their party.
No non-Labor leader could be forced to accept anyone as 
a ministerial colleague, but he might hesitate to make 
appointments which would be unpopular to the party as a whole. 
The fact that an open clash between a leader and the members 
of his party never occurred was probably an indication of the 
leader's awareness of the climate of opinion in the party 
and not of the party's subservience to the leader. In both 
states, ministers were gradually drawn primarily from the 
party's own ranks. The party became the 'gatekeeper''*' to 
cabinet rank and the main channel of advancement for an 
ambitious politician. The personal governments of the faction 
period were replaced by cabinets that were fully identified 
with and approved by the supporting party.
The development of a party structure and the delegation 
of powers of the leader probably created a series of leadership 
cadres at different levels of the party. In 1904 Carruthers 
discussed his selection of cabinet with two leading members
2of the party, although the final decision remained his alone. 
These two M.L.A.s obviously belonged to the core of the party 
leadership. In the electoral organization, party officials, 
and particularly those who had a long record of participation 
in political affairs, almost certainly gained wide influence. 
Some, like Archdale Parkhill, progressed upwards in the ranks 
of party officials and appear to have made politics and
3party organization their career. Others even used their party
4position to advance their own ambitions. However, in both
1. See L.F. Seligman, 'Political Parties and the Recruitment of
Political Leadership' in L.J. Edinger, Political Leadership 
in Industrialised Societies, p.299.
2. D . T . , 29/8/04. Ashton and Moore were both consulted by
Carruthers.
3. See details of the careers of Archdale Parkhill and F.G.
Hanslow in I.R. Campbell, Politics, Parties and Pressure 
Groups, 1900-1905 , M.A. , University of Sydney 1962, 
p p .46-50.
4. Sir James Graham, Vice-President of the Liberal and Reform
Association, regularly, and usually unsuccessfully, tried 
to get himself adopted as candidate for some Liberal 
constituencies.
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states the organization of the Liberal parties was only two 
or three years old at the time when the analysis of events 
in this thesis ends. Therefore there is not sufficient 
evidence to draw any substantial conclusions about the effects 
of the delegation of powers on party organization and on 
leadership trends. The problem, which is an important one, 
must remain unexplored.
Two Illustrations of Political Leadership in New South Wales
As the party identity developed, the party leader in 
New South Wales gained authority because of his party office 
rather than his personality. The increasing influence of 
the office can be seen in various ways. The position of 
party leader became formally recognized in the party 
constitution, even though its powers were usually not defined# 
it also became accepted by the public which saw the leader 
as a symbol of the movement that he represented and as the 
formal source of party policy. Consequently, the position 
of party leader increased in authority, regardless of the 
personality of the incumbent.
However, it is still difficult to discuss the source of 
authority of parliamentary leaders in Weberian t e r m s /  He 
clearly did not have authority of traditional or charismatic 
kinds. He had no authority granted by the rules of the party 
to his office, as the leader of the Labor party had. The 
non-Labor leader depended on informal authority which was 
not defined in any set of rules but which was granted to him 
by precedents and because of his party position. It was a 
quasi-legal 'informal' authority of a kind which Weber's 
classification does not admit. The leader had no sanctions 
with which to enforce his decisions, yet, as the influence of 
the party grew, he could bring some pressure to bear on 
members because of his party position. A leader in the 
early period had to act personally; a leader at a later date 
could be said more accurately to act in the name of the party.
An examination of two party leaders in New South Wales and of 
another two in Tasmania will illustrate how his position 
changed as the party identity developed.
1. For the various types of authority on which a leader depends, 
see M. Weber, 'Politics as a Vocation', in H.H. Gerth and 
C . W . Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology , London
1947 , p . 78-79 -
Before Reid became Premier, his position as leader was 
under consistent challenge. His right to the position was 
never generally accepted, particularly as contradictory rumours 
of the manner of his original election were often current. 
Furthermore, in 1894 the party was also divided over policy; 
Parkes was antagonistic towards Reid and it was predictable 
that, if the election returned a majority of freetraders,
Parkes would make a bid for the party leadership. Consequently 
Reid had to attract support of voters and candidates and at 
the same time keep the confidence of the leading party members 
and particularly of those who had formerly been ministerial 
colleagues of Parkes."*" Since there was no party organization, 
Reid had to carry out these functions primarily by himself 
and he had to maintain a high level of personal loyalty within 
the freetrade ranks.
After the election and the formation of his cabinet,
Reid's position was strengthened. He was not only the 
unchallenged leader of the party, but he also could use 
legislative and administrative powers to maintain his majority. 
His increase in authority was primarily a result of his 
ministerial office, not his party position. In 1895 he still 
continuously had to exert influence to maintain party 
solidarity. Despite the occasional assistance of party 
organization in the elections of 1895 and 1898, Reid as leader 
still had no real limitations on his freedom of action. If 
he dissatisfied any supporters, as he did in 1899 when the 
party of revenge rebelled, they had to leave the party 
because the leadership was the most obvious symbol of the 
party and the party had no independent collective existence. 
Reid's success was based mostly on his ability as an individual 
and partly on his position of premier.
When Carruthers formed the Liberal and Reform Association, 
he deliberately developed a party structure which permitted 
local participation, the formation of a distinct party policy 
and the organization of a widely based branch network. 
Consequently, as the party developed a distinct identity,
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1. See Reid to McMillan 21/3/94, McMillan Papers, M.L. MSS 1885, 
and Reid to Carruthers 8/6/94. Carruthers Papers, Box 14a. 
M.L. MSS. 1638. In the latter letter, Reid promised to 
seek advice from Carruthers on many important occasions.
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loyalty could be directed to the party rather than to the 
leader as an individual. At the same time Carruthers made it 
clear that, within the party, he might not have expected total 
agreement with party policy but he did expect loyalty and 
obedience. Soon after being elected party leader, he declared
I will not, therefore, take the responsibility of 
leadership without its power and authority. I 
wish then all true friends of reform to understand 
that I am prepared to lead in no uncertain way 
upon this question and I ask all who are prepared 
to follow me to enrol under the standard of the 
Liberal and Reform party. If, however, they prefer 
to join any of the existing bodies that course is 
still open to them, but in doing so let it be 
understood that in electoral matters my hands must 
not be fettered by a splitting up of votes through 
the various organizations interfering to push 
forward their friends and so risk defeat thereby.
Let all the associations do their work in propaganda 
for their own cause ,but when the decks are cleared 
for action, let there be but one captain to the 
ship and let the crew work under that captain 
heartily and loyally and not take it each into his 
own head to work as he likes, when he likes and 
for whom he likes. 1
He showed little patience with any criticism of his leadership 
and believed that he alone had the sole right to make decisions 
In 1906 he commented to the Liberal and Reform Association 
Council that
There was a time for people who differed with a 
leader's tactics to discuss them but that time^ 
was not the time of warfare - it was not now.
Reid would never have dared take such a dictatorial stance 
but Carruthers now had the advantage that the loyalty of 
members was directed to the party. As party leader he could 
be deposed if his actions did not suit his supporters, but 
backbench or electoral dissatisfaction with the leader himself 
did not necessarily lead to defection from the party.
Carruthers still had to ensure that he acted within the
limits which his position allowed and in 1905 he was strongly
advised by Wade not to reintroduce the government savings bank
3bill for fear of causing a split within party ranks; even
1. D,T., 22/10/02.
2 * D °T . , 2 4/7/06.
3. Wade to Carruthers, 9/6/05. Carruthers Papers, Box 11. M.L. 
MSS . 1638 .
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the increased authority of a party organization could not 
persuade members to accept a measure to which they objected.
The leader's role of conciliation was one which he could 
never afford to ignore, yet generally the increasing influence 
of the party organization and its growing usefulness as a 
means of securing re-election for members, coupled with the 
fact that Carruthers as party leader in parliament was 
ex-officio president of the Association, added party authority 
to the leader's individual influence. At the same time, the 
organization became responsible for campaign co-ordination and 
maintaining local activity and removed from the leader many 
of the earlier burdens of the faction leaders. In his capacity 
as party leader, Carruthers gained authority from the 
organization, provided he acted within the constraints created 
by the organization and the platform. When Carruthers 
resigned, one correspondent suggested that Wade might have 
problems uniting the party because Carruthers had relied 
primarily on personal appeal.’*" The ease with which Wade 
formed a cabinet showed that the party position was clearly 
more important than personal influence. His followers similarly 
had less freedom of action if they accepted party membership.
By 1907 the leader was primarily effective because of his 
position; personal characteristics might increase his efficiency, 
but they could not in themselves be a source of authority to a 
leader on a wide scale.
Two Illustrations of Political Leadership in Tasmania
The growth in the importance of party office and the 
decline of the influence of the individual as a source of
l
leadership and authority were even more marked in Tasmania 
than in New South Wales. This fact can be illustrated by 
a comparison of the position of Braddon between 1894 and 
1899 and of Lewis between 1909 and 1912. Braddon was elected 
by the group of parliamentarians who had constituted the 
opposition to the Dobson government, but the support given to 
his ministry was not party support because there was no 
consistently identifiable group. Before 1898 Braddon was 
assisted by other able ministers, but after the resignation
1 . D .T . , 1/10/07.
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of Fysh most of the government adm i n i s t r a t i o n  fell on his 
ailing shoulders and the ministry became totally dependent  
on him.'*' When his followers became disaffected, they 
des er te d to the opposition. Al t h o u g h  ori g i n a l l y  based on 
a p a r l i a m e n t a r y  group, the mi n i s t r y  became centred on Braddon 
and there were no restrictions on his actions. His continuance 
in office de pended on his personal influence and his 
a d m i n i st rative efficiency. When these ta l e n t s  failed, he 
lost sup port and office.
Lewis, on the other hand, was never a po pular leader 
after 1909 and held office only because he was party leader.
He was a c o n s e rvative and regarded with suspicion by many 
members of the party. In October 1909 he was forced to 
resign for a short period and in 1912 he was u n c e r e m o n i o u s l y  
di sca rde d by his party. Rumours of d i s c o n t e n t  within the 
cabinet were persistent. Yet, in spite of these tensions 
within the party, he retained the party l e a d ership and 
cons eq ue ntly office from 1909 till 1912. He did not have 
the p e r s o n a l i t y  to dominate the party but r e c eived support 
from many members only on account of his position. The 
a n ti -s ocialist M.H.A.s were united in their desire to retain 
office and to achieve this aim were prepared to remain solid 
even behind an u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  leader. As the events of 
October 1909 illustrated, to reject the leader would mean a 
loss of power. The major difference between the leaders 
was that, when Braddon lost the confidence of his followers, 
he lost office; when Lewis did, he remained in power until 
dis carded by his supporters after the election of 1912, 
because the welfare of the party was too important to be 
jeopa rdi sed by dest r o y i n g  a poor leader. Only his po s i t i o n  as 
party leader allowed him to remain in office.
Co ncl usi ons
Whether the leader held power as an individual or as 
the inc umbent of party office, he always depended on consent 
from his followers to maint a i n  his position. When wr iting 
of the Conservative party in Britain, M c K enzie comments that
1. Gov ernor's Confidential D e s p a t c h e s . 20/10/98. State 
Archives of Tasmania.
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Although there are few formal democratic checks 
on his authority, it is important to note that 
the Conservative Leader achieves office and retains 
power only with the consent of his followers; 
and there is ample precedent for the withdrawal 
of that consent. 1
In the non-Labor parties in Australia, the leader did not
have to consult his followers and he was never formally
answerable to them; yet if he failed to satisfy them, he
might be faced either by desertion or by dismissal. Since
leaders in both states were deposed by the actions of their
supporters, clearly the threat of withdrawal of consent
2could restrict the actions of leaders . The general absence
of clashes between leaders and foilower s was not due to the 
inability of supporters to affect decisions, but to the 
knowledge of leaders that, even if not formally required to 
consult the party, it would be unwise to act without 
informally sounding out the opinion of followers.
In both states the development of party politics had 
two major effects on the power and position of the leader.
In the first place, the leader was faced with more constraints 
on his actions by the growth of a party identity. While the 
actions of the early party leaders were limited only by the 
need to maintain the support of followers, the leader of the 
later parties had to act within the limits prescribed by the 
organization and the adopted platform. Secondly, loyalty 
was directed to the leader as the incumbent of a party position 
rather than to him as an individual . The authority of the 
party, small though it may have been and almost totally lacking 
in sanctions, was added to the personal influence of the leader. 
His authority was never actually defined or regulated but 
clearly existed. Therefore the development of the party 
limited the freedom of action of the leader by developing
constraints on his actions and at the same time increased 
his authority because he demanded loyalty as the party leader 
and not merely as an individual. The support became more 
secure and predictable and therefore increased his political
1. R.T. McKenzie, British Political Parties, p.22. The italics
are McKenzie's .
2. P.Y. Medding, 'A Framework for the Analysis of Power in
Political Parties' , Political Studies, Vol.18, N o .1 ,
March 19 70, p . 11 .
influence and power, despite having apparently the opposite 
effect.
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Chapter 13
CONCLUSIONS
The main object of this thesis has been to describe 
the early non-Labor parties in New South Wales and Tasmania 
and to give an account of the development of their 
organization and identity. Usually non-Labor parties have 
been described in terms which have been drawn from studies 
of the Labor party and they have been compared with the 
Labor party. Their lack of formal rules, their inability to 
force members to obey party decisions with official 
sanctions, their frequent changes of name, their lack of 
organizational continuity and their failure to pursue a 
consistent policy or platform have been contrasted with the 
formal structure, aims and continuity of the Labor party.
It is assumed that the Labor party had the characteristics 
of a modern party and that, compared with it, the early 
non-Labor parties could scarcely be regarded as parties 
at all.
Yet the non-Labor parties were undoubtedly very different 
from the personal factions which they replaced, even if they 
were still unlike the Labor party. In New South Wales in 
1910 the non-Labor parties often elected their leaders, 
held regular party meetings, co-ordinated electoral 
campaigns, became involved in the selection of candidates 
and fulfilled several other roles which the factions had not 
attempted to play. In Tasmania the non-Labor parties 
gradually developed an electoral structure which had 
continuity of existence and which covered all parts of the 
state; they also endorsed candidates, accepted a uniform 
policy, and co-ordinated the efforts of candidates during 
campaigns. None of these aspects of party action had existed 
in the state in earlier years. Obviously the non-Labor 
parties were different from both the Labor party and the 
factions. The problem is that much of the discussion of 
early Australian parties has been conducted by contrasting 
the Labor party to the factions. The lack of formal 
organization of the non-Labor parties was emphasized and they 
were considered to be merely re-constituted and enlarged
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factions, without any important changes in their mode of 
action. Since in this discussion there was no room for a 
third alternative type of organization, the fundamental 
differences between the non-Labor parties and the factions 
have been largely ignored.
What I have tried to do is to suggest a different 
framework within which parties can be studied. My basic 
assumption is that the activities of a party should be 
analysed and not its formal organization, its rules, its 
policy or the social and political functions which it performs 
for society as a whole. These things obviously must be 
discussed, but only after parties have been analysed in 
terms which can be equally applicable to all parties, both 
Labor and non-Labor, and which facilitate comparisons 
between them without being biased towards either one.
I have attempted to do this by considering how groups 
of individuals developed the use of political resources which 
were useful in assisting them to win power. The resources 
which I discussed were things which all parties must use to 
some extent although, as we have seen, the Labor and non- 
Labor parties did not have an equal share of or equal
access to each resource. I have assumed that these resources
->■ •were needed to allow a party to carry out activities which 
led to the attainment of power which, in this context, meant 
ministerial office. For example, the non-Labor parties 
needed organization to co-ordinate their campaigns, ideology 
to develop a unifying and coherent policy and both manpower 
and organization to secure the successful selection of 
candidates by the members of local branches. In parliament 
they managed the votes of M.P.s, developed a party stance on 
political issues and a collective identity. Manpower, 
organization, ideology and leadership were all necessary in 
some part to fulfil these activities. Some of a party's 
activities were developed so that a party could gain resources 
that were required for later activities; for instance, 
candidates were endorsed by the non-Labor parties before an 
election so that, among other things, they would be more 
amenable to party discipline in parliament if they were 
elected.
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I have described how the non-Labor parties actually 
acted and it is in this area that the Labor and non-Labor 
parties might profitably be compared, without prejudice, 
both in one state and in different states. The comparison 
here has been between the non-Labor parties in the two 
states which at this time were as different socially and 
economically as any two states in the federation; the aim 
has been to see whether the non-Labor parties were generally 
alike and to identify differences between them. Since the 
political systems and to some extent the social and 
economic conditions were similar, the non-Labor parties in 
both states had access to similar resources. Although 
there were some differences in the timing of party 
development and in the organizations of the non-Labor 
parties in the two states and although these differences 
were not unimportant, they can be easily explained by the 
levels of industrial development, the sizes of the population 
or the demands of the voting system. What is more important 
is that activities of the non-Labor parties and their use 
of resources were very similar in both states. By 
examining how parties of any type developed their activities 
by use of resources, it is possible to compare them and to 
understand their procedures in a way which would not be 
possible if the analysis concentrated on their formal 
structure or organization.
The process of development of a party was gradual and 
there is no point at which it can be said that a party
suddenly emerged, even though the non-Labor parties 
developed along similar lines in both states. What we can 
say is that by 1912 non-Labor parties which twenty years 
before had been unknown in Tasmania and only in 'embryo' 
in New South Wales, were now securely in existence and in a 
position to control proceedings in parliament and to drive 
most non-party politicians from the political scene.
I will now draw the threads of the earlier discussion 
together and summarise the main aspects of the development 
of the non-Labor parties. In parliament most non-Labor 
members claimed to oppose any organization or procedures 
which could theoretically force them to vote against their
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conscience or could impose formal restraints on their 
actions. Despite these attitudes, the increasingly regular 
party meetings identified the members with the party as a 
collective body and the development of a general anti­
socialist ideology helped to unify the party on a broad 
range of issues. The election of leaders by the party was 
becoming a recognized procedure and the notion that 
promotion to cabinet office came only to party members was 
widely accepted. At the same time the existence of 
distinct groups within the party became less common as 
members identified themselves more fully with the party. 
Loyalty was granted to the leader primarily in his capacity 
as a party official, rather than as an individual. At no 
stage did the non-Labor parties develop any formal proce­
dures by which the activities of their members were regulated 
Instead a series of precedents and generally accepted 
procedures acted as a basis for the development of a 
collective identity. Despite the lack of formal methods 
and of effective sanctions, the non-Labor parties in both 
states were able to maintain a fairly high level of 
cohesion by the end of the period and to win divisions when 
challenged by the opposition. The methods of the non- 
Labor parties and their approach to the use of resources 
may have been different from those of the Labor party, but 
throughout the period they maintained a similar level of 
solidarity to that of the Labor party.
In the electorate the non-Labor parties at first had 
no organizational base of their own on which to found their 
activities. Furthermore, many of the parliamentary members 
of the party had formerly been elected for local, rather 
than party, reasons. In order to increase the party's 
parliamentary strength, the leaders of the non-Labor parties 
expanded their influence wherever possible by co-ordinating 
campaigns, centralising the finance and propaganda of the 
party and forming branches which became part of a co­
ordinated and articulated organization. Instead of trying 
to replace the influences which had previously been 
responsible for the election of members, they tried to adapt 
them to their own advantage. Consequently, they encouraged
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the local selection of candidates so that the appeal of 
local men could be of benefit to the party, they permitted 
the branches to have at least an illusion of influence and 
independence so that the country areas did not appear to be 
dominated by the central executives of the party and they 
allowed other groups to act through them. As the non-Labor 
parties expanded their activities, their legitimacy became 
accepted, their electoral methods became more effective 
and their collective identity became more distinct. Gradually 
the parties developed a sophisticated and co-ordinated party 
structure as a means of formalizing these complex electoral 
relationships. However, this organization served to 
reinforce methods which had already proved to be effective 
and it did not replace any well-established procedures with 
new and untried ones. The electoral methods of the non- 
Labor parties were devised to produce winning candidates 
because they were intended primarily to increase the 
parliamentary strength of the party. Because they were 
adopting existing political processes to new ends and made 
no attempt to carry out large-scale reforms of political 
methods, their development was a gradual process which 
lacked drama and appeared unremarkable by comparison with 
the rapid growth of the Labor party.
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APPENDIX A
Party Strength after Elections
1. New South Wales
Several different versions of the numerical strength 
of parties after elections are available and it is impossible
to argue that one is right to the exclusion of all the
others. Therefore I have tabled the results given in the
following sources
Hughes and Graham A Handbook of Australian Government 
and Politics;
The Legislative Council Consolidated Index (L . C . C . I . )
Evatt
Vol.3, 1894-1913. 
Australian Labour Leader
Rydon and Spann New South Wales Politics, 1901-1910
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2 .____ Realigned Parties in the Session of 1 9 0 3 .
Calculations for the analysis of voting in 1903 were 
based on the following re-aligned parties.
Liberal : Affleck, Ashton, Broughton, Bru n k e r , Carroll,
Carruthers, Clark E., Cohen, Coleman, Davidson,
Dick, Fallick, Ferguson, Fitzpatrick J., Fleming, 
Garland, George, Gilbert, Hawthorne, Haynes, Hogue, 
Hurley J., Jessep, Latimer, Law, Levy, McCoy, 
McKenzie, Mahony, Millard, Moore, Morton, Moxham, 
Newman, N o b b s , Oakes, O'Conner, O'Conor, Phillips, 
Rose, Storey D . , Wood, Winchcombe, Campbell 
(Archibald), Lee, Allen, Howarth, Kearney, Lonsdale, 
Stirton, Terry, Thomas, Wade, Whiddon. (54).
Progressive : Anderson, Barnes, Bennett, Briner, Campbell
(Alexander), Chapman, Clarke H . , Crick, Davis,
Dight, Donaldson, Evans, Fegan, Fitzpatrick T., 
Gillies, Gormly, Hall B., Hays, Hurley W., Kidd, 
Levien, McFarlane, McLaurin, Meagher, MacMahon, 
Nelson, O'Sullivan, Perry, Pyers, Quinn, Reymond, 
Richards, See, Smith J., Smith T., Thomson, Waddell, 
Willis, Wright, Young, (40).
Labor : Burgess, Cann, Charlton, Clara, Dacey, Daley, Edden,
Estell, Griffith A., Hall D., Hollis, Holman, Jones, 
Kelly, McDonald, McDonell, McGowen, MacNeil, Miller, 
Nielsen, Power, Scobie, Storey J., Sullivan, Webster, 
Wi l l i a m s . (26).
Exc1uded - (either they were not in the house during the 
session or because they consistently claimed to be independent 
both in the session and in the election of 1904).
Collins, Far n e l l , McCourt (the Speak e r ) , McIntyre, 
Ross, Smith S., Archer, Byrne, Griffith T.,
Nicolson, Norton, Price, Quirk, Sleath, Walsh. (15).
The total in all categories is 135 because this list includes 
ten members who retired or died during the 1901-4 parliament, 
and the members who replaced them.
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3. Tasmania
The results of elections in Tasmania were always open 
to interpretation before 1909; the figures produced by Hughes 
and Graham are therefore as accurate as any, even though 
still open to dispute. I have therefore made up this table 
mainly from their figures.
Election Tot a 1 Ministeria-
list
L e w i s , e t c .
Oppo sition 
B r a d d o n , 
etc .
Independent Labor
1893 36 17 10 9 -
1897 37 12 201 2 5 -
1900 38 18 9 11 -
1903 35 7 22 3 3
1906 35 16 8 3 8
Liberal Independent Labor
1909 30 18 2 - 12
1912 30 1 5 3 1 14
1913 30 16 - 14
1. Including the Democratic League candidate.
2. Including the Liberal Democrat.
3. Excluding Cameron, who was never endorsed by the Liberal
League and who has been incorrectly classified by 
Hughes and Graham.
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APPENDIX B
Ministries in New South Wales and Tasmania 1
1. New South Wales, 1894-1907
1. Reid Ministry (Free Trade)
3 August 1894 to 13 September 1899.
G .H . Reid
J . N . Brunker
G.B. Simpson, M.L.C.
S. Smith
J.H. Carruthers
J . H . Young
A . J . Gould 
J . Garrard
J . Cook
W .H . Suttor, M.L.C.
Prime Minister; Colonial Treasurer 
(until 3 July 1899); Attorney- 
General (5 April 1898 to 18 June 1898 
and from 19 April 1899) .
Colonial Secretary.
Attorney-General (until 1 Dec. 1894) .
Secretary for Mines and Agriculture 
(until 15 August 1898) .
Secretary for Lands (until 3 July 
1899); Colonial Treasurer (from 3 
July 1899).
Secretary for Public Works (until 
3 July 1899); Secretary for Lands 
(from 3 July 1899).
Minister of Justice (until 15 
Augus t 18 98).
Minister of Public Instruction (until 
15 August 1898); Minister for Labour 
and Industry (11 March 1895 to 
15 August 1898) .
Postmaster-General (until 27 August 
1898); Secretary for Mines and 
Agriculture (from 27 August 1898) .
Vice-President of the Executive 
Council (7 August 1894 to 15 March 
1895) .
J.H. W a n t , M.L.C.
A. Garran, M.L.C.
V . Parkes 
J . A . Hogue
Attorney-General (18 December 1894 
to 4 April 1898 and 18 June 1898 
to 18 April 1899) .
Vice-President of the Executive 
Council (19 March 1895 to 18 November 
1898) .
Postmaster-General (from 27 August 
1898) .
Minister of Public Instruction (from 
27 August 1898); Minister for Labour 
and Industry (from 27 August 1898).
1. From Hughes and Graham. Handbook of Australian Govern­
ment and Polit i c s , p.59-63, p.254-257.
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C .A . Lee Minister of Justice (27 August 1898 
to 3 July 1899); Secretary for Public 
Works (from 3 July 1899) .
J . H u g h e s , M .L .C . Vice-President of the Executive 
Council (from 22 November 1898) ; 
Minister of Justice (from 3 July 1899)
2. Lyne Ministry (Protectionist)
14 September 1899 to 27 March 1901
W .J . Lyne Prime Minister; Vice President of 
the Executive Council (until 15 
September 1899); Colonial Treasurer 
(15 September 1899 to 20 March 1901).
J . See Colonial Secretary.
B .R . Wise Attorney-General
T . H . Has sail Secretary for Lands (until 9 April 
1901).
E .W . 0 1S ul1ivan Secretary for Public Works.
W . H . Wood Minister of Justice (until 9 April 
1901).
J . Perry Minister of Public Instruction, 
Minister for Labour and Industry.
W . P . Crick Postmaster-Genera1 (until 28 February 
1901); Member of Executive Council 
without Portfolio (from 1 March 1901),
J . L . F egan Secretary for Mines and Agriculture 
(until 8 April 1901) .
J.A.K. Mackay, M.L.C. Vice-President of the Executive 
Council (15 September 1899 to 24 
April 1900).
F . B . Su t t o r , M.L.C. Vice-President of the Executive 
Council (from 12 June 1900) .
3. See Ministry (Protectionist)
28 March 1901 to 14 June 1904
J . See Premier, Colonial Secretary.
T. Waddell Colonial Treasurer (from 10 April 
1901).
B . W i s e , M.L.C. Attorney-General; Minister of 
Justice (from 25 July 1901) .
W . P . Crick Secretary for Lands (from 11 April 
1901).
E .W . 0 1S u 11ivan Secretary for Public Works.
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J . Perry
R.G.D. Fitzgerald 
J . Kidd
F .B . Suttor , M .L .C . 
J . Hayes 
W . Bennett
J .L . F egan
J.A.K. Mackay, M.L.C.
Minister of Public Instruction, 
Minister for Labour and Industry.
Minister of Justice (11 April 1901 
to 16 July 1901).
Secretary for Mines and Agriculture 
(from 10 April 1901).
Vice-President of the Executive 
Council (to 23 May 1903).
Member of Executive Council without 
Portfolio (from 11 April 1901).
Member of Executive Council without 
Portfolio (from 16 April 1901).
Member of Executive Council without 
Portfolio (from 24 March 1903).
Vice-President of the Executive 
Council (from 6 June 1903).
4. Waddell Ministry (Protectionist) 
15 June 1904 to 29 August 1904
T . Wadd e 11
E . W . O 'Sul1ivan 
W . Bennett 
J . L . F egan
J . Perry
J.C. Gannon, M.L.C.
J . Kidd
J.A.K. Mackay, M.L.C.
Premier, Colonial Treasurer, Minister 
of J u s t i c e .
Secretary for Lands.
Secretary for Public Works.
Minister of Public Instruction, 
Minister for Labour and Industry.
Colonial Secretary.
Attorney-General.
Secretary for Mines and Agriculture.
Vice-President of the Executive 
C o u n c i l .
5. Carruthers Ministry (Liberal-Reform) 
30 August 1904 to 1 October 1907.
j.H. Carruthers 
J . A . Hogue
C.G. Wade 
S .W . Moore
Premier, Colonial Treasurer.
Colonial Secretary (until 13 May 
1907); Minister of Public 
Instruction, Minister for Labour 
and Industry (from 14 May 1907).
Attorney-General, Minister of Justice.
Secretary for Mines and Agriculture.
Secretary for Lands.J . Ashton
270
C . A . Lee Secretary for Public Works.
B .B . 0'Conor Minister of Public Instruction, 
Minister for Labour and Industry 
(until 13 May 1907).
W .T . Dick Member of Executive Council without 
Portfolio.
J . Hughes Vice-President of the Executive 
Co unci1.
J.N. Brunker, M.L.C. Member of Executive Council without 
Portfolio (from 12 June 1905).
T . W a d d e 11 Colonial Secretary (from 14 May 1907)
6. Wade Ministry (Liberal-Reform)
2 October 1907 to 20 October 1910
C .G . Wade Premier, Attorney General; Minister 
of Justice (until 20 December 1909).
W.H. Wood Colonial Secretary; Minister for 
Labour and Industry (until 21 
January 1908) ; Secretary for Mines 
(from 22 January 1908).
T . W . W a dde11 Colonial Treasurer.
J . Perry Secretary for Mines (until 21 January 
1908); Minister of Agriculture (from 
22 January 1908).
S . W . Moore Secretary for Lands.
C . A . Lee Secretary for Public Works.
J . A . Hogue Minister of Public Instruction; 
Minister for Labour and Industry 
(from 22 January 1908).
J . Hughes Vice-President of the Executive 
Counci1.
C .W . Oakes Member of Executive Council without 
Por t fo1io .
J. Ashton, M.L.C. Member of Executive Council without 
Portfolio (until 25 June 1909).
J. Garland, M.L.C. Minister of Justice, Solicitor- 
General (from 21 December 1909).
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2. Tasmania
1. Dobson Ministry (Conservative)
H . Dobson P r e m i e r .
A. Douglas, M.L.C. Chief Secretary.
N . E . Lewis Attorney-General.
W . Hartnell Minister of Lands and Works.
J . Henry Treasurer, Postmaster-General.
C .H . G r a n t , M.L.C. Member of Executive Council without 
Of f i c e .
2. Braddon Ministry (Liberal)
14 April 1894 to 12 October 1899.
E . N . C . Braddon Premier; Treasurer, Postmaster- 
General (from 1 January 1899) .
W . Moore, M.L.C. Chief Secretary.
Sir P .0. Fysh Treasurer, Postmaster-General (until 
30 December 1898) .
A . I . Clark Attorney-General (until 23 October 
1897) .
A . T . P i 11inger Minister of Lands and Works (until 
6 May 1899).
T . Reibey Member of Executive Council without 
office.
D .C . Urquhar t Attorney-General (from 10 November 
1897) .
E .T . Miles Minister of Lands and Works (10 
May 1899 to 1 October 1899).
3. Lewis Ministry (Conservative)
12 October 1899 to 8 April 1903
N . E . Lewis Premier, Attorney-General.
G . T . Coll i n s , M.L.C. Chief Secretary; Minister for 
Agriculture; Minister administering 
the Defence Act.
B . S . Bird Treasurer; Minister administering 
the Education Act; Postmaster-General 
(until 1 March 1901).
E. Mulcahy Minister for Lands and Works, 
Minister for Mines, Minister for 
Railway s .
F.W. Piesse, M.L.C. Member of Executive Council without 
Office (until May 1901).
4. Propsting Ministry (Libera1-Democrat)
9 April 1903 to 11 July 1904
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W . B . Propsting Premier; Treasurer.
J. McCall Chief Secretary; Minister for 
Agriculture.
H. Nicholls Attorney-General; Minister admini­
stering the Education Act.
C . Lyn e Minister of Lands and Works; Minister 
for Mines; Minister for Railways.
A. M o r r i s b y , M.L.C. Member of Executive Council without 
Office.
5. Evans Ministry (Liberal)
12 July 1904 to 19 June 1909
J .W . Evans Premier; Minister of Education (until 
1 May 1906); Treasurer (10 October 
1905 to 1 May 1906); Chief Secretary 
(from 1 May 1906) .
W . Moor e , M.L.C. Chief Secretary (until 1 May 1906); 
Member of Executive Council without 
Office (1 May 1906 to 26 June 1907).
G .C . Gilmore Attorney-General (until 1 May 1906).
C .L . S tewart Treasurer; Minister for Mines (until 
9 October 1905) .
A . H ean Minister of Lands and Works, Minister 
for Agriculture; Minister for 
Railways; Minister for Mines (from 
10 October 1905) .
D .C . Urquhar t Treasurer (from 1 May 1906) .
W.B. Propsting, M.L.C. Attorney-General (from 1 May 1906); 
Minister for Education (from 9 July 
1906) .
6. Lewis Ministry (Liberal Fusion)
19 June 1909 to 20 October 1909
Sir N .E . Lewis Prem i e r ;Treasurer .
G.H. Butler, M.L.C. Chief Secretary.
A .E . Solomon Attorney-General; Minister for 
Education.
A . Hean Minister of Lands and Works; Minister 
for Agriculture; Minister for Mines.
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J . Hope Member of Executive Council 
without Office.
C . Ru ssen, M -L .C . Member of Executive Council 
without Office.
7. Earle Ministry (Labor)
20 October 1909 to 27 October 1909
J . Earle Premier; Attorney-General; Minister 
for Education.
J .A . J ens en Chief Secretary; Minister for 
Railway s .
J .E . Ogden Tr e a s u r e r .
J . J . Long Minister of Lands and Works, 
Minister for Mines; Minister for 
A g r iculture.
J .W . C h e e k , M .L .C . Member of Executive Council without 
Office.
8. Lewis Ministry (Liberal)
27 October 1909 to 14 June 1912
Sir N .E . Lewis Premier, Treasurer.
G . H . B u t l e r ,M .L . C . Chief Secretary.
A . E . Solomon Attorney-General, Minister for 
Education; Minister for Mines.
A . Hean Minister of Lands and Works, Minister 
for Railways; Minister for 
A g riculture.
C . Rus sen, M .L .C . Member of Executive Council without 
Office.
9. Solomon Ministry (Liberal)
14 June 1912 to 6 April 1914
A . E . Solomon Premier; Attorney-General; Minister 
for Education.
G.H. Butler, M.L.C. Chief Secretary.
H.J.M. Payne Treasurer; Minister for Agriculture; 
Minister for Railways.
E . Mulc ahy Minister of Lands and Works, Minister 
for M i n e s .
C . Rus s e n , M.L.C. Member of Executive Council without 
Office.
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APPENDIX C
Methods Used to Analyse Divisions
1. Rice Index of Cohesion
The Rice Index of Cohesion"*' for a party is calculated
i Y - N !for each division by the formula -— —— — where Y is the 
number of 'yes' votes cast by the party in each division and 
N is the number of 'no' votes. The index established varies 
for 0.0 to 1.00. If one member in a party of ten opposes 
the party, its R.I.C. is .80; if five out of ten oppose, then 
its R.I.C. is 0.0.
2. Index of Party Likeness
2The formula for calculating the index of Party likeness
of two parties voting in the same division is
Ya _ Yb
Ya + Na Yb + Nb
Where Ya = total 'yes' votes cast by party a 
Yb = total 'yes' votes cast by party b 
Na = total 'no' votes cast by party a 
Nb = total 'no' votes cast by party b
If two parties are solid and opposed to one another, 
their I.P.L. is 0.0. If they are solid and voting together 
their I,P.L. is 1.00. If one or both is divided, the I.P.L. 
ranges from 0.0 to 1.00. If both parties are equally divided, 
say, 80-20, their I.P.L. is also 1.00, but these instances 
can be distinguished from those on which the parties are 
solid by inspection of their R.I.C.s.
3. Absenteeism Rates
The absentee rate for a party is calculated by the 
Y + Nformula 1 - ---------- :—  It is simply a direct percentage ofY + N + A b s .
the party which is not present and voting.
1. For further details see Anderson et. al. Legislative Roll-
call A n a l y s i s , p.32-35.
2. See Anderson et. al., Legislative Roll Call A n a l y s i s , p.44-45.
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4. R i c e -B eyle Cluster Analysis
A c l u s t e r - a n a l y s i s  is used to discover the existence of 
groups w i thin a party or parliament. It considers how often 
each po ss i b l e  pair of members agreed in their votes in 
relation to the number of divisions in which each of the 
ind ividuals of a pair both voted together, either agreeing 
or dis agreeing. If two members agreed on five divisions but 
voted together in ten divisions, their agre ement score would 
be 0.50. Blocks of members can be built up by placing  
together on a matrix the high agreement scores of i n t e r ­
related p a i r s .
The divi sions from which these c alculations are made 
can also be divided into two sub-sets at the m e d i a n  R.I.C.
The low subset then includes those divisions in which the 
party more or less evenly split and the 'high cohesion' 
subset includes those divisions in which a few individuals 
only voted against the majority of the party. An exam ination  
of these subsets by a cluster - a n a l y s i s  enables other 
group ing s or instances of dissidence to be identified.
1. For further details see D.B. Truman, The C o n g r e s s i o n a l
Party, p.320-330; A n d e r s o n  et. a 1., L e g i s l a t i v e  Roll Call 
A n a l y s i s , p.59-75; P. Loveday, Gr ouping M.P.s, p.183-188.
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APPENDIX D
Voting in the Legislative Councils of New South Wales
and Tasmania
1. The Legislative Council in New South Wales, 1900-1903
In New South Wales, the votes of members in divisions 
of the council between 1900 and 1903 were analysed. During 
this period the Lyne and See governments were in office and 
only two men, B.R. Wise and R.G.D. Fitzgerald, were nominated 
to the council. There were ninety-one divisions of the 
council in these four years - forty eight in 1900, twenty- 
four in 1901, nine in 1902 and ten in 1903. Of these, 
eighty-one were analysed in a cluster analysis; the 
remaining ten divisions were excluded either because the 
Council almost voted unanimously or because more than 60% 
of the members included in the analysis were absent. A very 
high absentee rate made it necessary to exclude from the 
calculations those members who voted in less than twenty- 
five of the original ninety-one divisions. As a result, 
twenty-seven men were excluded and forty-nine included in 
the calculations.
The cluster analysis indicated the existence of two 
distinct groups who were generally opposed to one another.
One group of twenty-one members consistently supported the 
government's proposals. Nineteen of these men consistently 
had agreement scores among themselves of over 0.90 while the 
other two had scores with this group of over 0.70. The 
government group included all the fourteen appointments of
Lyne in June 1900^ and five men who had been appointed by
2Reid. At least three of the latter group were Labor men 
and the Labor party supported the Lyne and See ministries in 
the assembly. The final two members of the groups were the 
two fringe members and both had been appointed by Dibbs 
in 1892.* 3
1. Black, Earp, Flowers, Hill, Langweil, Meagher, Meeks, Nash,
Robson, Ross, Slattery, Stuart, Suttor, Wise.
2. Backhouse, Buzacott, Hepher, Holborow, Wilson.
3 . D a y , H y a m .
The opposition group of nineteen was less cohesive; 
sixteen of them had agreement scores among themselves of 
over 0.80 and the other three had scores of around 0.70
with this group. Of these nineteen members, thirteen had
1 2 been appointed in 1890 or earlier, two in 1892 by Dibbs
3and the remaining four had been nominated by Reid.
Several members belonged to neither group; three of
4these tended to favour the opposition group , one the 
5government , and the remainder did not vote consistently 
with either side4 *6 .
The two groups were then considered as units and their 
R.I.C.s and an index of party likeness were calculated.
The two opposed each other, (i.e., they had an I.P.L. of 
under 0.20 and at the same time had R.I.C.s of over 0.80) 
on forty-four of the eighty-one divisions. Twenty of these 
divisions were concerned with railway development, twelve 
with the introduction of the female franchise and twelve 
with various industrial matters such as arbitration, early 
closing, shearers' accommodation and miners' wages. 
Furthermore, both groups showed a fairly high level of 
solidarity over all divisions, as is shown in Table I.
TABLE I : The Frequency with which the Government and
Opposition Groups reached different levels of 
cohesion in all divisions, expressed as a 
percentage of all divisions.
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R . I . C . = 1.00 0.80-0.99 0 . 60-0.79 Under 0.60 Total number
of Divisions
Government 56 20 15 9 81
Opposition 53 11 20 16 81
In the light of these findings, how far can it be said
that party voting existed in the council in the same way as
1. Campbell, Charles, Dangar , 
McLaurin, Moses, Norton,
K a t e r , 
Pilcher
K e r r , L e e , 
, R e n w i c k ,
M c I n t o s h , 
W a t s o n .
2. Brown, T.H. Smith.
3. Hawker, Jones, F . J . Smith, W a n t .
4. Vickery, Cullen, Humphries.
5 . H u g h e s .
6. Heydon, Kethel, Creed.
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it did in the assembly? All L y n e 's nominees supported the 
measures of the government. So did those members who were 
identified with the Labor party. Consequently, the 
government party reflected party voting. However, the 
opposition did not. The two members who were most closely 
identified with the opposition Liberal party in the assembly 
did not vote together. Hughes, a future member of 
Carruthers's cabinet in 1904 was favourably inclined towards 
the government group; Want was definitely opposed to it.
Instead of interpreting the voting patterns in the 
council as a reflection of party alignments in the assembly, 
it would appear more reasonable to see the opposition to 
the government's proposal as a conservative reaction to 
'progressive' measures. Most of the members of the 
opposition group had been appointed before 1892 and before 
parties were firmly established. Their views on legislation 
concerning arbitration, early closing and the female 
franchise were likely to be less 'advanced' than those of 
members of the Labor party or of the radical fringes of 
the other parties.
Obviously far more detailed research is required to 
support such a hypothesis, but the voting analysis does 
suggest that, while members appointed by the government 
continued to support its measures, the opposition in the 
council was not yet directly identifiable with the opposition 
in the assembly. By 1904 appointment to the council might 
be recognized as a party action, but the two-party alignment 
of the assembly had not yet been transferred there, even 
though other alignments obviously did exist.
2. The Legislative Council in Tasmania, 1903-1908
In Tasmania divisions in the Legislative Council were 
analysed for the years 1903 to 1908. There were eighteen 
members of the council and in these years five members 
either retired, died or were defeated. In 1903-4, the 
Propsting ministry was in office and finally resigned because 
the council defeated most of its progressive legislation; 
there were twenty-seven divisions in this period. Between
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1904 and 1908, Evans was premier; during these years there 
were fifty-seven divisions. The two sets of divisions were 
analysed separately.
In 1903-4 the cluster analysis indicated the existence 
of two distinct groups. Seven members opposed the 
government's measures and had agreement scores among them­
selves of 0.80 or above'*'; three others were on the fringe 
2of this group . The government was supported by three
members; two of these were elected in early 1904 and
consequently only voted in ten divisions in this set. In
these divisions they voted solidly with one another and with
3the official government representative. Four members
4belonged to neither group . Since the leading member of 
the opposition group, C.E. Davies, was suggested as a 
possible premier if Propsting was defeated, it is clear that 
the members of the council led much of the opposition to 
the radical ministers. In this respect, the alignments of 
the assembly were reflected in the council although, of 
course, no formal party ties existed in the state.
Between 1904 and 1908 the cluster analysis does not 
indicate the existence of distinct groups. A few members 
supported the ministry, but not with any great consistency1 2345  6.
Others fairly regularly opposed it and showed some signs of 
cohesion among themselves, but were not nearly as solid as 
they had been between 1903 and 19045 . Generally no definite 
groups can be found during this period and, as in the 
assembly, there were no distinct party alignment. Since the 
members of the council were elected, rather than nominated, 
their lack of any identification with the government was not 
surprising.
1. C. Davies, Gibson, Butler, Gant, Murdoch, Page, Dean.
2. Collins, Dodery, Grubb.
3. McCracken, Russen, Morrisby (the government representative)
4. Scott, Nicholls, Crosby, Moore.
5. Propsting and Moore were ministers. Russen, McCracken,
Morrisby often supported them.
6. Davies, Dean, Gant, Fisher, Murdoch.
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